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Abstract 
This thesis examines key determining factors influencing bilateral relations between two 
small states that emanate from different regions but continuously interacting in the 
international political system. In doing this, the researcher will focus on Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia (with the emphasis more on the Malaysian side). The main 
reason for choosing Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as the case study is because both 
countries have significant characteristics which they largely share with most of the other 
small states such as the overwhelming dominance of one single political regime and the 
idiosyncratic element that control the administration of these two countries (UMNO party 
for Malaysia and the Al-Saud family for Saudi Arabia), the dependent position (as 
peripheral states) in the international political economy, and also sharing co-ideological 
affiliation of Islam. Upon the employment of the multi-level approach with the 
incorporation of the empirical textuality (see Chapter II), the study has identified four key 
determining factors that largely influence Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. The 
four key determining factors are; the nature of state and regime interest, economic 
determinants, religious affiliation, and the membership in small states' organizations. 
Throughout the discussion, however, the study has found that the four key determining 
factors do not uniformly indicate that the character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi 
Arabia is intimate. Instead, the relations are variable according to the four determining 
factors discussed. The thesis has supplied two main original contributions for the 
development of knowledge in the international relations field. Firstly, the analysis of 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia can be considered as a `pioneering' study, and 
secondly, the employment of the multi-level approach with the incorporation of the 
empirical textuality may encourage other researchers to evaluate any bilateral relations 
between two countries, specifically those originating from different regions. 
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CHAPTER I 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to the Study 
In International Relations studies, interstate relations have long been a core feature of 
world politics. Once a state emerges, it tends to seek relations with other states. Through 
this continuous relationship, a state will be able to consolidate its position in the 
international system. Over the years, a state will further develop a larger network of 
interstate relations, either through war or global co-operation, to build a world of 
civilization, or an empire. ' 
The above phenomenon has been successfully manifested in the Tigris-Euphrates 
and Nile Valleys, the Greek city-states system, old empires and dynasties, to the present 
day. The character of interstate relations, in fact, has been parallel to Aristotle's argument 
that man is by nature a political animal, so he needs to form social groups (these can be 
interpreted as a state, or non-governmental organization) to realize his and others' needs. 
These social groups, although they differ in their nature and scope, reflect the structure 
within the group and the relationship with others, 2 and through the formation of social 
groups and political organizations lead men (and states) to safeguard their interests 
because, as was argued by Jean Jacques Rousseau, in the absence of an organized power, 
it is impossible for men (or states) to live together with even a modicum of peace. 3 
1 Joseph Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
1988), 15. 
2 Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, 12. 
' Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War :A Theoretical Analysis (New York : Columbia 
University Press, 1968), 4-5. 
2 
Various assumptions can be simply made as to why a state has a tendency to 
enhance its relations with others. Among other purposes are to maximize influence 
(power), to secure protection from external threats and challenges, to increase a state's 
wealth, to form regional or international organizations, to practise cultural and religious 
affairs, to resolve some interconnected issues and so forth. The achievement of all these 
ends depends on certain factors such as historical linkages, geographical proximity, the 
nature of state and regime interests, socio-economic necessities, and systemic factors (or 
external environment). 
The interactions of small states'4 or their foreign policies in the international 
system are largely associated with the survival of their own political regimes 
(corresponding to the nature of the state and its capabilities against most powerful- 
developed states). Most researchers, however, have different outlooks on the best 
conceptual approaches to be applied in identifying the significant factors influencing the 
foreign policy or the behaviour of these small states. The overemphasis of the three 
theoretical approaches of International relations, namely Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberal and 
Structuralism on systemic factors, the Foreign Policy Analysis on states' internal 
elements like bureaucratic decision-making (for further explanation see Chapter II), or 
4 The term `small states' here is preferably used to refer to those countries that emanate from, at 
least, three major `undeveloped' regions; Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The usage of `small 
states' is also to differentiate from those superpowers, the US and the former Soviet Union, and 
other major regional powers, namely European states like the UK, France, Germany and Italy, 
China, and Japan as well as those `small states' geographically located both in western and 
eastern Europe, with the exception of the former Federation of Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and others 
which had participated in small states' organizations like the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the character of `small states', other terms like `less 
developed countries', and `Muslim countries' (also part of small states' communities) will be 
interchangeably applied in the case study, especially in Chapter VII. 
3 
the most common approach of using the dominant factor of idiosyncrasies or the 
dependent position (the powerlessness) vis-ä-vis the pressures of systemic environment, 5 
are found to be less than adequate to better understanding of the foreign policy or the 
behaviour of small states in the international system. Therefore, the study believes that a 
multi-level approach (the combination of domestic and international factors) with the 
incorporation of the empirical contextuality of the small states under study (the field to 
obtain the data required), and not depending solely on one approach over another, is the 
most helpful guideline to analysing small states' foreign policies or their behaviour. In 
this case, the researcher would like to apply a multi-level approach with the incorporation 
of empirical contextuality, specifically developed by Gerd Nonneman, 6 to examine the 
character of `Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. The study's preference of using a 
multi-level approach to investigate Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia is to further 
represent a good example (and as a part of the knowledge contribution, especially the 
empirical findings of the case study, to the analysis of the character of small states' 
behaviour) of how the evaluation of both domestic and international factors, and also the 
question of small states' autonomy in shaping their own foreign policies, is essential to 
'See for instance, Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, "The Foreign Policies of the Global South 
: An Introduction" in Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (ed. ), The Foreign Policies of the 
Global South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 
9 (for idiosyncracies), Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy : U. S. and Comparative Foreignn 
Policy in the 2151 Century (Boulder : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 21-22 (for 
Marxism/Structuralism's dependency), Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Foreign Policy in Dependent States", 
in Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey & Patrick J. Haney (ed. ), Foreign Policy Analysis : Continuity 
and Change in Its Second Generation (New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 1995), 201-213, and see also 
Chapter II. 
6 See Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa :A 
Conceptual Framework", in Gerd Nonneman (ed. ), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies 
(London : Routledge, 2005), and see also the sub-topic "Conceptual Framework for the Case 
Study" in the Chapter II. 
4 
understand the foreign policy or the behaviour of a small state in the international 
political system. 
Besides that, the main reason for choosing `Malaysia's relations with Saudi 
Arabia' as the case study is because both countries have significant characteristics which 
they largely share with most of the other small states. This could indirectly give 
alternative answers to the analysis of small states' foreign policies or their behaviour, and 
also to some extent, it is parallel with the application of the multi-level conceptual 
approach suggested. Among the characteristics are the overwhelming dominance of one 
single political regime and the idiosyncractic element (as has been mentioned before 
about the role of idiosyncrasy in small states)7 that control the administration of these 
two countries (UMNO party for Malaysia and the Al-Saud family for Saudi Arabia). The 
dominant position of the political regimes in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia is one of the key 
determining factors in shaping both countries' foreign policies and behaviour that 
certainly cannot be ignored, particularly for the Malaysian political regime which makes 
efforts to strengthen relations with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
are among the peripheral states that are also dependent in the world economic system. 
However, in probable contrast to other poorer small states (mostly in the African 
continent), the level of their dependency upon the core states (developed-industrial 
countries) does not impede their achievement of continuous economic development. Both 
countries, instead, are mutually engaging with other developed-powerful countries in the 
international economic system even though, to some extent, it indirectly drives them to 
concentrate less on their bilateral economic co-operation, especially for the Malaysian 
7 See note 5 in the Chapter I. 
5 
government which has economic disadvantages compared with the Kingdom (sce 
Chapter V). Furthermore, more importantly, both countries are Muslim states that share 
co-ideological affiliation, Islam. As they are co-religionist, the study presumes that the 
degree of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia is more intimate than other relations. 
Without denying the level of `religious intimacy' between these two countries, however, 
both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have used religion for the survival and the maintenance 
of their political regimes both at home and the international level. By cementing the 
relationship, despite the dominance of Wahhabism ideology, the Malaysian government 
in particular can continuously receive Saudi Arabia's capital donations to develop its 
Islamic infrastructure in order to fulfil the Malaysian Muslim community's needs. For the 
Saudi regime too, through its global Islamic donation, this would enable the Kingdom to 
further consolidate its position as one of the Islamic leading nations in the Muslim-Arab 
world. Roughly, based upon a few similarities that both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have, 
this study to some extent also presupposes that the level of their relations is close. 
The researcher, however, will give more focus to Malaysia because accessibility 
to data and information is easier than for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This will not 
hinder the discussion of the thesis because it will give an opportunity for the researcher to 
investigate the nature of the relations from a Malaysian viewpoint. Besides that, the 
period of the relations that will be analyzed is from 1957 (Malaysia's independence) to 
the 1990s. Yet, the pre-1957 period will also be discussed to historically track down the 
relations. 
6 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
Most researchers find some difficulty in analyzing small states' foreign policies or their 
behaviour in the international system. This is largely due to the existing conceptual 
frameworks which give more emphasis to one single factor over others, such as the 
overwhelming dominant domestic factors over the systemic environment. Hence, this is 
among the main objectives of this study, to provide an alternative conceptual framework 
to understand better the foreign policies or the behaviour of small states towards other 
states or events in the international system. Based upon Gerd Nonnemen's conceptual 
approach, `the multi-level approach with empirical contextuality', the study will apply 
this approach (with some modifications to suit to the case study's empirical contextuality, 
see Chapter II) to examine Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. By using this 
approach, the study is able to identify, at least four key determining factors that, to some 
extent, influence the character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. The four key 
determining factors that will be analyzed in this thesis are (as has been indicated in 
Chapter II): the nature of state and regime interests, economic determinants and religious 
affiliation (domestic factor), and the membership of a few small states' organizations 
(systemic or international factor). 
Before discussing further the four key determining factors above, the study 
however, will trace historically the ancient interactions between the Malay Peninsula and 
the Arabian Peninsula (the territories which later formed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 
that might have occurred prior to the emergence of both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as 
modern states in the international system. Probably the best starting point to this 
7 
discussion is the establishment of the Malacca Sultanate in the 15`h century because 
during this period Malacca became well-known for its commercial trading centre as well 
as Islamic religious development, especially in the Malay Archipelago. The tracking 
down of the ancient interactions between both political entities (Malay Peninsula and 
Arabian Peninsula) will provide the initial foundation (historical background) for the case 
study of this thesis. This will be followed by the analysis of the four key determining 
factors influencing Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. The first is the nature of state 
and regime interest; the study will attempt to relate the significance of the relations for 
the regime maintenance of both political regimes, especially for the Malaysian political 
regime, the Barisan Nasional-led by UMNO. The discussion will be based primarily upon 
the leadership period of both countries (with more emphasis on Malaysia). For the 
second, economic determinants, the researcher will try to focus on three major economic 
aspects: the economic background, the character of economic activities (mainly the need 
for Malaysia to import Saudi oil for its main domestic energy source) and the influence of 
the international economic system, which largely affects the pattern of Malaysia's 
economic relations with Saudi Arabia in the world economic system. Based upon early 
economic interactions and the fact that they have been co-religionist for a long period of 
time, the study presumes that Malaysia's economic relations with the Kingdom will be 
encouraging. 
The third subject of analysis is religious affiliation. Since Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia have realized the importance of portraying religious commitment, both countries, 
but especially Malaysia, have used religion as the main tool to soothe the Islamic 
8 
pressures, locally and internationally (see for instance Chapter IV and VI). Malaysia 
needs to safeguard its relations with the Kingdom (despite the dominance of Wahhabism 
which is different to the practice of the Malaysian Muslim community) to enable it to 
continuously receive the Kingdom's capital donation for the development of its Islamic 
infrastructure. Whereas, for the Saudi government, its capital donation to Malaysia can be 
considered as part of the Kingdom's global financial assistance to other Muslim 
counterparts in order to justify its position as one of the leading Islamic countries in the 
Muslim Arab world. Fourthly, the membership of small states' organizations: the study 
will look into the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the three major small 
states' organizations, namely NAM, G-77 and the OIC as a `shield' against systemic 
pressures. The analysis will concentrate on how the participation of Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia in these organizations can safeguard both countries' interests vis-ä-vis systemic 
pressures and in what manner it will shape the degree of their relations in the 
international system. 
1.3 Research Approach and Methods 
The background of the research approach is based upon the discussion of major 
conceptual frameworks on the foreign policy or the behaviour of states, as well as the 
pattern of small states' relations in the international system. There are at least three major 
theoretical perspectives of International Relations, namely Realist, Liberal and Marxist or 
Structural schools that researchers attempt to link with the analysis of foreign policy or 
behaviour of states. However, due to the emphasis of these theoretical perspectives (with 
the exception of traditional realist, specifically with reference to Hans Morgenthau, 
9 
which emphasizes the maximization of power as an end itself) on the systemic factor, this 
approach is less adequate for explaining states' policies or their behaviour. Besides that, 
the other approach of foreign policy, which is known as the Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA), where it stresses the internal elements of a state like the bureaucratic or officials' 
decision-making process, in some ways has indirectly ignored other factors, including 
systemic environment which is also vital in affecting the policies or the behaviour of 
states in the international political system. 
Meanwhile, by analyzing some work carried out by a few researchers on small 
states' policies or relations, including both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's interactions with 
other states, the study has found that these researchers have a tendency (probably because 
of the nature or the scope of the research) to focus on only one or two determining factors 
that influence those particular states' policies or behaviour. These include, for instance, 
Samuel C. Y. Ku8 and Ganganath Jha9 who concentrated on political and economic 
factors, and added with the pressure of regional actors like China and India in the 
Southeast and South Asian context; J. A. Allan and Chibli Mallat, Mostafa Dolatyar and 
Tim Gray, and Helga Haftendron10 (Middle East regional water issue); Ronald A. Morse, 
8 See for example, Samuel C. Y. Ku, "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with 
Malaysia : Opportunities and Challenges", Journal of Asian and African Studies 35 (1) 2000, 
133-157. 
9 Ganganath Jha, "A Brief Survey of India-Indonesia Relations", Contemporary Southeast Asia 
17 (4) March 1996,389-405. 
10 See J. A. Allan and Chibli Mallat, "Preface" in J. A. Allan and Chibli Mallat (ed. ), Water in the 
Middle East : Legal, Political and Commercial Implications (London : Tauris Academic Studies, 
1995), 15, Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East :A Context for 
Conflict or Co-operation? (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), 111,133-134 & 195-202, and 
Helga Haftendorn, "Water and International Conflict" paper presented at the Environmental and 
National Security Panel, (Washington : International Studies Association Convention, 16-20 
February 1999), 14-15. 
10 
Harold C. Hinton, and Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak11 (referring to the character of 
small states' relations with the great powers - mainly on security issues and hegemonic 
influence). Christopher Clapham, 12 Gwyneth Williams, 13 Philippe Braillard & 
Mohammad-Reza Djalili14 analyze the membership of small or developing states' in 
several organizations, particularly the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77 
against systemic pressures. Also there is overemphasis on the role of idiosyncrasies in 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's foreign policies by a few researchers such as In-Won 
Hong, 15 R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, 16 Marvin C. Ott, 17 Khoo Boo Teik, 18 (for 
Malaysia), and Fouad Al-Farsy, 19 Dr. Nasser Ibrahim Rashid & Dr. Esber Ibrahim 
11 See for instance, the works of Ronald A. Morse, Harold C. Hinton, and Seung-Ho Joo and Tae- 
Hwan Kwak who clearly indicate how the issue of regional security and stability enhance US- 
Japan, US-Korean and Russia-North Korean relations respectively. Ronald A. Morse also views 
economy as the vital element in US-Japan relations. Ronald A. Morse, "Introduction" in Ronald 
A. Morse (ed. ), U. S. - Japan Relations : An Agenda for the Future (Lanham, New York : Pacific Forum University Press of America Inc., 1989), vii-viii, Harold C. Hinton, "The U. S. - Korean Relationship : An American Perspective" in Harold C. Hinton, Donald Zagoria, Jung Ha Lee, 
Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Chung Min Lee and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (cd. ), The U. S. -Korean 
Security Relationship : Prospects and Challenges for the 1990s (Washington : Pergamon- 
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988), 1-15, Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan 
Kwak, "Military Relations Between Russia and North Korea" The Journal of East Asian Affairs 
xv (2) Fall/Winter 2001,297-323. 
12 Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics : An Introduction (Wisconsin : The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985). 
13 Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization :A Review of Developments (London : 
The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981). 
1° Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations 
(Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986). 
" In-Won Hong, Personalized Politics : The Malaysian State under Mahathir (Singapore 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). 
16 R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, 16 Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London : Routledge, 
1999). 
17 Marvin C. Ott, "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia", Asian Survey 12 March 1972,225- 
239. 
16 Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism : An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir 
Mohammad (Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1995). 
19 Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia :A Case Study in Development (London : Kegan Paul 
International, 1986), pp. 70-95 (under the sub-title : "The Polity and Organization of the 
Kingdom"). 
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Shaheen, 20 Leslie McLoughlin'21 Sarah Yizraeli22 R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz & Lewis 
W. Snider, 23 (for Saudi Arabia), and others (with the exception of a few others, see 
Chapter II). The researcher does not argue with the significance of those factors discussed 
above (ranging from idiosyncracies to systemic factors) but in the case of Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia, the study believes that a multi-level approach (the 
combination of domestic and systemic factors), not a separable discussion of those 
factors, with the incorporation of empirical contextuality of the case study, needs to be 
applied in order to understand better the character of the relationship (the researcher's 
case study). Hence, the study of Gerd Nonneman's multi-level approach (for further 
explanation see Chapter II) with the observation of the pattern of small states' relations 
and in parallel with the case study `Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia', the 
researcher is able to identify four key determining factors influencing the character of 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, and these factors will be further elaborated in 
Chapter II. 
In examining both the background of the conceptual framework and the case 
study the researcher has concentrated on documentary analysis and fieldwork methods. 
20 Dr. Nasser Ibrahim Rashid & Dr. Esber Ibrahim Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War 
(Joplin, Missouri : International Institute of Technology, Inc., 1992), Chapter 1 (Brief History of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). 
21 Leslie McLoughlin, 21 Ibn Saud : Founder of a Kingdom (Hampshire : The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1993), pp. 103-123 (the early establishment of Saudi Arabia). 
22 Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia : The Struggle Between King Sa'ud and Crown 
Prince Faysal, 1953-1962 (Tel Aviv : Tel Aviv University, 1997), Sarah Yizareli examined the 
tussle leadership between King Sa'ud and King Faysal in shaping Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy, 
which was considered as the facet of national security for Al-saud family. 
23 R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz & Lewis W. Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy : Issues and 
Processes (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1982), see Chapter 6 of this book "Saudi Foreign 
Policymaking", particularly pages 195-205. 
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The term documentary analysis does not only refer to `library-based reading' or 
secondary data but also includes the archives and governmental written documents 
(primary data). Meanwhile the fieldwork activity involves interviews with a few related 
individual figures. The justification of this method is due to the character of this thesis 
which is qualitative-oriented, necessitating the interpretation of data (adopted from the 
documentary analysis and fieldwork) to support the researcher's conceptualization of 
some basic concepts, as well as establishing several variables that are to be examined for 
the case study and also to evaluate (interpret) some charts and statistical indicators (like 
economic information) to further strengthen the researcher's arguments. 
The documentary analysis has been divided into two major literature reviews. 
Firstly, the previous studies on conceptual framework - the theoretical perspectives of 
International Relations on foreign policies, the discipline of foreign policy analysis 
(FPA), and some major discussions on the pattern of small states' relations have been 
examined. For this part (which is discussed in the Chapter II), the researcher has 
reviewed some works by well-known researchers (as an exemplar) including Jacqueline 
Anne Braveboy-Wagner & Michael T. Snarr, Laura Neack, Gerd Nonneman, K. J. Holsti, 
K. N. Watlz, Scott Burchill & Andrew Linklater with Richard Deretak, Matthew Paterson 
& Jacqui True, Laura Neack, Walter Carlsnaes, Jeanne A. K. Hey, J. David Singer, 
Bahgat Korany, Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck & Burton Sapin, Graham T. Allison, 
Brian White, Charles W. Kegley, Jr & Eugene R. Wittkopf, Michael Brecher, Blema 
Steinberg & Janice Stein, Steve Smith, and others. 
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Secondly, literature has been reviewed for Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. 
Since this topic has been less well-studied, or can be regarded as `a pioneering study', 
there are some difficulties in obtaining materials (based on previous researchers) that 
exactly concentrate on these bilateral relations. Nevertheless, there are some references 
that are very helpful in forming a few basic connotations in regards to Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia, like the works carried out by Wan Mohd. Wan Musa, 24 
Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, 25 Dari'ah Sulaiman'26 J. B. Dalton'27 Dato' Abdullah 
Ahmad'28 Mohammad Redzuan Othman'29 and others. But all these works are insufficient 
to give a clear picture of the character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. In 
24 Wan Mohd. Wan Musa's thesis is an undergraduate study and he focused on Malaysia's foreign 
policy with Arab countries without specifically addressing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wan 
Mohd. Wan Musa, "Dasar Luar Malaysia Dengan Negara-Negara Arab (1957-1980) : Dari 
Perspektif Malaysia" (Malaysia's Foreign Relations with Arab Countries (1957-1980) : 
Malaysia's Perspective), Latihan Ilmiah (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
1985/1986). 
25 Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli's work, also an undergraduate study and not particularly focussed 
on Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. Instead, she analyzed historical interaction between 
Malaysia and Arab countries. Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-Asia 
Barat Sehingga 1985" (Historical Relations of Malaysia-Middle East till 1985), Latihan Ilmiah 
(Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1991/92). 
26 Dari'ah Sulaiman's thesis (undergraduate level), however, is on the role of Arabs in spreading 
Islam in Malacca in the 15`h-16`h centuries. Dari'ah Sulaiman, "Peranan Orang Arab Dalam 
Menyebarkan Agama Islam di Melaka Pada Abad 15M dan 16M", (The Role of Arab People in 
Spreading Islam in Malacca during the 15`h-16`h centuries), Latihan Ilmiah (Kuala Lumpur 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993/94). 
27 J. B. Dalton did not examine Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, however he helped in 
giving some views on Malaysia's external relations with the Middle East, especially with Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia (but only in brief). J. B. Dalton, "The Development of Malayan External Policy, 
1957-1963", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Oxford : University of Oxford, 1967). 
28 Dato Abdullah only gives a brief outline of Malaysia's foreign policy with some Middle East 
countries, mainly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, "Tengku Abdul Rahman and 
Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1963-1970", Unpublished Thesis (Degree of M. Litt) (Cambridge 
University of Cambridge, 1984). 
29 Mohammad Redzuan Othman's thesis is only an historical analysis on the Middle Eastern 
influence upon Malay society in the period 1880 to 1940, and it does not cover the period of post- 
Malayan independence in 1957 and onwards. In this study, however, he refers the term, `Middle 
East' to three major modern entities, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (see page 17). Mohammad 
Redzuan Othman, "The Middle Eastern Influence on the Development of Religious and Political 
Thought in Malay Society, 1880-1940", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Edinburgh : The University 
of Edinburgh, 1994). 
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rectifying this matter, the study has classified the literature reviews on Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia into two main categories; historical, and practical (referring 
to the governmental reports, archives and several previous studies on a few related 
issues). 
In historical relations, several works (as an example, see Chapter III) have been 
evaluated such as Armando Cortesao, 30 Barbara W. Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, 31 
David R. Hughes, 32 G. R. Tibbets, 33 Mahayudin Haji Yahya, 34 Marshall G. S. Hodgson '35 
David Bulbeck & co, 36 Anthony Reid, 37 and Fred R. Von Der Mehden, 38. These works 
have provided significant facts about ancient interactions between the Malay Peninsula 
(Malaysia) and the Arabian Peninsula (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) prior to the 
emergence of both countries as modern states in the international system. Furthermore, 
for the practical part, the researcher has successfully managed to obtain some valuable 
governmental written documents from archives or government agencies to assess the 
Y' Armando Cotesao (trans. ), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires : An Account of the East, From 
the Red Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515 vol. II, series II (London : The 
Hakluyt Society, 1944). 
3' Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (London : Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd., 1982). 
32 David R. Hughes, The Peoples of Malaya (Singapore : Eastern Universities Press Ltd., 1965). 
33 G. R. Tibbets, "Early Muslim Traders in South East Asia", Journal of the Malaysian Branch of 
the Royal Society 30 1957,1-45. 
34 Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 
2001). 
35 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam : Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization, Volume Two, The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods (Chicago : The 
University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
36 David Bulbeck, Anthony Reid Lay Cheng Tan, and Yiqi Wu (compiled), Southeast Asian 
Exports Since the 14" Century : Cloves, Pepper, Coffee, and Sugar (Leiden, the Netherlands 
KITLV Press, 1998). 
3' Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, Vol. Two, Expansion and 
Crisis (New Haven, London : Yale University Press, 1993). 
3' Fred R. Von Der Mehden, Two World of Islam : Interaction Between Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East (Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 1993). 
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practical conduct of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia in the fields in which both 
countries have regularly interacted. In other words, all the documentary data of this thesis 
have been taken from various sources, like printed documents from government and 
private institutions, books, journals, magazines, newspapers, and some relevant websites. 
Besides that, for the fieldwork activity, the researcher has conducted interviews with 
some government officials, both in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (particularly the Embassy 
of Malaysia in Riyadh), and also had informal discussions with other related individuals. 
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter I discusses the introduction of the 
study which includes the main issue that will be analyzed, the objectives, the research 
approach and methods, and the structure of the thesis. Chapter II focuses on the 
conceptual framework of this thesis. Chapter III is the tracking down of the historical 
interaction between Malaysia (Malay Peninsula) and Saudi Arabia (Arabian Peninsula) as 
early as the 15`h century during the Malacca Sultanate, through the British administration 
in Malaya and to the early independence of Malaya in 1957. This ancient relationship 
will be taken up in greater detail, especially within the scope of the nature of state and 
regime interests, economic and religious interactions, and the influence of systemic 
factors upon the character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia since the former 
gained independence in 1957. 
Chapter IV analyzes the role of the nature of the interests of the states and 
regimes, especially from the Malaysian political regime's point of view, in strengthening 
16 
the relations. Chapter V critically investigates Malaysia's economic interaction with the 
Kingdom. This chapter discusses three major economic determinants in order to explain 
the character of the economic relations. These determinants are the economic 
background, the character of economic activities and the influence of the international 
economic system upon Malaysia's economic relations with Saudi Arabia. Chapter VI 
pinpoints the religious affiliation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia: both countries consider 
the use of `religion' as the main tool to maintain the survival of their own political 
regimes. Although Malaysia realizes the possible influence of the Wahhabism ideology in 
Saudi Arabia, which is different from the practice of the Malaysian Muslim community, 
through a wise approach towards the ideology the Malaysian political regime is able to 
safeguard its relations with the Al-Saud family. Indirectly, this will help the Malaysian 
government to continuously receive the Kingdom's donations which are vital for the 
development of Islamic programmes in order to suppress Islamic pressures at home. 
Meanwhile, the Saudi government's generosity to Malaysia is, in fact, part of its global 
Islamic donations to show the Muslim world its commitment to supporting any religious 
(Islamic) necessities. By continuously donating the Kingdom's capital, it will consolidate 
its position among its Arab-Muslim counterparts. Chapter VII touches on the membership 
of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia of the three major smaller states' organizations as their 
reactions towards the pressures or challenges of the systemic environment. The 
organizations are NAM, G-77 and the OIC. The participation of both Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia in these three organizations is generally viewed as a way for them to safeguard 
their interests against any outside pressures and challenges in the international system. 
The chapter also attempts to examine how far membership will help to strengthen their 
17 
relations. Chapter VIII is the conclusion of this thesis. It reveals the research findings of 
the overall discussion of the thesis: the conceptual building of the multi-level approach 
with the incorporation of empirical contextuality and the application of its variables or 
key determining factors upon Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. 
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CHAPTER II 
2.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK : FOREIGN POLICY AND 
SMALL STATES' INTERACTIONS 
The difficulty of analyzing the pattern of behaviour or the foreign policies of small states 
in the international system has been commonly realized by researchers. This is largely 
due to the massive diversity of the characteristics of small states which represent almost 
two-third of all states in the global political system. 39 The small states, which are 
geographically located in the Asian, Latin America and African continents, are not only 
distinct in language, culture, religion, but also in their type of political-institutional 
system of government. The variety of small states' characteristics has caused some 
problems for researchers in providing a conceptual framework which is able to 
reasonably define the behaviour or the foreign polices of the small states. The 
researcher's case study, `Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia' shows that both 
countries, in some aspects, share a few similarities such as the co-affiliation of Islam, 
being dependent or peripheral states in the international economic system despite 
managing to mutually engage with the pressure of the global economy. Other similarities 
are the overwhelming dominance of one political regime or leadership in the state 
administration (UMNO party for Malaysia, and Al-Saud family for Saudi Arabia), and 
having closer ties with the US-British bloc. These factors may make it possible to give 
alternative answer to some major questions on the foreign policies of, and relations 
between small states (that do not form part of the same region in particular), especially on 
39 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, "The Foreign Policies of the Global South : An 
Introduction" in Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (ed. ), The Foreign Policies of the Global 
South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 1. 
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the key determining factors influencing their policies or behaviour. Most of the studies on 
small states are mainly focused on the supremacy of idiosyncrasies 40 or the absolute 
dependence or powerlessness of these states against the challenges of the systemic 
environment. 41 Besides that, as has been mentioned before, since both countries share a 
few similarities, the study assumes that the degree of Malaysia's relations with Saudi 
Arabia is intimately closer. Before discussing the character and the key determining 
factors influencing Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, the study would like to point 
out a few major conceptual frameworks that attempt to explain the foreign policy or the 
behaviour of states, including small states, in the international system. 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives of International Relations 
In general, there are at least three major theoretical perspectives of International 
Relations which may underlie a state's foreign policy or its behaviour towards others. 
The first is the Realist school which emphasizes the maximization of power as an end in 
itself that must be pursued by a state (as a monolithic actor) in order to survive in the 
world of anarchy as well as to eliminate its enemies. 42 This school then was further 
40 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, "The Foreign Policies of the Global South : An 
Introduction" in Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (ed. ), The Foreign Policies of the Global 
South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 9. 
41 The dependency or the powerlessness of small states in the international political-economic 
system is generally associated with the Marxism or Structuralism school. See for instance, Laura 
Neack, The New Foreign Policy : U. S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 2151 Century 
(Boulder : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 21-22, see also Jacqueline Anne 
Braveboy-Wagner, "The Foreign Policies of the Global South : An Introduction", 8 
42 Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa :A 
Conceptual Framework", in Gerd Nonneman (ed. ), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies 
(London : Routledge, 2005), 7, K. J. Holsti, Change in the International System : Essays on the 
Theory and Practice of International Relations (Aldershot, Hants : Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 1991), 195-196. For further details on Realism, see for instance, John Baylis & Steve 
Smith, The Globalization of World Politics : An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 161-183. 
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developed or called `Neo-Realist', by the work of Kenneth N. Waltz who strongly 
believed that states' behaviour is predominantly influenced by the structure of the 
international system. 3 The second is the Liberal school or Neo-Liberal Institutionalism 
which stresses the high prospect of co-operation among states (and also non-state actors) 
in the anarchical world. This school argued that states and non-state actors are not living 
in a constant struggle for domination over others but live in harmony and respect towards 
each other. This harmony situation, probably, has paved the way for the creation of 
several institutions like the European Union that are able to transcend the sovereignty of 
states as an early step to building an `international society' based upon the respect of 
individual rights and the service of the collective good. 44 The third is the Marxist school 
or `Structuralism' which tries to define the foreign policy or the behaviour of small states 
within the context of the exploitation of the core states (industrially-developed states) 
towards peripheral states (small and developing states), especially in the international 
political economy. These peripheral states or `dependencies' are economically dependent 
on core states so that the former are inevitably forced to align with the latter. The unequal 
relations have led small states into an inferior position in the international system, and 
43 K. N. Watlz posed a question on why states exhibit similar foreign policy behaviour despite 
their different political systems and contrasting ideologies. He argued that this can be associated 
with the systemic constraints (specifically during the bipolar era) on each state rather than their 
internal composition. Scott Burchill & Andrew Linklater with Richard Deretak, Matthew 
Paterson & Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (New York : Palgrave, 2001), 85-87, 
see also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought & Neorealist Theory", Journal of International 
Affairs 44 1990,21-37, Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy : U. S. and Comparative Foreign 
Policy in the 21st Century (Boulder : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 19-20. 
" Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy, 20-21, Walter Carlsnaes, "On the Study of Foreign 
Policy", to be published in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Riise & Beth Simmons (ed. ), Handbook of 
International Relations (London : Sage Publications, 2002), 9, John Baylis & Steve Smith, The 
Globalization of World Politics, 185-203. 
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consequently provide no `autonomy' for the leaders of small states to design their own 
policies towards other states or to react to any external environment. 45 
These three theoretical approaches or `systemic approach', as argued by Walter 
Carlsnaes, 4G however, are less adequate, especially in explaining small states' foreign 
policies or their behaviour in the international system. For the first school, the 
overemphasis of the maximization of power is more relevant to the great powers vis-ä-vis 
the relatively weak power possessed by small states. The school's narrow concentration 
on military and conflict issues, too, is found to be rather limited to the complexity of 
small states' issues which are overwhelmingly plagued by economic and social 
challenges. 7 Besides that, the Realist school ignores the significance of idiosyncratic 
values (or the personal beliefs of leaders) in influencing a state's behaviour, for it regards 
both leaders and states alike - they all pursue national interests (the protection of the state 
and its power). 48 Meanwhile, the Neo-Realists' systemic approach, which gives less 
emphasis to idiosyncratic and domestic factors, has given no room for states, specifically 
small states, to define their own policies. Instead states behave like the concept of billiard 
balls, waiting and reacting to each other in the same attitude and direction. 49 The second 
45 Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Foreign Policies in Dependent States" in Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey & 
Patrick J. Haney (ed. ), Foreign Policy Analysis : Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1995), 201, Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the 
Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa", 7-8, Laura Neack, The New Foreign 
Po_ licy, 21-22, John Baylis & Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, 225-249. 
46 Walter Carlsnaes, "On the Study of Foreign Policy", 3-6. 
47 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner & Michael T. Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and 
Empirical Approaches" in Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (ed. ), The Foreign Policies of the 
Global South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 
16. 
48 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy, 23. 
49 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War :A Theoretical Analysis (New York : Columbia 
University Press, 1959), J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International 
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school's philosophical principle is too ambitious and `Utopian' to be implemented in 
small states concern on their conditions, where deep class and societal antagonisms exist, 
and which are too far behind compared to industrially-developed states. 50 The third 
school, to some extent, has successfully portrayed, through the dependency lens, the 
unequal relations of core-peripheral states, but it is still insufficient to examine the 
foreign policies of small states. This is because it overwhelmingly indicates the absolute 
powerlessness of small states or their lack of `relative autonomy' in shaping their policies 
vis-ä-vis great powers in the international system. 51 It also (most likely as Neo-Realist) 
leaves no room for analysis of the political, bureaucratic, personalist (psychological), and 
societal elements of the foreign policy and small states' behaviour. 52 
2.2 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
Apart from the three major theoretical approaches, which are also considered to be 
`macro level', there is another approach that focuses on the `internal determinants' (micro 
level) of the foreign policy or behaviour of a state. This approach is usually self-defined 
as part of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) discipline. 53 It examines the foreign policy 
of states from the lens of leaders' personalities (or regime change), decision-making and 
bureaucratic process. This approach (particularly decision-making and bureaucratic 
models) claims to be more `scientific' (known as behaviouralism) in its methodological 
Relations", World Politics 14 (1) October 1961,77-92, Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1976), 18-19. 
so Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner & Michael T. Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and 
Empirical Approaches", 17. 
51 Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa", 8& 
14-16. 
52 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner & Michael T. Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and 
Empirical Approaches", 18. 
53 Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa", 7. 
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underpinning than the systemic approach. 54 Nevertheless, not different from IR 
theoretical approaches, this approach also has several shortcomings in analyzing the 
behaviour of small states. The idiosyncratic model (the Great Man) which connotes 
leaders as makers and movers of world history excludes other factors such as societal and 
global elements which are both also vital in influencing states' policies. 55 Meanwhile, 
regime change in a particular country, in some ways, might able to show its relevance to 
the significant changes in foreign policy but it cannot elaborate or `predict' much about 
regime preferences (for instance, either pro- or anti-US) which is more important in 
determining the direction of a state's behaviour in the international system. 56 The 
decision-making (closely linked with the work of Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck & Burton 
Sapin57) and bureaucratic models (specifically developed by Graham T. Allison on Cuban 
missile cri sis), 58 which both concentrate on the formulations and the decisions from a 
5' Walter Carlsnaes, "On the Study of Foreign Policy", 4-5. 
55 Bahgat Korany, "Foreign Policy in the Third World : An Introduction" in International Political 
Science Review 5 (1) 1984,7, Charles W. Kegley, Jr & Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics 
Trend and Transformation (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1997), 60. 
56 To overcome the shortcomings, the `development strategy' model is used to conceptualize 
regime preferences. This model assumes `economic development elements', in which it could 
differentiate states (in this case, in Latin America) from conventional-moderate to radical 
regimes, is able to show that those conventional-moderate regimes are closer to the US than the 
radical ones. However, based on some previous studies, it showed that the results were mixed, 
and it simultaneously stated that shifts from conventional-moderate to radical regimes did not 
necessarily result in anti-US foreign policy. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner & Michael T. 
Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches", 25-27. 
57 These researchers argued by saying that "..... the definition of the situation which we consider 
to be central to the explanation of state behaviour result from decision-making processes in an 
organizational context". Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck & Burton Sapin (ed. ), Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making : An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York : The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1962), 87. 
58 Walter Carlsnaes, "On the Study of Foreign Policy", 11, Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston : Little, Brown and Company, 1971). 
24 
group of policy-makers within a government59 or are based on large-scale organizations 
(bureaucratic organizations like the US State Department, the US Defense Department, 
CIA and others) '60 also 
have some setbacks, especially for their overemphasis on the 
psychological environment (policy-makers' perceptions and bureaucratic calculations) 
over the operational environment (the context or environment within which leaders or 
policy makers made decisions). In other words, this approach has divorced itself from 
interacting with the structural-operational environment and been reduced to the office of 
its official-decision makers. 61 On top of that, since the decision-making and bureaucratic 
models have required overwhelming variables ranging from actors, perceptions, values, 
motivations and other psychological questions, its high demands for a mass of data to 
some extent is a major obstacle for researchers to get data accessibility in most small 
states. 62 
Another approach of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is comparative study or, 
rather, `Comparative Foreign Policy' (CFP). This approach could be linked with James 
Rosenau's five pre-theory independent variables of foreign policy: idiosyncratic, the role 
of officials, governmental structure, societal factors (non-governmental elements), and 
s9 Brian White, "Analysing Foreign Policy : Problems and Approaches", in Michael Clarke & 
Brian White (ed. ), Understanding Foreign Policy : The Foreign Policy Systems Approach 
(Aldershots, Hants : Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1989), 12 & 16-17. 
"Charles W. Kegley, Jr & Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics : Trend and Transformation, 55. 
61 Bahgat Korany, "Foreign Policy in the Third World : An Introduction", 14. 
62 Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg & Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign 
Policy Behaviour", Conflict Resolution xiii (1) March 1969,77-78 (75-102). However, Bahgat 
Korany did not deny the successful study of the former U. S. S. R and China where usually 
researchers were having difficulties to access particular data on these two countries. Bahgat 
Korany, "Foreign Policy in the Third World : An Introduction", 8& 14-15, Bahgat Korany, "The 
Take-Off of Third World Studies? : The Case of Foreign Policy", World Politics xxxv (3) April 
1983,467 (465-487). 
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systemic environments, and also other comparative studies on states' foreign policies, 
including the Interstate Behaviour Analysis Model by Jonathan Wilkenfeld ct al, and the 
Comparative Research on the Events of Nations Project (CREON) by Maurice East et 
al. 63 The main essence of CFP is, it believes, that foreign policy is a phenomenon 
common to all states, therefore the same analytical tools and concepts can be used to 
explain any other states' foreign policies within the conformity (or the uniformity) of a 
class of phenomena (for example, based on United Nations voting and others). 64 This is 
despite the fact that CFP realizes the variety of foreign policies of states from one issue to 
another or in different situations). However, CFP was heavily criticized by some foreign 
policy researchers for largely depending on empirical measurements like the U. N votes 
which, some researchers argued, do not fully represent a state's foreign policy6s 
Moreover CFP does not produce major theoretical insights in its analysis of state 
behaviour as Bahgat Korany argued, saying that Rosenau's work or his foreign policy 
analysis (in terms of its output) only display general behaviour transactions. 66 
63 Comparative Foreign Policy is regarded as the main tool in analyzing foreign policy in the 
United States, whereas in the UK, it needs various approaches and methodologies in examining 
different states' foreign policies. In other words, the UK emphasizes the uniqueness of the foreign 
policies of states. Steve Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis : British and American Orientations and 
Methodologies", Political Studies xxxi (4) December 1983,557-561 (556-565, Bahgat Korany, 
"Foreign Policy in the Third World : An Introduction", 9-10, Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner 
& Michael T. Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches", 21. 
6' Steve Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis", 558. 
65 Jeanne A. I. Hey, "Foreign Policy in Dependent States", 207-208. 
66 See for example, Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner & Michael T. Snarr, "Assessing Current 
Conceptual and Empirical Approaches", 21-22, Bahgat Korany, "Foreign Policy in the Third 
World : An Introduction", 10-11, Bahgat Korany, "The Take-Off of Third World Studies?, 466- 
468. 
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2.3 A Few Studies on Small States' Interactions 
All the theoretical frameworks and methods of studying the behaviour or the foreign 
policies of states discussed above have their own advantages as well as disadvantages. 
Each approach uses specific concepts and techniques in explaining states' behaviour. 
They also provide certain variables or several important determinants influencing the 
foreign policy of states. However, the study believes that in order to understand better the 
character or the foreign policy of a state, particularly small states, a researcher cannot 
afford to depend on one single approach. He or she cannot dissociate himself or herself 
from examining the impact of systemic structure upon the behaviour of states, and a 
researcher also cannot single-handedly rely upon the influence of domestic factors upon a 
state's foreign policy. This is because every state is unique, 67 and depending solely on 
one approach will not provide an adequate explanation of particular states' behaviour or 
actions towards others, as argued by Bahgat Korany (referring to the characteristics of 
small or developing states): "....... It seems that the best way out of the present 
conceptual cul de sac is to turn to the field itself and see what the data say". 68 Hence, in 
order to achieve better understanding of small states' foreign policies or their behaviour, 
a multi-level approach (the combination of domestic and systemic elements together) 
with the incorporation of empirical contextuality of small states under study (the field to 
6' In examining a state's foreign policy, the uniqueness of every state has also been emphasized 
by a British scholar, F. Northedge, who at some levels, disagrees with the Comparative Foreign 
Policy approach, by saying that : "in the final resort.... there is really no alternative to the 
consideration of the state as a unique entity. Apart from certain superficially similar physical 
features, it remains true that no two states..... are exactly like each other. We may enumerate all 
the standard aspects of foreign policy, but in the end the nature of that state and its attitudes 
towards other state-members of the international system will elude us unless we have done 
something to penetrate its unique cast of mind, the product of quite unique historical 
experiences. " Steve Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis", 561. 
bs Bahgat Korany, "Foreign Policy in the Third World : An Introduction", 17. 
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get the data required), could be the best alternative approach to avoid depending on one 
approach over others. 69 
If an analysis is carried out on several studies, especially on small states' relations 
or policies towards each other or their reactions to the systemic pressures (specifically on 
the dominance of hegemonic or regional power), however, various approaches have been 
employed. For instance, the employment of one or two domestic factors, mostly political 
and economic, urged these states to form several small states' organizations including the 
Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to enable them to defend their interests. 
Added to this were the pressure of regional actors (like China and India in the Southeast 
and South Asian context), 70 the influence and interplay of regional issues, 71 (like the 
security issue) and the hegemonic power's interest (systemic factor - referring to the 
character of small states' relations with the great powers, especially the US and the 
72 73 former Soviet Union), and also a few studies by Christopher Clapham, Gwyneth 
69 As suggested by Gerd Nonneman in his study on the foreign policies of the Middle East and 
North Africa towards Europe. Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle 
East and North Africa", 9. 
70 See for example, Samuel C. Y. Ku, "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with 
Malaysia : Opportunities and Challenges", Journal of Asian and African Studies 35 (1) 2000, 
133-157, Ganganath Jha, "A Brief Survey of India-Indonesia Relations", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 17 (4) March 1996,389-405. 
" Some studies made by J. A. Allan and Chibli Mallat, Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray, and 
Helga Haftendron have empirically proven how regional water issues such as the Jordan River 
Basin, the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, and the Arabian Peninsular, affect the degree of relations 
(either towards conflict or co-operation) specifically between two countries in the Middle East 
region, including between Jordan-Israel, Turkey-Iraq, Turkey-Syria, Syria-Iraq, Saudi Arabia- 
Bahrain, Iran-Qatar, and others. See J. A. Allan and Chibli Mallat, "Preface" in J. A. Allan and 
Chibli Mallat (ed. ), Water in the Middle East : Legal, Political and Commercial Implications 
(London : Tauris Academic Studies, 1995), 15, Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray, Water Politics in 
the Middle East :A Context for Conflict or Co-operation? (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 
2000), 111,133-134 & 195-202, and Helga Haftendom, "Water and International Conflict" paper 
presented at the Environmental and National Security Panel, (Washington : International Studies 
Association Convention, 16-20 February 1999), 14-15. 
'Z See for instance, the works of Ronald A. Morse, Harold C. Hinton, and Seung-Ho Joo and Tae- 
Hwan Kwak who clearly indicate how the issue of regional security and stability enhance the 
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Williams, 74 Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili75 (as an examplar) who 
primarily contemplate the small or developing states' reactions to the systemic pressures 
of the international system (especially during the bipolar era and the debates of North- 
South or core-periphery relations). Meanwhile, for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's foreign 
policies or behaviour (including determining factors influencing their relations with other 
states), most of the previous studies give emphasis on one dominant factor over other 
factors. These include (on Malaysia's side), for instance, Firdaus Hj. Abdullah (cultural 
factor), 76 Shafruddin Hashim (ethnic factor), 77 Zakaria Haji Ahmad (the bureaucratic role 
of Wisma Putra as a governmental agency) 78, or the most common approach in analyzing 
Malaysia's foreign policy, the role of the idiosyncratic model which is mostly associated 
with Dr. Mahathir's era (the fourth Malaysian premier) like the works of In-Won Hong, 79 
relations between US-Japan, US-Korean and Russia-North Korean relations respectively. Ronald 
A. Morse also views economy as the vital element in US-Japan relations. Ronald A. Morse, 
"Introduction" in Ronald A. Morse (ed. ), U. S. - Japan Relations : An Agenda for the Future 
(Lanham, New York : Pacific Forum University Press of America Inc., 1989), vii-viii, Harold C. 
Hinton, "The U. S. - Korean Relationship : An American Perspective" in Harold C. Hinton, 
Donald Zagoria, Jung Ha Lee, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Chung Min Lee and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed. ), The U. S. -Korean Security Relationship : Prospects and Challenges for the 
1990s (Washington : Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988), 1-15, 
Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak, "Military Relations Between Russia and North Korea" The 
Journal of East Asian Affairs xv (2) Fall/Winter 2001,297-323. 
" Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics : An Introduction (Wisconsin : The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985). 
74 Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization :A Review of Developments (London : 
The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981). 
" Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations 
(Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986). 
76 Firdaus Haji Abdullah, "The Rumpun Concept in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations", The 
Indonesian Quarterly xxi (2) 1993,137-150. 
77 Shafruddin Hashim, "Malaysian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy : The Impact of 
Ethnicity", in Karl D. Jackson (ed. ), Asian in Regional and Global Context (Institute of East 
Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986), 155-162. 
78 Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia Change and Adaptation in Foreign Policy : Malaysia's Foreign 
Policy", in Brian Hocking (ed. ), Foreign Ministries : Change and Adaptation (London 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), 117-132. 
79 In-Won Hong, Personalized Politics : The Malaysian State under Mahathir (Singapore 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). 
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R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, 80 Marvin C. Ott, 81 Khoo Boo Teik, 82 and others. For the 
Saudi Arabian side, the studies into the behaviour of this kingdom are largely 
concentrated on the overwhelming role of the Al-Saud family in determining the 
direction of its own foreign policy, such as Fouad Al-Farsy, 83 Dr. Nasser Ibrahim Rashid 
& Dr. Esber Ibrahim Shaheen, 84 Leslie McLoughlin'85 Sarah Yizraeli86 R. D. McLaurin, 
Don Peretz & Lewis W. Snider, 87 and others. Exceptions are a few works which consider 
a few other variables (using multi-level factors) such as F. Gregory Gause 111 88 and Gerd 
Nonneman89 (as an example for Saudi Arabia) who stress the multi-level factors (ranging 
from domestic to regional and international level) influencing Saudi Arabian foreign 
policy in the international system. The multi-level factors include the Saudi regime's 
political interests and the nature of the kingdom (domestic), regional-neighbour threats 
80 R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, B° Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London : Routledge, 
1999). 
ßi Marvin C. Ott, "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia", Asian Survey 12 March 1972,225- 
239. 
82 Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism : An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir 
Mohammad (Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1995). 
83 Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia :A Case Study in Development (London : Kegan Paul 
International, 1986), pp. 70-95 (under the sub-title : "The Polity and Organization of the 
Kingdom"). 
ßa Dr. Nasser Ibrahim Rashid & Dr. Esber Ibrahim Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War 
(Joplin, Missouri : International Institute of Technology, Inc., 1992), Chapter 1 (Brief History of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). 
85 Leslie McLoughlin, 85 Ibn Saud : Founder of a Kingdom (Hampshire : The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1993), pp. 103-123 (the early establishment of Saudi Arabia). 
86 Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia : The Struggle Between King Sa'ud and Crown 
Prince Faysal, 1953-1962 (Tel Aviv : Tel Aviv University, 1997), Sarah Yizareli examined the 
leadership dispute between King Sa'ud and King Faysal in shaping Saudi Arabia's Foreign 
Policy, which was considered as the facet of national security for Al-saud family. 
87 R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz & Lewis W. Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy : Issues and 
Processes (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1982), see Chapter 6 of this book "Saudi Foreign 
Policymaking", particularly pages 195-205. 
88 F. Gregory Gause III, "The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia", in Raymond Hinnebusch & 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami (ed. ), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder : Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002). 
89 Gerd Nonneman, "Saudi-European Relations 1902-2001 :A Pragmatic Quest for Relative 
Autonomy", International Affairs 77 (3) July 2001,631-661. 
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(together with Islamic ideological as well as the Palestinian issue) to the Kingdom as one 
of the regional Middle East powers (regional), and the Kingdom's strategic alliance with 
the US and some of the European counterparts (international). 90 While for the Malaysian 
side, since previous researchers were largely intoxicated with the powerful model of 
idiosyncracy, specifically under the Dr. Mahathir regime, the recent work by Karminder 
Singh Dhillon, 91 to some extent, may provide a new alternative in analyzing Malaysia's 
foreign policy. Karminder Singh Dhillon's thesis, which examines Malaysian foreign 
policy under Dr. Mahathir, does not only emphasize the importance of the idiosyncratic 
factor (Dr. Mahathir's leadership), but it believes that the role of other factors like 
domestic and external factors are also shaping the character of Malaysian foreign policy. 
Among those domestic factors studied are ethnic integration and national development, 
and for external factors it focuses on some of Malaysia's policies towards certain 
international events, for example the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
the Gulf War (1991 and 2003), the Bosnian issue and others. 92 
2.4 Conceptual Framework for the Case Study :A Multi-Level 
Approach with Empirical Textuality 
In regards to the researcher's case study, `Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia' which 
has yet to be examined comprehensively by other researchers (in other words, it could be 
regarded as a pioneering study), other than a few undergraduate works like Wan Mohd. 
9° F. Gregory Gause III, "The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia", 193-202, Gerd Nonneman, 
"Saudi-European Relations 1902-2001 ", especially pages 635-637. 
9" Karminder Singh Dhillon, "Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981-2003", 
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Boston University, USA, 2005). 
92 Karminder Singh Dhillon, "Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981-2003", see 
pages vii-viii & 6-8, and see also Chapter 2 (idiosyncracy), Chapter 3 (domestic issues) and 
Chapter 4&5 (external factors). 
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Wan Musa, 93 Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, 94 and also several studies which do not 
specifically evaluate the character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia including 
Dari'ah Sulaiman, 95 J. B. Dalton 
, 
96 Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, 97 and Mohammad Redzuan 
Othman. 98 So this study may apply a multi-level approach, rather than focusing on one 
determining factor over others, by trying to focus both domestic and international factors 
that could influence the character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. The study's 
preference for a multi-level approach, to some extent, could further represent a good 
example (and a part of the knowledge contribution to the study of the character of small 
states' behaviour) of how the evaluation of both factors, domestic and international, and 
93 Wan Mohd. Wan Musa's thesis is an undergraduate study and he focused on Malaysia's foreign 
policy with Arab countries without specifically addressing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wan 
Mohd. Wan Musa, "Dasar Luar Malaysia Dengan Negara-Negara Arab (1957-1980) : Dari 
Perspektif Malaysia" (Malaysia's Foreign Relations with Arab Countries (1957-1980) : 
Malaysia's Perspective), Latihan Ilmiah (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
1985/1986). 
94 Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli's work, also an undergraduate study and not particularly 
concentrating on Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. Instead, she analyzed historical 
interaction between Malaysia and Arab countries. Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah 
Hubungan Malaysia-Asia Barat Sehingga 1985" (Historical Relations of Malaysia-Middle East 
till 1985), Latihan Ilmiah (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1991/92). 
95 Dari'ah Sulaiman's thesis (undergraduate level), however, is on the role of Arab in spreading 
Islam in Malacca in the 15`h-16th centuries. Dari'ah Sulaiman, "Peranan Orang Arab Dalam 
Menyebarkan Agama Islam di Melaka Pada Abad 15M dan 16M", (The Role of Arab People in 
Spreading Islam in Malacca during the 15`h-16`h centuries), Latihan Ilmiah (Kuala Lumpur 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993/94). 
96 J. B. Dalton did not examine Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, however he helped in 
giving some views on Malaysia's external relations with the Middle East, especially with Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia (but only in brief). J. B. Dalton, "The Development of Malayan External Policy, 
1957-1963", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Oxford : University of Oxford, 1967). 
17 Dato Abdullah only gives a brief outline of Malaysia's foreign policy with some Middle East 
countries, mainly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, "Tengku Abdul Rahman and 
Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1963-1970", Unpublished M. Litt Thesis (Cambridge : University of 
Cambridge, 1984). 
98 Mohammad Redzuan Othman's thesis is only an historical analysis of the Middle Eastern 
influence upon Malay society in the period of 1880 to 1940, and it does not cover the period of 
the post-Malayan independence in 1957 and onwards. In this study, however, he applies the term, 
`Middle East' to three major modem entities, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (see page 17). 
Mohammad Redzuan Othman, "The Middle Eastern Influence on the Development of Religious 
and Political Thought in Malay Society, 1880-1940", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Edinburgh : The 
University of Edinburgh, 1994). 
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also the question of small states' autonomy in shaping their own foreign policies, is vital 
to understanding the foreign policy or the behaviour of a small state in the international 
system. 
In this case, the study by Gerd Nonneman on the foreign policies of the Middle 
East and North African countries (or MENA region) towards Europe, could be regarded 
as the most helpful guideline in providing other researchers, including this study, to 
construct a conceptual framework to analyze small states' foreign policies or their 
behaviour. This is because Gerd Nonneman's work does not only weigh up domestic 
factors (like leadership perception and regime interests), but also give focus on two 
systemic levels which are significant in shaping Middle East and North African countries 
(as part of small states' community). Those two systemic levels are the regional and 
international levels. 99 Frankly to say, the multi-level approach with the incorporation of 
contextuality (particularly developed by Gerd Nonneman) may be useful in identifying 
the key determining factors influencing Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. This is 
due to the fact that since both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are outside of a common region 
(Southeast and the Middle East regions), 100 the approach developed by Gerd Nonneman 
could become a decent conceptual framework to explain the character of Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia since it also deals with places not in the same region: the 
Middle East and North African foreign policies towards Europe (which incorporates three 
99 See Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa", 2- 
3,9-14. 
10° Even, through a discussion with the researcher's supervisor, David George, Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia could be regarded as `non-regional' due to their different membership 
in their own specific regional organizations; Malaysia in ASEAN, and saudi Arabia in the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC). 
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different regions). Moreover, Gerd Nonneman's approach which emphasizes the nature 
of the state and the regime's interests, is probably not much different from Karminder 
Singh Dillon's discussion (in terms of conceptual framework, not based on the content of 
analysis or the contextuality, for their case studies are different) on regime maintenance 
in Dr. Mahathir's era, 101 and may give broader picture of the analysis of a small state's 
policy or behaviour. On top of that, Gerd Nonneman's argument on the small states' 
relative autonomy vis-ä-vis Structuralism's absolutely dependent or powerless position, 
may be pertinent to several actions taken by small states in defending their interests and 
maintaining the regime's political survival, rather than battling against the more powerful 
states in the international system. 102 
The study, however, may `move away' somewhat from Gerd Nonneman's 
approach, for the researcher will only focus on two interacting level factors; domestic and 
international (excluding regional), that influence Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. 
This is due to the different geographical situations of the countries where their own 
regional issues do not directly affecting their relations. Only occasionally will the study 
focus on some regional issues like the Muslim minority in the Southern Philippines 
(Southeast Asia) and the Iran-Iraq war (Middle East). In these both countries have to 
interact more at the international level, not the regional, through several international 
organizations, specifically the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, because those 
particular issues have an effect on both countries' co-ideological affiliation, Islam (for 
further explanation, see Chapter VII). 
101 Karminder Singh Dhillon, "Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981-2003", see 
Chapter 3 (domestic issues). 
112 Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa", 16. 
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Before constructing the researcher's conceptual framework to analyze Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia, the study will highlight the relevant parts of Gerd 
Nonneman's multi-level approach103 to examine the foreign policy of small or developing 
states in the international system. Among the key determinant factors (excluding 
regional, except Islam) that are closely relevant to the case study are : 
a) Domestic level 
i. The nature of state and the regime interests 
ii. Capabilities - in particular economic and technological as well as 
demographic resources 
iii. Ideological affiliation, Islam104 
b) International factors 
i. The former colonial or semi-colonial ties between many of the small 
or developing countries 
ii. The dependent position of small states which have, to some degree, 
relative autonomy in the international system105 
Based upon the above variables, the study will attempt to propose them, with some 
modifications, as a conceptual framework in the analysis of Malaysia's relations with 
Saudi Arabia parallel with the contextuality of the researcher's case study. 106 In other 
103 For further elaboration on Gerd Nonneman's multi-level approach see See Gerd Nonneman, 
"Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa", particularly page 12. 
104 Ideological Islam, alongside with pan-Arabism, is one of the variables that is placed at the 
regional level. Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North 
Africa", 12. 
105 Gerd Nonneman, "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa", for 
autonomy discussion see pages 14-16. 
106 As has been argued by Bahgat Korany that due to the complexity of the present conceptual 
framework of states' foreign policy, especially for small states, the best way to analyze their 
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words, the key determinant factors influencing Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia 
from domestic factors are: a) the nature of state and the regime interests (and also the 
leadership role); b) economic determinants (states' capabilities or necessities); c) 
religious affiliation, Islam (ideological affiliation). 
Meanwhile, for the international or systemic factor, it is more towards the challenges of 
the systemic environment - as both countries were formerly either colonial (Malaysia 
under Great Britain) or allied with great powers (Saudi Arabia's alliance with the British, 
and later the US). They are also in a dependent position but not absolutely powerless - 
which led Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to join a few small states' organizations in order to 
safeguard their interests. The participation of these two countries in those organizations 
could probably further influence the character of their relations. 
The choice of the multi-level determinants (domestic and international factors 
discussed above) for studying the character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia is 
because they are intimately associated with the nature of Malaysia's and Saudi Arabia's 
historical-political emergence as modem states in the international political system. Both 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are overwhelmed by one dominant political regime (UMNO 
party for Malaysia and the Al-Saud family for Saudi Arabia) which has shaped the 
feature of each country's policies (including their joint relations), from the day of the 
state's formation (officially since 1957 for Malaysia, and 1932, or probably earlier, for 
Saudi Arabia) until the present day. The dominance of one political regime in Malaysia 
and in Saudi Arabia has also largely influenced the direction of the foreign policy or the 
behaviour is turn to the field itself and see what the data say. Bahgat Korany, "Foreign Policy in 
the Third World : An Introduction", 17. 
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behaviour of these two countries in responding to the external environment. Needless to 
say, the analysis of the nature of state and regime interest is one of the fundamental 
determining factors influencing the degree of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, 
especially the significance of the relations for the survival of the Malaysian political 
regime. For the economic determinant, since Malaysia's main energy sector mostly 
depends on oil (see Chapter V), it has to import petroleum products from oil-producing 
countries, mainly Saudi Arabia which is the major producer of oil in the current world. 
Malaysia's vast imports of oil from Saudi Arabia, however, have led to an unfavourable 
situation for the former's trade with the latter. Therefore, in order to balance the deficit, 
or at least to increase the volume of trade, and with the added pressure of the post- 
economic crisis of 1997, various efforts have been made by the Malaysian government to 
enhance its economic relations with the Kingdom by rapidly looking for new markets and 
business opportunities (like investment and tourism sectors) which were given less 
attention before, including the Saudi Arabian market. Although Malaysia's less 
encouraging economic relations with Saudi Arabia are relatively linked with the pattern 
of the international economic system, which is undeniably unequal in its distribution of 
wealth among countries, the continuous economic development enjoyed by both 
countries gives a positive signal to other small countries that economic development can 
be achieved by mutually engaging and co-operating with more developed-industrial 
economies (see Chapter V on the influence of international economic system upon 
Malaysia's economic relations with Saudi Arabia). This could be considered an example 
of the relative autonomy that both countries have in designing their economic direction in 
the international system. 
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Furthermore, in their religious affiliation, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have 
interacted `religiously' since the era of the Malacca Sultanate in the 1400s, prior to their 
emergence as modern states. The interactions are mostly founded, along with the trading 
activities, upon the performance of Pilgrimage (Hajj), and in the education field (see 
Chapter III). These continuous historical-religious interactions have indirectly made both 
countries, especially Malaysia, comprehend the significance of the realization of Islamic 
elements as one of the tools for regime maintenance in their system of government. This 
is because the Malaysian government, in particular, has to face domestic Islamic 
pressure, primarily from the Islamic opposition parties. By maintaining its relations with 
Saudi Arabia, the custodian of the two Islamic holy cities, Mecca and Medina, as well as 
receiving several financial donations from the Kingdom, the Malaysian government, at 
least, could soothe the pressure by further developing some religious infrastructures that 
were needed by the Muslim community in Malaysia (see Chapter IV & VI). Meanwhile, 
for the Saudi government, parallel with its reputation as one of the leading Islamic 
nations among Muslim countries, the Kingdom's financial donation (as part of Saudi 
Arabia's global tool policy, `Islamic capital donation') to develop some infrastructure in 
Malaysia, could be used to further boost Al-Sa'ud family's image both at local and 
international levels. Nonetheless, in interacting with the Kingdom, Malaysia has to deal 
`carefully' with the dominant ideology of Wahhabism which is not analogous with the 
application of Islam among the Malaysian Muslim population. Hence, a wise approach 
towards Wahhabism is essential, such as not declaring it a deviant teaching of Islam (see 
Chapter VI), to enable the Malaysian government to safeguard the relations and 
simultaneously to continue to receive the financial donation from the Kingdom. In other 
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words, the donation of the Saudi government for Malaysia to develop its religious 
necessities could be considered part of the `reciprocal' process for the survival of both 
political regimes locally and internationally. 
For the systemic factor, since Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are small states and to 
some extent in a `dependent' position vis-ä-vis more powerful-developed states, they are 
vulnerable to the influence of the challenges of the systemic environment, which to some 
degree may further determine the character of their relations. Those systemic challenges 
could be closely linked to the major patterns or issues of the international system since 
World War II. These include the superpower rivalries between the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, the North-South debates on economic development, the demand for 
religious solidarity among Muslim countries, and others. All these systemic challenges, 
particularly the pattern of bipolarity between the US and the former Soviet Union, were 
impossible for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to avoid. Both countries have to face the 
challenges, either by joining one of the two superpower rivalries or by participating in 
small states' organizations in order to safeguard their interests (security and political 
stability), to gain economic advantages especially in global market opportunities, or to 
bolster socio-cultural and religious affiliations. In the case of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, 
although their closer ties with the US-British bloc perhaps cannot be denied, they have 
joined at least three major small states' organizations, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), the Group of 77 (G77), and the Organisation of Islamic countries (OIC) for 
defending their interests in the international system. The participation of Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia in these three organizations could be regarded as the political manifestation 
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or the relative autonomy that they have in determining their own reactions or policies 
against the systemic pressures. Besides that, the membership of Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia in these three organizations could further improve or enhance the degree of their 
bilateral relations, especially for the Malaysian government which is in need of `financial 
support' as well as Islamic recognition from the Kingdom. Frankly to say, based upon the 
four key determining factors, the study presumes that Malaysia's relation with Saudi 
Arabia is extremely close. 
In order to systematically exhibit the key determining factors influencing 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, the researcher will draw a figure (see Figure 1) 
that highlights those significant determinant factors of the case study: 
a) Domestic Factors: 
i) the nature of state and regime interests, 
ii) economic determinants, 
iii) religious affiliation; 
b) International or Systemic Factors - refer to the membership of Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia in small states' organizations as their alternative responses or 
policies vis-ä-vis the systemic pressures. 
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Figure 1. Key Determinant Factors Influencing Malaysia's 
Relations with Saudi Arabia 
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CHAPTER III* 
3.0 EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF MALAYSIA'S RELATIONS WITH 
SAUDI ARABIA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The births of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as modern states107 did not occur at the same 
time. Malaysia gained independence from Great Britain on the 31" of August 1957. 
Unlike certain other Southeast Asian countries, for example Indonesia and the Philippines 
which had to use force to liberate themselves from colonization, Malaysia achieved 
independence through a series of meetings and negotiations conducted among Malay 
political leaders, Malayan rulers and the British Government between April 1949 and 
1957. It cannot be denied, however, that prior to World War I there were several anti- 
colonial movements launched by Malay tribal leaders against the British occupation, in 
some areas of the Peninsula. For instance, Megat Maharajalela in Perak, was accused of 
murdering a British resident, J. W. W. Birch; there were also the cases of Datuk Doi Sa'id 
in Naning (Negeri Sembilan), Tok Janggut in Kelantan, and Datuk Bahaman and Mat 
Kilau in Pahang. However these events did not deter British influence in the Malay 
Peninsula. 108 
*This Chapter III has been successfully published in an academic journal, Asian Profile 32 (4) 
August 2004,335-351. 
107 Modem state here refers to the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), 
that states, at least, must possess these four basic elements: a permanent population, a defined 
territory, a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and of 
conducting international relations with other states, and the recognition of other states (but this 
can often be crucial since it depends on the international community's acceptance). See Graham 
Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London 
Penguin Books Ltd., 1998), 512-513. 
108 Haji Buyong Adil, Perjuangan Orang Melayu Menentang Penjaiahan Abad 15-19 (Kuala 
Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1985), Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A 
History of Malaysia (London : The Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1985). 
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On the road to negotiating for independence, Malayan representatives were led by 
the Alliance (consisting of the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), later joined by Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) 
and the Rulers. The British Government was represented by particular individual figures 
such as Sir Henry Gurney, Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Templer, Lord Reid and others. 
Between June and August 1957, both parties agreed to certain recommendations and 
conditions to be incorporated into the final constitutional framework that was formally 
accepted by the Conference of Rulers and the Legislative Council, to give the people of 
Malaya the opportunity for full independence. 109 
Saudi Arabia, which was also under British influence, was founded by the Al- 
Saud family centred in Nejd, central Arabia. The Al-Saud family successfully established 
its kingdom between the early 1920s, and completed it in 1932. The struggle to establish 
a kingdom was initiated in 1744 by a partnership of Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Amir in 
Ad-Diriyah near Riyadh, and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab, the sheikh who is closely 
connected with the Wahhabism110 movement in the Arabian Peninsula. After a long battle 
109 For full details of the recommendations see Khong Kim I-Ioong, Merdeka! : British Rule and 
the Struggle for Independence in Malaya, 1945-1957 (Petaling Jaya, Selangor : Institute for 
Social Analysis (INSAN), 1984), 188-202, Lotfi Ismail, Sejarah Malaysia 1400-1963 (Kuala 
Lumpur : Utusan Publications & Distributors, 1978), 279-287, Barbara Watson Andaya and 
Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 1985, Richard Winstedt, The Malays :A Cultural 
History (Singapore : Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd., first revised by Tham Seong Chee in 1981, 
reprinted in 1988), particularly 183-187, Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British 
Malaya : Policies and Implementation (Jerusalem : The Magnes Press, 1979), 111-112. 
110 Wahhabism is an Islamic puritanical sect founded by Sheikh Muhammed Ibn Abd al-Wahab, 
the son of Suleiman, a poor Arab from a small Nejdi tribe. This movement promotes the doctrine 
of the oneness of God in Islam based on Hanbali interpretation of Islamic Law. For further details 
see Louis Alexandre Olivier de Corancez, The History of the Wahabis : From Their Origin Until 
the End of 1809, trans. By Eric Tabet (Reading : Garnet Publishing Ltd., 1995), Helen Chapin 
Metz, Saudi Arabia :A Country Study (Washington : Federal Research Division, 1992), xxi, and 
Edward Atiyah, The Arabs (Beirut : Lebanon Bookshop, 1968), 76. 
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against certain influential tribes, such as the Hashemite and Al-Rashid families, with the 
help of the Wahhabist group known as Al-Ikhwan (Brethren), and also after several 
negotiations conducted with the British government, the Al-Saud under the leadership of 
Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd ar-Rahman Al-Saud eventually succeeded in controlling a large part 
of the Arabian Peninsula including aI-Ahsa, al-Hejaz, and Asir to create a modem state 
called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. i ii 
Although Malaysia is about 25 years behind Saudi Arabia in terms of developing 
its own country's infrastructure and managing community development, this situation has 
not and will not prevent the countries forging closer bilateral relations in certain areas 
that are mutually beneficial. Hence, before examining the current pattern of relations, the 
early links between the Malay Peninsula and the Arabian Peninsula will be analyzed by 
considering three major historical phases of interaction. 
These are first, the historical interactions between the Malacca Sultanate and Arab 
traders in the fifteenth century; second, the post-Malacca Sultanate and third, the period 
from the early 20th century to post-Malayan independence. This level of interaction is 
significant because it will indicate the early development of relationships between the 
Malay and the Arabs in the pre-modem and modern periods, which clearly influence 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia in the present. 
". Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom (Hampshire : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1993), Helen Chapin Metz, Saudi Arabia :A Country Study, 20-24, F. Gregory Gause III, "The 
Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia" in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (ed. ) The 
Foreign Policy of Middle East States (London : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 199-200, and 
Peter Mansfield, The Arabs (London : The Penguin Books Ltd., 1976), 400-409. 
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3.1 The Era of the Malacca Sultanate 
It might be difficult to link Malaysia's early relations with Saudi Arabia to the era of the 
Malacca Sultanate in the fifteenth century, because during this period both Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia had yet to become a modem state. However, as stated earlier, the Malacca 
Sultanate era could be considered as representing one of the earliest interactions with the 
Arab world, as the former was the main trading as well as religious centre and thus 
indirectly bridged the distance between the Malay and Arabian Peninsulas. 
Malacca was certainly part of the Malay Peninsula territories (or Malay empire) in 
the fifteenth century, and remains one of the states comprising the Malaysian government 
of today. It would be a huge task for this study, however, to identify particular areas or 
territories to be associated with the present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the Ottoman 
Empire, most of the Arabian Peninsula was administered by a variety of political entities. 
For example, Hejaz (Mecca and Medina) was governed by Syarif family, while areas in 
Nejd were administered by families such as Uyainah by Al-Muammar, Diriyyah by Al- 
Saud, Ihsaa by Al-Khalid, Najran by Hazal, Riyadh by Ibn Duwais and others. 112 To 
simplify this problem, the researcher will place emphasis on those Arabs 113 who came to 
"Z Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap 
Ajaran Ahli Sunnah wal-Jamaah di Perlis", unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti 
Malaya, 1997), 34-35. 
13 Even the definition of `who are the Arabs' lacks agreement. Researches have given several 
definitions, for instance correlating the Arabs with the nomadic people inhabiting the Arabian 
Peninsula called `Bedouin' from as early as the second half of the 15t millennium B. C, or relating 
to religious-cultural affiliations such the Semitic people and those who naturally cherished the 
Arab tongue; or referring at least to the people of the Arabian Peninsula. This has seven 
independent countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, 
Omar and Yemen. Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in 1-listory (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
1993), 1-9, Collier's Encyclopedia, vol 2 (New York : P. F. Collier, 1994), 377-391, Edward 
Atiyah, The Arabs (Beirut : Lebanon Bookshop, 1968), 7-10, Peter Mansfield, The Arabs 
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Malacca as traders and preachers emanating from the areas under Saudi influence such as 
Jeddah and Mecca, or at least the nearest locations to the Saudi government including 
Aden, Hadhramau, and Muscat in the southern and eastern Arabian Peninsula. ' 14 
Basically, Malacca's roles as a famous trading entreport, and as an Islamic centre 
for the Muslim community to develop religious knowledge had turned it into one of the 
most important empires in the Malay Archipelago in the fifteenth century. These two 
roles had also in some way tied the Malay Peninsula with the Arab Muslim communities 
who came to Malacca, either to trade or to convey the message of Islam to the pagan 
local community. To enhance this argument, this study would like to focus on how 
Malacca successfully attracted a lot of foreign traders, particularly Arabs, and the spread 
of Islam by Muslim Arabs as the people responsible for bringing that religion into 
Malacca and other areas of the Malay Archipelago. 
3.1.1 Trading Activities in Malacca 
Before the emergence of the Malacca Sultanate in 1400s, 115 there were earlier 
commercial contacts between local communities in the Malay Archipelago and Arab 
traders who came mainly from Oman, Aden, Jeddah and al-Jar. For example, according 
(London : Penguin Books Ltd., 1976), 13-14, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 1 (London 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1992), 504. 
14 Aden and Hadhramaut have been allocated under the Yemen government, and Muscat in 
Oman. The influence of the Arabs who originated from these places, particularly Hadhramaut 
upon the Malaysian community was enormous, especially in the nineteenth century. 
15 The precise date of the foundation of Malacca is still a puzzle to researchers. The two major 
sources used to define the history of Malacca, the Suma Oriental and the Sejarah Melayu, are not 
sufficiently detailed to give an exact date. See Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, 
A History of Malaysia, 37-39. 
46 
to G. R. Tibbets, 116 Rita Rose, 117 Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, ' 18 K. 
N. Chaudhuri, 119 Peter Bellwood, 120 and Mahayudin Haji Yahya, 121 Arab traders found 
settlements in some parts of the Southeast Asian region, mainly in Indonesia and the 
Malay Peninsula, such as the Kingdom of Srivijaya (Crivijaya) 122 which flourished at 
Palembang (in southeast Sumatra), when they started visiting Chinese ports during the 8th 
century by the sea route. 123 Probably, due to more lucrative Chinese trade, the Arabs must 
had traded only with the natives on the shore or with petty rulers in riverside villages 
such as those areas in northwest and east coasts of Sumatra, the Melaka Straits down to 
Palembang, Kalah, 124 Johor, part of the Riau-Lingga archipelago and Tioman Island; or at 
116 G. R. Tibbets, "Early Muslim Traders in South East Asia", Journal of the Malaysian Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society 30 1957,1-45. 
117 Rita Rose Di Meglio, "Arab Trade with Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula from the 8th to the 
16th Century" in D. S. Richards (ed. ) Islam and the Trade of Asia :A Colloquium, (London 
Spottiswood, Ballantyne & Co. Ltd., 1970), 105-135. 
116 Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 17. 
119 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean : An Economic History From the 
Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
120 Peter Bellwood, Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago (Honolulu : University of 
Hawai'i Press, 1997), 139. 
121 Mahayudin Haji Yahya mentioned the earliest contact between Malay Archipelago and the 
Arabs as being during the Saba' empire ((950-115 B. Q. See Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di 
Alam Melayu (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 2001), 16. 
122 This kingdom, which was centred upon Palembang and Jambi, covered large areas of Sumatra, 
parts of Java and of the Malay Peninsula, as well as other small islands of the Malay Archipelago. 
See Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan 
Bahasa & Pustaka, 1992), 180, G. R. Tibbets, "Early Muslim Traders in South East Asia", 3, Rita 
Rose Di Meglio, "Arab Trade with Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula" in D. S. Richards (ed. ) 
Islam and the Trade of Asia, 108, Richard Allen, A Short Introduction to the History and Politics 
of Southeast Asia (New York : Oxford University Press, 1970), 25. 
123 Based on Chinese Muslim tradition, the contact between the Arabs and China by sea route may 
have begun even earlier than the 8`h century. For example, the tradition connects the coming of 
Islam to China with the arrival of a maternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h) named 
Sa'ad Ibn Waqas r. a. G. R. Tibbets, "Early Muslim Traders in South East Asia", 26. 
124 Rita Rose Di Meglio quotes various identifications of Kalah with several places, such as on the 
Malabar coasts or Coromandel coasts, or identifies it with the Hindu Malay Kingdom of Kataha 
(Kadaram). However, the majority of researchers believe that Kalah was a locality in the Malay 
Peninsula, either Kedah or the estuary of the Kelang River. Rita Rose Di Meglio, "Arab Trade 
with Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula" in D. S. Richards (ed. ) Islam and the Trade of Asia, 129 
(see note 45 in this article). 
47 
least the Arabs only made these places as stopping points for them and other foreign 
traders, before embarking to Canton in China. 125 
The above statement seems likely to be true (although it is still debated among 
researchers) because there are a few historical indications based on Arabic and Chinese 
sources that might be seen to support the arrival of the Arabs in the pre-Malacca era. For 
example, it is generally accepted that in the 9th-10th centuries, the Malay Archipelago was 
already known to the Arabs as reported by the Akhbar al-Sin wa'1-Hin and the works of 
Ibn Khurdahbih and Abu Zaid who mention some areas of this archipelago such as Kalah, 
Tioman, Champa, northwest of Sumatra, the Straits of Malacca, the west coast of the 
Malay Peninsula and Karimata Islands in Borneo. In addition, two coins of the Abbasid 
Caliphate were discovered in Kedah, one of which was clearly dated A. D. 848 (A. H. 234 
- Muslim Calendar), and a Wang Dinar (Dinar coin) was also found in Kelantan in 1914 
dated A. D. 1188 (A. H. 557) and which had Arabic words written on both sides, 'Al- 
Mutawakkil' (the ruler's name) and 'Al-Julus' (crown), possibly indicating that the Arabs 
had visited places in the Malay Peninsula. Other evidence includes the Arab settlements 
in Kedah in the 9th century, and at Fo-lo-an within the Srivijaya empire in the late 12th 
and early 13th centuries, which have been identified by P. Wheatley as Kuala Berang, 
Terengganu; and the arrival from Borneo of P'ii A-li, interpreted as Abu 'Ali, (Arabic 
names) by Hirth and Rockhill, as an ambassador to the Chinese court in 977 A. D. 126 
125 Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 51, and G. R. 
Tibbets, "Early Muslim Traders in South East Asia", 17. 
126 Arab sources such as the Akhbar al-Sin wa'l-Hindi (about A. D. 850-851), the works of Abu 
Ubaida (A. D. 750), Ibn Khurdahbih (846-47), and others; and Chinese sources such as the 
writings of I-tsing (A. D. 692), Hui-Ch'au (A. D. 727), Li-Can (A. D. 825) et al. For further details 
see G. E. Marrison, "The Coming of Islam to the East Indies", Journal of the Malaysian Branch 
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Following sour relations under the first ruler, Parameswara, trading activities in 
Malacca between local and foreign traders, especially Arabs, 127 were encouraged to 
flourish after an initiative taken by the second ruler of Malacca, Iskandar Shah, to create 
a mutual relationship between Malacca and Pasai and encourage Muslim merchants to 
operate in the region. 128 Thereafter, Malacca successfully attracted a lot of traders and 
merchants to come for trade and to exchange valuable goods among themselves. One 
source said that : "All trade from the lands above the wind and from the lands below the 
wind came to Malacca, crowded with people was the city of Malacca at that time. The 
Arabs called it Malakat, which means the collecting centre for commerce, because all 
kinds of goods were found there.... ". ' 29 Amongst other factors that led to this positive 
Royal Asiatic Society 24 (1) 1951,28-37, G. R. Tibbets, Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean 
Before the Coming of the Portuguese (London : UK Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and 
Ireland, 1971), 2, G. R. Tibbetts, A Study of the Arabic Texts Containing Material on South-East 
Asia (Leiden & London : The Royal Asiatic Society, 1979), G. R. Tibbetts, "Early Muslim 
Traders in South East Asia", 13-44, Rita Rose Di Meglio, "Arab Trade with Indonesia and the 
Malay Peninsula", 110-115, and see Christopher H. Wake, "Malacca's Early Kings and the 
Reception of Islam", Journal of Southeast Asian History 5 (2) 1964,118, Wahidah Yusof, 
"Institusi-Institusi Dakwah Islamiah di Malaysia : Satu Kajian Tentang Sumbangan dan Masalah 
Dalam Perkembangan Dakwah Masakini", Unpublished M. A Thesis, (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti 
Malaya, 1997), 11, and Haji Ibrahim Haji Abdullah, "Sejarah Pengajian Al-Qur'an di Kelantan", 
Utusan Qiblat August 1988,52-53. 
127 However, the Arab traders were superseded by their Muslim brethren from India, mainly 
Gujerati and Bengali merchants. This was because the spice route from the east (particularly from 
the Indian Ocean) via the Persian Gulf, the Levantine coast (eastern Mediterranean) and to 
northern Europe was closed after the Mongol destruction of Baghdad (Abbasid's capital) in 1258. 
Therefore, a new route was opened from the east to India, Aden in southern Arabia via the Red 
Sea up to Alexandria, Egypt. However, due to the refusal of the Caliph in Egypt to permit any but 
Muslim shipping through Alexandria other Muslim ports, especially in Gujerat, became more 
important for the spice trade. Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of 
Malaysia, 52. 
128 Some researchers identify Megat Iskandar Shah as the second ruler of Malacca, rather than 
Iskandar Shah as mentioned by Tom Pires, and they prefer to argue that the first ruler of Malacca, 
Parameswara or Iskandar Shah, was the person mainly responsible for bringing foreign traders 
into Malacca. See Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, 73-86 & 184- 
185, Armando Cortesao (trans. ), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires : An Account of the East 
From the Red Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515 vol. II, series II, (London : 
The Hakluyt Society, 1944), 240-242. 
129 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, 180. 
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development were that the city acted as a transit centre for vessels that passed through the 
Straits of Malacca, was a convenient place for exchanging and collecting products, 
because of the alternating system of monsoon winds which determined the sailing 
direction and also because it was administered by the system of Syahbandar (Harbour 
Masters of different nationalities), 130 who provided the best infrastructure and facilities 
for all foreign merchants who came to Malacca for trade. 131 
Among the Arab traders, or `Moors' (which generally means all Muslims, not 
only the Arabs) mentioned by Tome Pires were those who came to Malacca from Mecca, 
Jeddah, Aden and Cairo. These Arab traders, along with Parsees, Turks and Armenians, 
could not all come to Malacca in a single monsoon; most of them would go to Gujerat or 
Cambay to make profits there. Normally, they would embark from Gujerat or Cambay in 
March and sail directly to Malacca. t32 Every year, four ships from Gujerat and one ship 
from Cambay departed to Malacca. Upon arrival at Malacca, they had to pay six percent 
of their merchandise as import duty and would give presents to the King, Bendahara, 
Temenggung133 and Syahbandar. If they had relatives settled in Malacca, only three 
percent was charged. Those traders who came from the east, mainly China and the Malay 
130 Shahbandar is a Malay word. Tome Pires called it as Xabamdares. Shahbandar is the person 
responsible for managing the welfare of foreign traders. Armando Cortesao (trans. ), The Suma 
Oriental of Tome Pires, 265, Ha Suminto, "Relations Between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Muslim Kingdoms in the Malay-Indonesia Archipelago", Der Islam 57 1980,303. 
Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, 180. 
132 For further detail see the works of certain Arab navigators in the 19`h century, namely Ibn 
Majid, Sulaiman al-Mahri and Sidi Celebi, who studied several kinds of monsoon that link the 
Indian Ocean and parts of the Middle East. See G. R. Tibbets, Arab Navigation in the Indian 
Ocean, see Table of Monsoon Dates, between pages 364-367. 
133 Bendahara and Temenggung are the highest officials after the King in the Malacca Sultanate. 
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Archipelago, were exempted from duty on their merchandise and were only expected to 
present gifts to the King and the other mentioned officials. 134 
The Arab traders brought various merchandise to Malacca. For instance, Arabs 
from Mecca had opium, rosewater, and liquid storax; Aden sent opium, raisins, madder, 
indigo, rosewater, silver and seed-pearls, while Cairo's goods were scarlet-in-grain, 
coloured woollen cloth, coral, copper, silver, golden and other glassware. Most of these 
items, especially opium, might have been bought first in the ports of Gujerat or in 
. Cambay because the Arab traders usually stopped at these ports before continuing their 
journey to Malacca. ' 35 According to K. N. Chaudhuri, S. Q. Fatimi, and Mahayudin Haji 
Yahya, among the main products typically associated with the Arabs were pearls, ivory, 
rhinoceros horns, frankincense, ambergris, putchuk, nutmegs and others. Patricia Crone 
and Robert Simon state that incense, spices, silk, leather, and clothing were among the 
main goods in Arab-Meccan trading activities. 136 The trade between Malacca and the 
Arabs continued without interruption for many years, until the fall of Malacca at the 
134 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim said that traders from China and Ryukyu Island had to pay high 
duties in Malacca. However, Luis Filipe Ferreira agrees with Tome Pires that Eastern traders do 
not have to pay duty. See Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, 187, 
Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomas, "The Malay Sultanate of Malacca" in Anthony Reid (ed. ) 
Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era : Trade, Power and Belief (Ithaca : Cornell University 
Press, 1993), 74, Armando Cotesao (trans. ), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, 268-274, Barbara 
Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 42, Mahayudin I-Iaji Yahya, 
Islam di Alam Melayu (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 2001), 5. 
135 Armando Cotesao (trans. ), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, 268-269, Barbara Watson 
Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 42, D. G. E. Hall, A History of South- 
East Asia (London : Macmillan& Co. Ltd., 1964), 197. 
136 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean, 103, S. Q. Fatimi, Islam Comes to 
Malaysia (Singapore : Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1963), 68, Mahayudin Haji 
Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 4-5, Patricia Crone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (New 
Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1987), see sub-topic : "What Did the Meccans Export? " in 
this book, Robert Simon, Meccan Trade and Islam : Problems of Origin and Structure (Budapest : 
Akademiai Kiado, 1989), 91-92. 
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hands of the Portuguese in 1511. The arrival of the Portuguese had some impact upon 
these arrangements. Most of the Arab and Muslim traders directed their attention to 
another Muslim empire in Southeast Asia, Aceh in Sumatra Island. 
3.1.2 The Spread of Islam in Malacca 
Researchers disagree significantly about who were the first to introduce Islam to the 
southeast region of Asia, and particularly to the Malay Peninsula. A few groups of 
Muslim preachers or traders that were associated with the early arrival of Islam in the 
Malay Peninsula were those who emanated from the Arab lands, from Gujerat, Bengal, 
Coromandel and China. The writings of S. Q. Fatimi, 137 Richard Allen, 138 J. D. Legge, 
139 
Barbara Watson Andaya and Yoneo Ishii '140 
G. E. Marrison, 141 Fred R. von der 
Mehden, 142 and Cesar Adib Majul143 have expressed a variety of arguments about the 
beginnings of Islam in Southeast Asia. Some prefer to argue that the Arabs were the first 
carriers of Islam into Malay lands, while others believe that the Gujerat, southern Indian 
and Chinese traders played some part in introducing Islam to the local people. 
137 S. Q. Fatimi, Islam Comes to Malaysia (Singapore : Malaysian Sociological Research Institute 
Ltd., 1963). 
18 Richard Allen, A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of Southeast Asia (New York : 
Oxford University Press, 1970). 
139 J. D. Legge, "The Writing of Southeast Asian History" in Nicholas Tarling (ed. ) The 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia : From Early Times to C. 1500, vol. 1 (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-50. 
14o Barbara Watson Andaya and Yoneo Ishii, "Religious Developments in Southeast Asia : 
C. 1500-1800" in Nicholas Tarling (ed. ) The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 1, part II, 
164-227. 
141 G. E. Marrison, "The Coming of Islam to the East Indies", Journal of the Malaysian Branch 
Royal Asiatic Society 24 (1) 1951,28-37. 
142 Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam : Interaction Between Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East (Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 1993). 
143 Cesar Adib Majul, "Theories on the Introduction and Expansion of Islam in Malaysia", 
Silliman Journal xi (4) Fourth Quarter 1964,335-398. 
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Nevertheless, the most common arguments used by researchers to correlate the 
Arab role in bringing Islam into the Malay Archipelago, particularly to the Malay 
Peninsula, refer to the Arab-Malay trade relations from as early as the 9t1i century, and the 
teachings of Makhdum or Maulana (sheikh) and St fs (people who take a mystical 
approach to Islam) from Arabian Peninsula about Islam given to the rulers and the 
citizens. There was some cultural assimilation (language and customs) between the 
Malay and the Arabs, and there exist as further evidence certain Arabic inscriptions such 
as the royal gravestone dated 677 A. H. (1297 A. D) which carried the title of Sultan Malik 
al-Salih (Muslim-Arabs name) in Pasai, the tombstone of a Muslim woman in Leran, 
Surabaya dated 496/475 A. H. (1102 or 1082 A. D. ), and a stone with Islamic inscriptions 
discovered in Kuala Berang, Terengganu dated from the month of Rejab in the Cancer 
year, 702 A. H (February 1303). 144 These arguments, however, do nothing to negate the 
role of other Muslim traders, particularly from Gujerat and Coromandel, in conveying the 
message of Islam to the Malay Archipelago. For this researcher, all the arguments and 
evidence are inter-related and one cannot solely depend on one source. 
In the case of the arrival of Islam in Malacca, the study will endeavour to 
concentrate more on the Arabs, who originated from Arabian Peninsula and specifically 
Mecca, Jeddah and a few other southern areas, and who were allegedly responsible for 
1" For further explanation see Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas, Islam Dalam Sejarah 
Kebudayaan Melayu (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1972), 34-43, 
Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 3-24, Cesar Adib Majul, "Theories on the 
Introduction and Expansion of Islam in Malaysia", 338-342, S. Q. Fatimi, [slam Comes to 
Malaysia (Singapore : Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1963), 71, T. W. Arnold 
M. A. C. I. E. The Preaching of Islam :A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith (London : 
Constable & Company Ltd., 1913), Che Zarina Sa'ari, "A1-Ghazali's Al-Risalah al-Ladunniyyah 
and Its Influence on Malay Muslim Thought", Islamic Culture lxxvi (4) October 2002,37-64. 
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delivering the message of Islam to this area. This does not mean, however, that the study 
has concluded that the Arabs were the first carriers of Islam into Malacca. The reason for 
this is because it is parallel to the main focus of the study, which emphasizes Malay-Arab 
relations. Nonetheless, before analyzing the spread of Islam in Malacca, it has to be 
acknowledged that there were other parts of the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia which 
seem to have received the religion earlier. Historical findings by researchers might 
support such an assertion, for example the travels of Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta (early 
13`h and 14`h centuries) who observed the existence of Muslim communities in some 
areas of Southeast Asia such as Perlak, Pasai and Sumatra, and other circumstantial 
evidence revealed previously to indicate that there had been a few earlier Muslim 
contacts during those periods. '45 
Principal researchers have different opinions about how the rulers of Malacca, and 
the inhabitants, received Islam. The work of Christopher H. Wake calls upon a range of 
sources which describe how the first Muslim ruler of Malacca embraced the religion. 
Wake's main discussion, which is based on Portuguese, Malay and English literature 
revolves around whether Parameswara as the first ruler, or Iskandar Shah, the second 
ruler of Malacca, was the same person or not; and how the process of conversion applied 
to him (or them). The emphasis on the conversion of these kings is vital to an 
understanding of how Islam first spread through Malacca. 146 
ias Sir E. Denison Ross and Eileen Power (ed. ), Ibn Battuta : Travels in Asia and Africa 1325- 
1354, trans. by H. A. R. Gibb, (London : George Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1929), 273-279, 
Leonardo Olschki, Marco Polo's Asia (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1960), Barbara 
Watson Andaya and Yoneo Ishii, "Religious Developments in Southeast Asia", 169-170, S. Q. 
Fatimi, Islam Comes to Malaysia, 37-43 & 60-67. 
106 Christopher H. Wake, "Malacca's Early Kings and the Reception of Islam", 104-128. 
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There are at least three major accounts of how the early kings of Malacca 
embraced Islam. The first is based on Portuguese sources, and this argues that 
Parameswara and Iskandar Shah are different persons. The latter, at the age of seventy 
two (and perhaps the first Muslim ruler in Malacca) became Muslim after marrying a 
daughter of the ruler of Pasai. These sources also claimed that the conversion was due to 
diplomatic pressure from the King of Pasai, and Malacca's desire to share in trade with 
Java. 147 
The second comes roughly from Malay Annals such as the Hikayat Raja-Raja 
Pasai, the Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa (the Kedah Annals), and editions of Sejarah 
Melayu (by Winstedt and Shellabear) which record that the third ruler of Malacca, named 
Sri Maharaja Muhammad Syah (1425-1445), was the first Muslim king. The conversion 
of Sri Maharaja into Islam was closely linked to the king's dream of meeting the Prophet 
Muhammad (p. b. u. h) who taught him the profession of faith (Kalimah Shahadah), gave 
him a Muslim name, Muhammad, and foretold the arrival of a ship from Jeddah (Jiddah). 
The next evening, the awaited ship from Jeddah arrived and carried an eminent teacher, 
Sayyid 'Abd al-Aziz (who was one of the Prophet's own descendants) and his crew. The 
Sayyid was well received in Malacca, and the king as well as his people adopted Islam as 
their religion. 148 
14' Armando Cortesao, The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, 238 & 242-243, Christopher H. Wake, 
"Malacca's Early Kings and the Reception of Islam", 108 & 122. 
148 H. J. De Graaf, "South-East Asian Islam to the Eighteenth Century" in P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. 
Lambton and Bernard Lewis (ed. ), The Cambridge History of Islam vol. 2 (London : Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), 126, Barbara Watson Andaya and Yoneo Ishii, "Religious Developments 
in Southeast Asia", 172, and Christopher H. Wake, "Malacca's Early Kings and the Reception of 
Islam", 122, Zakaria All, Islamic Art : Southeast Asia, 830 A. D. - 1570 A. D. (Kuala Lumpur 
Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1994), 120-121. 
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The third, by Wang Gungwu and Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, was based on these 
two accounts and stated that Parameswara and Iskandar Shah were the same person, and 
also that the first Muslim ruler of Malacca was Megat Iskandar Shah (the second king, 
1414-1424). This argument connotes a few things; it is different from Tome Pires' 
sstatement that Parameswara and Iskandar Shah were different people, it rules out Sri 
Maharaja Muhammad Shah as the first Muslim Malacca ruler, but it agrees that Megat 
Iskandar Shah was the first Muslim ruler of Malacca after he married the Pasai Princess. 
The only difference between this argument and that of Tome Pires lies in the word 
`Megat'. The word Megat was missing from Tome Pires' statement, which only 
mentioned 'Xaquem Darxa' (Iskandar Shah). 
149 Hence, if Malacca's early relations with 
the Muslim Arabs are taken into account, the second argument could be noted as the 
beginning of continuous interaction between Malacca and the Arabs since the preacher 
was from Jeddah, one area of the Arabian Peninsula, later governed by Saudi Arabia. 
When the early rulers of Malacca started to embrace Islam, relations between 
Muslim traders, mainly Arabs, and the Malacca Sultanate became more intimate. This 
developed especially during the period of the third ruler of Malacca, Sultan Muzaffar 
Shah (1446-1456), 150 who extended activities in Malacca and spread Islam to 
neighbouring areas such as Kampar, and Inderagiri. The king also exchanged messages 
and presents with the kings of Aden and Hormuz, and sent local merchants to those 
149 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, 73-86. Armando Cortesao 
(trans. ), The Suma Oriental of Tome Fires, 238. 
"' Most researchers are skeptical whether Sultan Muzaffar Shah was the third ruler of Malacca. 
Other sources claim that there were four or five rulers before Sultan Muzaffar Shah. See 
Christopher H. Wake, "Malacca's Early Kings and the Reception of Islam", 104-128. 
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territories. 151 Sultan Mansur Syah (1456-1477), was also active in promoting Islam by 
building a beautiful mosque, used as a fortress for Malacca during the Portuguese rule, 
and was instructed in Islam by several Arab teachers such as Maulana Abu Bakar who 
taught a theological work entitled "Durr ul-Manzum". Furthermore, Sultan Mansur Syah 
encouraged his people to go to Mecca for pilgrimage, as he and his son planned to do, but 
unfortunately both died before achieving their goal. 152 
Besides this there were other Arab preachers who were appointed as 'Qadi' 
(judge) in the Malacca Sultanate, such as Saiyid Abdul Aziz (the first Qadi), Qadi Yusoff 
and Maulana Abu Bakar. 153 A few Arabic books containing Islamic teachings on tawheed 
and tasawwuf, such as Kitab Durr al-Manzaun by Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, and Umm al- 
Barahin by al-Sanusi, were translated and taught in Malacca, Aceh and Riau. ' 54 Other 
Muslim-Arab influences from the Malacca Sultanate remain to be seen in the Arabic 
writing on Malay Jawi inscriptions, old manuscripts and a few coins from the Malacca 
era. According to Prof. Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas there were at least five Arabic 
alphabets; jim, 'ain, fa, kaf and nun' which were synchronized into Malay-Jawi 
151 Armando Cortesao (trans. ), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, 243-245, Rita Rose Di Meglio, 
"Arab Trade with Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula", 122. 
'52 Armando Cortesao, The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, 249-251. 
153 Cesar Abd. Majid, "Theories on the Introduction and Expansion of Islam in Malaysia", 
Silliman Journal xi (4) Fourth Quarter 1964,360, Mohd. Sohaimi Esa, Ekonomi Orang Arab di 
Johor, 1862-1942 (Pusat Penataran Ilmu & Bahasa, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 1999), 22, 
Dari'ah Sulaiman, "Peranan Orang Arab Dalam Menycbarkan Agama Islam di Melaka Pada 
Abad 15M dan 16M", Latihan Ilmiah (Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
1993/94), 54,61-63. 
154 Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 21. 
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inscriptions; cha, nga, pa, ga and nya. 155 For the old manuscripts, and the coins, see the 
works of Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, 156 Zakaria Ali, 157 Dari'ah Sulaiman158 and others. 
3.2 Post-Malacca Sultanate 
After the fall of Malacca in 1511 the normal relations between Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East, especially between the Malay Peninsula and traders as well as the preachers 
from the Arabian Peninsula, were disrupted by the Portuguese occupation. 159 For 
instance, during the Aceh's reign (one of the Muslim empires in Sumatra Island emerging 
after Malacca's downfall) most Muslim traders had to sail directly across the Indian 
Ocean to Arabia, avoiding the Portuguese influence on the west coast of India and the 
Straits of Malacca. The custom duties in Malacca rose from 26,500 pardaos in 1544 to 
more than double that figure in 1584, and from 21.6 mil reis in 1586 to 27 mil by 1606. 
Although this led to some surpluses it was still insufficient to attract more Muslim traders 
to Malacca. In the 1570s and 1580s, several Arab scholars, such as Muhammad Azhari, 
Syeikh Abu'l Kheir ibn Syeikh ibn Hajar of Meca and Syeikh Muhammad of Yemen, had 
come directly from Arabian countries to teach the Muslim community about Islam in 
ºss Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas, Islam Dalam Sejarah Kebudayaan Melayu, 41. 
ºsb Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, 196 & 287-293. 
's' Zakaria Ali, Islamic Art in Southeast Asia, 131-134 & 143-157. 
158 Dari'ah Sulaiman, "Peranan Orang Arab Dalam Menyebarkan Agama Islam Di Melaka Pada 
Abad 15M dan 16M", 93,98-99 & 109. 
ºs' According to Tome Pires, after defeating the last ruler of Malacca, Sultan Mahmud, the 
Portuguese under the governorship of Afonso de Albuquerque (1509-1515) again began to 
welcome merchants and many came to Malacca. Trade between Portuguese-Malaccans and other 
foreign merchants, such as China, Bengal, Parsees (as well as Arabs) and local Malay traders was 
re-activated after the conquest. This was due to the fact that the Portuguese had seized some 
important ports, including the island of Goa off the west coast of India, in 1510 and Hormuz at 
the mouth of the Persian Gulf, in 1515. See Armando Cortesao, The Suma Oriental of Tome 
Pires, 278-289, Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 55-56, 
Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka" in Anthony Reid (ed. ), 
Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era : Trade, Power and Belief (Ithaca : Cornell University 
Press, 1993), 89, Mohd. Sohaimi Esa, Ekonomi Orang Arab di Johor, 22-23. 
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Aceh. Prior to Portuguese rule, most of these preachers landed first in India before 
heading towards Malacca. Most of the Arabs also diverted to other places in the Malay 
Archipelago such as the Sulu Islands, Borneo, Java, Sumatra and a few areas in Malay 
Peninsula, where their roles were more to do with political and religious movements. 160 
Furthermore with the arrival of the Dutch and English in the 1600s, the above 
situation was made worse, especially for the Arab traders who lost their monopoly over 
trade in the Malay Archipelago to the western traders. For example, in the 1620s there 
were no shipments of Southeast Asian pepper and spice along the old Muslim route 
between Western Asia, the Far East and the Spice Islands of Moluccas, to the Red Sea. 
Moreover, in the 1650s the Dutch also blocked a few Indian Muslim ships from trading in 
Aceh. As a result, by the eighteenth century Muslim shipping was predominantly local, 
and those local ships were not allowed to carry certain goods like tin and pepper, except 
for some ships granted the privilege by the colonial authorities. This indirectly made 
several Muslim ports such as Aceh, Johor-Riau, and Jeddah somewhat less important as 
commercial centres. The pilgrims also had to transship several times through various 
ports before reaching Mecca. The bitter rivalry between the Portuguese and the Dutch 
wishing to take charge of Malacca and its neighbouring areas also added to the 
160 Anthony Reid, "Islamization and Christianization in Southeast Asia : The Critical Phase, 1550- 
1650" in Anthony Reid (ed. ) Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era : Trade, Power and Belief 
(Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1993), 162-163, Yahya Abu Bakar, "The Dutch Threats to 
Melaka, 1600-1641", International Seminar on Malaysian History from Dutch Sources, October 
23-25,2001, Melaka, 1-11, Mohd. Sohaimi Esa, Ekonomi Orang Arab di Johor, 22-23. 
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complexity of trade patterns, as well as affecting the expansion of Islam in the post- 
Malacca period. 161 
Not only trading activities and the spread of Islam changed between the Malay 
and the Arabs in the colonial period, but also the reactions of the post-Malacca Malay 
kingdoms like Johor, Aceh and others, which were more focused on re-capturing Malacca 
from the European powers (mainly the Portuguese and Dutch). For example one of the 
closest descendants of the Malacca Sultanate, the Kingdom of Johor, launched several 
attacks against the Portuguese in Malacca. 162 They were followed by Aceh, which used 
close connections with the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor to oust the Portuguese. 163 The 
struggle against the Portuguese occupation continued until the Dutch reign, beginning in 
1641 after toppling the Portuguese in Malacca with the help of Johore. In other words, 
after the fall of Malacca, relations between the Malay and the Arabs were coloured by the 
course of the European presence in Southeast Asia. 
161 Anthony Reid, "Islamization and Christianization in Southeast Asia", in Anthony Reid (ed. ) 
Southeast Asia in the Early Modem Era, 163, Ahmad Jelani Halimi, "Perkapalan dan 
Perdagangan Melayu Dengan Melaka Pada Separuh Kedua Abad Ke-18", International Seminar 
on Malaysian History from Dutch Sources, October 23-25, Melaka, 1-41. 
162 For further details see Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor 1641-1728 (Kuala Lumpur : 
Oxford University Press, 1975). 
163 For discussion of Aceh's relations with the Ottoman empire see Ha Suminto, "Relations 
Between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim Kingdoms of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago" 
Der Islam 57 1980,301-310. 
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3.3 British Influence in the 19th Century 
The first British occupation of the Malay Peninsula came through the acquisition of 
Penang (one of the Malaysian states) by Francis Light in August 1786.1 64 Roughly 
speaking, Britain acquired full ascendancy over Malacca and most of the Malay 
Peninsula from the Netherlands in 1824, after both parties agreed a treaty indicating their 
areas of influence. The treaty gave British the upper hand over the Dutch in most of the 
Malay Peninsula, while the Dutch took control over the Indonesian Islands. 165 Needless 
to say, the British arrival in the early 19th century brought some changes with regard to 
the Malay and Arab relations. The British government encouraged foreign traders, mainly 
the Arabs and the Chinese, to trade in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore with the 
removal of custom duties, and Stamford Raffles stated : "Let the Chinese and Arabs still 
trade to the eastward. Without them, the trade would be reduced to less than one third of 
even what it is at present; but let their trade be regulated". 166 Not only that, the Britsih 
administration in Malaya also conducted some economic activities with Arabia, for 
instance, between 1921-1930, the former exported some of its commodities like 
pineapple canned, dried fruits, and others to the latter. 167 
16' See John Bastin and R. Roolvink (ed. ), Malayan and Indonesian Studies : Essays Presented to 
Sir Richard Winstedt (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1964), 140. 
165 Malayan Year Book 1936 (Singapore : Government Printing Office, 1936), 14, J. B. Dalton, 
"The Development of Malayan External Policy, 1957-1963", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Oxford 
: University of Oxford, 1967), vol. 1,10-11. 
166 Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 162. 
167 British Malaya, Return of Foreign Imports and Exports During the Year, 1921 (Singapore 
The Methodist Publishing House, 1922), 94-97, CO 740/1, British Malaya, Return of Foreign 
Imports and Exports During the Year, 1925 (Singapore : The Methodist Publishing House, 1926), 
57 & 81, CO 740/3, British Malaya, Return of Foreign Imports and Exports During the Year, 
1930 (Singapore : The Methodist Publishing Mouse, 1931), 94-97, CO 740/8. All this information 
adopted from British Public Record Office, UK. 
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Despite some rules and policies implemented by the British to limit the role of 
religion in politics and government administration, which inevitably caused stiff 
resistance from a few Malay nationalists, 168 they did not, however, prevent the Muslim 
community from performing religious activities such as pilgrimage and studying Islam in 
Mecca and Medina. In contrast with the tough administration run by the Dutch in 
Indonesia, 169 the British managed to create a balance between their interests and Islamic 
needs in order to create political and socio-economic stability in the Malay Peninsula. As 
the outcome of this `loose' British policy, relations between the Malay and the Arabs 
again started to develop through the processes of migration, pilgrimage and education. 
For instance, when the British founded an entrepot in Singapore in 1819, this indirectly 
dashed Riau-Johore's hope of rebuilding its own commercial development. Singapore 
became an important trading (as well as Islamic) centre in Southeast Asia. This situation 
subsequently attracted a lot of Arab migrants, especially from the Hadhramaut region, to 
settle in Singapore, Penang and Malacca. In 1901, it was estimated that there were about 
1,508 Arab settlers in the Straits of Settlements, and almost 1,000 in Singapore. 170 
Overall, there were about 2012 Arabs in Malay lands in 1891, and this number increased 
to 5718 in 1947.171 
168 Richard Winstedt, The Malays :A Cultural History, revised and updated by Tham Seong Chee 
(Singapore : Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd., 1961), 176-184. 
169 See for instance Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 3, P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. 
Lambton and Bernard Lewis (ed. ), The Cambridge History of Islam, 170-171, M. Dien Majid, 
"Aktivitas Travel Haji Firma Al-Segaff & Co, 1885-1899, di Semenanjung Mclayu Dalam Arsip 
Belanda", International Seminar on Malaysian History from Dutch Sources, October 23-25, 
Melaka, 2-3. 
170 William R. Roff, "The Malayo-Muslim World of Singapore at the Close of the Nineteenth 
Century", Journal of Asian Studies 24 (1) 1964,81, Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan- 
Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia", Journal of Asian Studies 26 (2) February 1967,270. 
171 Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 139 and Mohd. Sohaimi Esa, Ekonomi Orang 
Arab di Johor, 54. 
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As for pilgrimage, due to the less stringent British policy the Malay Muslims 
found no obstacle in travelling to Mecca. Even in the mid-nineteenth century, in order to 
avoid Dutch restrictions a number of Indonesians (about 2,000 pilgrims) took passage 
from Singapore before embarking to Mecca. 172 Meanwhile, in the field of education, 
under the British influence Singapore unexpectedly attracted a lot of students from all 
over the Malay Archipelago, as well as several scholars from the Arabian Peninsula. 
These came mainly from Hadhramaut, people who had studied in Mecca, and this also 
led to the emergence of a few schools built by Arabs such as Madrasah al-Junied in 
Singapore, Madrasah al-Masyur in Penang, Madrasah al-Attar al-Arabiyah in Johore and 
Madrasah al-Attas in Pahang. In other words, Singapore and several Malay states under 
British influence played a vital role in setting up a communication network, particularly 
between the Malay Peninsula and the Hejaz. 173 
Among other factors that led to the re-establishment of Malay Muslim and Arab 
relations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (during British influence in 
the Malay Peninsula) was also the emergence of the Pan-Islam movement, an ideological 
basis for co-operation between or beyond individual political units in a political struggle 
under the banner of Islam, and Wahhabism, a puritanical sect, which captured Mecca in 
1803. These two movements indirectly drove Moslem communities towards a 
172 In fact before 1895, a small fee was levied on pilgrim passports in British Malaya. After that 
date the fee was no longer required. William R. Roff, "The Malayo-Muslim World of Singapore", 
79-80. For a brief comparison with the Dutch see Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam, 
270. 
"' William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur : University of Malaya 
Press, 1967), 43, William R. Roff, "The Malayo-Muslim World of Singapore", 83, Mahayudin 
Haji Yahaya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 163, Mohd. Sohaimi Esa, Ekonomi Orang Arab di Johor, 
125, Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 194 & 234. 
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purification of their faith and a return to the Koran's basic teachings as well as placing 
emphasis on Jihad (the holy war) for both religious teachers and leaders. This occurred 
via the propagation of particular methods such as the 'Islah' (reformation) engineered by 
Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Syeikh Muhammad Abduh, and also the mystical Sufi 
brotherhoods (tariqat) namely the Naqshabandiah, 'Alawiyah, Ahmadiyah, and others. 174 
These two methods, however, adopted different approaches to facing the foreign powers 
in the Malay Archipelago. These movements (particularly under Pan-Islam) were less 
influential in the Malay Peninsula due to the fact that most of the Malay states were less 
structured as Islamic authorities, for instance being governed by a more traditional 
aristocracy, compared with their Indonesian counterparts, mainly Aceh, Java, Palembang 
and others. 175 
3.4 Relations in the Early 20th Century 
The issues of Arab migration, pilgrimage, education, Pan-Islam and British colonial 
policy continued to influence relations between the Malay and Arabian Peninsulas in the 
20th century. The writings of Moshe Yegar, 176 Anthony Reid, 177 Mahayudin Haji 
Yahaya, 178 Mohd. Sohaimi Esa, 179 and Fred R. von der Mehden, 180 showed how these 
174 The influence of the Sufi movement in spreading Islam in Malay Peninsula after the Malacca 
cannot be ignored. This has been acknowledged by Dr. A. H. Johns, who believed that the early 
expansion of Islam was accompanied by the `Sheikh' (Sufi trade guilds), and not merely by 
ordinary trading activities. See S. Q. Fatimi, Islam Comes to Malaya, 71. 
175 Fred R. von Mehden, Two World's of Islam, 7, Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, Islam di Alam 
Melayu, 121-123, P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton & Bernard Lewis, The Cambridge History of 
Islam, vol. 2,174-175, Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam", 267, Barbara Andaya, 
History of Malaysia, 119. 
176 Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya : Policies and Implementation 
(Jerusalem : The Hebrew University Press, 1979). 
177 Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam", 269-271. 
178 Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 124-140 & 160-164.. 
179 Mohd. Sohaimi Esa, Ekonomi Orang Arab di Johor, 107-195. 
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particular issues frequently impact upon those relationships. About Arab migrants, Moshe 
Yegar, Anthony Reid, Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, and Mohd. Sohaimi Esa mention a few 
Arab families who settled in certain Malay states in the early 20`h century, mainly in 
Singapore, Penang, Pahang, Johor and Malacca; such as the family of Syed Alawiyah 
from Hadhramaut in Singapore, Pahang and Johor, Al-Juneid in Singapore, and Abdul 
Rahman Al-Sagoff from Arabia who came to Malacca in the 19`h century. The Al-Sagoff 
family played an important role in maintaining Malay and Arab connections, such as 
acting as the agent of the Sultan of the Hadhramaut in the management of several firms, 
and also as representatives of the Sharif of the Hejaz. The Al-Sagoff family represented 
by their grandson, Syed Omar ibn Mohammed Al-Sagoff, and Syed Alwee Al-Juneid 
became a member of the Muhammedan Advisory Board which was established in 
Singapore on June 10`h, 1915.181 
In 1920, Malaya sent about 12,000-14,000 pilgrims to Mecca, one of the largest 
contingents from Southeast Asia. (Indonesians were the largest, sending about 52,000 
pilgrims). It was argued that the main reason behind the rapid increase was due to the Ibn 
Saud conquest of Mecca in the 1920s and the wide influence of Pax Wahhabica, both 
fostering Pan-Islamic ideas throughout the Islamic world. 182 For instance, the study by 
Zakaria Daud showed how the Wahhabism movement, to some extent, influenced a 
group of Malay Muslim people in Perlis (one of the Malaysian states). Zakaria quoted 
180 Fred R. von der Mehden, Two World's of Islam, 4-14. 
181 Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya, 14 & 98, Anthony Reid, 
"Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam", 271. Mahayudin focused more on Syed descendants in Pahang, 
and Mohd. Sohaimi on the Arabs in Johore. See notes 178 & 179 in the Chapter III. 
182 P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis (ed. ), The Cambridge History of Islam, 182, 
Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 4. 
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several Saudi Muslim scholars who were proponents of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab 
and who taught Islam in Perlis, such as Sheikh Hassan and Sheikh Nur al-Surur from 
Medina in the 1920s. 183 Furthermore the ideas of Pan-Islamism also encouraged Malay- 
Indonesian students to form associations during their studies in the Middle East, such as 
The Association of Indonesian and Malay Students in Saudi Arabia, Persatuan Tabibah 
Indonesia Malaysia (PERTINDOM), Jami'ah Al-Khairiah in Egypt, and Majlis 
Kebangsaan Indonesia-Malaya (MAKINDOM) in Iraq. 184 
The British administration in Malaya, however, did manage to prevent the 
majority of the Malay Muslim community from being prejudiced by the ideologies of the 
Pan-Islam movement. For example, although Great Britain and the Commonwealth were 
at war against Turkey and its allies during World War I, Malay leadership was still loyal 
to the British, and asked their people not to give aid to the Turks. Alun Jones has argued 
that this revealed the strength of Malay royal and aristocrat ties with Britain. 
Nevertheless, prior to the war, Britain had to make certain proclamations and promises to 
justify its war against Turkey including the guaranteed protection of Muslim holy places, 
shrines and the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. 185 Most Malay rulers have preferred to 
send students to study in Mecca rather than in Egypt; as one of the Sultans of Selangor 
said : "In Mecca one could study religion only, in Cairo politics as well". '86 
183 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahhab dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap 
Ajaran Ahli Sunnah wal-Jamaah di Perlis, 451-453. 
184 Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 5. 
185 Alun Jones, "Internal Security in British Malaya, 1895-1942", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Yale 
University, 1970), 33 & 36-37. 
186 Fred R. von der Meliden, Two Worlds of Islam, 5-7. 
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3.5 Political-Economic Relations in the Post-Independence Era 
Before independence, formal relations between Malaya and Saudi Arabia had yet to be 
established. For example, in terms of economic interaction between 1936 and 1939 there 
were no Middle Eastern nations, including Saudi Arabia, listed in the Malayan Yearbook 
for import-export activities. 187 Nevertheless since Malaya, which later became Malaysia 
after Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined in 1963, achieved independence on August 
31St 1957, relations between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia were more properly structured 
and largely centred on political and socio-economic matters. This was enhanced by the 
establishment of a Malaysian embassy in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia in 1964 and 
the appointment of Tunku Abd. Rahaman, the first Malaysian Prime Minister, as the first 
Secretary of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1970.188 
From the 1970s onwards, the extent of relations was growing; perhaps due to the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979. The Saudi government, worrying about the influence of 
Khomeini (among other factors), supported a lot of religious programmes and donated a 
large amount of money to Muslim countries in South-East Asia, including Malaysia. 
Among the Islamic organizations or institutions in Malaysia that received Saudi 
donations were the Muslim College in Petaling Jaya, Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam 
Malaysian (PERKIM), International Islamic University of Malaysia (UIAM), the 
Regional Islamic Organization for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP). Other 
religious activities included building mosques and Muslim schools in diverse areas of 
187 Malayan Year Book 1936 (Singapore : Government Printing Office, 1936), 117, Malayan Year 
Book 1939 (Singapore : Government Printing Office, 1939), 123, Fred R. von der Mehden, Two 
World's of Islam, 2. 
188 G. K. A. Kumaraseri, Diplomasi Profesional dan Pengurusan Hal-Ehwal Negeri : Pengalaman 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1995). 
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Malaysia. The range of donations was between about RM200,000-RM600,000.189 Along 
with that there were certain trade agreements signed between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, 
namely Economic and Technical Cooperation (1975), the Cultural and Scientific 
Cooperation Agreement (1976), and Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement 
(1993). 190 Saudi Arabia ranks 27 `h in Malaysia's external trading partners. 191 
Furthermore, in terms of international political relations, both countries have been 
jointly active in the Organization of Islamic Conference, to discuss Muslim issues around 
the world such as the question of Palestine, the Iranian Revolution, the invasion of 
Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War and terrorist threats. These issues continuously 
influence the nature and extent of relations between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, 
especially at the global level as both countries are seen as having the potential to lead 
developing nations, especially Muslim countries, to better their positions at the global 
level. By the same token, Malaysia has always encouraged the Saudi government to play 
a bigger role in Muslim world affairs, as their country is wealthier and the custodian of 
two holy cities, Mecca and Medina. 192 
1B9 J. S. Solomon, Challenging Times : Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra (Pctaling Jaya : Pelanduk 
Publications, 1986), 139 & 146, Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 18-19. 190 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), "Opening of Caravan Malaysia 2003 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia", December 7,2003 (http: //www. niiti. ), ), ov. iily/si)eech-7decO3. htnil). 
19' Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE), "Overseas Market 
Information, Saudi Arabia", (MATRADE Branch, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, 1999-2000). 
192 For further discussion see Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy (London 
Routledge, 1997), Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 38-63. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
It has been noticeable that socio-economic and religious elements mostly influenced 
relations between the Malay and the Arabian Peninsula between the early 15`h to I9`h 
centuries, notwithstanding that in the 17th and I Sth centuries, more effort was spent on re- 
capturing Malacca by launching attacks against the Portuguese and Dutch. Despite the 
attacks continuing during the British presence between the early 19th and 20th centuries, 
the British government was able to accommodate the challenge fomented by a group of 
Malay nationalists. The decline of the Ottoman Empire also subsequently had less impact 
upon the anti-colonialism movement in the Malay Peninsula. 
The researcher, however, found difficulty identifying those Arabs originating 
from the Arabian Peninsula (such as Jeddah, Mecca, Medina and other neighbouring 
areas), who came to Malacca, and other Malay territories, especially before and during 
the era of the Malacca Sultanate. This is because most previous researchers only mention 
`the Arabs' without referring to any specific territories or regions in the Arab lands. 
Nevertheless, the works of Tome Pires, H. J. De Graaf, Barbara Watson Andaya and 
Yoneo Ishii, Zakaria Ali, Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, Mohd. Sohaimi Esa and other 
researchers have given some helpful pointers to support the discussion of this study. In 
spite of this shortfall in detail, the study has found that although the two political entities 
are geographically separated, the ancient link between the Malay Peninsula and the 
Arabian Peninsula operated to an extent through two main mechanisms, trade and 
religious expansion, which together thoroughly typify the character of the relationship. 
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In other words, the remoteness of the geographical regions was not enough to keep them 
apart. 
This relationship has continued to grow until the present day. However, the main 
feature of the connection is a little different to that of previous decades, because both 
entities have become modern states. The interaction is more diplomatic, in the fields of 
politics, economics, and socio-religion. Therefore, in order to further understand the 
current attribute of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, the study would like to focus 
on the four key determining factors; namely the nature of state and regime interest, 
economic determinants, religious affiliation, and the membership in small states' 
organizations (systemic factor), that influence the degree of the relations, specifically 
since Malaysia achieved independence in 1957 in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER IV 
4.0 THE NATURE OF STATE AND REGIME INTERESTS 
It is undeniable that the nature of state and its regime interests are among the main 
elements influencing a state's relations with others. This is also with the case of 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia where the nature of state and the regime interests 
of both countries, particularly for the former, play the leading role to enhance the degree 
of the relations. The nature of the state will be defined here as the character of the state 
itself, and the regime interests193 will be referred to some particular interests that the 
prevailing system of a government (the regime of a state) is pursuing in order to preserve 
its political continuity both at domestic and international, especially in augmenting its 
relations with other states. 194 
In examining how the nature of state and the regime interests may influence the 
character of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, this chapter will discuss three major 
193 In the International Relations perspective, the word `regime' is usually defined as a framework 
of rules, expectations and prescriptions between actors (both state and non-state actors) in 
international relations. The operation of a regime is closely linked to the actors' common 
membership in a few special purpose organizations which are based on the principle of 
reciprocity. Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International 
Relations (London : Penguin Books Ltd., 1998), 471-472. 
"' Or as Gerd Nonneman (in his study on the Middle East and North Africa states' relations with 
Europe) has argued that : "..... These interests are essentially those of regime survival and 
consolidation, and state consolidation, and the acquisition of the political and economic means to 
ensure them". Gerd Nonneman, "Introduction" in Gerd Nonneman (ed. ), Analyzing Middle East 
Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe (Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, 2005), 3. 
Beside that, the usage of the word regime to the prevailing system of government is widely 
applied in a few previous studies like In-Won Ilwang, Personalized Politics : The Malaysian State 
under Mahathir (Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 5-16, Sarah Yizraeli, 
The Remaking of Saudi Arabia : The Struggle Between King Sa'ud and Crown Prince Faysal. 
1953-1962 (Ramat Aviv, Israel : The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern & African Studies, 
Tel Aviv University, 1997), Fred Haliday, Arabia Without Sultans (see the sub-topic "The 
Origins of the Saudi State"), (London : Saqi Books, 2002), and others. 
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points. Firstly, the study will analyze the character of both countries as a modem state as 
well as will identify any particular interests that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia attempt to 
conserve for their regime survival. Secondly, this chapter will chronologically examine 
the development of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia since the Tunku Abdul 
Rahman to the Mahathir regimes and also from the Saudi regime side. The examination is 
vital in order to show that the degree of the relations is varied (whether the relations is 
growing or vice-versa) under the prevailing different regimes or leadership. Thirdly, 
which is more important, is the discussion on the significance of the relations for the 
maintenance of both regime political interests locally and internationally. The overall 
discussion on this chapter will be based upon the leadership periods of both countries for 
it illustrates the political authority of Malaysian and Saudi Arabian regimes. 
4.1 The Character of State and Regime Interests 
As has been mentioned before, the nature or the character of state and regime interests of 
both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia will be examined. The main focus will begin with the 
early emergence of both countries as a modem state or the day Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia achieved their own global recognition from great powers and international 
society. For the regime interests, the study will analyze the interests or the challenges that 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's regimes have to preserve or to face in prolonging their 
political continuity at domestic and international level. 
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4.1.1 Malaysia 
Malaysia or previously known as `Malaya' was a former British colony in the Southeast 
Asian region. It successfully achieved independence from Great Britain in 1957. 
Malaysia began with one political-territory, Malay Peninsula (the basic foundation of 
Malaya) and later joined by two Borneo territories, Sabah and Sarawak, to form the 
Federation of Malaysia in 1963.195 Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy government. It 
consists of 13 states and one federal territory (Wilayah Persekutuan) with three 
components; City of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya. 196. Unlike Saudi Arabia 
where the monarch has absolute power over the constitution and the masses (will be 
discussed later under sub-topic "Saudi Arabia"), the Malaysian King is only a symbol of 
government and on most subjects acts on the advice of his ministers. 197 The real holder of 
political power in the Malaysian government is the political party that emerged victorious 
in general elections which will be responsible for running the parliament and forming the 
cabinet ministers. 198 For the Malaysian case, the Party of Barisan Nasional (National 
Front) led by United Malay National Organization (UMNO) is the dominant party and 
has been in control since the first general election in August 1959 till the last election in 
2004.199 
'9s Singapore also joined the Federation of Malaysia but it withdrew in 1965 to form its own 
government, the Republic of Singapore. See for instance, R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Politics 
and Government in Malaysia (Singapore : Times Books International, 1980), 1-2. 
1% CIA, The World Factbook, "Malaysia", last updated 1 November 2005, 
(littp: //www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mv. html). 
197 R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, 37, Mohd. Foad Sakdan, 
Pengetahuan Asas Politik Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1997), 154. 
'98 R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, 37. 
'99 In 2004, Barisan Nasional gained more than 90 per cent of the Malaysian voters. Syed Farid 
Alatas, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and Malaysia : The Rise of the Post- 
Colonial State (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), 3, Asia Source, "Special Report: Malaysia 
Elections 2004", March 29,2004, 
(http: //www. asiasource. orit/news/at mp 02. cfnY? newsid=110070). 
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The long endurance of Barisan Nasional in domineering the Malaysian politics is 
closely linked with the hegemonic influence of UMNO, founded in 1946, as the Malay 
leading party over its other component alliance parties like Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA), Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) and others. 200 The significance of UMNO in 
the Malaysian politics is unquestionable for it is the party that represents most of the 
Malay community (as the Malaysian biggest ethnic group) in Malaysia along side with 
several other Malay parties like PAS, Berjasa, Parti Rakyat Malaysia and et cetera. On 
top of that, UMNO has preceded other Malay parties that uphold the interests and the 
rights of Malay people, especially in its struggle against the establishment of the Malayan 
Union by the British Malaya administration which threatened the power of the Malay 
rulers. Through UMNO leaders' effort also, especially the first Malaysian premier, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, with the alliance of MCA and MIC, Malaysia was able to achieve 
independence in 1957. In other words, the contribution of UMNO in the process of 
nation-building in Malaysia is quite obvious. 201 
Yet, although Barisan Nasional-led by UMNO has been in power for a long 
period of time which is about 45 years, it needlessly means that the National Front, 
especially UMNO does not encounter any problems or challenges that could weaken its 
political hegemony in Malaysia. In fact, the UMNO regime is incessantly facing a 
dilemma in maintaining its political authority among its coalition-partners as well as with 
other political opposition parties. There are two major issues that critically haunting the 
200 R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, 355-358, R. S. Milne & 
Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London : Routledge, 1999), 2, David 
Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London : Routledge, 1994), 225 & 244. 201 See for instance, R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, 23-43, 
123-125 & 352-364. 
74 
UMNO regime since the day of independence; the issue of multi-ethnic and the domestic 
religious pressure, Islam. The issue of Malaysia's multi-ethnic which consists of Malay 
(55%), Chinese (27.3%), Indians (7.7%) and others, 202 had left `appalling memory' for 
the Malaysian society when a riot broke out in 1969 between the Malay and the Chinese 
communities. The main cause of the riot is mostly linked with the unequal distribution of 
economy among various ethnic in Malaysia. The riot too had called Tun Razak, the 
second premier, to introduce the New Economic Policy (NEP) to re-balance the 
economic distribution. 203 For the domestic Islamic pressure, which rapidly began to 
mount from Tun Hussein Orin to Dr. Mahathir (the third and the fourth Malaysian 
premiers), predominantly following the Iranian revolution in 1979, the UMNO regime 
has to deal with the strong demand of Muslim population in Malaysia, mostly the 
Malays, 204 to implement Islamic laws and principles in the government. This was also 
due to the strong challenge by the Islamic party, PAS, which used Islam as the main 
setting of its own political agenda. 205 
In managing the first issue, the UMNO regime employed, at least, three kinds of 
the so-called `democratic administration'. In the beginning of the establishment of 
202 In-Won Hong, Personalized Politics : The Malaysian State under Mahathir (Singapore 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 4. 
203 The riot began with the victory of two Chinese political parties, Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) and Gerakan, in the Malay's stronghold area, Kuala Lumpur in the general election of 
1969. The supporters of these two political parties taunted the slogan "The Malays have fallen" 
which indirectly provoked the Malays (enginered by UMNO) to demonstrate. The demonstration, 
however, ended up in a riot between the Malays and the Chinese. David Brown, The State and 
Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, 230-23 1. 
204 Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia : From Revivalism to Islamic State? (Singapore : Singapore 
University Press, 1993), 17-30. 
205 See David Brown on PAS political orientation. David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in 
Southeast Asia, 223-224. 
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Malaysia as a multi-ethnic country, the UMNO regime emphasized the concept of 
consociational bargaining with an attempt to mutually accommodating the interests of 
inter-ethnic elites. 206 However, when the riot of 1969 erupted where the Malays in 
particular felt threatened by the Chinese racial sentiment, the UMNO regime's approach 
led by the second premier, Tun Razak, changed abruptly to be more `discriminate' by 
vastly increasing Malays' participation in political and economic activities under the New 
Economic Policy. 207 Then, during the era of Dr. Mahathir where his idiosyncratic values 
is more influential, the UMNO regime has exercised more tightened controls by applying 
various ways including the control over media, frequent use of Internal Security Act 
(ISA), banning students from involving in politics and others in order to curb any 
negative racial sentiments that could dampen Malaysia's political stability. 208 The 
tightened control of the Mahathir regime has led to some researchers to conclude that 
Malaysia's democracy is 'pseudo-democracy'. 209 Despite the tightened control of UMNO 
206 Consociational Democracy is a situation in which two or more ethnic blocs, roughly equal in 
power, cooperated in spite of remaining substantially separate in their activities, through 
agreement between their leaders, who at the same time were able to retain the support of their 
followers. In Malaysia, the National Front seems to follow this consociationalism but the 
difference is the predominance of UMNO is clearly recognized. R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, 
Politics and Government in Malaysia, 355-358. 
207 In-Won Hong, Personalized Politics : The Malaysian State under Mahathir, 9-11, Hussin 
Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia, 27-28. 
208 The tightened control was also related with the sack of Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy 
Prime Minister, in 1998 which accelerated tension among Muslim intellectuals and the UMNO 
regime. William Case, "Testing Malaysia's pseudo-democracy" in in Edmund Terence Gomez 
(ed. ), The State of Malaysia : Ethnicity, Equity and Reform (London : Routledge Cuzon, Taylor 
& Francis Group, 2004), 32-33. 
20' Wiliam Case defined pseudo-democracy as the government has limited, but not fully 
extinguished civil liberties, while distorting, but not tightly rigging electoral procedures with also 
the dominance of a single party like UMNO in Malaysia. Pseudo-democracy in Malaysia could 
also be illustrated in the words of In-won Hong who had put into : "coercive consociationalism 
implies centralized federalism, political dominance of one party in cabinet and government, no 
constitutional establishment of mutual veto on the sensitive issues, especially under Mahathir 
era". William Case, "Testing Malaysia's pseudo-democracy", 29, In-Won Hong, Personalized 
Politics : The Malaysian State under Mahathir, 9. 
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as well as much favour to the Malays, the regime still safeguard its `intimate relations' 
with a group of economically dominant class, predominantly Chinese capitalists in 
continuingly gaining support from its coalition partners in the National Front. 210 
Meanwhile, to appease the Islamic pressure, the UMNO regime, especially under Dr. 
Mahathir's Islamization programme, incorporated Islamic values in a few governmental 
as well as private institutions and also building several Islamic institutions such as 
Islamic Bank, Islamic University of Malaysia and others. The UMNO leaders also stress 
the importance of Malaysia's active involvement in Islamic activities at the international 
level like the participation in the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the maintenance 
of intimate relations with other Muslim countries, specifically Malaysia's relations with 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Mecca and Medina, in order to justify 
UMNO's position as the guardian of Islam in the eyes of Malay audience. 211 
210 Or as argued by Howard H. Lentner that those wealthy entrepreneurial classes composed 
predominantly of Chinese have been modified, not by appropriating Chinese property but rather 
by providing special opportunities for the mostly rural bumiputra and by putting into place 
programs favoring the latter's acquisition of industrial property as well as education and training. 
Thus far, these policies and programs have contributed to both economic growth and social peace 
and equity. Howard H. Lentner, "Modernization and Foreign Policy : An Alternative Approach to 
the Global South", in Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (ed. ), The Foreign Policies of the 
Global South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 
179, and see also Syed Farid Alatas, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and Malaysia, 
42. 
211 For a good discussion on UMNO's Islamization agenda, see for instance, Kikue Hamayotsu, 
"Islamisation, Patronage and Political Ascendancy : The Politics and Business of Islam in 
Malaysia", in Edmund Terence Gomez (ed. ), The State of Malaysia : Ethnicity, Equity and 
Reform (London : Routledge Cuzon, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), especially pages 229-230, 
Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia, 30, R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under 
Mahathir (London : Routledge, 1999). For Malaysia's participation in the OIC, see Chapter VII. 
77 
4.1.2 Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as has been stated in the Chapter III, was officially 
became a sovereign state212 in 1932. Prior to this date, Al-Saud family had attempted to 
create the Kingdom twice; between 1747-1818 and 1824-1891, but all these efforts were 
less successful. 213 The Kingdom, however, eventually emerged as a more stable state in 
1932 under the new leadership of King Abdul Al-Aziz Ibn Saud (1901-1953) who 
conquered Asir and Hejaz in 1925 and simultaneously drove the Hashemite family into 
exile. 214 Principally, the nature of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchical or royal 
state. The royal family of this Kingdom is originated from the descendant of Najd tribal 
leader (or as Amir in Ad-Diriyah near Riyadh), King Muhammad Ibn Saud (1726-1765). 
In order to strengthen the political authority of Al-Saud family against other tribal 
societies in the Arabian Peninsula like the Hashemites, Al-Rashidis, Al-Shammar and 
others, the King collaborated with Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab215, the founder 
of the Wahhabism ideology, to establish the political authority of Al-Saud family. 
Through this continuous politico-religious collaboration, with the British support, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was at last completed in 1932.216 
212 There are four essential elements of a state; the people, the territory, the government, and the 
sovereignty. Joseph Frankel, International Politics : Conflict and Harmony, 37-38, P. A. Reynolds, 
An Introduction to International Relations, 16. 
213 For further explanation see for instance, Taha Osman El-Farra, "The Effects of Detribalizing 
the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State : The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia", 
Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, (University of Pittsburgh, Greensbury, USA, 1973), 86, Mohamed 
Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History, 1924-1964", Unpublished Ph. D Thesis 
(University of Utah, USA, 1970), 2-12,13-24 & 25-27. 
214 Fred Haliday, Arabia Without Sultans, 49. 
215 Researchers are in disagreement on the exact date of birth and the death of Sheikh Ibn Abd al- 
Wahab. See note 546 in the Chapter VI. 
216 Ghassan Salame, "Political Power and the Saudi State", in Berch Berberoglu (ed. ), Power and 
Stability in the Middle East (New Jersey : Zed Books Ltd., 1989), 70-71, Roger Owen, State, 
Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York : Routledge, 2004), 52, 
78 
Realizing the nature of Saudi Arabian state is a royal state or rather called as 
`family state', 217 the major political interest of the Saudi regime is to ensure the survival 
and the stability of political authority of Al-Saud family both at home and international 
arena. This is because the Saudi regime is facing a lot of challenges and threats that 
capable of toppling it from ruling the Kingdom. Therefore, the way the Saudi regime 
governs the Kingdom is full with suspicions and anxiety, particularly of its own security. 
In the beginning, for example, the regime was highly cautious with the Hashemites 
challenges, especially the monarchs in Iraq and Transjordan who would one day avenge 
Al-Saud family for driving them out of the central power in the Arabian Peninsula. 218 The 
Saudi regime also was deeply concerned with the influence of Jamal Abdel Nasser, the 
Egyptian premier who was able to spread social revolutions in a few countries in the 
Middle East like Yemen and Syria. Moreover, Nasser's Pan-Arabism, to some extend, 
had agitated Saudi regime's quest for leadership in the Arab world. 219 Along with these, 
Al-Saud family was also facing several domestic threats posed by some oppositional 
groups and a few Muslim extremists such as 1969 air force coup, the National Liberation 
Front associated with dissident Prince Talal, 1979 Mecca rebellion and others. 22° 
Fred Haliday, Arabia Without Sultans, 47-49, Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia, 
149. 
217 Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia, 149. 
218 However, these two challenges were declining, specifically the Hashemites government in Iraq 
which was overthrown by a revolution led by Arab nationalist officers believed to be partisans of 
Nasser on July 14,1958. This was added with the Saudi regime's new approach which was in 
favour of `mutual relations' with the two Hashemites following the aftermath of the Suez War in 
1956, in order to curb the influence of Egypt in the Arab world. Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia : The 
Ceaseless Quest for Security (Cambridge : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1985), 77-83 & 88. 
2'9 Abdullah M. Sindi, "King Faisal and Pan-Islamism" in Willard A. Beling (ed. ), King Faisal 
and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia (London : Croom Helm, 1980), especially, 184-187. 
220 Ghassan Salame, "Political Power and the Saudi State", 80 & 86, R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The 
Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Journal 48 (4), Autumn 1994,628 (627- 
643). 
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In tackling all the above challenges as well as suppressing the threats, various 
approaches have been applied by the Saudi regime. These include the strong 
collaboration with Wahhabism ideology, gaining support as well as political recognition 
from the British government, and the establishment of Al-Ikhwan group (later replaced 
with the National Guard) which helps King Ibn Saud ((1901-1953) to conquer a few more 
territories in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly to recapture Hejaz from the Hashemites. 
Furthermore, Al-Saud regime had interchangeably `used' Egypt as a friend and a foe to 
contain its traditional-political enemies in the Arab-Muslim world. As an exemplar, in 
countering the Hashemites, particularly the Iraqi monarch who joined the Baghdad Pact 
in February 1955, King Saud (1953-1964) concluded a mutual defence treaty with Egypt 
in October 1955. King Saud's effort was to isolate Iraq as well as prevent Jordan from 
joining the pact which was considered as a part of the Hashemite reawakening. 221 
Nevertheless, when the influence of Jamal Abdel Nasser was gradually overwhelming 
Al-Saud family among the Arab counterparts, especially after the Suez War which Egypt 
actively attempted to promote its anti-West and supported anti-monarch movements, the 
mutual relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt turned into sour when, for instance, 
both regimes clashed in the Yemen event. 222 Besides that, the Saudi regime is 
continuously maintaining its economic relations with the US, through ARAMCO, as an 
outside support and a guarantee for Saudi oil development in the future. 223 
22' Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia : The Ceaseless Quest for Security, 78. 
222 The Yemen event showed the stiff rivalry between revolutionary socialism against traditional 
monarchical conservative. The Nasser regime recognized the army revolution led by Colonel 
Abdullah al-Salleh to denounce Imam Muhammad al-Badr (Yemen monarchy), and even sent his 
military advisers to Yemen, between 1962-1963. However, the Saudi regime did not accept the 
new regime. It broke off its relations with Egypt and helped royalist forces in Yemen. See for 
instance, Abdullah M. Sindi, "King Faisal and Pan-Islamism", 185-187. 
223 Fred Haliday, Arabia Without Sultans, 49. 
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Meanwhile, to eradicate the domestic threats, Al-Saud family is heavily relying 
upon the strength of its armed forces. Nonetheless, due to the uneasiness of the Saudi 
regime's perception of `army' which it strongly believed that those armed forces might 
propel other social domestic units (like the Muslim extremists, and other political 
oppositions) to challenge the regime based on what had happened in some Arab 
countries, 224 Al-Saud family had to `balance' and `neutralize' the size of its armed forces 
(almost equal in size) which is roughly divided into two; the Royal Guard, and the 
National Guard as well as the regular army. The former is to deal with the Al-Saud 
family's security and the latter is for defending the Kingdom's borders. The central aim 
of the neutralization of these two armed forces is to ensure that the Royal Guard, which is 
the best equipped and trained than other armies, would be able to protect Al-Saud family 
when a revolutionary (for instance, led by army) or any social movements erupt in the 
Kingdom. 225 Moreover, in expanding the political recognition of the Saudi regime 
beyond the Arab world, and at the same time to oppose Nasser's Pan-Arabism, the 
regime through King Feisal (1964-1975) launched the religious slogan, `Pan-Islam', 
which undeniably had effectively contributed to the consolidation of Al-Saud regime 
specifically among the Muslim counterparts till present, 226 and indirectly too brought 
Malaysia's relations with the Kingdom closer. 227 
224 Referring, for example, to the downfall of royal monarchs in Iraq and Yemen. Sarah Yizraeli, 
The Remaking of Saudi Arabia, 149-164, Ghassan Salame, "Political Power and the Saudi State", 
75-76. 
225 Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia, 152-153, Ghassan Salame, "Political Power 
and the Saudi State", 75-76. 
226 For a good reference, see for example, Ghassan Salame, "Political Power and the Saudi State", 
in Berch Berberoglu (ed. ), Power and Stability in the Middle East (New Jersey : Zed Books Ltd., 
1989), 70-75, Fred Haliday, Arabia Without Sultans (see the sub-topic "The Origins of the Saudi 
State"), (London : Saqi Books, 2002), 48-57. 
22' The visit by King Feisal to Malaysia will be discussed later in this Chapter IV. 
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Based upon the discussion, it relatively shows that both Malaysian and Saudi 
Arabian regimes are pursuing hard to maintain their political continuity over others. Not 
only that they are depending on some ways and strategies discussed above, but also 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia need outside support from other countries in strengthening the 
positions of their political regimes at home. Hence, within the context of Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia, both countries, especially Malaysia, are very much in need 
of the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in facing several domestic pressures 
which could threaten the political dominance of the Malaysian political regime (the 
National Front-led by UMNO). Among the domestic pressure that probably drives 
Malaysia to enhance its relations with Saudi Arabia is to soothe the religious demands of 
Malaysian Muslim community and also to weaken the challenge from the Islamic party, 
PAS which frequently calls for the establishment of an Islamic state. By cementing the 
relations with the Kingdom as the custodian of the two holy Islamic places, Mecca and 
Medina, alternatively the Malaysian political regime can show to the masses as well as to 
other Muslim countries that it emphasizes too the Islamic elements in its governing 
policy. For the Saudi political regime, its relations with Malaysia could be considered as 
part of its global political agenda in consolidating Al-Saud's religious ideology, `pan- 
Islam, in the Islamic world vis-ä-vis pan-Arabism and the Shi'a-Iranian revolution in 
1979.228 
228 Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that in this chapter the discussion on the Saudi political 
regimes' recognition on Malaysia is limited. It will only focus on King Feisal's (the only Al-Saud 
family rulers ever came to Malaysia) visit to Malaysia. However, through King Feisal's effort to 
spread his ideology, Pan-Islam, various `religious donations' have been continuously received by 
the Malaysian government as well as other religious institutions in Malaysia. This will further 
developed in the Chapter VI. 
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Before discussing this further, however, the study would like to chronologically 
examine the pattern of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia since its independence 
from 1957. The analysis of the pattern will help to clarify more the basic foundation of 
the relations which will later be developed in linking it with the question of the 
importance of the relations for both political regimes continuity. As has been mentioned 
before, the discussion on the pattern and the significance of the relations will be 
examined based upon the leadership period of both regimes for it reveals the political 
authority of these two countries. It also to demonstrate that the leadership of both 
political regimes directly exhibits the character of the Malaysian and Saudi Arabian 
ruling regime because in the case of Malaysia, for instance, the Prime Minister is also the 
President of UMNO, the party that leads the National Front to rule the country, and this is 
not different too much for Saudi Arabia where the King himself has the absolute power to 
determine the direction of his own kingdom. Moreover, since the political regime of these 
two countries are keep changing over the years, hence, by focussing on the leadership 
periods of both regimes, the study will be able to illustrate the different policies and 
actions taken by both countries' leaders in order to ensure the survival of their regimes 
which, in some ways, might further determine the character of Malaysia's relations with 
Saudi Arabia. In doing this, the discussion will begin with Malaysia's side (from the first 
Malaysian premier; Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Razak, Tun Hussein Onn, and Dr. 
Mahathir), and then it will be followed in the analysis of the Saudi regime's recognition 
on Malaysia. 
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4.2 Malaysia's Relations with Saudi Arabia Under Tunku Abdul Rahman Era 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, especially during the onset of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, 229 era was generally considered as traditional or ancient links between the two 
countries. This ancient link is best illustrated in the words of Peter Boyce : ".... in the 
relatively innocent and uneventful years 1957-62, Malaya230 did not extend its diplomatic 
interests in the Muslim world beyond Egypt and Saudi Arabia". 231 This statement 
principally signals to the religious relations between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, which 
have been interacted since the era of the Malacca Sultanate or earlier. This is because 
pilgrimage and education are the main activities that maintained the association of both 
countries for a long time until the early independent period. Dato' Abdullah mentioned 
that there was only a Malayan Consulate232 in Jeddah in 1958 to look after the Malay 
Pilgrims, and it was responsible to the Malayan Embassy in Cairo, Egypt. 233 However, 
22" Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj was the first Prime Minister of Malaya (1957-1970). He 
replaced Datuk Orin Jaafar as UMNO President from 1951-1971. In Malaysian political tradition, 
UMNO President automatically becomes a Prime Minister after an election held. S. Hashim 
Ahmad, Jeiak Kcramat (Ampang, Selangor : JUZ' ART, 1999), 8& 38. 
230 The term Malaya was only used prior to 1963, and it was changed later following the 
admission of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. 
231 Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy : Documents and 
Commentaries (Sydney : Sydney University Press, 1968), 175, Wan Mohd. Wan Musa, "Dasar 
Luar Malaysia Dengan Negara-Negara Arab (1957-1980) : Dari Perspektif Malaysia", Latihan 
Ilmiah (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1985/86), 28. 
212 Tuan Haji Othman Haji Mohd. Yusoff was the Malayan Consulate or Charge d'Affaires, and 
Mr. Hanafiah as Second Secretary at that particular time. `Formal Notes Between Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia 1963', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20`h November, 1963, National Archive of 
Malaysia (1083/1963), J. B. Dalton, "The Development of Malayan External Policy", 45. 
233 Malayan Embassy in Egypt established in 1960. Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, "Tengku Abdul 
Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1963-1970", Unpublished Thesis (Degree of M. Litt) 
(University of Cambridge, 1984), 109, "Informal relations between Egypt and Malaysia have 
come a long way", Egypt-Malaysia, Religion, 8/2/1997 
(http: //www. arahicnews. com/ansuh/Daily/Day/970802/1997080219. htni1). 
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the Consulate was later upgraded to Embassy of the Federation of Malaysia 
corresponding to the establishment of Malaysia on the I" September, 1963.234 
Tunku's first visit as Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia, where he received a warm 
welcome from the Saudi government, was on the 18th of June, 1958, where he performed 
pilgrimage in Mecca to give thanks for God for giving Malaya full independence from 
Great Britain on the basis of mutual negotiations between the two parties. 235 After then, 
there was no formal visit made by Tunku to Saudi Arabia because he put more stress on 
domestic affairs in order to develop Malaya as a peaceful and prosperous country. 
Despite that, in the early 1960s, Tunku attempted a few plans to bring together Muslim- 
Arab countries for closer co-operation, which might indirectly keep Malaysia's relations 
with Saudi Arabia more intact. For example, in 1961 Tunku attempted to revive Muslim 
as well as Arab countries to unite under one flag, or form a Commonwealth of all Muslim 
countries. Unfortunately, only Pakistan supported the idea, while other Muslim-Arab 
counterparts, including Saudi Arabia, were less enthusiastic about it. Following relentless 
efforts by Tunku, the first International Islamic Seminar was eventually held in Kuala 
Lumpur on April 21", 1969, where Malaysia's relations with Muslim-Arab countries 
started to grow positively. 236 
234 Malaysian Embassy was transferred to Riyadh, however the Consul in Jeddah still existed and 
mainly dealt with registration and immigration matters for students and pilgrims. Interview with 
Raja Saifful Ridzuwan Raja Kamaruddin, Asisstant Secretary for West Asia & North Africa, 
Wisma Putra, Putrajaya Malaysia on 2"d April, 2003 at 10.00-11.00am, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, "Formal Notes Between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, 1963" National Archive of Malaysia 
(1083/1963). 
235 Wan Mohd. Wan Musa, "Dasar Luar Malaysia Dengan Negara-Negara Arab", 57, J. B. Dalton, 
"The Development of Malayan External Policy", 191. 
236 Mokhtar A. Kadir, Keamanan Seiagat : Peranan Malaysia Dalam Politik Antarabangsa (Kuala 
Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1991), 83-85. 
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Nonetheless the turning point, especially for Malaysia's closer relations with 
Saudi Arabia as well as with the Arabs and Afro-Asia blocks, was during the 
confrontation launched by Indonesia and the Philippines protesting against the Malaysian 
plan to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The King of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman and his government officials had to travel abroad, particularly to the West Asia 
and African continents to raise support internationally for an undivided recognition of the 
Government of Malaysia, and also to defy Indonesia-Philippines' confrontations. At this 
time, Malaysia felt itself much closer to the support of Muslim countries, especially the 
Arabs, and Africa. For example, between January and February 1964, Lee Kuan Yew237 
went to 17 countries in Africa, and was followed by Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak's 
official tour of Mediterranean Arab countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria and 
Tunisia in November 1964, and April 1965.238 Furthermore, on 3rd April, 1965, in order 
to further strengthen the support of the establishment of Malaysia, the King of Malaysia 
(Yang Dipertuan Agong, Baginda Sultan Perlis), Tuanku Syed Putra Syed Hassan 
Jamalullail (1920-2000), visited Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf States like Kuwait, 
Egypt and Jordan. At the same time the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, also 
made a call to the Saudi government to go against Tunku's plan but proved to be 
unsuccessful. 239 
23' Lee Kuan Yew was the Chief Minister of Singapore at the time of joining the Federation of 
Malaysia. 
238 Mokhtar A. Kadir, Keamanan Sejagat : Peranan Malaysia Dalam Politik Antarabangsa, 84, 
Wan Mohd. Wan Musa, "Dasar Luar Malaysia Dengan Negara-Negara Arab", 24, Dato' 
Abdullah Ahmad, "Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy", 110-111. 
239 "YDPA, Lawatan Negara ke Arab Saudi, Sambutan Ketibaan Baginda di Lapangan Terbang 
Jeddah, April 3,1965", Rekod Pandang dan Dengar, National Archive of Malaysia, 
(2001/0029880, G. 4217), "Last King of Malaya, First of Malaysia", Sunday Mail, 23'd March, 
2003, Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, "Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy", 110- 
111. 
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When the confrontations were finally over with Indonesia's approval to the 
Federation of Malaysia in June 1965, except for the Philippines which has yet to drop its 
claim over Sabah (one of the Malaysian states), various efforts were made by the Tunku 
regime to consolidate Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, including the upgrade of 
Malaysian Consulate to Embassy status, and to organize as well as participate in several 
seminars and Muslim Summits, which obliquely brought Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
closer. Among the seminars were the International Islamic Seminar in Kuala Lumpur on 
21st April, 1969, the First Muslim Summit in Rabat, Maghribi on 22nd September, 1969, 
and the Meetings of Muslim Foreign Ministers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1970. The 
common agendas discussed concerned religious matters (for instance, the issue of organ 
donations, eyes and heart, by dead Muslim people), the question of Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts, and the proposal to set up a Permanent Secretariat for Muslim countries in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 240 
Furthermore, on 7`h June, 1970, it was the most historic moment for Tunku and 
the Malaysian government when King Feisal Ibn Abdel Aziz paid a four-day visit to 
Malaysia. While in Malaysia, King Feisal was officially involved in some educational 
occasions, and donated a large sum of money for religious developments in the higher 
learning institutions, and also to the grassroots level. King Feisal also openly called upon 
Tunku Abdul Rahman to become the first Secretary General of the Muslim Secretariat, 
later known as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). 241 Since King Feisal's 
Z; 0 Mokhtar A. Kadir, Keamanan Sejagat : Peranan Malaysia Dalam Politik Antarabangsa, 85,86- 
88. 
"' "Majlis Santapan Di-Raja Kerana Meraikan D. Y. M. M Seri Paduka Baginda Al-Malik Faisal 
Ibni Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Saudi Arabia, Istana Negara, June 7,1970", Rekod Pandang dan 
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offer to Tunku to hold the top post, the relationship between the two figures gradually 
became more personal. Tunku took advantage of the relationship to secure more capital 
donations to his Islamic organization, PERKIM, in Malaysia when he retired in 1970 as 
Prime Minister, after the eruption of a riot on 13th May, 1969.242 Tunku was officially 
replaced by Tun Razak, who also extended Malaysia's relations with the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Tunku died at the age of 88 on 6 `h December, 1990.243 
4.3 Tun Razak's Political-Economic Relations With Saudi Arabia 
As Tunku Abdul Rahman's relations with Saudi Arabia continued in the form of ancient 
links, except after the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, Tun Razak initiated some 
development programmes which might widen political and socio-economic relations 
between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. By not merely depending on pilgrimage and 
education affairs, Tun Razak made several official trips to a group of Gulf States, 
including Saudi Arabia, to lure economic and investment opportunities from these oil- 
rich countries. For instance, after attending the Summit Conference in Lahore, Pakistan, 
Tun Razak, accompanied by Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Ministry of Information and 
Special Functions, and other officials, visited Saudi Arabia from February 24`h until 
March 3"' 1974.244 This was followed by the Malaysian Economic Mission to the Middle 
Eastern countries led by the Honourable Raja Tan Sri Mohar Raja Badiozaman, Special 
Dengar, National Archive of Malaysia, (1999/0023163), Mokhtar A. Kadir, Keamanan Sejagat 
Peranan Malaysia Dalam Politik Antarabangsa, 87. 
242 The issue of Saudi's contribution in education (financial assistance), capital donation and OIC 
will be further discussed in other chapters (VI & VII). 
243 S. Hashim Ahmad, Jeiak Keramat, 38, J. B. Dalton, "The Development of Malayan External 
Policy", 362 (Appendix 1). 
244 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Formal Notes Between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia", 13`h 
February, 1974, National Archive of Malaysia (1150/1974,1151/1974). 
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Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, who went to Saudi Arabia between 
26`h March and 3"' April, 1974. Among the main objectives for the mission was to 
explore the possibilities of increasing Malaysian exports to West Asia, and also to 
promote investment and the setting up ofjoint-venture enterprises in Malaysia. 245 
Furthermore, from January 27`h to February Ist, 1975, Tun Razak, and his 
officials such as Datuk Abdul Rahman Yaakob, Chief Minister of Sarawak, Tengku 
Razalcigh Hamzah (Petronas Chairman), and Tan Sri Syed Nassir, journeyed again to 
Saudi Arabia and to other Gulf States like Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Bahrain. Tun Razak's mission was to attract these countries to invest and 
to establish joint-venture projects in the Third Malaysia Plan, such as hydro-electric 
projects, land development schemes in Pahang Tenggara, Tcrengganu Tengah and 
Bintulu Sarawak, the Kuantan port project, and airfields. 246 During this journey, Tun 
Razak successfully secured a Saudi loan amounting to $200 million, and both 
governments also agreed to set up a joint-commission committee to further discuss the 
economic and technical co-operation agreement between the two countries. 
Tun Razak's government also succeeded in obtaining Kuwait's promise to give 
away loans of $100 million and other economic and trading treaties with Bahrain, Oman, 
245 Basically, this mission was also to penetrate Pakistan market and investment. See Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, A Handbook of Malaysian Economic Mission to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, 
March 25-April 7,1974. Ministry of Foreign Afairs, "Formal Notes", 19`h March, 1974, National 
Archive of Malaysia (1150/1974,1151/1974). 
246 Ministry of Information, News from Saudi Arabia, xi (545) February 4,1975,1 & 6, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, "Formal Notes Between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia", 15`h January, 1975, 
National Archive of Malaysia (1152/1975,1153/1975), "Tun Tells of Viable Projects, Offers for 
Arabs", The Star, January 19,1975. 
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Qatar, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 247 As the Prime Minister of a Muslim country, 
Malaysia, Tun Razak also played a role, along with Saudi Arabia, in enhancing relations 
between Muslim countries. Even while Tun Razak was the deputy to Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, he represented Malaysia in the First Muslim Foreign Summit in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia in March 23-25,1970. On June 23,1974, Tun Razak chaired another Muslim 
Foreign Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. At this summit, Tun Razak urged the 
Muslim community and the world to help the Palestinian people, and also proposed to 
found a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative in Kuala Lumpur. 248 
Due to the short period of his government (1970-1976), about 6 years, Tun Razak 
had inadequate time to carry out more than a few development programs that could 
render Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia more intimate. Moreover, with the passing 
away of King Feisal on March 26,1975, the direction of the Saudi government changed 
somewhat . 
2"9 Tun Razak died at the age of 54 on January 14,1976, in London. 250 He was 
succeeded by another influential figure, Tun Hussein Orin, who also had the desire to 
interact with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
247 Mohd. Wan Musa, "Dasar Luar Malaysia Dengan Negara-Negara Arab", 75-81, Fariza Hanum 
Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-Asia Barat Sehingga 1985", Latihan Ilmiah (Kuala 
Lumpur, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1991/92), 55. 
248 Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-Asia Barat Sehingga 1985", 50- 
51. 
249 , Kemangkatan King Feisal, Perdana Menteri, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, Menandatangani 
Buku Takziah di Kedutaan Arab Saudi, Kuala Lumpur, March 26,1975", Rekod Pandang dan 
Den gar, National Archive of Malaysia (2001/0043096, G. 13750). 
2s0 Rozeman Abu Hassan, Tun Abdul Razak Bin Dato' Hussein : Dasar Luar Malaysia 1970- 
1976,119-120, S. 1lashim Ahmad, Jak Keramat, 48. 
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4.4 Towards Much Improved Bilateral Relations under Tun Hussein Onn 
After the sudden loss of Tun Razak in 1976, Tun Hussein Onn became the third Prime 
Minister of Malaysia. Like his predecessors, he continued to journey to Saudi Arabia, and 
also to other Gulf States. This tour, in fact, was to follow up, and further the actions of, 
the visit by the late, Tun Hj. Abdul Razak, who had planned to visit Saudi Arabia in 
February 1976 251 Tun Hussein departed from Malaysia on 16th of May, 1976 by 
executive jet F28, and was accompanied by a 14 member official delegation. Among 
those officials were Tengku Datuk Ahmed Rithauddeen, Foreign Minister, Datuk Ahmad 
Zainal Abidin bin Mohamed Yusof, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and others. Tun Hussein was expected to call on King Khaled Ibn Abdel Aziz, Crown 
Prince, the First Deputy Prime Minister Prince Fahd, and other Saudi government 
ministers to discuss political and socio-economic matters. The Malaysian Prime Minister 
also hoped for Saudi Arabia's greater participation in development programs in 
Malaysia. 252 
While in Saudi Arabia, various activities and meetings had been arranged by the 
Saudi government for Tun Hussein and his officials. For instance, Tun Hussein was 
granted special appreciation by Gabenor Mecca, Amir Fawaz Ibn Abdel Aziz, by 
allowing him to pray in Ka'abah (the highest respect of worship), which was only opened 
once a year during hajj (pilgrimage season). 253 Tun Hussein also met Malaysian students 
251 "Dato' Hussein with a 14 Member Official Delegation Left by Executive Jet F28 for Riyadh", 
The Star, May 17,1976. 
252 Ministry of Information, News From Saudi Arabia, xiii (611) May 25,1976,1 & 5, "Dato' 
Hussein with a 14 Member Official Delegation Left by Executive Jet F28 for Riyadh", The Star, 
May 17,1976. 
253 "Datuk Iiussein Orin Sembahyang Dalam Ka'abah", Utusan Melayu, May 21,1976. 
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in Jeddah, Mecca and Medina. A meeting for a socio-economic discussion between 
Tengku Rithauddeen, Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohamad Ibn Kitail, Finance 
Minister of Saudi Arabia, and Dr. Mahsun Jalal, Minister for Economic Development of 
Saudi Arabia also took place. Among the matters raised included the request by 
Malaysian officials for a few files about the Saudi development plan to be analyzed and 
learnt by Tun Hussein's government, the exchange of information through mass-media, 
and the issue of education in which both countries agreed to discuss terms so that their 
degrees and diplomas could be recognized for postgraduate studies. Beside that, Tun 
Hussein and his government also showed firm support for Arab initiatives to help the 
Palestinians. 254 
Tun Hussein's five day tour in Saudi Arabia could be considered as successful 
because he was able to convince the Kingdom to agree to give financial assistance, which 
was really needed by the Malaysian government to implement its development plan. The 
Saudi government pledged full co-operation and financial assistance to a few projects 
under the 3`d Malaysia Plan amounting to a $194.6 million loan to Malaysia, which would 
be further discussed in the Conference of the Malaysian-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission 
under the Cultural and Scientific Agreement 1976.255 Before that (during Tun Razak's 
254 "Datuk Hussein Orin Sembahyang Dalam Ka'abah", Utusan Melayu, May 21,1976, 
"Malaysia and Saudi Arabia Agreed to Discuss Education Affairs", The Star, May 26,1976. 
25s The Cultural and Scientific Co-operation Agreement 1976, which was prepared by Sheikh 
Reza (Saudi Arabia), and Datuk Zakaria Hj. Mohd. Ali (Malaysia), includes the exchange of 
academicians, documents, research, publication, films, journalist, athletic. This will he mentioned 
in other chapters. "The File of Malaysia-Saudi Arabia Cultural and Scientific Co-operation 
Agreement 1976", National Archive of Malaysia, Department of Statistics, The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), 10`h of March, 2001, "Lawatan Rasmi ke Arab Saudi, 
Perjanjian Kerjasama Kebudayaan dan Saintifik telah ditandatangani, May 23,1976", Rekod 
Pandang dan Dengar, National Archive of Malaysia (2001/0043836, G. 14448). 
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official visit in 1975), King Fahd had given away S200 million for four projects: the 
construction of a medical faculty at the National University of Malaysia, the University 
Technology of Malaysia's development project, the Pahang Tenggara land project, and 
the land development project in Ulu Kelantan. 256 Unfortunately for Tun Hussein, due to a 
severe health problem, he had to withdraw from government in 1981. His short-lived 
administration (1976-1981), like the late Tun Razak, did not allow Tun Hussein to have 
sufficient time to further improve Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. After 
struggling with his life, Tun Hussein eventually passed away, due to a heart problem, on 
May 29,1990.257 
4.5 Mahathir Era : Dynamic Relations 
It is publicly well-known that Dr. Mahathir is the longest serving Prime Minister of 
Malaysia. He took over from Tun Hussein, who withdrew due to poor health, in 1981. 
Without looking back to the era of his predecessors, Dr. Mahathir made a few dynamic 
changes to Malaysia's external relations at the international level. He stressed ASEAN 
regional co-operation (security, political and socio-economic fields), closer relations with 
Islamic countries, especially with the Middle Eastern counterparts, and also put emphasis 
upon the implementation of the Look East Policy in the Malaysian economy. 
258 His 
longer term as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, compared to the previous leaders, gave 
256 "Saudi's Financial Assistance Under 3`d Malaysian Plan", The Star, May 23,1976. 
257 S. Hashim Ahmad, Jejak Keramat, 56 & 60. 
258 For example, see David Camroux, "Looking East and Inwards : Internal Factors in Malaysian 
Foreign Relations During the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994", Australia-Asia Paper No. 72 (Griffith 
University : Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia 
Relations, October 1994), 14-29. 
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him more opportunities to augment Malaysia's relations with other countries, mainly the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
As soon as he became Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir and his officials, Tengku 
Razaleigh Hamzah (Ministry of Finance), Tengku Ahmad Rithaudden (Ministry of Trade 
and Industry), Tan Sri Ghazali Shafiee (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), went to the Gulf 
States, including Saudi Arabia from March 5 to 7,1982. Prior to his trip, the King of 
Malaysia, Sultan Haji Ahmed Shah and other officials had arrived on January 24`h, 1982. 
The King also discussed socio-economic opportunities as well as the issues of the 
Palestinian and the Arab World. 259 Dr. Mahathir's trip had two missions, firstly to discuss 
and to mediate on the Iran-Iraq war in Jeddah (where the Saudi government was the host 
to discuss the war), and secondly to look for new economic and investment prospects as 
well as to obtain financial assistance from the Gulf States to further accelerate Malaysian 
development projects. In the case of Iran-Iraq war, Malaysia had been selected by the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) with other six members, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
the PLO, Turkey, Senegal, and Gambia, to bring about a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. 
Nevertheless, their efforts to persuade both conflicting parties to end the crisis were 
fruitless. 260 
Among the Gulf States visited by Dr. Mahathir were Bahrain, Oman, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. The visit was to expand the signing of new 
259 Saudi Review, 24`h January, 1982, Saudi Review, 26`h January, 1982. 
260 Even Malaysia, during the Muslim Summit in Baghdad, had proposed seven ways to cease the 
conflict, but also failed. Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-Asia 
Barat 
Sehingga 1985", 115-118, "Diplomat Mahathir on Peace Mission", The Star, March 5,1982. 
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agreements in economic and technical co-operation since the era of Tun Razak in 1975, 
and Tun Hussein in 1976 and onwards, where Malaysia had received six loans amounting 
to $248 million from Saudi Arabia. 62 per cent from these loans was utilized in land 
development projects in the National University of Malaysia, the National Technology of 
Malaysia, and Maktab Rendah Sains Mara. 261 During his trip to the Gulf States in 1982, 
Dr. Mahathir also managed to secure a few loans from Saudi Arabia. For example, a loan 
agreement of $10.6 million from the Saudi Fund had been signed between Tengku 
Razaleigh Hamzah (Malaysia's Finance Minister) and Mohammad A. Al-Sugair (Deputy 
Chairman of the Saudi Fund) in Kuala Lumpur. The loan was to build five hospitals in 
the states of Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu. The Saudi government also promised to 
distribute another S58 million from the Saudi Fund for the second phase of Lebuhraya 
Timur-Barat construction, and on January 24`h, 1986, the Saudi Development Fund 
approved SR189.00 million (equivalent to RM132.2 million) for the second phases of 
two projects, the Port Project in Penang Island, and Lebuhraya Timur-Barat. 
262 Up to 
1984, the overall loan from the Saudi Fund was $252.2 million. 263 Furthermore, in 1985, 
the Malaysian government allowed the National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia 
(NSCSA)264 to have access to the Malaysian ports. This led to the setting up of a Joint- 
Committee between the National Trade and Commerce Council of Malaysia and the 
261 Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-Asia Barat Sehingga 1985", 106. 
262 Ministry of Finance, Laporan Ekonomi 1986/87 (Kuala Lumpur : Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 
1986), 151. 
263 The loan given by the Saudi Fund (along with The Kuwaiti Fund amounted $137.8 million) 
was mainly utilized in agriculture projects, education, land development and medical facilities. 
This loan may exclude the loan for the second phase as it was only approved in 1986. See Fariza 
Hanum Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-Asia Barat Sehingga 1985", 108, and 
economic report by the Ministry of Finance, Laporan Ekonomi 1986/87 (Kuala Lumpur : Jabatan 
Percetakan Negara, 1986), 151 for an useful explanation. 
2&1 See website of National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia 
(http:! /w%, ww. nscsa. conv'htmis! Of'cs MdlEast. html 
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Middle East Trade, Industry and Agriculture Council, which indirectly expanded the 
areas of bilateral trade relations for both parties. Besides that, Dr. Mahathir's government 
also created various trade exhibitions in the Middle East in order to attract more potential 
buyers for Malaysian products. 65 Not only that, but Malaysia's relations with Saudi 
Arabia in the 1980s were further boosted by the visit as well as by appreciation from a 
few Saudi officials who came to Malaysia, such as the meeting of Dr. Ali Aziz Al- 
Khudiri (Asisstant-Deputy of Media Radio and Information, Saudi Arabia), and Mr. 
Kasim Ahmad (Deputy of Information Minister, Malaysia) on January 22,1985, which 
brought another agreement signed on the launch of Islamic Radio Programme called 
'Nida ul-Islam 'between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
266 
As the relationship headed towards the 1990s, most of the efforts were 
concentrated towards improving and balancing trade exchanges between Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia as the former was running a deficit in its bilateral trade relations with the 
latter. For instance, from 1999 to 2000, Malaysia's trade relation with Saudi Arabia was 
registered as one of the highest deficits, about -RMI, 19.24 million, and the 
Saudi 
government only ranked 27 in Malaysia's external trade relations, whereas the United 
States, the European countries, Japan and Singapore were the main trading partners. 
267 
Then, in trade agreements, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia only managed to secure three 
major signings: the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement 1975 (Tun Razak 
26s Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, "Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-Asia Barat Sehingga 1985", 106- 
111. 
166 "Saudi Arabia, Penolong Timbalan Media Radio dan Penyiaran dan Timbalan Penerangan, En. 
Kassim Ahmad Menandatangani Minit Mesyuarat Mengenai Rancangan NIDAL AL-ISLAM di 
Kuala Lumpur, January 22,1985", Rekod Pandang dan Dengar, National Archive of Malaysia 
(2001/0049389, G. 19507). 
267 See note 191 in the Chapter III and note 367 in the Chapter V. 
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era), the Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Agreement 1976 (Tun Hussein era), and the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement 1993 (Dr. Mahathir era). 268 
Therefore, various attempts were taken by Dr. Mahathir's government, 
particularly in the economic field, to hasten the volume of trade and investment by the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into Malaysia. For example, since the tragedy of the economic 
crisis in 1997, the Middle East region, especially Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, 
have become the main target of the Malaysian government in looking for new markets 
and investment overseas. One of the most potential attractions, along with the efforts to 
increase volume exports, and to enlarge the quantity of exports of various products, 
which has been emphasized by the National Economic Plan Council of Malaysia after the 
economic crisis in 1997, is the tourism industry which endeavours to entice more Saudi 
visitors to Malaysia. 269 In other words, in the post-crisis of 1997, Malaysia has attempted 
to change the pattern of its relations with Saudi Arabia from one to two ways of 
communication, by depending less upon the financial assistance of the Kingdom and by 
gearing towards fair bilateral economic relations in the future. 270 
The above statement may be linked to the latest visits by Prince Abdul Aziz, the 
Second Deputy of Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia to Malaysia in May 2001, followed 
268 See note 190 in the Chapter III and note 366 in the Chapter V. 
269 Prior to the crisis, tourists from the Middle East region had contributed to RM 11.3 billion from 
1990-1996 to the development of the Malaysian economy. See Majlis Tindakan Ekonomi Negara, 
"Pelan Pemulihan Ekonomi Negara : Agenda Tindakan", (Kuala Lumpur, Ogos 1998), 218 & 
221. 
270Interview 
with Raja Saifful Ridzuwan Raja Kamaruddin, Assistant Secretary for West Asia & 
North Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2,2003,10.00-11.00 am, Putrajaya, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
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by the Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister (later became Malaysian Prime Minister in 
2003), YAB Datuk Abdullah Badawi to the Kingdom in September 2001 to meet King 
Fahd. In those visits, various issues and events were discussed, but specifically on 
economic and investment opportunities, including tourism . 
271 This event also led to the 
Second Saudi-Malaysian Commission meeting in Kuala Lumpur, which lasted three days, 
concluding on May 12,2001. In this meeting, Ibn Mohammed Al-Kurdi, the Secretary 
General of the Council of the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry revealed that 
both countries have identified potential areas which could be improved, particularly on 
the Saudi non-export oil to Malaysia, participation in joint investment, the 
implementation of the new regulation of Umrah (minor pilgrimage), and Saudi tourism in 
Malaysia, as well as announcing that the volume of trade exchange between Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia amounted to SR2188 million in 2000.272 The most recent event was on 
October 2002, when Dr. Mahathir was officially invited to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to 
present a keynote address in a seminar on "The Future Vision for the Saudi Economy". In 
the seminar Dr. Mahathir addressed how the Saudi government can vary their economic 
resources by not merely depending on crude oil to be exported abroad. The re- 
afforestation of deserts using artificial irrigation and oil conversion into other products 
such as electrical power, may make the Saudi economy more stable in the future. 273 
211 Interview with Raja Saifful Ridzuwan Raja Kamaruddin, Assistant Secretary for West Asia & 
North Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2,2003,10.00-11.00 am, Putrajaya, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
272 "12/05/2001 Saudi-Malaysian Commission Concludes Meeting", Saudi Arabian Information 
Resource, 12`h May 2001 (hp: //www. saudint: com/main/v2d88. htm). 
2'3 "Seminar on the Future Vision for the Saudi Economy", the King Faisal Hall Riyadh Inter- 
Continental Hotel, October 19'h 2002, Prime Minister Office, Putrjaya, Malaysia. 
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4.6 The Significance of Relations for the Malaysian Political Regime 
In real politik, some researchers will argue that most of the efforts or initiatives 
undertaken by leaders for their country are merely for the survival of their political 
regimes or for the continuation of the dominance of their own party struggle over others. 
For this study, without full ignorance of the real politik notion, the researcher also 
inevitably presumes that those efforts taken by the Malaysian leaders in preserving 
bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia were, more or less, concerned with the struggle of 
their political wishes. It is not the objective of this study, however, to undermine those 
valuable efforts in bringing Malaysia closer to Saudi Arabia, but should be noticed that 
there are some indications that there are links between those efforts and the Malaysian 
regime's political interests. 
As has been mentioned before, among the major facet of political interests that 
can be associated to Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, apart from securing 
economic opportunities from the Kingdom which have been highlighted before (where 
during the Malaysian leaders' visit to Saudi Arabia they received a few sum amounts of 
financial aid), might be for the portrayal of religious commitment, both domestically and 
internationally. 274 The attempt to relate this issue of religious commitment to the 
significance of Malaysia's relations with the Kingdom for the Malaysian political 
regimes is largely due to the nature of the relations which have been historically 
274 The promotion of Islam by Malaysian leaders, both at home, and at the international level, is 
vital for the continuance of their political survival. See for instance, Mohamad Abu Bakar, "Islam 
in Malaysia's Foreign Policy", Hamdard Islamicus xiii (1) 1990,3-13, Diane K. Mauzy & R. S. 
Milne, "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia : Discipline through Islam", Pacific Affairs 56 
(4) Winter 1983-84,631-648, Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy, (London 
Routledge, 1997). 
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overwhelmingly established on `socio-religious orientation' (pilgrimage and education) 
since the era of the Malacca Sultanate to the present. This, together with the image of 
Saudi Arabia, which is habitually considered as one of the Islamic states275 and the 
custodian of two Islamic Holy Places, Mecca and Medina, but more importantly, the 
continuous maintenance of Malaysia's mutual relations with the custodian of two Holy 
Places, could be viewed as part of the portrayal of the Malaysian political regimes' 
(UMNO) `religious appearance' in facing domestic religious pressures. This especially 
concerns the highly domestic appeal (particularly by the Malaysian Muslims) for Islam, 
usually in matters related to pilgrimage and education in the Kingdom, and to counter 
Islamic opposition parties as well as to manifest Malaysia's close affiliation with her 
Muslim counterparts, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is so significant for 
its political continuance in the Muslim world at large. In order to examine this argument, 
the study will critically evaluate how the Malaysian political regime responds to this 
challenge. Due to the different situations and challenges faced by the Malaysian political 
regime in maintaining its relations with the Saudi government, the study will 
systematically analyze the portrayal of religious commitment based upon the leadership 
period of the Malaysian leaders. 
n5 A few researchers define distinctly between Islamic state and Muslim state. The former refers 
to the complete regulation of Shari'ah for both the government and the administration, whereas 
the latter, still considers the Shari 'ah Laws important, but the implementation is separable from 
the government, and it usually applies to the religious institutions. David George, "Pax Islamica : 
An Alternative New World Order? ", in A. S. Sidahmed & A. Ehteshamic (ed. ) Islamic 
Fundamentalism (Boulder : Westview Press, 1996), 88, Patricia A. Martinez, "The Islamic State 
or the State of Islam in Malaysia", Contemporary Southeast Asia 23 (3) December 2003,492-493 
(Patricia highlights more on the definition of an Islamic state, and attempts it to link with the 
Malaysian situation). 
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4.6.1 The Tunku Abdul Rahman Regime 
It would be inaccurate to overstress the argument that Malaysia's relations with Saudi 
Arabia are totally for the religious portrayal of Islam, for the scope of the relations could 
be much wider and not merely concentrate on religious issues. Even Malaysia's Islamic 
relations do not only focus on Muslim-Arab counterparts, they cover all Muslim 
countries without taking into account the nationality of the government, whether from 
Asian, African, Arab, or European continents. 276 Nevertheless, the religious responsibility 
of Saudi Arabia as the custodian of the two Holy Places, Mecca and Medina, and as one 
of the well-known Islamic learning centres, subsequently and religiously led Malaysia 
closer to the kingdom. This is as what happened during the Tunku regime's early 
independent era, and prior to 1963, where his policies towards Saudi Arabia were based 
more on traditional and ancient relations, mostly on pilgrimage and education affairs, and 
no other issues were formally discussed between these two countries. This was partly also 
owing to the Tunku's government's foreign policy, which was mainly pro-western and 
anti-communist. The Malayan government had just achieved independence from Great 
Britain and was still hugely dependent upon it. The Defence Treaty signed between 
Malaya and the British government consequently pushed the level of affiliation much 
higher. The treaty was to provide each other with mutual aid in the event of an armed 
attack on either Malayan or British possessions in the Far East. 
277 
ne Mohamad Abu Bakar argued that Islam never occupied a central position in Malaysia's foreign 
policy, and in its long established ties with the Muslim Middle East. Mohamad Abu Bakar, 
"Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy", 3. See also Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism, 
159. 
27 J. Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence : Two Decades of Malaysia (Penang 
Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1983), 21, Wan Mohd. Wan Musa, "Dasar Luar Malaysia 
Dengan Negara-Negara Arab", 24. 
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Because of the limited resources and trained personnel officials the Malayan 
government was further restricted in enhancing its relations with other countries which 
were willing to establish diplomatic and economic relations with her, except for Saudi 
Arabia. J. B. Dalton pointed out that on December 12th, 1957, Tunku Abdul Rahman 
revealed that Malaya had to refuse invitations from 20 countries to establish diplomatic 
relations because of a lack of official personnel. 278 Therefore, due to the nature of the 
Tunku's policy and limited resources, most of the Malayan personnel were trained by 
Great Britain and Australia. They were given experience serving in the United States, 
India and Pakistan under the guidance of British diplomats, and also in Canberra in the 
Australian Department of External Affairs. The major tasks concentrated largely on trade, 
information and student affairs. 279 
Furthermore, the Tunku regime also faced various challenges at the domestic 
level. The biggest challenge was the complexity of Malaya's plural society, comprised of 
three different ethnics groups, Malay, Chinese and Indian (plus Bornean people when 
Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaya in 1963). As admitted by Tunku: "In our country 
today, unlike any other country in the world, we have so many people with different 
origins and divided loyalty. """"" 
280 The complexity of Malayan society brought a few 
unhappy moments for Tunku's reign, such as unequal distribution in the socio-economic 
field, and the tragedy of May 13,1969 where a riot erupted between Malay and Chinese `h 
278 Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, "Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy", 109, J. B. 
Dalton, "The Development of Malayan External Policy, 1957-1963", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis 
(Oxford : University of Oxford, 1967), 44. 
2'9 J. B. Dalton, "The Development of Malayan External Policy, ", 43-44. 
280 J. B. Dalton, "The Development of Malayan External Policy, 22-23. 
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communities in Kuala Lumpur. 281 In other words, at the domestic level, most of the 
efforts were concentrated more on re-building and accommodating Malaysian multi- 
racial society, especially in the socio-economic development. 
From the 1960s onwards, however, there were some efforts made by the Tunku 
regime to proclaim his religious commitment to the Islamic world, although at the early 
stage it did not directly involve Saudi Arabia. In 1956, Tunku sent a delegation of 
members of Parliament to tour Muslim countries in order to interest them in the 
promotion of Islamic brotherhood and in the study of the possibility of bringing about 
closer co-operation among Muslim people. This was followed by his call in 1961 
engaging all Muslim counterparts to unite under the Commonwealth of Muslim countries. 
Tunku believed that the British Commonwealth could become a good model for Muslim 
countries to set up `another Commonwealth' in enhancing co-operation as well as 
reducing the differences between them. 282 As he put it: "It is my dream to form a 
Commonwealth of all Muslim countries, somewhat after the pattern of -the British 
Commonwealth. If the British Commonwealth can bring together in harmony people 
from four corners of the earth, then why can the Muslim world not join together in a 
common bond of friendship, thus making a contribution to global harmony". 283 However, 
as has been said before, this call was coolly welcomed, even Saudi Arabia was less keen 
about the idea, and only Pakistan supported it. That the Saudi government was unwilling 
281 See note 203 in the Chapter IV, and see also John Slimming, Malaysia : Death of a Democracy 
(London : John Murray Publishers, 1969), 25-51. 
282 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy (London : Routledge, 1997), 56 & 83-84. 
283 Anidah Robani, "The Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government Towards the Palestinian 
Issue, 1957-1989", Unpublished M. A. Thesis (International Islamic University of Malaysia, 
February 2001), 56, Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy, 175. 
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to respond Tunku regime's call was largely due to its allegiance with the idea of Pan- 
Islamism to challenge Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt for Arab leadership in the Middle 
East. 284 
The Tunku regime also initiated some religious activities, for example hosting and 
actively participating in a few International Islamic Seminars, campaigning on the 
Palestinian question in the United Nations, Commonwealth and Non-Aligned Movement 
Conferences, making a Joint-Communique with King Feisal of Saudi Arabia to criticize 
the Israeli usurpation of the Arab lands, offering the Al-Fatah movement an office in 
Kuala Lumpur, 285 and being involved in other Muslim issues such as Muslim minorities 
in Pattani, Thailand and the Philippines, which eventually led to Tunku's appointment as 
the first Secretary of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). His appointment as 
OIC Secretary, in fact, had been offered personally by King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, while 
Tunku was still the Prime Minister, during his official visit to Malaysia in 1970. 
A question may arise as to why King Feisal proposed Tunku as the first OIC 
Secretary, and why not other Arab or Asian Muslim leaders? The most probable answer 
for this was that most of the Arab countries were still at war against Israel, especially 
... For instance, on May 16-20,1962, Saudi Arabia organized an International Islamic 
Conference, 'Dhu al-Hizaz' to challenge Pan-Arabism disseminated by Jamal Abdel Nasser of 
Egypt. King Feisal also visited a few Muslim counterparts including Iran, Jordan, Sudan, 
Palestine, Turki, Morocco, Tunisia and others to promote Pan-Islamism. Hugh Thomas, The Suez 
Affair (London : C. Tinling & C. Ltd., 1966), 10, Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia 
di Dalam OIC, 1969-1990", Latihan Ilmiah (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
1995/1996,11-13. 
285 For further elaboration on Malaysia's involvement in Palestine during Tunku era, see for 
instance Anidah Robani, "The Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government Towards the 
Palestinian Issue, 1957-1989", 56-71, Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 59 & 85, 
Mohamad Abu Bakar, "Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy", 8-9. 
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after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 which brought massive casualties to the Arabs and 
further occupation of land by the Israelis, and the challenge of Jamal Abdel Nasser to 
Arabs' leadership (however, his successor Anwar Sadat was pro-Pan Islamism), might 
cause a distraction from full concentration in handling the management of the 
organization. In the case of Asian leaders, it was quite discernible that both Tunku and 
Sukarno were the leading actors in the Asian Muslim region. However, living in the 
bipolar era, Sukarno was much closer to the Soviet Union, while Tunku had good 
relations with liberal democratic blocs, mainly the United Kingdom and the United 
States, as Saudi Arabia did, so this situation had given advantages for Tunku to be 
suggested as the first Secretary of OIC. 286 His important position in OIC, made the Tunku 
regime's relations with King Feisal of Saudi Arabia become personally closer, and this 
was indirectly beneficial for Tun Razak's government (Tunku's successor) where the 
level of interaction was much further improved, and also to Tunku's religious 
organization, PERKIM (after he relinquished his OIC Secretary post), which frequently 
received several donations from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to implement dakwah 
activities in Malaysia. 
It is quite indicative that in the Tunku regime's early independent era, the element 
of religious commitment in Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia was confined only to 
the affairs of pilgrimage and education. However, this pattern of ancient relations 
Z86 Nonetheless, there are various arguments given on Tunku's appointment. According to Ismail 
Abdul Halim, a former Malaysian official in Socio-Cultural Affairs of OIC, a secretary should be 
Muslim, knows Muslim ideology and has high vision. Tunku was appointed as he was skillful in 
administration, for example, gaining independence for Malaysia without war. Others argue, 
Tunku was active in championing Muslim issues at the international level, so his appointment 
was the highest recognition from the Muslim-Arab world. See Gomathi A/P Vanathan, 
"Penglibatan Malaysia di Dalam OIC, 1969-1990", 28 & 50. 
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changed abruptly in the 1960s and onwards, mostly due to the Tunku regime's ambitious 
plan to establish the Federation of Malaysia, a plan to form a greater Malaysia 
comprising Sabah, Sarawak, Singapore and Brunei. Because of the political pressures and 
confrontations launched by Indonesia and the Philippines, which both claimed that they 
had also some rights over the Malay Peninsula and Sabah, Tunku and his government 
officers had to make several official tours to the Middle East (including Saudi Arabia) 
and the Afro-Asia block in order to raise their recognition to the formation of 
Malaysia. 287 Yet, this change in the pattern of relations cannot be argued as further 
indication of the Tunku regime's religious portrayal: it was more towards gaining 
political recognition of the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia from the 
Kingdom. 
In other words, the Tunku regime's efforts in showing its religious commitment in 
regard to Malaysia's relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (and indirectly also to 
the Muslim world) are mainly related to the form of the ancient links in the issue of 
pilgrimage, education, and some other Islamic activities (which were, in some instances, 
not directly bound to the Kingdom) but not to the Saudis' recognition for the 
establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. In some points, the Tunku regime's closer 
relations with the King Feisal's government could also be connected to Tunku's personal 
influence upon domestic affairs. This is because the Tunku regime was not only facing a 
challenge from the unequal distribution of economic resources amongst a multi-racial 
society, but also Islamic pressure from the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) which 
28' Rene Peritz, "The Changing World of Malaysia", Current History 52, January 1967,31. 
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constantly called for the setting up of an Islamic State in Malaysia. 298 Having close 
relations with Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia, being actively involved in 
religious activities and his appointment as the OIC Secretary would give some moral 
motivation for the Tunku regime to indicate its religious image among the Malaysian 
Muslim community, as well as countering Islamic pressures from the Muslim opposition 
party, and other groups within UMNO itself, who were less satisfied with Tunku's 
policy. 289 Nevertheless, to simply argue that the Tunku regime was fully committed to the 
promotion of Islam, especially at the domestic level, would raise some doubts particularly 
on Tunku's opinion of the establishment of an Islamic State in Malaysia. As he 
commented on Dr. Mahathir's Islamization policy: "...... provided that Islam should only 
be the official religion. The notion of Islamic State was untenable in a multi-racial 
country like Malaysia. Besides, a true Muslim must respect the rights of all people of 
other faiths. There must never be any coercion or attempts to impose Islam upon people 
290 with other faiths". 
288 In the 1959 Election, 2 years after Malayan Independence, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) 
had gained 2 seats in Kelantan and Terengganu. Therefore, Muslim internationalism emphasized 
by Tunku relatively reduced PAS influence at the domestic level. Gomathi A/P Vanathan, 
"Penglibatan Malaysia di Dalam OIC, 1957-1990", 29. 
289 Tunku was not only facing pressure from opposition parties, but also from a group of young 
leaders within UMNO, which was called the `Ultras Group' like Dr. Mahathir Muhammad and 
Datuk Musa Hitam, who were less supportive of Tunku's pro-western policy. They also urged 
him to drop his recognition to the State of Israel. Tunku recognized the emergence of Israel 
because it is a member of the United Nations. However, he eventually withdrew his recognition 
in 1967. See Shanti Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 56, Anidah Robani, "The 
Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government Towards the Palestinian Issue, 1957-1989", 63. 
290 Anidah Robani, "The Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government Towards the Palestinian 
Issue, 1957-1989", 43, Media Conference Statement launching of the second phase of "No to 
911, No to 929, Yes to 1957" People's Awareness Campaign in Penang by Lim Kit Siang, 
28/7/2002 (http_//ww« dapmalaysia. org/english/lks/ju102/lksl753. htm). 
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4.6.2 The Tun Abdul Razak Regime 
In Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, the Tun Razak regime changed the pattern 
from ancient and traditional links towards more political and socio-economic relations. 
Hence, is there any possibility of linking the Tun Razak regime's approach to the Saudi 
government with religious commitment? To discuss this argument, the basic orientation 
of Tun Razak's foreign policy needs to be considered. When Tun Razak was appointed as 
the second Prime Minister of Malaysia, succeeding Tunku Abdul Rahman on 22nd 
September 1970, Malaysia's external relations with other countries started to change 
dramatically. In contrast with Tunku, he preferred to have wider relations with other 
countries and did not solely focus on the western counterparts, especially Great Britain. 
The main theme of Tun Razak's external policy was on the basis of non-aligned, 
integrity, and neutralization approach. These concepts denote the Tun Razak regime's 
attempt to seek relations with all countries, irrespective of their ideologies and their type 
of government, and to secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone 
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), free from any form or manner of 
interference by outside powers. 29 Despite the influence of the bipolarity era, the tussle 
between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the Tun Razak regime managed 
to initiate some efforts to establish new friends as well as consolidating a few existing 
bilateral relations with other countries. 
29' Among the main reasons for Tun Razak's non-aligned and neutral policy was US withdrawal 
from Vietnam in 1971, and also US President Nixon's (The Nixon Doctrine) recognition of 
Communist China. Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia : The Making of a Nation (Singapore : Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 150, K. S. Nathan, "Vision 2020 and Malaysian Foreign Policy 
: Strategic Evolution and the Mahathir Impact", Southeast Asian Affairs 1995,222-223, J. 
Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence : Two Decades of Malaysia's Foreign Policy 
(Penang : Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1983), 6-7 & 96-97. 
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The most unexpected action made by Tun Razak was during his visit to China in 
1974, which was viewed as one of the big rivals to the pro-western democratic block. The 
main purpose of the visit was to gain China's support of the neutralization policy as well 
as to reduce China's threat to the Southeast Asian region. 292 Tun Razak also emphasized 
the sense of regionalism among ASEAN members by jointly forming the Declaration of 
the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 
November 1971 to indicate that Southeast Asia was not tied up to any bipolar 
superpowers. 293 In other words, Tun Razak's policy was more on non-aligned, ASEAN 
regionalism, and Commonwealth, while the policy towards Muslim relations was of less 
importance. 294 
Notwithstanding the above policies, this would not demote the issue of Malaysia's 
relations with Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia, under the Tun Razak regime. 
Instead, Tun Razak had doubled his efforts in luring the Kingdom to give loans as well as 
to invest in Malaysian developmental projects. He was relatively successful in changing 
the ancient relations to the new form of interactions, which were more centred on politic 
and socio-economic co-operation. As previously mentioned, Tun Razak was able to 
secure loans from the Kingdom to participate in several joint-venture projects between 
both countries. Since the degree of diplomatic and economic relations with Saudi 295 
292 Rozeman Abu Hassan, Tun Abdul Razak Bin Dato' Hussein : Dasar Luar Malaysia 1970-1976 
(Tanjung Malim, Perak : Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris, 2003), 89. 
293 Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia : The Making of a Nation, 150. 
294 Shanti Nair mentioned that Muslim identity was only ranked fifth in Tun Razak' foreign 
policy. Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 61. 
295 For further detail see sub-topic "Tun Razak's Political-Economic Relations with Saudi 
Arabia", in the Chapter IV. 
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Arabia was largely improved, is there any indication that the Tun Razak regime's 
approach towards religious portrayal also enhanced in the relations? 
It may be somewhat difficult to relate Tun Razak's policy towards Saudi Arabia 
with religious commitment at the domestic level. This is because most of the measures 
taken during Tun Razak's tenure were to sustain his domestic policy, called the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), which was set up to re-stabilize the level of socio-economic 
inequalities among the main races, Malay, Chinese and Indians, following the tragedy of 
May 13`h 1969. The main focus of the policy was also to achieve the transfer of 30 
percent of the manufacturing and commercial undertaking to Malay (Bumiputeras) 
ownership by 1990.296 In addition, the Tun Razak regime did not face having tough 
Islamic opposition parties at home due to the admission of the Islamic Party of Malaysia 
(PAS) into the ruling party, Barisan Nasional (BN). To help promote closer official 
attention to both domestic and international Islamic matters, Tun Razak appointed the 
PAS President, Datuk Asri as the Head of the National Religious Affairs Bureau, and its 
Vice President, Yusof Rawa, as Malaysian Ambassador to Iran. 297 This golden 
opportunity helped the Tun Razak regime to focus more on socio-economic development 
at the national level without having to face so many obstacles, and the loans given by 
Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States, indirectly further accelerated the path of 
development. 
296 See Edmond Terence Gomez & Jomo K. S., Malaysia's Political Economy : Politics, Patronage 
and Profits (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997), 24, Donald R. Snodgrass, 
Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 
1980), 5-10 & 56-60, Chris Dixon, South East Asia in the world-economy (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 189-190. 
29' Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 62. 
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At the international level, the role of religious portrayal was fairly observable. As 
his predecessor, Tun Razak was also active in promoting Islam by implementing some 
international Islamic programmes having organized a few International Islamic 
Conferences in 1974, helped the Palestinians by raising capital donations as well as 
promoting self-determination, questioned the plight of Muslim minority in the southern 
Philippines at the fifth OIC Summit in Kuala Lumpur, and signed the Islamic Charter of 
the OIC in 1972. Furthermore, during the Arab oil boycott following the war of 1973, led 
by Saudi Arabia, the Tun Razak regime unanimously supported and considered it as 
practical without acknowledging adverse effects on other states, especially developing 
ones. Although, this boycott did not involve all Muslim countries, it was closely related 
to the issue of Palestine, about which all Muslim counterparts were concerned. As a 
result, the Saudi Kingdom granted a guarantee to place Malaysia among the ten most 
favoured nations exempted from oil cutbacks during the 1973 crisis. One year after the 
crisis, Tun Razak's government sponsored the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers and directly called upon oil rich Islamic countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf States, to assist and invest in Muslim developing nations like Malaysia. At the 
same time also, the volume of bilateral trade between Malaysia and the Middle Eastern 
countries had increased from M$72 million in 1969 to M$654 million in 1974.98 
Moreover, with the appointment of Tunku Abdul Rahman as the OIC Secretary, Tun 
Razak's administration had benefitted tremendously from the support of the organization 
as it indirectly generated more funds for his socio-economic development projects, 
especially from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). 
298 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 62. 
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Generally, Tun Razak's government showed some indications of its religious 
commitment to Muslim affairs, especially at the international level. This was so vital for 
Malaysia in order to attract more Arab-Muslim countries to assist its growth projects 
financially. 299 At the domestic level, however, the Tun Razak regime paid more attention 
to re-building the socio-economic development of the freshly worsening situation in 
Malaysia's multi-racial society after the tragedy of May 13th, 1969. Thus the funds and 
the loans, for instance from Saudi Arabia, were utilized to make the objectives of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) more successful. In addition, the absence of a strong 
Islamic opposition domestically, further smoothed the way for the Tun Razak regime's 
growth plan for Malaysia. 
4.6.3 The Tun Hussein Onn Regime 
There was nothing much different in Tun Hussein's policy towards relations with other 
countries. He maintained the Tun Razak regime's approach of non-alignment and 
neutralization policies at the international level. The Tun Hussein regime, however, was 
closer to the west than to the Soviet Union following the latter's invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1979.300 In regard to Saudi Arabia, Tun Hussein successfully derived more loans from 
the Kingdom to finance projects of development under the Third Malaysian Plan. That 
Saudi capital was not only vital for infrastructural development projects, but were also 
z" This is also related to Malaysia's former colonial overlord, Great Britain, which had refused to 
increase its financial contribution in the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970). See Rene Peritz, "The 
Changing World of Malaysia", 34-35. 
300 J. Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence : Two Decades of Malaysia's Foreign 
Policy, 1957-1977,150, Anidah Robani, "The Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government 
Towards the Palestinian Issue, 1957-1989", 96, Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 
78. 
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utilized to construct some religious buildings like mosques and schools, and to run 
301 Islamic programmes at the domestic level. 
The Tun Hussein regime had to show its religious piety, especially to the Muslim 
community in Malaysia, in order to maintain the dominance of the ruling party, Barisan 
Nasional (BN). As Tun Hussein said: "You may wonder why we spend so much money 
on Islam. You may think it is a waste of money. If we don't..... Party Islam will get at us. 
The Party will and does claim that we are not religious and the people will lose faith, '. 302 
In contrast with the era of the Tun Razak regime, the Tun Hussein regime was facing 
different challenges both domestically and internationally. Those challenges ranged from 
a small quarrel within the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) itself, 303 through 
the overwhelming of the Islamic resurgence, the Iranian Revolution, to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Tun Hussein also had to admit that the Islamic Party of 
Malaysia was no longer under the Barisan Nasional (BN) umbrella when the party opted 
out from BN's components due to some discrepancies in dealing with certain issues 
involving Muslim affairs. Therefore, the enormous amount of the Saudi capital 
investment, and its moral-religious support had, to some extent, boosted the Tun Hussein 
301 Malaysia's economically closeness to Saudi Arabia was also due to Tun Hussein's aligned 
policy to Third World or Southern positions, which encouraged the establishment of the so-called 
`New International Economic Order' (NIEO). See J. Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of 
Independence : Two Decades of Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1957-1977,146-147. 
302 Anidah Robani, "The Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government Towards the Palestinian 
Issue, 1957-1989", 43. 
303 The challenges ranged from his party, UMNO, when his leadership was confronted by other 
members who were. less dissatisfied with him, to the issue of corruption involving a chief 
minister, and also the question of who would he appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister. For 
further elaboration see Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Hussein Orin Dengan Era Baru (Kuala Lumpur 
Firma Malaysia Publishing, 1979), 1-24. 
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regime's confidence (in financial terms) in handling Islamic issues, particularly at the 
domestic level. 
Various efforts were implemented by the Tun Hussein regime to demonstrate its 
undivided commitment to Islam, such as regularly organizing the International Qur'an 
Reading Competition (which gained praise from the Saudi Kingdom), constantly 
upholding the Palestinian cause, criticizing the Soviet invasion, and in 1977, the Tun 
Hussein regime also broke off all Malaysian trade, direct and indirect, with Israel through 
the Customs Prohibition Act passed by Parliament. 304 Nonetheless, there were some 
occasions when Tun Hussein's commitment towards religious issues, especially in 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia, was carefully taken into account. These included, 
for instance, the issue of the Iranian Revolution, the Camp David Accord, the occupation 
of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the fate of Muslim minorities in India, Myanmar, 
Pattani and other parts of the world. 
Indubitably, the Iranian Revolution, to some extent, was able to threaten the 
supremacy of Saudi Arabia as one of the leading actors in the Muslim world. Both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran have long tussled over a methodological way of promoting Islam 
worldwide. The former is more towards the Sunni approach, and the latter is Shi'i. 305 The 
Saudi Kingdom revived the call for Islam over two hundreds years ago through the 
304 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 66. 
305 Sunni and Shi'i can be defined as a way of understanding as well as interpreting the Shari'ah 
Law, the sacred law of Islam. 
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movement of Wahhabism, the reawakening of Hanbalism, 306 led by Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab. In some measure, the Iranian revolution might challenge Saudis' early 
revolution, although the impact was limited to the Gulf States, and the Arabian Peninsula 
as a whole. 307 However, official reactions from other Muslim counterparts, including 
Malaysia were crucial. Thus, Malaysia's official response to the revolution was important 
for the moral support of the Saudi Kingdom. Yet the Tun Hussein regime was no hurry to 
make any official statement regarding the Iranian case. 308 At the early stage, Tun Hussein 
seemed to have no `suitable answer' for such a revolution, although there were some 
actions taken by the Malaysian non-governmental organization, Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia (ABIM), which through its President, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, visited 
Ayatollah Khomeini after the event occurred. It was only 18 months later, via a 
Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmed Rithauddeen, that it was announced that 
relations between Malaysia and the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue, and that the 
revolution was considered to be Iran's internal matter. 309 
In the case of the Camp David meeting which led to the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel, the Tun Hussein administration gave neither a clear signal of protesting 
306 In Fiqh (laws mostly related to the matters of prayer, pilgrimage, food, personal life, and 
property, etc), there are four main schools; the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafe'I, and Hanbali Schools. 
307 David E. Long, "The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf 
States" in John L. Esposito, The Iranian Revolution : Its Global Impact (Miami : Florida 
International University Press, 1990), 102-104, see also Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, 
"Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order", Adelphi Paper 304,48-65, Ameer Ali, 
"Islamic Revivalism in Harmony and Conflict : The Experience in Sri Lanka and Malaysia", 
Asian Survey xxiv (3) March 1984,299-300. 
308 This was also partly due to domestic disturbances such as the temple breaking incident in 1978 
at Kerling, Kuala Lumpur, and the attack on a police station in Batu Pahat, Johore in 1980 (after 
the Iranian Revolution), which caused 23 deaths, by a group of religious extremists and fanatics. 
See Ameer Ali, "Islamic Revivalism in Harmony and Conflict : The Experience in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia", 306 & 309, Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia : The Making of a Nation, 166-167. 
309 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 74. 
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nor of accepting the process. Although the Tun Hussein regime received harsh criticism 
at the domestic level, especially from student and dakwah organizations, he maintained 
his non-partisan approach. Tun Hussein believed that Sadat's initiative did not deviate 
from the unified Arab stance, particularly his uncompromising attitude on the basic Arab 
stand on the returning of all Arab land occupied since 1967, and the treaty itself only 
involved a few Arab states: Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians (along with Israel, 
and the United States). Besides that, Tun Hussein considered it an `internal matter' 
between the Arabs, and his government diplomatically refrained from any involvement in 
inter-Arab disputes. 310 Nonetheless, the study believes that the non-partisan approach by 
Tun Hussein's government may have indirectly influenced, or be related to, the attitude 
of Saudi Arabia which seemingly `encouraged' the peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel . 
311 This was because it was a way for the Saudi Kingdom to `curb' Egypt's position 
in the struggle for Arab leadership in the Middle East, to avoid the latter from repealing 
the Pan-Arab policies of the 1950s during the Jamal Abdel Nasser era, and 
simultaneously other Arab countries would no longer count on the weight of Egypt in the 
scales of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 312 
30 See Anidah Robani, "The Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government Towards the 
Palestine Issue, 1957-1989", 100 & 111-113. 
"' The Camp David Peace Process was just concluded a year after Tun Hussein successfully 
secured Saudi loans, and signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia in Scientific and Technical Co- 
operation. 
312 Saudi attitude to Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty might be linked to the trend in Saudi royal family 
politics which advocated recognition of Israel (in the Fahd plan of 1981) in order to reach a 
comprehensive settlement, but still support the return of the Holy places of Jerusalem and 
restoration of territories occupied in 1967, and also based on a fatwa from the senior mufti, 
Sheikh bin Baz, stating that peace between Muslims and Jews was compatible with the Shari'ah 
and the example of the Prophet. See Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, "Iran-Saudi Arabia 
Relations and Regional Order", 58-60, William B. Quandt, Camp David : Peacemaking and 
Politics, (Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1986), 331. 
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The Tun Hussein regime was also in a dilemma about giving views on the 
occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a dissident politico-religious group in 
November 1979. The group was psychologically speculated to be of Iranian origin (the 
impact of the Iranian Revolution). However, after studying the reactions of the rest of the 
Muslim world, and specifically from Saudi Arabia, Tun Hussein eventually opposed it 
and declared the action as extremist and deviationist. 313 In the affairs of Muslim 
minorities, Tun Hussein's government was criticized for being insensitive enough to 
tackle those issues by dakwah associations and the Islamic party. Even these groups, 
particularly the Islamic party of Malaysia (PAS), and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
(ABIM), were invited to the International Islamic Congress for the Liberation of Muslims 
Land in London in 1979 organized by the Islamic Council of Europe. In November 1979, 
ABIM also launched an International Solidarity Day with the Palestinians. ABIM's 
efforts impressed Arab Embassies in Malaysia like Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These 
events, to some extent, questioned Tun Hussein's understandable commitment towards 
Islamic issues, not only from opposition parties and religious organizations at home, but 
also those Islamic embassies in Malaysia. Nonetheless, to diminish this Islamic tension, 
he made plans to counterbalance the challenge, including despatching 18 UMNO 
delegations, led by his deputy, Dr. Mahathir Muhammad, to Libya and Pakistan to raise 
support and to eliminate the label of UMNO as `anti-Islamic' from the opposition parties, 
as well as re-instate the Tun Hussein regime's image in the eyes of those embassies, 
specifically Saudi Arabia. 314 
"' Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 76, David E. Long, "The Impact of the Iranian 
Revolution on the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf States" in John L. Esposito, The Iranian 
Revolution : Its Global Impact, 106. 
314 Shanti Nair, Islam In Malaysian Foreign Policy, 77. 
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Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia during the Tun Hussein era could be 
regarded as important as in the Tunku's early relations with Great Britain, where the 
focus was more on security-defence matters. The Tun Hussein administration faced one 
of the toughest challenges of the Islamic reawakening in the Muslim world following the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979. He was not only dealing with the issue internationally, but 
also at a domestic level, where religious organizations frequently questioned the role of 
government in certain Muslim issues. The issues ranged from the active role of dakwah 
organizations in Malaysia like Tabligh, Arqam, ABIM, and PAS (as Islamic Party) to the 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution. By 
consistently practising a moderate approach towards those challenges, Tun Hussein's 
government relations with other countries, especially with Saudi Arabia, was well- 
maintained as well as his image in the OIC, and also the stability of a multi-racial country 
like Malaysia. 
4.6.4 The Dr. Mahathir Regime 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia during Dr. Mahathir's era changed dynamically, 
specifically in the 1990s. Several initiatives have been taken by Dr. Mahathir regime to 
shift the pattern of relations from one to two ways of communication. For example, in 
economic development, Dr. Mahathir's administration encourages the Kingdom to open 
up more markets for Malaysian products, and at the same time tries not to merely depend 
upon the Saudi loans to build more development projects. At several International Islamic 
Conferences, Dr. Mahathir also frequently insisted that the Kingdom play a bigger role in 
solving Muslims' misunderstandings among themselves, and in helping the plight of the 
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Palestinians, and Muslim minorities in other countries. Mahathir's emphasis on 
maintaining relations with Muslim countries as well as being active in promoting Islam 
has been the major feature of his foreign policy; as he said : "It is always our intention to 
play an active role in the Islamic dakwah movement, both locally and internationally. It is 
our policy to be closely associated with Islamic nations and to support Islamic causes. 
We in Malaysia will continue to do everything with our means to assist the struggle of the 
Muslim ummah, for the right to live the life of the Muslims". 315 
As his predecessors, Dr. Mahathir realizes the significance of continuous relations 
with Saudi Arabia for Malaysian interests both domestically and internationally. On some 
occasions, the study might find it difficult to specifically relate Dr. Mahathir's 
government's relations with Saudi Arabia to the portrayal of Islam, both at the domestic 
and international level. This is because the nature of the Dr. Mahathr regime's religious 
commitment is broader, and does not merely focus on one single issue or Muslim 
country. Dr. Mahathir has been involved in countless Islamic affairs ranging from the 
issue of Muslim minorities in the Southeast Asian region, 316 Palestine, 317 Afghanistan, 
Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, Balkan crisis, 318 and others. His government also organized 
35 Hussin Mutalib, "Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States : Political Implications", Asian Survey 
xxx (9), September 1990,888. Richard Stubbs also argued that Mahathir's priority is ASEAN, 
then followed by OIC, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Commonwealth. Richard Stubbs, 
"The Foreign Policy of Malaysia" in David Wurfel & Bruce Burton (ed. ), The Political Economy 
of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 111. 
316 The level of intervention is limited due to Malaysia's closer commitment to ASEAN spirit. 
Malaysia has to respect the sovereignty of those countries, which have some Muslim minorities 
such as Pattani, southern Thailand, and MORO movement in southern Philippines. 
"' Granted PLO office in Kuala Lumpur embassy status in 1981. David Camroux, "State 
Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", 866. 
318 Dr. Mahathir sent 1,400 Malaysian troops to Bosnia-Herzogovina to carry out humanitarian 
aid. David Camroux, "State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", 867. 
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many International Islamic Seminars, most ' of which were philosophical knowledge- 
oriented, such as Islamic Approach Towards Technological Development (1983), Islamic 
Civilization (1984), Islamic Thought (1984), Islamic management for the Asia-Pacific 
Region (1986), Islam and the Philosophy of Science (1989). Moreover, the relentless 
challenge from the Islamic opposition party (PAS), which at present does not consider 
Saudi Arabia to be the best model of an Islamic State, 319 led Dr. Mahathir's government 
to seek wider relations with Muslim countries. Since the eruption of the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979, PAS has admired the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran under 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the relations between both parties have been maintained, and 
also a series of diplomatic visits are continuously active. 320 
This is not to say, however, that religious portrayal is irrelevant to Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia in the Dr. Mahathir era. It is certainly significant since the 
issues of pilgrimage, education, membership of the OIC, and some religious programmes 
at the domestic level still bring Malaysia closer to Saudi Arabia. For example, in 
lessening PAS and other dakwah organizations' appeal for a more Islamic policy, Dr. 
Mahathir has launched Islamization programmes321 in some government or banking 
39 This particularly refers to the question of Saudi guardianship in the Holy city of Mecca during 
the 1990 hajj in Mina where there occurred the tragic death of thousands of pilgrims, including 
that of 153 Malaysians, and also to some of Saudi's lenient policy towards certain controversial 
Muslim issues mainly the Palestinians (peace treaty with Israel), and the stationing of US troops 
in the Kingdom. Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 146. 
320 Fred R. von der Mehden, "Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic Movements and the Iranian 
Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed. ) The Iranian Revolution, 248. 
321 Due to misunderstanding, various parties, including the former first Prime Minister, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, urged Dr. Mahathir to halt the launch of Islamization Programme. Islamization 
programme defined by Anwar Ibrahim, one of Dr. Mahathir's cabinet member, as a process 
designed to inject more spiritual values into the Malaysian or Muslim way of life, to bridge the 
spiritual-material gap, to unite Muslims, but not turn them into religious fanatics. Datuk Musa 
Hitam, Deputy Prime Minister, noted that the government effort was more towards striking a 
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institutions such as the establishment of the International Islamic University of Malaysia 
(UTAM), 322 Islamic Economic Development Foundation, Islamic Banking of Malaysia 
Berhad, and the emphasis of the assimilation of Islamic values among the Muslim 
government staff through the Islamic Consultative Body. The concept of the Islamization 
programme may be considered vital for Dr. Mahathir's government (although it has 
raised some worries among the non-Muslim community) as his early era was at the 
beginning of the Iranian Revolution, and the Islamic resurgence, which began in the 
1970s. The challenge from the Islamic party and religious organizations, which had been 
increasing since the late Tun Hussein Onn, further pushed Mahathir's administration 
towards the implementation of Islam in the whole system of government. Thus, by 
implementing the Islamization programme, they may to some extent soothe the pressure 
from these groups and the Muslim community at large, who demanded `more Islam' in 
the conduct of public affairs. 323 
Indirectly too, through the implementation of Islamization programmes, it will 
give Malaysia financial benefits, for instance by receiving, at least once a year by request, 
capital contributions from Saudi Arabia for the running of Islamic institutions, especially 
to the Islamic University of Malaysia (UTAM), and also to several dakwah organizations 
balance between the spiritual and material. Diane K. Mauzy & R. S. Milne, "The Mahathir 
Administration in Malaysia : Discipline Through Islam", Pacific Affairs 56 (4) Winter 1983-85, 
631. 
322 The main concept of the International Islamic University of Malaysia was based on the ideals 
of First World Conference on Muslim Education in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 1976. This university 
is financially co-sponsored among OIC members. Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism, 
193. 
323 Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism, 175. 
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as well as religious schools in Malaysia. 324 Along with that, by executing the Islamization 
process in only a few government and banking institutions, rather than applying the 
whole Islamic Laws all over Malaysian institutions, the Dr. Mahathir regime's closeness 
to the moderate block of Muslim-Arab countries will be portrayed, especially to Saudi 
Arabia, which is relatively less comfortable with the drastic way of the Iranian 
Revolution in practicing Islamic principles in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 325 
Furthermore, to ensure the process of Islamization ran smoothly, Dr. Mahathir 
successfully brought Anwar Ibrahim into the United Malay National Organization 
(UMNO) in 1982. The joining of Anwar Ibrahim in the government, can be regarded as a 
pacifier for Dr. Mahathir's administration in facing Islamic pressure, especially from the 
Islamic opposition party and non-governmental organizations in Malaysia. This is 
because it would weaken the influence of PAS as well as other dakwah organizations, 
such as the movement of Darul Arqam, which was eventually banned by the government 
in 1994 since some of its basic teachings deviated from Islam, 326 and also to run those 
324 Interview with Prof. D. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Member of the International Fiqh Academy 
of OIC, International Islamic University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, May 9,2003. For 
more discussion on a few Saudi's donations to dakwah organizations and religious institutions in 
Malaysia, see Chapter VI. 
325 For instance, in 1983, the Saudi Kingdom arrested seven Malaysians contravening Saudi Law 
through the possession of material evidence indicating rebellious intention by having posters and 
photographs of Khomeini. Nevertheless, Malaysia successfully convinced the Kingdom that they 
referred only to `individual actions'. See Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 166. 
326 The ban of Al-Arqam considered by most of the Muslim Arab countries, including Saudi 
Arabia as Malaysia's internal matter, and even Saudi's Wahabism found incompatible with Al- 
Arqam's philosophical teachings. Discussion with Dr. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, via e-mail, 
who has done on Al-Arqam for his Ph. D, entitled : "Islamic Resurgence in the Periphery :A 
Study of Political Islam in Contemporary Malaysia with Special Reference to the Darul Arqam 
Movement", March 1998, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. See also David Camroux, 
"State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia : Accommodation, Co-Option, and 
Confrontation", 863-865. 
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Islamic institutions effectively. 327 Moreover, the admission of Anwar was not only 
beneficial for Malaysia domestically but also to the international level in strengthening 
Muslims' networks. This is because the image of Anwar Ibrahim, as one of the former 
Islamic leaders in one of the well-known Muslim organizations, ABIM, might promote 
32s Malaysia's religious commitment especially to the Muslim-Arab world. 
Besides that, there are a few international events with which Dr. Mahathir's 
policy might not compatible, or coincidentally parallel, with Saudi Arabian interests such 
as the matter of the PLO's loss of the moral and financial support of several Arab 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, after the Gulf War ended, condemning its support of 
Iraq, and also the call by the United States for the PLO to sit for peace negotiations with 
Israel. Although most of the Arab countries have been less content with the PLO's 
attitude in the Gulf War, Dr. Mahathir has endlessly given his support for the PLO, 
during Yasser Arafat's visit to Malaysia, and indicated some of his opinions on the issue 
of peace negotiation by arguing that no big nation could violate the sovereignty of a weak 
32' Although at the early stage Anwar was seen as closer to Iran due to his visit to Iran two weeks 
after the revolution, while he was the President of ABIM, but his decision to join UMNO, and not 
PAS, suffice to indicate that Anwar's modernist and universalist view of Islam was closer to that 
of Mahathir than PAS. David Camroux, "State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia : 
Accommodation, Co-Option, and Confrontation", Asian Survey xxxvi (9) September 1996,859, 
Simon Barraclough, "Managing the Challenges of Islamic Revival in Malaysia :A Regime 
Perspective", Asian Survey xxiii (8) August 1983,968. 
328 Anwar Ibrahim has various Islamic organization networks including the Rabithah al Alain al- 
Islami of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Council of Europe, the Islamic Foundation in UK, and others. 
Along with that, while he was the Deputy of Prime Minister, this former ABIM leader also held 
the Presidency of the International Islamic University of Malaysia, and he worked well with the 
Rector of the university, Prof. Abu Suleyman Hamid, a Saudi citizen, in running the university. 
Unfortunately, Anwar Ibrahim was sacked by Dr. Mahathir in September 1998 due to personal 
misconduct and bribery charges. Fadzillah Mohd. Jamil, "The Reawakening of Islamic 
Consciousness in Malaysia : 1970-1987", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Edinburgh : University of 
Edinburgh, June 1988), 150, International Islamic University of Malaysia, Undergraduate 
Prospectus 1992-1993 (Petaling Jaya : HUM Press, 1992-1993). 
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nation. 329 At the onset of the Gulf War, Dr. Mahathir's government backed U. N. 
Resolution 678 against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and urged Saddam Hussein to withdraw 
from the occupied territory. But Malaysia declined a public request from Saudi Arabia to 
send its troops and would only do that if Mecca and Medina were attacked. However, in 
the middle of the war, Dr. Mahathir's policy changed a little with more sympathy given 
towards the innocent Iraqi people. This change might be due to the sentiments of the 
Malaysian community after watching the bombings and the death of women and children 
in Iraq, through the media and newspapers, and the subsequent pressure on the 
government to review its policy. 330 To some extent, Dr. Mahathir's policy towards the 
Gulf War may parallel to the Saudis' approach to the harsh action taken by Saddam 
Hussein, especially at the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, in the middle of the war, 
the Kingdom possibly disagreed with the Malaysian attitude because if the U. N coalition 
failed to force Saddam out of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia could become the next target of the 
Iraqi leader. Therefore, the need for incessant action by the U. N. troops as well as the 
stationing of U. S troops in the Kingdom was really needed, although it raised some 
disagreements among Muslim countries. 
Along with that, Dr. Mahathir also openly criticized the weak role of the OIC in 
resolving Muslims' problems and disagreements among its members, specifically on 
inter-Arab or Arab-Iranian rivalry. 331 In 1989, for instance, while giving a speech at the 
Muslim Summit, Taif, Saudi Arabia, Dr. Mahathir repeatedly called on OIC members, 
329 Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia : The Making of a Nation, 215. 
330 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 245-246. 
33' The rivalries were more on the leadership struggle to dominate the Arab world or Middle East 
region such as King Feisal vs Gamal Abdel Nasser, the issue of Egypt's peace process with Israel 
in the Camp David Agreement and Iran-Iraq War. 
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particularly Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, urging them to take a bigger role in 
uniting OIC members and ending all misunderstandings, and also emphasized self- 
reliance among themselves. 332 At the same time also, he took some initiatives to bridge 
the gaps and misunderstandings among the Arabs including showing his support for the 
re-admission of Egypt into the OIC after its membership was cancelled for 
controversially signing the peace process with Israel at Camp David, which most of the 
Muslim countries were against. 
Frankly to say, it is quite hard to particularly associate religious commitment in 
Dr. Mahathir's era with Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. This is because the level 
of the Dr. Mahathir regime's involvement in Muslim affairs is broad and does not merely 
concentrate on one issue or a Muslim country. Moreover, the Islamic opposition party 
and other dakwah organizations seem no longer to regard Saudi Arabia as the best model 
of a good Islamic state, for they believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran can lead all 
Muslim countries for better a life and prosperous achievement in the political and socio- 
economic fields. Nevertheless, Dr. Mahathir's administration still manages to stand firm 
on the more suitable approach in dealing with these challenges by introducing 
Islamization programmes, which is quite liberal and moderate, not only to the Muslim 
community but also to non-Muslims, as well domestically and internationally. 
4.7 Saudi Political Regimes' Recognition upon Malaysia 
It has to be admitted that visits of Al-Saud family rulers to Malaysia have not been as 
frequent as the tours made by the Malaysian political regimes (especially the leaders) to 
"Z Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam OIC", 34. 
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the Kingdom. From the reign of King Saud (1953-1964), with the exception of the first 
leader of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz (1932-1953) because Malaysia had yet to 
achieve independence during his term, to King Feisal (1964-1975), King Khaled (1975- 
1982), and King Fahd (1982-2004), 333 it was only King Feisal that made a trip to 
Malaysia to discuss some related issues with the first Malaysian premier, the late Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, in 1970.334 After the visit of King Feisal, Malaysia only received some 
official visits by a few Saudi ministers like the those by the Kingdom's Foreign 
33s Ministers, Tuan Omar Sakkar in 1973, Saudi Hajj and Waqaf Minister, Sheikh Hasan 
Kutbi in 1974,336 Oil Saudi Minister, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani in 1976 '337 
Saudi 
Finance Minister in 1978,338 Saudi Education Minister, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Sheikh in 
1978 '339 
Saudi Labour Deputy Minister, Prince Fahad Ibn Sultan in 1981,340 and others. 
Most of these visits, except the trips of the Saudi Foreign Minister (Tuan Omar Sakkar) 
and the Saudi Finance Minister, who had more specific activities like the former (also 
313 For the duration of each Saudi Kings' reign see for instance, The Saudi Arabia Information 
Resource, "Kings of Saudi Arabia", (http: //www. saudinf. com/main/b43. htm). 
334 For further information on King Feisal's visit to Malaysia see pages 86 & 103-104 in the 
Chapter IV. 
"' "Menteri Luar Arab Saudi, Tuan Omar Sakkar, Kunjungan ke Atas Perdana Menteri, Tun Haji 
Abdul Razak Hussein, Kuala Lumpur, August 13,1973", Rekod Pandang dan DenQar, National 
Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0042297, G. 13023). 
336 "Arab Saudi, Menteri Urusan Haji dan Wakaf, Hasan Kutbi, Majlis Makan Malam diraikan 
oleh Perdana Menteri, Tun Haji Abdul Razak Hussein, Kuala Lumpur, February 19,1974", 
Rekod Pandang dan Dengar, National Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0042721, G. 13382). 
337 "Arab Saudi Menteri Minyak, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani Mengunjungi Perdana Menteri, 
Datuk Hussein Onn, Kuala Lumpur, May 25,1976", Rekod Pandang dan DenQar, National 
Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0043842, G. 14454). 
338 "Arab Saudi, Ketibaan Menteri Kewangan dan Ekonomi Bagi Menghadiri Sidang Tahunan 
Kedua Bank Pembangunan Islam, Kuala Lumpur, March 15,1978", Rekod Pandang dan Dengar, 
National Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0044852, G. 15376). 
339 "Arab Saudi, Menteri Pelajaran, Tuan Sheikh Hasan Abdullah Al-Sheikh Mengunjungi 
Menteri Pelajaran Datuk Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, October 16,1978", Rekod Pandan dan 
DenQa, National Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0045267, G. 15751). 
340 "Arab Saudi, Timbalan Menteri Hal-Ehwal Kebajikan Kementerian Buruh dan Hal-Ehwal 
Sosial, Putera Fahad Ibn Sultan Mengunjungi YDPA, November 12,1981", Rekod Pandang dan 
DenQar, National Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0046665, G. 17171). 
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accompanied by Moustapha Cisse, Senegal Foreign Minister) was on his way to Manila 
to discuss the issue of the Muslim minority in the southern Philipines, 
341 while the latter 
was to attend the Second Seminar of the Islamic Development Bank held in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 342 were the outcome (or a follow-up) of the Joint Commission under 
the Cultural and Scientific Agreement signed in 1976 between Tun Hussein Onn (the 
second Malaysia's Premier), and King Khaled's government (and also to discuss the 
issue of pilgrimage). 343 Nevertheless, this joint commission did not lead the Al-Saud 
family leaders, especially King Khaled, and King Fahd to officially visit Malaysia. It took 
about 25 years for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to commence the second Joint 
Commission, which was only held in 2001, with the official visit of Prince Sultan Ibn 
Abdul Aziz, the Second Deputy Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia, to Malaysia. 344 
That Al-Saud family kings, excluding King Feisal, did not come to Malaysia, 
does not necessarily mean that the Kingdom's leaders were less interested in visiting 
other countries. Apart from King Khaled, who was generally considered to prefer staying 
at home rather than going abroad , 
345 other Saudi leaders like King Abdul Aziz, King 
Saud, King Feisal, and King Fahd did travels to a few countries. The first Saudi leader, 
J4' "Menteri Luar Arab Saudi, Tuan Omar Sakkar, Kunjungan ke Atas Perdana Menteri, Tun Haji 
Abdul Razak Hussein, Kuala Lumpur, August 13,1973", Rekod Pandang dan Dengar, National 
Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0042297, G. 13023). 
342 "Arab Saudi, Ketibaan Menteri Kewangan dan Ekonomi Bagi Menghadiri Sidang Tahunan 
Kedua Bank Pembangunan Islam, Kuala Lumpur, March 15,1978", Rekod Pandang dan Dengar, 
National Archive of Malaysia, (2001/0044852, G. 15376). 
343 See note 255 in the Chapter IV. 
344 According to Tan Sri Wan Mokhtar, the commencement of the second Joint-Commission 
between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia is also hardly initiated by the Malaysian government as it 
attempts to increase its bilateral economic relations with the Kingdom. Interview with Tan Sri 
Wan Mokhtar, Malaysian Ambassador in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00-10.30am, September 1, 
2004. 
345 The Saudi Arabia Information Resource, "King Khaled Ibn Abdul Aziz", 
((http: //www. saudinf. com/main/b45. litni). 
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King Abdul Aziz, for instance, was famous for his historic meeting with President 
Roosevelt of the US when he was invited by the latter to meet in an American destroyer 
in the Suez Canal on February 10,1945. Among the major subjects discussed between 
these two leaders was the issue of the Palestine, concerning which the US President, 
before he died, sent a letter to King Abdul Aziz to indicate his co-operative stance with 
the King on that issue. 346 The mutual relations between Saudi Arabia and the US were 
also continued by the visit of King Saud to the United States in January 1957 for the 
setting up of the Dhahran air base, 347 and were later followed by King Feisal, and King 
Fahd (as the Crown Prince) in 1971 who suggested the US should enforce the UN 
resolution calling for Israel's withdrawal, 348 by another visit by King Fahd in 1974 which 
led to the establishment of the Saudi Arabia-US Joint Commission on economic 
cooperation, 349 and in 1985 when the King asked the US to play more active role in the 
Middle East region. 350 Besides the US, the Saudi leaders also toured some influential 
countries in the international system including Great Britain, which King Feisal visited in 
1967 to talk about the possibility of purchasing the British aircraft (which were later 
successfully secured through the al-Yamamah Project in 1987), 351 and further extended 
346 Dr. Nasser Ibrahim Rashid & Dr. Esber Ibrahim Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War 
(Missouri : International Institute of Technology, Inc., 1992), 25. 
14' "Saudi Arabia, " Encarta Online Encyclopedia, Microsoft Corporation, All Rights Reserved, 
1997-2005, (httt ): //uk. encarta. msn. com). 
34s "Attitude of Saudi Arabia Towards Middle East", British Public Record Office, UK (FCO 
8/1735), "Visit of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia to UK From Saudi Arabia, 1971", British Public 
Record Office, UK (FCO 8/1760). 
349 The Saudi Arabia Information Resource, "King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz", 
(http: //www. sau(iinf. com/main/b462. htm). 
350 Saudi Embassy in UK, "The Reign of King Fahd", 
(httT): //www. saudiemhassy. or-. uk/zovernmcnt-information/prot ile-of-kin, -fahcUthe-rei(-Yn-of- 
kinp-fahd. htm). 
3s' Project al-Yamamah was an agreement signed in 1985 between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and Great Britain which showed the latter secured defence contract with the former worth US$30 
billion dollar. HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal, ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the 
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by the two visits of Prince Fahd in 1971352 for further discussion on the Saudi-Abu Dhabi 
border, and in 1987353 on al-Yamamah Project. Other countries were France, which was 
visited by King Fahd in 1975,354 as well as Saudi Arabia's neighbouring Middle East 
countries like Egypt, Iraq and Iran. 
The lack of visits by Al-Saud family rulers to Malaysia, in some cases only make 
this study more difficult to link the role of the Saudi political regimes in strengthening the 
relations between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, and also to relate them with any issues that 
were raised in this chapter such as securing economic opportunities, the portrayal of 
religious comittment, or any political domestic purposes. With the exception of King 
Feisal, whose visit was specifically to gain more support for his Pan-Islamism from other 
Islamic countries in order to counteract the challenge posed by Gamal Abdel Nasser of 
Egypt, 355 none could be extracted from other Al-Saud family leaders who did not pay any 
official tours to Malaysia. Nonetheless, this would not simply lead to an indication that 
the Saudi political regime had ignored its relations with the Malaysian regime. Instead, 
with the continuous efforts carried out by the Malaysian leaders to attract the attention of 
the Saudi government, Malaysia had benefited greatly by receiving some financial 
assistance, securing political recognition, especially during the confrontation with the 
UK & Ireland, "Saudi/British Business and Political Relations", Public Lecture, Curtis 
Auditorium, Herschel Building, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 5.00-6.00pm, May 11, 
2004, Gerd Nonneman, "Saudi-European Relations 1902-2001 ", 649-650. 
352 "Visit of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia to UK From Saudi Arabia, 1971 ", British Public Record 
Office, UK (FCO 8/1760). 
353 Saudi Embassy in UK, "Profile of King Fahd, Chronology", 
(http: //www. saudiembassy-ore. uk/Qovernment-information/prol ilc-of-king-f ah(/chronology. htm). 
354 Ministry of Saudi Arabia Information, "Prince Fahd Ends Visit to France : Agreement on 
Economic Cooperation", News From Saudi Arabia, A Weekly Newsletter, xii (573) July 29, 
1975. 
351 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 16-17. 
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Indonesian government, and other related issues that further strengthened Malaysia's 
relations with the Kingdom including pilgrimage and education. In other points of 
discussion, the study believes that the tendency of Al-Saud family rulers not to visit 
Malaysia was probably due to the absence of any conflicts that directly affected the 
relations between the two countries (although the study could not deny that such a 
conflict may further disrupt the relations, but at least, a conflict would open more ways 
for conflicting countries to interact frequently) such as border conflicts or quarrels which 
both countries normally have with their own neighbouring countries. 356 This is in 
addition to the practice of non-interference policy by both countries' regimes who avoid 
interfering in some domestic conflicts like the issue of Malaysia's ban on the Al-Arqam 
(Islamic Da'wah movement in Malaysia357), or some critical domestic upheavals in the 
Kingdom, for example, the illegal incursion of the Al-Haram Mosque in 1979, the Iranian 
demonstration in 1987, and the tragedy of Muaissim Tunnel in 1990358 which in some 
ways may not lead to frequent interaction between them, specifically for the Saudi 
political regimes. Besides, both countries mostly interacted with other general Muslim 
issues, beyond the scope of their relations, like the Palestinian people, the issue of 
Muslim minorities, and others which were usually discussed at the international Islamic 
dialogue or in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). On top of that, with the 
assassination of King Feisal in March 1975, there was no personal relationship formed 
356 Malaysia is currently having some border disputes with Singapore over Batu Putih Island, and 
overlapping claims on the Spratlys Island which are also alleged by other countries including 
China, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. While Saudi Arabia still has `unclear' border with 
Yemen, and also having continuous discussion with Kuwait and Iran over maritime boundary. 
CIA The World FactBook, "Malaysia", 
(htttp: //www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geo, /iny. html), CIA The World Factbook, "Saudi 
Arabia", (http: //www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sa. html). 
3S7 See note 326 in the Chapter IV. 
3"' For these three upheavals see notes 752,753 & 754 in the Chapter VI. 
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between both political regimes, as there was Tunku Abdul Rahman and King Feisal, 
which indirectly discouraged the level of interaction between both countries' leaders. 359 
Furthermore, more significantly, the Malaysian political regimes have to avow that they 
have to interact first with Al-Saud family rulers for they need the latter's contribution and 
co-operation more, for instance in obtaining financial aid or in fulfilling the Islamic 
appeal of the Malaysian Muslim community particularly in doing pilgrimage activities in 
the Kingdom, and not vice-versa. Moreover, since Malaysia is only a small country, and 
has no bigger influence in the international system, this indirectly leads Al-Saud family 
rulers to pay more attention to other more influential and important countries in order to 
consolidate their diplomatic recognition, to enhance the level of security as well as to 
further develop their economic prosperity in the international system. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The role of the nature of state and regime interests is one of the essential variables that 
influence Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. Throughout the discussion which is 
largely based upon the leadership period of Malaysian and Saudi Arabian political 
regimes, the study has found, decidedly, that most of the initiatives taken, particularly by 
the Malaysian political regimes from the Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Dr. Mahathir 
regimes, have enhanced the level of interactions between both countries. The efforts, 
which normally take place through formal visits by the Prime Minister of Malaysia and 
his officials to Saudi Arabia, can be regarded as successful because they are able to 
generate diplomatic and socio-economic opportunities, as well as the religious 
359 Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Mission, "Brief Statement", Embassy of Malaysia in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 5. 
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commitment that is highly beneficial for both countries. However the study cannot deny 
that the relations, in fact, have been mostly initiated by Malaysian political regimes, and 
not Al-Saud family rulers. 
The study has also identified that the nature of Malaysia's relations with Saudi 
Arabia are mostly on the basis of mutual recognition since there has yet to appear a 
conflict or dispute between them, and only a few occasions have arisen where both 
countries have been involved as the mediator to settle some Muslim countries' problems 
such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghanistan crisis, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and 
others under the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The issues discussed at the 
exchanges of visit by Malaysian and Saudi Arabian political regimes are more about 
pilgrimage, education, dakwah (ancient links), economic, financial assistance, market 
opportunities, and investment. In other words, the character of relations is not under 
stress but more on peaceful-mutual basis without the expulsion of the element of 
rationality. Furthermore, the study attempts to relate the significance of the relations to 
the Malaysian political regimes in terms of religious commitment (by having close 
interaction with one of the most influential Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia) both 
domestically and internationally. It has made some relatively valuable findings, 
especially at the domestic level where the portrayal of religious commitment is more 
towards gaining political support among Malaysian Muslim communities. Besides, the 
level of religious portrayal has varied from the Tunku to the Dr. Mahathir regimes. This 
might be due to the different situation at the domestic and international levels, which to 
some extent, has affected the level of commitment. In contrast with the Saudi 
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government, due to the lack of visits by Al-Saud family rulers to Malaysia, except for 
King Fcisal, it is difficult for this study to enhance the significance of the relations for the 
Kingdom other than by considering that King Feisal's visit to Malaysia (through King 
Feisal's visit to Malaysia, however, had opened up more opportunities for the Malaysian 
political regime to continuously receive various religious donations from Al-Saud family. 
This will be further discussed in the Chapter VI) is part of Al-Saud family's global 
agenda to promote its religious ideology, Pan-Islam, to further consolidate the Kingdom's 
position in the Muslim countries. 
In general, the main approach of this chapter gives emphasis to the nature of the 
state and regime interests by focusing the discussion on the different leadership period of 
both political regimes, especially Malaysia, which have come to appear fruitful in order 
to re-affirm the role of the nature of state and regime interests as one of the key 
determining factors influencing Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. Along with that, 
since this chapter focuses on the nature of state and regime interests as the prime mover 
to establish relations, therefore the outcome of this factor may be extended and developed 
in the other chapters, which examine the level of economic and religious interactions, and 
also systemic factor that might further determine the character of Malaysia's relations 
with Saudi Arabia. 
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CHAPTER V 
5.0 ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS AND THE PATTERN OF 
RELATIONS 
It has usually been argued that economic interest is amongst the basic aims of a country 
pursuing bilateral relations with others. This is the interest that two countries or more are 
able to forge closer relations, despite the existence of misunderstandings or 
disagreements between them over a few political matters. 360 In regards to Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia, it is quite noticeable that the economic field, along with the 
religious responsibility, 361 is one of the interests that both countries can share and develop 
at the highest level of cooperation, owing to the nature of the relationship which is not 
grounded upon security or military alliance, but more towards mutual interaction in 
political, socio-economic " and religious fields. This is also increased with the type of 
affiliation of both countries, to an organization like ASEAN and GCC or even OIC, 
which largely focus on diplomatic and socio-economic solidarity. 362 
360 For instance, this has been the case with Malaysia's relations with the United States, and 
Singapore. Despite some misunderstandings on a few political issues, such as Dr. Mahathir's 
stand on US dominance in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), his question on US 
`late' action towards Yugoslavian conflicts (Bosnia-Hezergovina), the dispute between Malaysia 
and Singapore on an island called `Batu Putih', water issues, immigration and customs 
procedures for the Malaysia-Singapore rail link and others, Malaysia's economic relations with 
these two countries is growing tremendously, and they are still among the top five trading 
partners. R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir (New York 
Routledge, 1999), 132-133 & 141-143. 
361 Religious affiliation will be discussed in the Chapter VI. 
362 During and after the two world wars, both countries were members of a security alliance or 
treaty like Malaysia signed the Defence Treaty between Malaysia and Britain soon after the 
former achieved independence in 1957, while Hejaz (one of the Saudi Arabian territories) under 
Shariff Hussein had teamed up with Britain in the First World War against the Ottoman Empire in 
the Arabian Peninsula, and even GCC might act as a security bulwark against Iraq or Iran 
challenges to the stability in the Persian Gulf as well as in the entire Middle East region. See J. 
Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence, 21, K. S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia : With an 
Account of Development of Its Natural Resources (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1953), 
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Malaysia's early economic interactions with Saudi Arabia can be traced back to 
the era of the Malacca Sultanate where most of the Arab traders came to trade with local 
as well as other foreign merchants. 363 This tradition had been continuously pursued by the 
British administration in Malaya, but not by the Portuguese and the Dutch who 
interrupted the trade, prior to the independent period as the UK mainland also 
successfully secured several economic treaties with a few kingdoms in the Arabian 
Peninsula such as with Bahrain (1820), Muscat and Oman (1891), Kuwait (1899), Qatar 
(1916), and the first oil concession given to a British company by King Abdul Aziz of 
Saudi Arabia in 1923.3 Although this interaction as not as important as Malaya's 
economic activities with the United Kingdom, the United States, some other European 
countries and Japan, at least it had formed some early economic exchanges between these 
two political entities. Thus, based on this established historical economic relationship, 
and along with Fred Von der Mehden's assumption365 that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
have been co-religionist for a long period of time, it would be an enormous advantage for 
both countries to strongly develop their economic cooperation in the international 
economic system. Ironically, however, when looking at some of the economic indicators, 
the assumption is in doubt, and inevitably invites a few questions that need to be critically 
96-99, John Christie, "History and Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council :A Brief 
Overview", in John A. Sandwick (ed. ) The Gulf Cooperation Council : Moderation and Stability 
in an Interdependent World (Boulder : Westview Press, 1987), 7-20, J. E. Peterson, "The GCC 
and Regional Security", in John A. Sandwick (ed. ) The Gulf Cooperation Council, 169-171. 
363 See Chapter Three. 
364 See note 167 in the Chapter III. See also Roger Owen & Sevket Pamuk A History of Middle 
East Economies in the Twentieth Century (London : I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), 77, Fouad Al- 
Farsy, Saudi Arabia :A Case Study in Development (London : KPI Limited, 1982), 45, for the 
British mainland's trade agreements with several gulf countries. 
365 Fred R. von der Mehden, however, does not focus on one single country, but analyzes a few 
Middle Eastern countries that actively interact with the Southeast Asian region such as Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf states, and Pakistan. Fred R. von 
der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, xi & 17. 
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analyzed. Among the indicators are, for instance, from the 1960s to the 1990s, the total 
amount of Malaysia's bilateral trade relations with Saudi Arabia was not more than 
RM3.7 billion ringgit, and constantly registered a high deficit to the former due to large 
imports of the latter's petroleum products. This is different with Malaysia's closest 
trading partners such as the US, Singapore, and Japan, which, on average have not less 
than RM20 billion and up to RM70 billion ringgit. In terms of trade agreements, both 
countries only managed to sign five major agreements, of which the last three agreements 
have only been signed after almost twenty years since the first two; The Economic and 
Technical Cooperation Agreement (1975), The Cultural and Scientific Cooperation 
Agreement (1976), and The Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement (1993), 
Investment Guarantee Agreements, and Agreement on the Accession of Saudi Arabia to 
the WTO (2000). 366 Moreover, Saudi Arabia only ranks 27th in Malaysia's external trade 
relations, which demonstrates that the United States, Japan, Singapore and Europe are the 
leading partners in Malaysia's trade relations. 367 
Concerned with the above pattern of Malaysia's economic relations with Saudi 
Arabia, this chapter aims to identify how and why the degree of the relationship is less 
encouraging, especially for Malaysia. To examine this matter, the study will focus on 
three major economic determinants, which in the opinion of the researcher, vastly impact 
upon the pattern of Malaysia's economic relations with Saudi Arabia. Firstly, the 
" The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), "Opening of Caravan Malaysia 2003 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia", December 7,2003 (http: //www. miti. g(iv. rny/spgech-7decO3. htmi), Saudia 
Online, May 22,2001 (http: //www. saudia-online. com/niaynews/Business56. htni), "Signing of 
Bilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA) and the Accession of Saudi Arabia to the 
WTO", MITI (http: //www. miti. gov. my/press34a. htm). 
167 Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE), "Overseas Market 
Information, Saudi Arabia", (MATRADE Branch, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, 1999-2000). 
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economic background of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia will be examined, secondly, the 
character of economic activities, and thirdly the influence of international economic 
system, especially by referring to the concept of core-periphery relations. 
5.1 The Background of the Malaysian Economy 
Before achieving independence in 1957, the Malaysian economy had been under the 
influence of the British administration, at least, since the late 18`h century, through the 
acquisition of Penang by Francis Light in August 1786, and after the Treaty of London in 
1824 which paved the way for Britain to have full authority over the most areas of the 
Malay Peninsula. 368 Although prior to the British arrival there were some early economic 
interactions, mainly with Muslim-Arab traders, and other European powers, like the 
Dutch, it was the British who had the upper hand over them. Frankly to say, on the road 
to independence the historical background of the Malaysian economy was generally 
shaped by the presence of the British administration in Malaya, particularly from the 
early 19`h century to 1957. 
In the era of the British administration, the Malayan economy had been largely 
concentrated on the agricultural and mining sectors. Malaya became the main exporter of 
two raw materials, rubber and tin, in the international trade. The production of rubber and 
tin in Malaya started in the early 19`h century. Rubber plantations were first developed 
commercially by Sir Hugh Low in 1877; tin mining, however, was initially dominated by 
'" This treaty also formally decided the spheres of British and Dutch interest in the Malay 
Archipelago as well as gave Sumatra to the Dutch. Malayan Year Book 1936 (Singapore : The 
Government Printing Office, 1936), 14. 
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the Chinese, until the last years of the nineteenth century. 369 Both rubber and tin had 
contributed to Malayan export earning from $269 million dollars (1920) to $757 million 
dollars (1925), and S128 million dollars (1920) to $175 million dollars (1925) 
respectively. 370 However, these figures dropped abruptly during the 1930s due to the 
Great Economic Depression. For instance, in 1935, the export of rubber only amounted to 
$259 million dollars, and tin to $117 million dollars. 371 Thus, from 1930-1939, Malaya 
began to emphasize the plantation of oil palms, production from which rose significantly 
from 3,300 tons to 57,400 tons, and successfully contributed to the total world output, 
increasing from 1 per cent to over 11 per cent. 372 Nevertheless, at the outset of 
independence of 1957, rubber and tin still accounted for some 85 percent of export 
earnings, and almost half of the Malaysian national output. 373 
Malaya's main trading partners were the United Kingdom, British possessions, 374 
the United States, European Economic Community members (EEC) or the Common 
Market, 375 Japan, and China. The United States, however, was Malaya's principal export 
369 John T. Thoburn, Primary Commodity Exports and Economic Development : Theory, 
Evidence and a Study of Malaysia (London : John Wiley & Sons, 1977), 14,58, & 61, P. P. 
Courtenay, A Geography of Trade and Development in Malaya (London : G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 
1972), 115, T. H. Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia (Durham : Duke 
University Press, 1959), 8-9 & 157, Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K. S. (ed. ), Malaysia's 
Political Economy : Politics, Patronage and Profits (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 10 & 13-14. 
370 John T. Thoburn, Primary Commodity Exports and Economic Development, 70. 
371 Malayan Year Book 1936,118, John T. Thoburn, Primary Commodity Exports and Economic 
Development, 70 
372 P. P. Courtenay, A Geography of Trade and Development in Malaya, 125. 
373 John T. Thobum, Primar v Commodity Exports and Economic Development, 72. 
374 British possession including British India, Burma and Hong Kong. 
375 European Economic Community (EEC) or the Common Market was an organization of West 
European states created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Its original members were Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. UK joined EEC in 1973. The 
Macmillan Encyclopedia (London : Guild Publishing, 1986), 426. 
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market, followed by the EEC, UK and Japan. For example, the Malayan total value of 
merchandise imported from and export to the United States in 1935 was $204,472 million 
dollars, EEC $61,890 million dollars, UK $12,596 million dollars and Japan $22,284 
million dollars. Furthermore, from 1937 to the 1950s (1952-1953), the US continued as 
one of the leading Malayan trading partners as the latter's export to the former remained 
steady with the average between $382,942 million dollars and $291.7 million dollars. 
Meanwhile, Malayan trading with the UK registered a deficit of between -$7,436 million 
dollars, and -$56.7 million dollars. 
376 The US developed as the main principal market for 
Malaya owing to her position as the rising superpower after the World Wars I and II, 
compared to Great Britain which started to decline politically and economically in the 
post-war years. Moreover, the level of Malayan imports had often surpassed exports to 
UK due to the huge need for certain materials,. especially food and manufactured 
goods. 377 Then, as has been said before, there were no specific Middle East countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, listed in the overseas trade of Malaya in the Malayan Year Book 
from 1930s to 1950s. Malaysia's trade with Saudi Arabia was only began to be quoted 
from the 1960s and onwards, such as a report in the Malayan Year Book of 1966 which 
stated bilateral trade between both countries amounting to a deficit of -RM72,290,563 
million. The huge deficit was because of the total of import for Saudi's crude oil and 
petroleum products (RM73,416,464 million) outnumbered Malaysian combined main 
376 Nevertheless, in 1952, Malayan export to the UK surpassed its import, which amounted $425.7 
million dollar. Malayan Year Book 1939 (Singapore : The Government Printing Office, 1939), 
122, Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur : The Government Press, 1951), 
72-73, Federation of Malaya Annual Report 1953 (Kuala Lumpur : The Government Press, 
1954), 104-105. See also T. H. Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia, 161- 
162, for a good elaboration. 
377 See Malayan Year Book 1939,121. 
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exports, rubber manufacture, tin, preserved fruits and electrical machinery (RM1,016,912 
million). 378 
After gaining independence in 1957, the Malaysian government moved ahead 
with the industrialization process. This owed much to the realization of the price 
fluctuation of its primary commodities in the international market, faced with the United 
States's synthetic rubber during the war, and a few recommendations by the International 
Bank and Reconstruction Development (IBRD), which visited Malaya in 1954, to 
diversify its economy and not merely depend on agricultural products. 379 This was also 
related to its total GDP, of which two-fifths came from agriculture, and only less than 10 
percent from the manufacturing sector. 380 
The process of industrialization in Malaysia can be referred to the phases of 
import-substitution-industrialization (ISI), and export-oriented-industrialization (EOI). 
The former took off in the late 1950s to 1960s, and it was a strategy to encourage foreign 
investors to set up production, assembly and packaging plants in the country to supply 
finished goods previously imported from abroad. The government also subsidized, 
directly or indirectly, the establishment of new factories, and at the same time, protected 
the domestic market. ISI policy was very encouraging as it led Malaysian GDP to grow 
38 Malaysia Quaterly Statistics of External Trade, July-September 1966 and Nine Months Ended 
September 1966 (Kuala Lumpur : Department of Statistics, 1966), 28,33 & 52. 
39 David Lim, "Malaysian Development Planning", Pacific Affairs 55 (4) Winter 1982-83,617, 
John Gullick, Malaysia : Economic Expansion and National Unity (London : Westview Press, 
1981), 142, John T. Thoburn, Primary Commodity Exports and Economic Development, 72. 
180 Jomo K. S. & Chris Edward, "Malaysian Industrialisation in Historical Perspective" in Jomo 
K. S. (ed. ), Industrialising Malaysia : Policy, Performance and Prospects (London : Routledge, 
1993), 18. 
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from 9 percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1970. The EOI policy, which began in the early 
1970s, attempted to facilitate and encourage Malaysian manufacturing production for 
export using imported equipment and available raw materials. The prime aims of EOI 
were to increase the processing of older (rubber and tin) and newer (palm oil and timber) 
primary commodities for export, and also to develop non-resource based exports like 
electrical and electronic components. The first aim was less successful as it was not 
consumed much by developed economies as they prefer to import those raw materials 
rather than finished products, while the electrical and electronic sector indicated potential 
growth as it produced more than half of the total manufactured exports since the mid- 
1980s. 381 
Beside that, due to the importance of energy sector, especially oil, as the 
backbone of economy where petroleum products are the dominant fuel use of commercial 
energy about 64.5 percent, followed by electricity (18%), coal and coke (3.1%), 
particularly in the 1990s, 382 Malaysia begins to explore some potential areas which are 
believed to have oil reserves such as off-shore Sabah, Sarawak and Terengganu. This 
effort became fruitful when petroleum was successfully drilled for the first time in 
38' Jomo K. S. & Chris Edward, "Malaysian Industrialisation in Historical Perspective", 25-26, 
Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K. S. (ed. ), Malaysia's Political Economy, 16-17. 
382 Petroleum products are largely used in transport sector (42%), followed by industrial sector 
(37%), residential and commercial sector (13%) and agricultural sector (0.3%). National Energy 
Balance 2001, "Executive Summary", 
(http: //ns2. ptm. org. my/medishomepage/PDFReport/NTLBES 01. pdf), Petroliam Nasional Bhd, 
"The Oil and Gas Industry : Providing Energy for the Future", in Michael Yeoh (ed. ), 2151 
Century Malaysia : Challenges and Strategies in Attaining Vision 2020 (London : ASEAN 
Academic Press Ltd., 2002), 140. 
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1957.33 With the establishment of PETRONAS in 1974,384 the production of oil is 
encouraging. The range of Malaysia's oil production was from 1,000 barrels to 99,000 
barrels per day between 1967-1973.385 In the mid-1980s, the average production of oil 
was dramatically increasing at the rate of 444 000 barrels a day. 386 Furthermore, from the 
1990s and onwards, Malaysia was successful in enhancing its monthly crude oil 
production to about 650,000 barrels per day, and was placed as the 27th largest of crude 
oil reserves in the world (the total volume is about 4.84 billion barrels387). Most of its 
crude oil is exported to Singapore, Japan, Thailand, and South Korea. 388 
In spite of the ability to export of crude oil, Malaysia is still producing or refining 
insufficient petroleum products for its domestic energy uses. For example, in 1980 and 
1995, Malaysia could only supply petroleum products between 2,323 ktoe389 and 610 
ktoe compared to the level of use was between 5,550 ktoe (1980) and 16,142 ktoe (1995), 
383 Fong Chan Orin, New Economic Dynamo : Structures and Investment Opportunities in the 
Malaysian Economy (Sydney : Allen & Unwin, 1986), 132. 
384 PETRONAS stands for Petroliam Nasional Bhd which was set up in August 17,1974. It is a 
wholly-owned by the Malaysian government to manage the entire oil and gas resources in 
Malaysia. PETRONAS, "Corporate", 2000-2005 
(http: //www. petronas. coni. my/intcmet/core/centralrep2. nsf`/ rameset core'? OpenFrameset). 
365 Bruce Gale, "PETRONAS : Malaysia's National Oil Corporation", Asian Survey xxi (II) 
November 1981,1131. 
386 Fong Chan Orin, New Economic Dynamo, 134. 
387 However, according to the recent report by Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
Malaysia's proven oil reserves decreased from 4.3 billion barrels in 1996 to 3.0 billion in early 
2005, and it will last less than 20 years. Energy Information Administration (EIA), "Country 
Analysis Briefs : Malaysia", January 2005 (http: //www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/malaysia. html), 
United States Energy Information Administration, "Malaysia", July 1996 
(http: //www. convergcr. com/ciacah/malaysia. htm). 
388 Energy Information Administration (EIA), "General Background : Malaysia", 
(http: //www. cia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs! nialaysia. html), UK, Trade and Investment, "Oil, Gas, 
Refining and Petrochemicals (Plant 
Design) & Construction Market in Malaysia" 
(http: //www. tradepartners. s,, ov. uk/oil and gas/malaysia/profile/overview. shtml), Sidek Kamiso, 
"Shell Makes Major Oil Discovery", The Star September 23,2004 
(http: //hiz. thestar. com. my/news*/storv. asp*ttle=/2004/9/23/business/8963658&sec=business). 
389 Ktoe stands for `kilo tan of energy'. 
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and also in 1998 and 1999 the production was only at 1,793 ktoe and 848 ktoe, whereas 
the total use was 17,488 ktoe and 19,247 ktoe respectively. 390 This scenario has generally 
been shared by the Ministry of Energy, Communications and Multimedia, Malaysia, 
which believes that supply from petroleum products and crude oil for domestic uses 
decreased from 87.8 per cent in 1980 to 52.1 per cent in 1998.391 Therefore Malaysia has 
to import some petroleum products from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran and Singapore to cover 
up those deficiencies 392 and the government is compelled to seek an international 
exploration and production strategy by investing in some foreign countries' oil industries 
including Syria, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, China, Vietnam, Burma, Algeria, which 
contributes one-third of PETRONAS revenue. 393 The insufficient production of oil for 
the domestic consumption which Malaysia is largely dependable upon the oil rich 
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, indirectly too leads to the imbalance in the former's 
trade with the latter as has been discussed later in the sub-topic : "Trade : The Pattern of 
Export and Import". 
As Malaysia headed towards the 1980s and onwards, its economy, to some extent, 
diversified considerably from too much dependence upon agricultural commodities 
towards export-oriented-industrialization, and heavy industries (automobile) which 
390 Komathi Mariyappan, "Status of Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency in Malaysia", Center 
for Environment, Technology and Development, Malaysia (CTDEM), 
(http: //www. isep or. ih/spena/2000/countryreports/malaysia. htm). 
191 Ministry of Energy, Communications, & Multimedia, "National Energy Balance Malaysia, 
1999 & Quarter I&2,2000", 
(http: //ns2. ptm. or, Q. my/medishomepa. e/PDFReport/NEBQI 02 00. PDF). 
392 Singapore is the biggest exporter of petroleum products (71.7 per cent) to Malaysia. UK, Trade 
and Investment, "Oil, Gas, Refining and Petrochemicals (Plant Design) & Construction Market in 
Malaysia" (http: //www. tradepartners. gov. uk/oil and gas/malavsia/profile/ovcrview. shtml). 
393 Energy Information Administration (EIA), "General Background . Malaysia", 
(http: //www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/malaysia. html). 
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endeavoured to replicate the model of Newly Industrializing Countries of Asia (NICs), 394 
mainly South Korea as well as Japan, the most developed economy in East Asia. To 
speed up the phase of industrialization, Malaysia, under the administration of Dr. 
Mahathir Mohammed, also introduced the `Look East Policy', which tried to emphasize 
and implement the culture of the Japanese and the South Korean people who turned their 
country into one of the fastest growing modern economies in the world. Furthermore, to 
develop heavy industry of automobile production, the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM) was responsible for setting up joint ventures between Perusahaan 
Otomobil Nasional (PROTON), Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC), Mitsubishi 
Corporation (MC), Perwaja Terengganu Sdn. Bhd. (PERWAJA), and with a consortium 
of eight Japanese firms led by Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC). 395 The Malaysian 
government's efforts to industrialize its economy by attempting to emulate the model of 
development in Japan, and the Newly Industrializing Countries in the East Asian region, 
and by the same token also, to open up more opportunities to foreign investors to become 
involved in several industrial projects at the local level, caused Malaysia to undergo 
booming economies in the mid-1990s, before succumbing to the East Asian crisis in 
1997. 
5.2 The Background of the Saudi Arabian Economy 
Not much different to Malaysia, the Saudi Arabian economy prior to the discovery of oil 
in the 1930s was based on agricultural and pastoral activities in tribal villages at oases. It 
"° There are four countries labeled as NICs; South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
395 Kit G. Machado, "Japanese Transnational Corporations in Malaysia's State Sponsored Heavy 
Industrialization Drive : The HICOM Automobile and Steel Projects", Pacific Affairs 62 (4) 
Winter 1989-90,505, Jomo K. S. & Chris Edward, "Malaysian Industrialisation in Historical 
Perspective", 29. 
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was faced with geographical inadequacy for cultivation of more food for little water, with 
desert lands where the rainfall was only five inches annually. Its main agricultural 
products were dates, millet, wheat and barley. Nonetheless, after oil production started in 
Saudi Arabia in 1937, with commercial production begun in the following year by the 
Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) which obtained a 60 year concession from 
1933-1993,396 its economy grew rapidly. Since then too, Saudi dependency upon 
industrial nations, mainly the United States through the setting up of Arabian-American 
Oil Company (Aramco) which has dominated oil exploration in the Kingdom, the 
development of its oil industry has vastly increased. 397 Saudi Arabian oil revenues rose 
continuously year by year from $56.7 million in 1950 to $2,734.1 million in 1972, and 
reached S60 billion in 1980.398 In 1990, it went down a little, however, to around $38,995 
billion, mostly due to the Gulf War crisis following Saddam's invasion of Kuwait on 
August 2,1990.399 Despite that, from the 1990s and onwards, Saudi Arabia has become 
396 The concession agreement was signed between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Standard 
Oil Company of California on May 29,1933, and it was later be extended from a 60 year 
concession for a further six years. Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy (New 
York : Praeger Publishers, 1976), 6, Saudi Arabian Information Source, "Oil : Historical 
Background and Aramco (4)", (http: //www. saudinf. com/main/dl4. htni). 
397 Actually Saudi Arabia had been receiving European influence since the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, where the role of Britain and France began penetrating the most areas of the Middle East 
region. For further discussion see Abbas Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political 
Economy of Dependency, (New York : Greenwood Press, 1991), 4-14, Rodney Wilson, 
Economic Development in the Middle East (London : Routledge, 1995), 13-17, William B. 
Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s : ForeigLi Policy, Security and Oil (Washington DC : The 
Brookings Institution, 1981), 147-149. 
398 Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy, 6-10, Abbas Alnasrawi, Arab 
Nationalism, Oil and the Political Economy of Dependency, 13, J. S. Birks & C. A. Sinclair, "The 
Domestic Political Economy of Development in Saudi Arabia" in Tim Niblock (ed. ), State, 
Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (London : Croom Helm Ltd., 1982), 199. 
399 The NCB Economist 1 (1) September 1991,6, Dr. Nasser Ibrahim Rashid & Dr. Esber Ibrahim 
Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War (Joplin, Missouri : International Institute of Technology, 
Inc., 1992), 159. 
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the leading producer and exporter of oil by contributing 11.5 percent of world oil. in 2002, 
followed by Russia (10.7 percent), the US (9.9 percent) and others 40° 
It is quite obvious that the Saudi Arabian economy depends heavily on the 
production and the export of crude oil to the international market. Before the discovery of 
oil, pilgrimage, along with agricultural sectors, was among the main sources of Saudi 
economy. 401 The Kingdom has been categorized as one of those countries whose 
commodity products (oil exporter) cover between 90 to 100 per cent of its total export 
and the oil industry alone contributes 30 to 40 per cent of Saudi GDP to the present 
day. 402 Saudi's close trading partners, as well as its oil main consumers from the 1950s to 
the 1990s, have been the five industrial countries of the United States, UK, Japan, France 
and Italy, which require Saudi oil to nourish their industrial projects. 403 Therefore, in 
400 This is different with Saudi Arabian position in the 1970s, where it was only the third largest 
behind the US and the former Soviet Union. See Justin Thompson, "Venezuela and Oil", CBS 
News Online, November 27,2003, (http: //www. cbc. ca/news/background/venezuela/oil. html), 
Ministry of Information, Saudi Arabia and Its Place in the World (Jeddah : Dar Al Shorouq, 
1979), 134, Paul Stevens, "Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy in the 1970s : Its Origins, Implementation 
and Implications" in Tim Niblock (ed. ), State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, 215. 
401 Today pilgrimage only contributes US$2 billion annually, while the agricultural sector lost its 
central position in the Kingdom's economy. David Edwin Long, "The Hajj Today :A Survey of 
the Contemporary Pilgrimage to Makkah", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (The George Washington 
University, February 1973), 190-191, "Saudi Arabia : Economy", Encyclopaedia of the Orient 
(http: //lexicoricnt. com/c. o/saudi 2. htm). 
402 Professor Issam El-Zaim, "The Industrial Patterns of Islamic Countries and Their 
Opportunities of Industrial Co-operation", Cahier 23 1983,6 (1-51), Joseph D. Coppock, Foreign 
Trade of the Middle East : Instability and Growth, 1946-1962 (Lebanon : Economic Research 
Institute, American University of Beirut, 1966), 133, Ramon Knauerbase, "Saudi Arabia's 
Economy at the Beginning of the 1970s", The Middle East Journal xxviii Spring 1974,133 (126- 
140), Anthony H. Cordesman & Arleigh A. Burke, "Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century", 2, The 
Energy Information Agency of the US Department of Energy, "Saudi Arabia" 
(http: //www. cia. doe. Lov/cmcu/cabs/saudi. html). 
40' Except from 1951 to 1961, Bahrein was the main consumer of Saudi exports along with the 
five industrial countries. However, in the 1980s and onwards, Non-Islamic Asian States 
combined, mainly Japan and South Korea, replaced the North American region as the largest 
market of Saudi exports. Joseph D. Coppock, Foreign Trade of the Middle East, 141, Middle Fast 
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order to diversify its economy and not depend solely on the export of crude oil, as well as 
to develop industrial status, the Saudi government focuses on several economic-industrial 
oriented sectors that have large potential for development, including modem agriculture, 
the electrical industry, petroleum and mineral wealth, commerce, and the manufacturing 
sector. 
The diversification effort, however, was initiated in 1957, through a close co- 
operation between Saudi Arabia and the United Nations, which both signed two 
agreements under the name of Technical Assistance Board (TAB) in 1957 and 1960- 
1961. In 1970, TAB was changed to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
which would emphasize more the technical training of Saudi people. Like Malaysia, the 
Saudi development program, under UNDP, would be carried out in the Fourth Five Year 
Plan (1970-1990), and this plan will continue further in the years ahead. 404 The Saudi 
government also set up the General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (Petromin), the 
first Saudi national petroleum company, in 1962, to formulate and execute projects for 
the development of the petroleum, petrochemical and mineral industries. 405 Nevertheless, 
despite the rigorous efforts towards the diversification plan, the Saudi economy is still 
principally based on the production of oil and petroleum products, which roughly 
Economic Digest (MEED), August 1978,39, Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), July 1983, 
13, Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), June 1987,6, The NCB Economist 2 (8) October 
1992,5, Saudi Economic Survey xxxii (1599) December 30,1998,9, The NCB Economist 9 (4) 
July/August 1999,4-7. 
4' Ministry of Information, Saudi Arabia and Its Place in the World, 134-136, Fouad Al-Farsy, 
Saudi Arabia :A Case Study in Development (London : KPI Limited, 1982), 135-141, David G. 
Edens & William P. Snavely, "Planning for Economic Development in Saudi Arabia", The 
Middle East Journal xxiv Winter 1970,21-27. 
405 Ramon Knauerbase, "Saudi Arabia's Economy at the Beginning of the 1970s", 134, Fouad Al- 
Farsy, Saudi Arabia :A Case Study in Development, 49-51. 
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accounts for 75 per cent of budget revenues, 45 per cent of GDP, and 90 per cent of 
export earnings 406 This also added to the lesser achievement of other non-oil sectors, 
particularly agriculture (food cultivation), which is still growing insufficiently, 407 and 
Saudi Arabia itself (within the Arab region) is one of the highest food-importing 
408 countries in the world 
5.3 Closer to Developed Countries and High Demand for Industrialization 
By looking at the background economy of both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, which has 
been discussed before, it can be seen that there are a few similarities, for instance, the 
presence of European or US influences, the provider of raw materials to industrial 
countries, and high demand for industrialization status. Perhaps it may sound paradoxical 
to some researchers, since the existence of several similarities might lead to closer 
interaction between two countries, but this situation is different for Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia. What the study means by `those similarities' is that since Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia had experienced some European influences, the former under Great Britain, and 
the latter at the early stage enjoyed British alliance (or support King Abdul Aziz 
administration) before the US took the lead in the Middle East and indirectly assumed its 
bigger role in Saudi oil exploration, both countries inevitably complied with the needs 
and the policies of these developed economies. Malaysia and Saudi Arabia had to 
406The NCB Economist 9 (1) January/February 1999,1-3, The NCB Economist 11 (1) First 
Quarter 2001,3, The World CIA Factbook 
(http: //www. cia.. gov/cia/publications/facthook/gcos/sa. html). 
40' For instance in 1995-1996, agricultural sector represents only 6.6 per cent of total Saudi GDP. 
The NCB Economist 6(1) January/February 1996,9. 
408 During 1994-1995, the volume of import on food stuffs was not declining (around SR2 million 
quarterly) compared to other products. The NCB Economist 6(1) January/February 1996,3, 
Abbas Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political Economy of Dependency, 177. 
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maintain relations with their 'parent'409 countries as it was they that helped or influenced 
the creation of the basis of their economic structure as well as guiding them to sell their 
primary commodities in the international market. The intimate economic links between 
Malaysia-United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia-the United States can be observed when 
both countries (Malaysia and Saudi Arabia) at the early stage of development, played a 
more important role as the main supplier of raw materials for UK and the US, and also to 
other industrial nations as has been argued by Jomo K. S, 410 William B. Quandt, 411 Abbas 
Alnasrawi 412 This scenario is unavoidable as industrial countries may provide bigger 
markets as well as vast capital in return compared with if they only trade between 
themselves alone or with other less developed countries. 
Furthermore, in order to develop and keep pace with the modern global economy, 
both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia emphasize the process of industrialization and 
diversification of their economies. This trend certainly encourages both countries to 
behold and attempt to emulate a model of economy from developed countries, rather than 
from other countries which have par level with them. Up to the 1980s, Malaysia began to 
replicate the model of Japan, and other four Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs); 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, by launching the Look East Policy 
which gave more focus to industrializing its economy by venturing into heavy industries 
such as manufacturing sectors (electrical and electronic products), and automobile 
409 The word `parent' represents colonial and protectorates, and it refers to the influence of 
" Britain, and the US over the Malaysian and Saudi Arabian governments respectively as the latter 
was not colonized by British or the US as the former was. 
410 Jomo K. S. "Introduction" in Jorno K. S. (ed. ) Industrialising Malaysia, 1. 
41 William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, 147-149. 
412 Abbas Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political Economy of Dependency, 1-2. 
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projects. This policy, however, will not totally ignore the model of developed-western 
counterparts (as the US still the biggest Malaysian trading partner), but it is argued, 
perhaps, is only a justification for Malaysia as Japan and the four NICs are from the 
Asian region, which may, to some extent, be more appropriate for the culture of the 
Malaysian economy. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this Kingdom started its development 
plan much earlier than Malaysia. This is due to the role of the Arabian-American Oil 
Company (Aramco) that has shaped major features of Kingdom economy, especially the 
Saudi oil industry. 413 Unlike Malaysia, which prefers the Look East Policy, Saudi Arabia 
is more inclined towards developed-western countries, mainly the United States, for 
bringing development to the Kingdom. 414 The outcome of this approach has slightly 
transformed Saudi Arabia into one of the more modern countries in the Middle East, 
despite having to face some common domestic problems such as the lack of manpower 
from the Saudi citizens, the large influx of foreign labourers, and less achievement in the 
agricultural field. 
The high demand for industrialization status has, up to the present, unsurprisingly 
demonstrated that both countries have more lively economic relations with developed 
413 Even when Aramco was taken over by the Saudi government in 1980, it still heavily staffed 
with American workers. William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, 147, Anthony H. 
Cordesman & Arleigh A. Burke, "Saudi Arabia Enters the 2151 Century", 6, J. S. Birks & C. A. 
Sinclair, "The Domestic Political Economy of Development in Saudi Arabia", 200. 
414 Although some efforts by the Saudi government to reduce its reliance on the developed 
western economies, especially post-1975, but less fruitful as those countries, especially the US, 
are the major consumers of its oil as well as the main arms suppliers for the Kingdom (However, 
in July 1985, through al-Yamamah deal, British secured the largest single defence contract with 
Saudi Arabia worth US$30 billion, consequently shifted the entire structure of Saudi dependence 
on the US). J. S. Birks & C. A. Sinclair, "The Domestic Political Economy of Development in 
Saudi Arabia", 206, Abbas Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political Economy of 
Dependency, 46 & 112-116, Gerd Nonneman, "Saudi-European Relations 1902-2001", 649-650. 
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countries vis-ä-vis as their current major trading partners, mainly the US, Japan, UK, 
South Korea, Singapore, France and other OECD groups, which indirectly also keeps the 
level of economic interactions between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia from becoming 
properly enhanced. This is added too with Malaysia's dependence on Saudi oil which 
largely causes the trade balance between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia since the early 
1960s to the 1990s has been unfavourable to the former. 415 In other words, the closeness 
of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to developed countries (or to their parent countries in 
particular) which, in some ways, cannot be denied in terms of providing more market 
opportunities for their commodities and higher potentiality of gaining technological 
know-how in order to achieve their desire for industrialization process (also without 
ignoring Malaysia's unfavourable reliance on Saudi oil), had made their economic 
interaction less dynamic. Besides the nature of the economic background that has 
affected the degree of Malaysia's economic interactions with Saudi Arabia, the study will 
also examine the character of economic activities, ranging from the kinds of trade, 
financial assistance, investment and others which might further colour the relations. 
5.4 The Character of Economic Activities 
The study will analyze some major economic activities that have patterned the level of 
economic interactions between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Those economic activities 
and a few indicators such as the amount of trade, investment, and others, are useful as a 
level of measurement to point out quantifiably the interactions between both countries in 
the economic field. In doing this, the study will concentrate on several key points of 
economic indicators, mainly the level of trade, financial assistance, investment, and 
"' As has been indicated in the page 135 in the Chapter V. 
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foreign workers, and also the tourism industry, for this sector (acts as income services), 
has lately indicated impressive growth in the Malaysian economy. This chapter will not 
cover the economic interactions during the Malacca Sultanate and the British 
administration in Malaya as these periods have been slightly touched on before, and also 
owing to the nature of the study which emphasizes more the period of Malaysian 
independence and after; therefore the focus will be from the day of Malayan 
independence in 1957, when it became a modern sovereign state (although Saudi Arabia 
had been earlier), to the 1990s and onwards. Nevertheless, since most of the formal 
written documents416 only started reporting exclusively on Malaysia's economic relations 
with Saudi Arabia in 1960, the period of under examination will be more from the 1960s 
up to the 1990s. 
5.4.1 Trade : The Pattern of Export and Import 
Principally, Malaysia's bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia has been predominantly 
influenced by the massive import of the latter's oil products. This, in some way, has led 
to a continuous deficit in Malaysian trade with the Kingdom. Even though Malaysia 
exports a lot of products to the Kingdom like palm oil, vegetablc oil, electrical and 
electronic machinery, gold, jewellery, and sawn timber, they are still besieged by the 
import of oil, and other organic chemicals (like alcohol, phenol-alcohol, hydrocarbon and 
polymer ethylene). For overall picture of Malaysia's trading pattern (export and import 
a'6 Basically prior to 1960, most of the formal written documents like the Malayan Book of the 
Year or any economic indicators from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia, do not specifically 
mention Saudi Arabia, instead the term `the rest of the world' is frequently used, which may 
indicate the lower significance of such economic interactions. Moreover, the Federation of 
Malaysia was only established in 1963. 
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performance) with Saudi Arabia, the study will highlight the pattern from the 1960s and 
onwards as shown in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Malaysia's Bilateral Trade with Partner Country Saudi Arabia (1960-2002) 
Year Export Value Import Value Trade Balance Value 
1960a 4.3 5.9 -1.6 
1961 4.2 13.9 -9.7 
1962 0.65 4.10 -3.45 
1963 0.83 11.26 -10.43 
1964 1.00 16.17 -15.17 
1965 1.37 50.09 -48.72 
1966 1.14 73.43 -72.29 
1967 1.67 75.95 -74.28 
1968 3.33 79.04 -75.71 
1969 3.32 72.64 -69.32 
1970c 0.971 23.642 -22.671 
1971 0.948 20.748 -19.8 
1972 1.169 25.300 -24.131 
1973 N. A 37.445 -37.445 
1974 0.718 129.627 -128.909 
1975 9.517 80.344 -70.827 
1976 9.296 85.706 -76.41 
1977 32.023 193.673 -161.65 
1978 33.346 236.594 -203.248 
1979 42.633 247.155 -204.522 
1980 60.954 664.668 -603.714 
1981 60.726 543.540 -482.814 
1982 70.702 404.950 -334.248 
1983 63.800 569.600 -505.80 
1984 132.801 430.642 -297.841 
1985 93.141 268.406 -175.265 
1986 53.261 46.441 6.82 
1987 81.855 106.021 -24.166 
1988 123.820 150.579 -132.113 
1989 144.200 96.098 48.102 
1990 150.488 143.534 6.954 
1991 191.841 190.982 0.859 
1992 0.68 0.53 0.15 
1993 0.72 0.67 0.05 
1994 0.71 0.57 0.14 
1995 0.85 0.57 0.28 
1996 0.80 0.83 -0.03 
1997 0.83 1.02 -0.19 
153 
1998 1.10 0.90 0.2 
1999 1.14 1.09 0.05 
2000 1.23 2.40 -1.17 
2001 1.30 2.41 -1.11 
2002 1.46 1.51 -0.05 
a. From 1960 & 1961, the value of trade is in million Saudi Riyals. Source : Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook of International 
Trade Statistics, 1964 (New York : United Nations, 1966), 537. 
b. From 1962 to 1969, the value of trade is in RM million ringgit (Ringgit Malaysia). Source 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook 
of International Trade Statistics, 1966 (New York : United Nations, 1968), 513, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook of International 
Trade Statistics, 1969 (New York : United Nations, 1971), 540. 
c. From 1970 to 1991, the value of trade is in US$million dollars. Source : Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook of International 
Trade Statistics, 1970-1971 (New York : United Nations, 1973), 465, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics, 1974 vol. I (New York : United Nations, 1975), 585, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics, 1975 vol. I (New York : United Nations, 1976), 626, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1978 Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics, vol. I (New York : United Nations, 1979), 733, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1979 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 
vol. I (New York : United Nations, 1980), 616, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1984 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, vol. I 
(New York : United Nations, 1986), 798, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical 
Office of the United Nations, 1987 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, vol. I (New York : 
United Nations, 1989), 535, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the 
United Nations, 1989 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, vol. I (New York : United 
Nations, 1991), 538, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United 
Nations, 1990 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, vol. I (New York : United Nations, 
1992), 549, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, 
1993 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, vol. I (New York : United Nations, 1995), 581. 
d. From 1992 to 2002, the value of trade is in RMbillion ringgit. Source : Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia, compiled by Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 
(MATRADE), February 2003. 
N. A: Not Available. 
Based upon the Table 1, it shows that Malaysia's trading pattern with Saudi Arabia is 
mostly in deficit terms, with the exception from 1986,1989 and mid-1990s. In the 1960s, 
for instance, between 1962 to 1968, the average deficit of the trade was -RM42.864 
million although from 1962 until 1966 the total of Malaysian external trade was in 
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surplus ranging from RM180.8 million to RM436.3 million ringgit, 417 and continuously 
acquiring a surplus of RM680 million ringgit in 1968 with most of its trading partners 
like France, the US, Singapore, and Italy. 418 The huge deficit was because the total 
Malaysian imports from Saudi Arabia, which mostly oil, were bigger than its total 
exports. Furthermore, in the 1970s (from 1970 to 1979), the pattern of Malaysian external 
trade with Saudi Arabia continued to be in deficit which amounted -US$949.613 million 
in trade balance value. Moreover, although the overall external trade performance in the 
1980s was in the surplus value, where exports surpassed imports, for instance RM4,721 
million ringgit in 1980, and the last five years (1986-1990) with average surplus roughly 
around RMS, 071 million ringgit, 419 Malaysia's trade with Saudi Arabia still indicated 
some deficits. The amount of deficit was much higher than the previous years as it 
reached till US$603.714 million, particularly in the early 1980s. The vast amount of 
deficit in the 1980s, could be closely linked to the price of oil in the international market 
which abruptly increased due to the second oil shock began in 1979 following the Iranian 
4' This external trade includes West Malaysia (Malay Peninsula), Sabah and Sarawak. Malaysia 
Official Year Book 1966 vol. 6 (Kuala Lumpur : Government Press, 1968) 194. 
418 Malaysia main exports were mostly from primary commodities such as rubber, tin, palm oil, 
and some manufactured goods like food, rubber products, footwear, beverages and tobacco and 
others. While its imports were more of crude materials, petroleum products, manufactured goods 
including metal, mineral and wood manufactures, machinery and transport equipment. The 
favourable trade balance for Malaysia with its trading partners like France, the US, Singapore, 
and Italy was largely due to the consistency of the level of export, especially from the primary 
commodities, which constantly registered surplus in trade value against the level of import. For 
example, from 1964 to 1968, the average growth rate of exports by Malaysian primary 
commodities alone was 10.5 per cent compared to its total imports, 6.7 per cent only. Malay 
Official Year Book 1968 vol. 8 (Kuala Lumpur : Government Press, 1969), 12-13 & 14-15. 
419 Statistics Handbook 1987 (Kuala Lumpur : Department of Statistics, 1987), 12, Statistics 
Handbook 1988 (Kuala Lumpur : Department of Statistics, 1988), 12, Statistics Handbook 1989 
(Kuala Lumpur : Department of Statistics, 1989), 12, Statistics Handbook 1990 (Kuala Lumpur : 
Department of Statistics, 1990), 12. 
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revolution. 420 Nevertheless, at the end of the 1980s, from 1986 to 1990, the import level 
of Saudi oil averagely declined by about RM291 million ringgit per year . 
421 This was 
because of the dynamic operation of Petroliam Nasional Sdn. Bhd. (PETRONAS), a local 
Malaysian oil corporation set up in 1974, which had successfully begun to increase the 
production of crude oil, and contributed well to the Malaysian economy. 422 This is added 
too with the economic situation of Malaysia which was not encouraging (affected the 
level of export and import) for most of its commodities' prices were declining which 
indirectly resulted the balance on the current account turned around from surplus to a 
deficit. 23 During the early 1990s, especially from 1992-1995, however, Malaysia's trade 
balance with Saudi Arabia had been positive due to the level of the former's export 
outshining its imports to the latter by an average of 0.155 billion ringgit. 424 From 1996 to 
2000, except for 1998-1999, the trade balance was back to negative for Malaysian overall 
trade with the Kingdom. Up to 2000, the amount of bilateral trade reached RM3633.56 
million ringgit, a 63 per cent increase over 1999, with the imports of Malaysia still larger 
420 For instance, the price of Saudi oil increased from US$24 per barrel in 1979 to US$32 per 
barrel in 1980. Energy Information Administration, "World Oil Market and Oil Price 
Chronologies : 1970-2004", (http: /Iwww. cia. doe. t, ov/emeu/cabs/chron. html), Samuel Bassey 
Okposin & Cheng Ming Yu, Economic Crises in Malaysia : Causes, Implications and Policy 
Prescriptions (Selangor, D. E.: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 2000), 72 & 85. 
421 Statistics Handbook 1987,14-15, Statistics Handbook 1988,14-15, Statistics Handbook 1989, 
14-15, Statistics Handbook 1990,14-15. 
422 Bruce Gale, "PETRONAS : Malaysia's National Oil Corporation" Asian Survey xxi (11) 
November 1981,1141-1142. 
423 In fact, it was not Malaysia that only facing the economic recession but it was a global 
economic problem that overwhelming international economic system following the second oil 
shock. Samuel Bassey Okposin & Cheng Ming Yu, Economic Crises in Malaysia, 81, Samuel 
Bassey Okposin, Abdul Halim Abdul Hamid & Ong Hway Boon, The Changing Phases of 
Malaysian Economy (Kuala Lumpur : Utusan Publication, 2003) 24, Mohamed Ariff, 1& 16. 
424 "Malaysia's Bilateral Trade with Partner Country Saudi Arabia (RMBillion)", Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia, compiled by Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 
(MATRADE), February 2003. 
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than its exports, about RM2406.54 million to RM1227.02 million ringgit respectively. 425 
(See also Table 1). Frankly to say, despite the pattern of trade is largely in deficit terms 
(especially for Malaysia), the growth of Malaysia's trade with Saudi Arabia is undeniably 
increasing, particularly in the late 1990s. This is due to the recent negotiations made by 
both parties on trade and investment opportunities 426 without ignoring that oil is still the 
biggest import in Malaysia's trade with Saudi Arabia which amounted US$5263.64 
427 million of total import US$6328.67 million from 2000 to 2002. 
There might be the question of why Malaysia still needs Saudi oil (petroleum 
products) as the former has been producing and exporting petroleum since the mid- I970s. 
It is no doubt that when PETRONAS was launched in 1974, Malaysia began to produce 
crude oil and petroleum products for domestic use as well as to be exported abroad. 
Malaysia's oil production had been dramatically increasing from only 1,000 barrels in the 
1960s to almost 650,000 barrels per day in the 1990s. This production also has been 
continuously growing till reached 912,000 barrels per day in 2004.428 However, (as has 
been said before in the background of the Malaysian economy) although Malaysia is able 
to produce its own oil, the production is still insufficient for the domestic consumption. 
425 "Perdagangan Dengan Arab Saudi Boleh Ditingkatkan", Utusan Malaysia, 24 May, 2001, 
(http: //utusan. com. my/utusan/archive. asp? y=2001&dt=0524&puh=tJtusan Malaysia&sec=Ekono 
mi&pg=ek 05. htm). 
426 See sub-topic "Mahathir Era : Dynamic Relations" in the Chapter IV. 
427 Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE), "Malaysia's Import From 
Saudi Arabia by SITC 3 Digit (Million)", 4 September 2003, 
(http: //www2. matrade. pov. my/application/mtr-eis. nsf/df iecgr? OpenForm&Scg=2). 
428 Green Car Congress, Energy, Technologies, Issues and Policies for Sustainable Mobility, 
"Malaysia May Become Oil Importer by 2009", 
(http: //www. greencarconzress. com/2005/07/malaysia may be. html). 
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Malaysia could only averagely supply petroleum products less than 2,000 ktoe429 whereas 
the consumption is roughly about 20,000 ktoe at the end of the 1990s. On top of that, 
since Malaysia's oil is of premium quality, low-sulfur and fetches higher prices than 
Arabian light, the marker crude, it is an advantage for Malaysia to export its oil to other 
countries like Singapore, Japan, Thailand, and South Korea in order to gain more profits 
in Malaysia's total international trade. 430 The ability of Malaysia to export its petroleum 
to international markets, it unnecessarily means that it has sufficient reserves of oil. 
Instead Malaysia have to import oil from other countries, especially Saudi Arabia for its 
own reserves are only predicted to be last less than 20 years to come 431 This also had 
been noticed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Tun Razak by saying that : 
"Malaysia is an oil exporter, but if we do not find new oil reserves, then by 2009, we will 
. become a net importer..... This mean we cannot continue to lean on the oil sector" 
432 
Notwithstanding the increasing total amount of Malaysia's trade with Saudi 
Arabia since the 1960s and onwards (although most in deficit terms), the amount of trade 
is still smaller compared with Malaysia's former main trading partners, namely the US, 
Japan, Singapore and the UK. The average percentage of the bilateral trade is about 3.5 to 
4.0 percent, whereas Malaysia's trade values with the four main countries are around 11 
429 Ktoe stands for `kilo tan of energy'. 
430 Fong Chan Onn, New Economic Dynamo, 134, and discussion, via telephone, with Tuan Hj. 
Fadzil, Senior Project Leader of PETRONAS, Kuala Lumpur Headquaters, 22 December 2005, 
4.30-5.00pm (Malaysian time). 
431 United States Energy Information Administration, "Malaysia", 
(http: //www. converges. com/eiacab/malaysia. htm). 
432 Green Car Congress, Energy, Technologies, Issues and Policies for Sustainable Mobility, 
"Malaysia May Become Oil Importer by 2009", 
(http: //w-%vw. greencarcongress. com/2005/07/malavsia may be. html). 
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to 24 per cent. 433 Moreover, it is not merely the imbalance of the export-import level 
which influences Malaysia's bilateral trade relations with Saudi Arabia, but there are also 
some difficult policies that restrict the growth of trade. For instance, Malaysian goods 
found it difficult to penetrate directly into Saudi markets due to the tax imposed, which is 
quite high at about 12 per cent. Thus, Malaysia chooses to export its goods to Dubai first 
(Free Trade Zone), and re-export, via Dubai, to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, which 
reduces the tax payable to 4 per cent. Beside that, Malaysia also faces some strict 
administrative business matters such as Saudi health authorities' stringent requirements 
for imports of pharmaceutical products. Only Malaysian companies that are already 
exporting to a developed country like the European Union, the US, and Japan can register 
with the Ministry of Health. The Saudi Ministry of Health does not recognize the Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP) issued by Malaysia, and for new chemical products, proof 
of 10 years research is required . 
434 The same also goes for the Malaysian quality standard 
like SIItIM which sets the grade for products and goods manufactured by Malaysian 
companies (for example palm oil and vegetable oil), where the Saudi government seems 
less confident with the standard . 
435 Malaysian companies are also less comfortable with 
the high cost of endorsement of trade documents like certificate of origin, invoices and 
433 Malaysia Quarterly Statistics of External Trade July-September 1966,6-9,52 & 58, 
Preliminary Figures of External Trade 1973 (Kuala Lumpur : Department of Statistics, 1973), 29, 
Preliminary Figures of External Trade 1979,33,35-36, Preliminary Figures of External Trade 
January 1984 (Kuala Lumpur : Department of Statistics, 1984), The Ministry of Finance 
(Malaysia), Economic Report 1986/1987 (Malay version) (Kuala Lumpur : Jabatan Percetakan 
Negara, 1986), xxvi-xxix & 106-107, Yearbook of Statistics 1989 (Kuala Lumpur : Department 
of Statistics, Julai 1990), xiii, 157-160, Yearbook of Statistics 1997-2000 (Kuala Lumpur 
Department of Statistics, September 2000), 169 & 171. 
434 Interview with Mr. Ibrahim Md. Yusop, Manager (Asia/Africa) for Malaysia External Trade 
Development Corporation (MATRADE), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 April, 2003. 
435 Interview with Raja Saifful Ridzuwan Raja Kamaruddin, Assistant Secretary for West & North 
Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 2 April 2003. 
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other trade documents for goods exported to Saudi Arabia. These documents must be 
endorsed by three agencies, the Malaysian Chamber of Commerce, Wisma Putra and the 
Saudi Embassy. In the opinion of Malaysian companies, the fees charged by Saudi 
Arabia are a burden for them. On top of that, obtaining a business visa to Saudi Arabia is 
rather hard because a Saudi sponsor (must be Saudi citizen) is always needed before the 
visa can be issued, and this is time consuming for the Malaysian companies, 436 whereas 
for Malaysia, upon the visit of Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Datuk 
Rafidah Aziz, to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2001, the Minister announced a relaxation of 
entry procedures for Saudi companies and investors in order to attract them more to the 
437 Malaysian economy by dispensing with the visa requirement. 
5.4.2 From Saudi Aid to Investment Activities 
Malaysia, as one of the developing countries in the international economic system, is 
very much in need of capital inflow from industrial nations, oil-rich countries or 
international financial institutions in order to develop its economic infrastructure. This 
could be referred, for instance, to Malaysia's dependency on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) where from 1969 to 1983, FDI had been the major supplier of foreign capital 
inflow to Malaysia with an average of US$550.266 million dollars, or 52 per cent of all 
total capital inflow. 438 Malaysia was also ranked first among the ASEAN countries in 
receiving FDI amounting to $35,177 million dollars, followed by Indonesia ($23,684 
436 Interview with Mr. Ibrahim Md. Yusop, Manager (Asia/Africa) for Malaysia External Trade 
Development Corporation (MATRADE), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 April, 2003. 
437 Saudia Online, "Malaysia Unveils Package to Attract Saudi Investment", May 22,2001 
(http: //www. sa Lid i a-onl ine. com/maynews/B usiness5 6. lit in). 
, 1311 Thomas G. Parry, "The Role of Foreign Capital in East Asia Industrialization, Growth and 
Development", 100. 
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million), Thailand ($17,177), and the Philippines ($8,379) from 1990 until 1997.439 
Traditionally, western counterparts, especially the United Kingdom, and the US, along 
with Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and ASEAN neighbours are among the 
biggest investors in Malaysia. 
Nonetheless, in regards to Saudi capital inflow into Malaysia, it was initially 
begun with the Kingdom's financial aid, and later continued by its investment, in 
nourishing some of the Malaysia's developmental projects. For example, during the years 
1975-1993, Malaysia received SR312.30 million from the Saudi Fund for Development 
Fund (SFD). 440 The aid was specifically for socio-economic infrastructure in the 
Malaysian economic development plan. The first Saudi aid received by Malaysia was 
under Tun Razak administration in 1975 and amounted to US$200 million 44' The 
financial aid, which was in the form of a loan, was used to help finance a few 
developmental projects, namely the University of Technology, the Medical Faculty of the 
National University of Malaysia, the Ulu Kelantan Land Settlement Project, and the 
Pahang Tenggara Land Settlement Project. About SR48.20 million was given to the 
University of Technology for the availability of trained professional manpower, SR54.20 
million for the Medical Faculty of UKM to increase the ratio of medical doctors, and to 
expand health care in Malaysia, SR40 million for Ulu Kelantan Land and SR86.1 million 
439 Stephen Thomsen, "Southeast Asia : The Role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in 
Development", Working Papers on International Investment, Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD), 1999/1, p. 7 (1-33), 
440 The aid, in fact, ended in 1983. Besides, this aid does not include donations which are given by 
the Saudi government for the purpose of religious activities as this will be discussed in Chapter 
VI. The Saudi Fund Development, Annual Report (20), 1993 (1413/1414H). 
d4' See Chapter IV on Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia during Tun Razak's reign 
(Malaysia's second premier). 
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for Pahang Tenggara Land, which both were projected to grow 30,000 acres of rubber 
plantations, and 86,400 acres of oil palm plantations, as well as for the settlement of 
small farmers for both areas respectively. 442 Furthermore, from 1976 to 1983, Malaysia 
continued to receive Saudi aid (also in the form of loans) in developing its projects. There 
were, at least, three additional developmental projects which were financed by this aid 
such as Lepar Utara Land Settlement (SR52.70 million), the construction of five Mara 
Junior Science Colleges (SR15.20 million), and four new district hospitals (SR15.90 
million), with the total aid approximately SR312.30 million. 
443 All these developmental 
projects which received the financial aid from SFD, with the interest rates ranging from 
3.5 to 4.0 per cent per annum, and a grace period of 5 to 15 years, were completely 
developed by the Malaysian government. 444 
A question may arise as to why SFD distributed its funds to co-develop those 
particular Malaysian development projects. In answering this question, it would be better 
first to relate the inflow of the Saudi aid to Malaysia with the Kingdom's position as 
among the biggest of the world's donors alongside the United States, a few European 
countries, and Japan. The Kingdom had vigorously started distributing its financial aid to 
442 The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report (20) 1993, (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
1993), 37. 
443 The financial reports given by SDF in 1975 and 1976 were inconsistent. Therefore, the 
researcher used SDF reports from 1982/1983,1989,1991, and 1993, which were more accurate 
and reliable. See for a good comparison The Saudi Fund for Development, First Annual Report 
March to July 1975,13-14, The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report III, June 1976 to 
June 1977 (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1977), 22, The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual 
Report March 1982/83, (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1983), 25, The Saudi Fund for 
Development, Annual Report 1989, (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1989), 46, The Saudi Fund 
for Development, Annual Report 1991, (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1991), 40, The Saudi 
Fund for Development, Annual Report (20) 1993,37. 
444 Anuar Kasman, "Brief on Malaysia's Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia", Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2004,17. 
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other countries in the late 1960s. At the early period of involvement, however, most of 
the aid distribution was concentrated on Arab counterparts. Together with other Arab 
donors like Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Iraq, they set up their 
own donor institutions like the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), 
the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED), the Iraqi Fund for 
External Development (IFED) , 
445 the Saudi Fund for Development Fund (SFD), and also 
through the OPEC aid to finance as well as participate in developmental projects in a few 
targeted countries. From the 1970s onwards, Arab donors began to develop and spread 
the aid to other non-Arab countries, however, it was quite noticeable that Saudi Arabian 
aid, mainly through SFD, 446 was more prominent than the others. With its huge oil 
revenues the Kingdom was able to take the major role in helping needy countries to build 
their infrastructural developments 447 For example, from 1974-1985, Saudi Arabia was 
the leading donor among the Arab OPEC members with the average of donation $3662.2 
million, followed by Kuwait ($979.08 million), UAE ($686.25), and Qatar ($155.5 
million). 448 
Up to the 1990s, the Kingdom remained as one of the most significant world 
donors for socio-economic development; for example in 1993, it distributed, through 
"' Iraq, however, turned into a net importer by 1983 after engaging in Iran-Iraq War. Gerd 
Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East (London : Routledge, 
1988), 126. 
446 The Saudi Development Fund (SDF) was chartered by Royal Decree on October 1,1974. The 
authorized capital was 10 billion Saudi Riyals, and its operation began on March 1,1975. The 
Saudi Fund for Development, First Annual Report March to July 1975 (The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, 1975), 7. 
"'See Gerd Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East, 125-128,152- 
155, 
4'8 Gerd Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East, 129. 
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SFD alone, the total aid of SR19,510.10 million to several countries based on their 
income levels, with 65 per cent of the total aid amounting to SR12602.30 million 
disseminated to Low Income Countries (LICs), SR5876.50 for Low Least Developed 
Countries (LLDCs), SR4345.30 for Low-Middle Income Countries (LMICs), and 
SR286.70 million to Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICS) . 
449 Throughout 1995- 
1998 and onwards, SFD has loaned more than SDR21 billion and financed 298 projects 
with about 62 countries benefiting from the fund, where Asia accounted for 52 per cent, 
46 per cent for Africa, and the rest for the European and Latin continents. 450 The nature 
of aid distribution by Saudi Arabia is not merely on the basis of co-religious affiliations 
as the aid is not only distributed to Muslim countries but also to other developing 
countries such as Thailand, Brazil, China, India, Nepal, and others. The Kingdom also 
disbursed its financial aid to other various international organizations such as the 
International Monetary Bank US$6,534,200,955 (3.42% of total fund), Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) US$536,440,000 million (25.5% of total fund), International 
Fund for Agriculture US$333,778,000 (14.26% of total fund), African Development 
Fund (ADF) US$116,524,973 (3.4% of total fund) , 
451 and until today Saudi Arabia is still 
the leading donor in OPEC Development Bank with US$995,038,196 million, followed 
by Venezuela (US$488,360,532 million) and Kuwait (US$358,525,916 million). 452 The 
generosity of the Kingdom in giving away such massive financial aid to needy countries 
" The level of income is based on U. N classifications. The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual 
Report 1993,1413/1414 A. H (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1993), 20. 
450 The Saudi Fund for Development, "Beneficiaries of SFD loans", 
(http: //www. kingfahdbinabdulaziz. com/main/n022. htm). 
451 "Saudi aid contributions through other organizations", 
(littp: //www. kinglahdbinabdulaziz. com/main/n032. htm). 
452 Opec Development Fund, "Contributions to the Opec Development Fund", 
(http: //www. kinufahdbinabdulaziz. com/main/n040. htm). 
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as well as to other international financial institutions, although in some ways is difficult 
to be answered for the type of recipient countries and the level of development are 
different, and also the nature of the aid distribution varies based on the needs of the 
recipients, but it was probably due to the enormous surplus of the Saudi Arabian 
economy, the attempt of the Saudi government to influence the thinking of other 
governments, especially for other fellow Muslim countries, and for the justification as 
well as the recognition of the Kingdom's wealth and independence at the international 
level . 
453 For the Saudi government itself, the generosity of distributing some financial aid- 
to other Arab and non-Arab countries is impelled neither by economic nor political 
454 motivation, but to be spent in the way of God. 
In regards to Saudi Arabia's financial aid, through SFD, to Malaysia, the study 
believes that since the nature of SFD, which focuses on helping the development process 
of less developed countries all over the world, Malaysia was not exceptional as it had 
been classified as one of the less developed countries (or low-middle income countries 
specified by the U. N), and also a member of the OIC. This might easily generate aid from 
the Kingdom and in addition, owing to the personal contact particularly between the first 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, 
which had been developed until the retirement of the former, and continuously 
maintained by Tunku's successors, this further enhanced the flow of aid into Malaysia. 
This explanation can also be linked to the types of aid distributed by the Kingdom as 
most of the aid given was for socio-economic development, namely in the education, 
ass Gerd Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East, 126. 
°'` The Saudi Fund for Development, First Annual Report March to July 1975,6. 
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health, and agriculture-rural development sectors, analogous with the nature and general 
objectives of the Saudi Fund for Development Fund (SFD). 455 Beside that, for the 
Malaysian government, Saudi financial aid was considered as the major boost for the 
economic development plan as those projects co-sponsored by SFD had been put under 
the Third Malaysia Plan, which was launched by the late Tun Hussein Onn, the third 
Prime Minister of Malaysia. Moreover, since the riot of 1969 and onwards, the 
government, through the New Economic Policy (NEP), has taken a lot of initiatives to 
minimize the poverty level among multi-racial Malaysian society, and also to develop 
rural areas by opening new settlements as well as encouraging its citizens, particularly the 
Malays, to venture into entrepreneur programs. Malaysia needs more funds or capital to 
achieve the NEP's goals, and the coming of the Saudi fund has, at least, eased the 
financial demands. 
Yet, as Malaysia was no longer receiving the Saudi financial aid from mid-1980s 
and onwards, for the Kingdom considered Malaysia to be one of the developing nations 
in the world, 456 it started to lure several investments from the Kingdom. The investment 
from Saudi Arabia, however, had only begun during the early 1990s, probably with the 
exception of the first major breakthrough of the massive inflow of Saudi Arabian capital 
into Malaysia in June 1979 (in the form of Arab capital market, and not directly from the 
Saudi government), when the Malaysian government signed a US$220 million ringgit 
loan agreement of 10 years to be utilized in its various development projects. This loan, 
however, was shared between Malaysia and the Arab-Malaysian Development Bank, as 
ass The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report (20) 1993,25-27. 
456 Anuar Kasman, "Brief on Malaysia's Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia", Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2004,18. 
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well as with its co-members such as the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia, 
Gulf International Bank, and Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad. 457 The late investment of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was mainly associated with the Malaysian government's 
stress on attracting industrialized-developed countries to invest in its industrialization 
projects. 458 With the launching of the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(MIDA) in 1965, investors from more developed countries like the US, UK, Denmark, 
Germany, Japan, and several Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) like Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea gave more priority to helping developing 
industrial sectors in Malaysia. Whereas other investors from less developed countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, were less emphasized because the Kingdom in particular had not 
yet fully industrialized. 459 Nevertheless, since Malaysia, to some extent, has rapidly 
achieved some industrialization processes, like producing its own national car, becoming 
the major exporter of the world electronic and electrical semi-conductor products, and 
lately paying more attention to refining crude oil, and petroleum products, more new 
capital inflow is needed, and among the new potential investors identified are Saudi 
457 "Malaysia Seals $220m Arab Loan Deal", The New Straits Times, 28 June 1979. 
ass Even Lennox A. Mills cited that prior to the World War II, western private investments were 
already the established investors, variously estimated at US$394,000,000 and US$372,000,000, 
which at least 70 per cent was British, and the rest American, Dutch, French, and Japanese. 
Nevertheless, Chinese investments were believed to amount to US$200,000,000. Lennox A. 
Mills, Southeast Asia : Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics (Minneapolis : University 
of Minnesota Press, 1964), 259. 
459 Even, according to Mr. Anuar Kasman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not listed by MIDA. 
Discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Malaysia 
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00-12.00pm, August 30`h, 2004, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. See also 
Fatimah Kari & Rashida Bee, "Pelaburan Asing dan Pemindahan Teknologi", in Mohd. Rosli 
Mohamad & Mohamed Aslam Gulam Hassan (ed. ), Pembangunan Ekonomi Malaysia Era 
Globalisasi (Kuala Lumpur : Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 2000), 271-276. 
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Arabia, and Pakistan. 460 Moreover, as the relations between the two countries has grown, 
instead of depending on financial aid, both countries, especially Malaysia, pay more 
attention to strengthening bilateral trade and investment sectors as these two activities are 
the main key to rendering their economic interactions more prosperous. In addition, 
Malaysia since the era of Dr. Mahathir, has attempted to change the character of relations 
from one way (by not merely depending on Saudi aid) to two ways of communication by 
increasing the volume of bilateral trade and investment. 461 
The investments from Saudi Arabia, which only just started from 1990 to 1997, 
were poured into eight Malaysian projects with equity worth RM139.6 million, mostly in 
the industrial-manufacturing sectors like food processing, plastic materials, textiles and 
textile products, electrical and electronic manufactures. 462 Furthermore, from 1998 to 
2000, Malaysia " secured two more manufacturing investments from Saudi Arabia 
amounting to RM7.8 million, and one project in 2001, worth RM10.8 million (See Table 
2& 3). 463 Malaysia has also had limited investment activities in Saudi Arabia, with the 
total amount of RM17.86 million ringgit, or roughly at the average of RMI. 9 million per 
year since the late 1990s. Among the joint-venture investment projects are included 
460 Fatimah Kari & Rashida Bee mentioned that the total investment from Pakistan to Malaysia in 
2000 was RM33.5 million ringgit. Fatimah Kari & Rashida Bee, "Pelaburan Asing dan 
Pemindahan Teknologi", 274-275. 
46' See sub-topic "Mahathir Era : Dynamic Relations" in the Chapter IV. 
462 Malaysia External Trade and Development Corporation, 2000 (Data supplied by Mr. Ibrahim 
Md. Yusop, Manager Asia/Africa for Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation), 
"Malaysia Sokong Kemasukan Arab Saudi Dalam WTO", Utusan Malaysia, 23 May, 2001, 
(http: //utusan. com. niv/utusan/archive. asp? v=2001&dt=0523&pub=utusan malaysia&sec=ekono 
mi&pg=ck 02. htm&arc=hive). 
463 Malaysia External Trade and Development Corporation, 2000 (Data supplied by Mr. Ibrahim 
Md. Yusop, Manager Asia/Africa for Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation), 
Malaysia Industrial Development Authority or MIDA (See Table 8&9 which are provided by 
MIDA). 
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maintenance services of machines and equipment used for gas pipelines and the drilling 
and extracting of crude oi1464 In addition, there are six companies which have established 
marketing offices in Saudi Arabia to promote their products, namely Ajinomoto 
(Monosodium Glutamate) Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., Alinamin (Tomato Sauce) Malaysia Sdn. 
Bhd., Kao Personal Care Products Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., Prime Oleochemical Industries 
(Medical Products) Sdn. Bhd., Sapura Holdings (Telephone) Sdn. Bhd., and Thong Fook 
Plastic Industries (Packing Bags) Sdn. Bhd. 465 
Table 2. Projects Approved with Saudi Arabian Participation by Industry, 1990- 
2001* 
Year Food 
Manufactu 
ring 
Textiles & 
Textiles 
Products 
Plastic 
Products 
Electronic 
& 
Electrical 
Products 
Miscellane 
ous 
Total (RM 
Million) 
1990 1 Project RM44,730,700 
1991 1 Project RM7,200,000 
1992 -- 
1993 -- 
1994 1 Project RM30,000,000 
1995 1 Project RM999,450 
1996 1 Project 1 Project RM56,570,500 
1997 -- 
1998 1 Project RM4,938,192 
464 This joint venture is between a Malaysian company, Seafield Company Sdn. Bhd. (30 per cent 
equity interest), with Mohamad Said Ibrahim Al-Ghamdi. Discussion with Mr. Ibrahim Md. 
Yusop, Manager (Asia/Africa) for Malaysia External Trade and Development Corporation 
(MATRADE) 2003, Anuar Kasman, "Brief on Malaysia's Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia", 
Embassy of Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2004,15-16. 
465 Anuar Kasman, "Brief on Malaysia's Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia", Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2004,16. 
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1999 
2000 1 Project RM2,880,000 
2001 1 Project RM 10,806,900 
TOTAL INVESTMENT RM158,125,742 
*(Source : Malaysia Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), 2003) 
Table 3. Sources of Foreign Investment in Approved Projects 1998-2002 (Selected 
Countries)* 
Country No. of Projects Value (RM Million) 
China 40 RM3,384,132,986 
Federation of Germany 97 RM9,653,526,466 
Iran 2 RM8,110,000 
Japan 622 RM9,708,060,085 
Jordan 1 RM720,000 
Saudi Arabia 3 RM 18,625,092 
Singapore 722 RM6,896,038,155 
Taiwan 393 RM3,575,573,177 
United Arab Emirates 4 RM310,591,119 
United Kingdom 84 RM1,734,376,117 
United States 206 RM25,163,581,374 
* Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(http: //www. mida. gov. my, lstats man/2003/march/tablel2. htm 
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It is undeniable that Saudi aid between 1975 and 1983 had helped Malaysia to 
provide some economic infrastructures for consistent development of its economy in the 
international economic system. However, this amount of Saudi aid (US74.90 million 
dollar) was still smaller than other financial aid from more established and bigger funds 
like Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the World Bank. For example, 
the former had averagely distributed loans in the form of technical co-operation to 
Malaysia of about Yen194.90 million from 1995-2000, and the World Bank gave $152 
billion dollars in bank loans to Malaysia between 1968 and 1982 to promote the clearing 
of 1.3 million acres of tropical forest land for export agriculture. 466 This is also different 
to investment sectors where, if a proportional percentage is made between Saudi 
investment and other developed countries like Japan, the US, UK and Singapore into 
Malaysia, the difference is quite immense. For example, from 1990-2001 (ten years 
period), the average percentage of Saudi investment was 8.3 per cent compared to Japan 
and the US from 1977-1982 (six years only), which had 19.9 per cent, and 8.6 per cent 
respectively, 467 or from 1981-1986 (six years also), Japan had 20.7 per cent, UK 10.7 per 
cent, Singapore 9.2 per cent, and the US 8.02 per cent. 468 Even today (2001-2003), the 
US, Singapore Japan, and the UK are still the largest investors in Malaysia with 
466 Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA), 
(http: //ww%v. *ica. org. my/aboutms/disbursenients. htm), "The World Bank : The Global Forest 
Threat', (http: //www. americanlands. ork/IMF/wbfact. htm). 
467 Ku-Hyun Jung, "Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Economic Growth : With Emphasis 
on Korea's Experiences", in Dalchoong Kim & Noordin Sopiee (ed. ) Regional Cooperation in the 
Pacific Era (Seoul : Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1988), 220. 
468 Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, Laporan Kewangan 1986/87 (Kuala Lumpur : Jabatan 
Percetakan Negara, 1986), Ivi-Ivii. 
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RM5,968,457,760.2 million, RM3,905,772,924.2 million, RM3,579,779,370 million, and 
RM3,774,193,41.4 million respectively469 (See also Table 9 from 1998-2002). 
5.4.3 Tourism Sector 
The tourism sector did not give a significant turnover for the Malaysian economy in the 
1960s, and towards the 1980s, as the country put more emphasis on developing 
agricultural, and industrial-manufacturing sectors. 70 Nevertheless, when Malaysia 
experienced financial crisis in 1997, which dragged its economy down after achieving 7- 
9 per cent GDP growth in almost a decade, the government began to look at other 
economic fields, especially the tourism sector, which might increase wealth resources for 
Malaysia. It does not entirely mean, however, that the government has just paid more 
attention to tourism in the post-crisis period, it is only where the level of emphasis has 
been greatly intensified by the effort of National Economic Action Council (NEAC), 
which was also newly established after the crisis of 1997, and among the efforts was 
included attracting more Saudi as well as other Middle Eastern tourists to come regularly 
to visit fascinating places in Malaysia . 
471 The effort of the government has, to some 
469 UK, however, has been overtaken by The Federation of Germany which ranks second behind 
the US with total FDI of RM5,352,365,979.8 million. Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority(MIDA) Malaysia Industrial Development Authority "Projects Approved By Country 
2003 and 2002", (http: //ww. v. mida. gov. mv/proposed/2003/sept/tahle3RM-apr. htnil), Malaysian 
Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), "Sources of Foreign Investment in Approved Projects 
1998-2002", (http: //www. mida. gov. m, %atsmanI2003/march/tablel2. htm). 
470 For instance, in 1980 and 1990, export of rubber alone amounted RM4,618 million and 
RM3,028 million, meanwhile the tourism sector only contributed at RM317 million, and 
RM1,667 million. See Statistics Handbook 1990 (Kuala Lumpur : Department of Statistics, 
1990), 15, United Nations Economic & Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP), 
"Malaysia", (http: //www. unescap. org/stat/statdata/Malaysia. pdf), Public Bank Economic Review, 
"Key Trends of the Tourism Industry in Malaysia", 
(http: //www. publicbank. com. i-ny/cnt review46. htm). 
471 Majlis Tindakan Ekonomi Negara (MTEN), Pelan Pemulihan Ekonomi Negara : Agenda 
Tindakan (Kuala Lumpur : Jabatan Percetakan Negara, Ogos 1998), 218 & 221, Malaysia, 
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extent, paid off as at the end of the 1990s, the tourism sector successfully attracted more 
tourists to visit Malaysia. For instance in 1990, the total tourist arrivals were about 
7,446,000 million people, an enormous increase from only 800,000 people in 1980, and 
continued to achieve steady arrivals around 7,469,000 million and 9,931,000 million 
people in 1995 and 1999 respectively. 472 Beside that, the tourism sector, which is 
currently categorized as an `export-oriented services industry', has become the second 
largest source of foreign exchange earnings after manufacturing, as it generates 
government revenue, for instance, at RM22 billion in 2001, and contributes 7.2 per cent 
473 of Malaysia's GDP in the same year compared to only 1.8 per cent in 1981. 
In regards to the coming of Saudi tourists to Malaysia, it can be generally 
expected that at the early stage of the Malaysian tourism development, especially from 
the 1960s to the end of 1980s, the level of arrival is barely discernible. This is, as has 
been mentioned before, owing to less emphasis by the Malaysian government on tourism 
development in its economic field, and also the tendency of Saudi people, as well as other 
Arab tourists, to prefer visiting more interesting places, especially in Europe and North 
America. 74 For example, the number of Middle Eastern tourists (classified as `Arabia', 
"Impact of Financial Crisis on Malaysia's Tourism Industry", WTO High-Level Meeting on the 
Economic Impacts of Tourism, Kobe, Japan, 25-27 November, 1998,5-6, 
(http: //www. mct. go. kr/conf/wto/2. htm). 
472 United Nations Economic & Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP), "Malaysia", 
(http: //www. unescap. org/stat/statdata/Malaysia. pdf). 
473 National Economic Action Council (NEAC), "Tourism Receipts to GDP Ratio Highest in the 
Region", 7 November 2002, (http: //neac. g: ov. my/indcx. cfm'? ID=227). 
474 However, currently the Saudis tend to spend their holidays in Asian, and other Middle Eastern 
countries. Syed Rashid Husain, "Saudis Avoid U. S for Summer Holidays", Gulf News, July 15, 
2002(httt): //www. aliazeerah. info/News' o20archives/2002%20News'/4,20archives/July`%,. 202002%, 
20News%201tems/Saudi%20avoid%20US' for` , 20Summer%20holidays. htm), "Saudi Tourists 
Dump U. S and Europe for Muslim, Arab Countries", Arab-American Business, July 2002, 
(http: //www. arabaniericanbusiness. com/July%202002/tourisni. htm). 
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which may refer to Saudi Arabia) who visited Sabah, one of the Malaysian Federation 
states, in 1969 was only 3 out of the total of 37,369 tourists. 475 Due to the small number 
of Middle Eastern tourists, including the Saudi people, most of the Malaysian tourist 
statistics (1970s-1980s) only categorized them as tourists from other Asian countries or 
other countries. The total number of tourists within this category in 1970 was only about 
593 people compared to other major tourists from the US (8,482 people), UK (5,120 
people), and Singapore (3,589 people), and between 1980 and 1982,476 were 957 people, 
while there were 24,822,14,238, and 6,751 people from Singapore, UK, and the US 
respectively visiting a few states in Malaysia. 477 
Nonetheless, as Malaysia headed towards the 1990s, tourists from the Middle 
Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia made a vast impact on the Malaysian tourism 
sector. Their numbers are increasing year by year, except between 1997-1998, where 
Malaysia had bad experiences such as economic downturn, environmental degradation 
(the occurrence of haze), and related health problems such as the outbreak of local 
viruses; Nipah and Coxsackie B, which attacked local populations. 78 According to Table 
415 The data covered from June-December 1969, while the Tourists Statistics States of Malaya 
1961-63, only categorized the Saudi, other tourists from the Middle East, and the rest as `other 
countries in Asia and Africa' indirectly indicated the less significant of their numbers in the entire 
figure of tourists visiting Malaysia. Tourist Statistics States of Malaya 1961-63, (Kuala Lumpur : 
Department of Statistics, 1963), see Table 7,8, and 9, Tourists Statistics Sabah, (Kota Kinabalu : 
Department of Statistics, 1969), 18. 
a'6 Although there was an agreement signed between the Malaysia Airline System (MAS), and 
Wabel Travel of Saudi Arabia in 1977 to encourage more Saudi coming into Malaysia. New 
Straits Times, 28 October 1977. 
47 Visitor Arrival Statistics Sarawak, 1980 (Kuching : Department of Statistics, 1980), Visitor 
Statistics Sabah, 1982 (Kota Kinabalu : Department of Statistics, 1982), 32-33. 
478 For instance, in 1997, there were, at least, 40 children died due to the epidemic of Coxsackie 
B. Malaysia, "Impact of Financial Crisis on Malaysia's Tourism Industry", 1-2, 
(http: //vww. mct. mo. kr/conf/wto/2. htm), Public Bank Economic Review, "Key Trends of the 
Tourism Industry in Malaysia", (http: /hvww. publicbank. com. mv/cnt review 46. htm). 
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4, the coming of Saudi tourists to Malaysia from 1992 to 2002 has indicated an 
impressive growth of arrivals in the tourism sector. Starting with the number of Saudi 
tourists in 1992 of 9,208 thousand people, it made a huge leap to 45,007 thousand people 
in 2002, and the overall average of arrival is about 17,402 people. Among the major 
reasons leading to the massive increase of the Saudi and other Middle Eastern tourists, 
particularly at the end of the 1990s, were the hectic campaigns launched by the 
government headed by the Minister of Culture and Tourism of Malaysia, Datuk Abdul 
Kadir Sheikh Fadzil, who made several visits to the Gulf Countries in 2000, including 
Saudi Arabia, to attract more tourists from this region to come to Malaysia. 479 During his 
stay in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Datuk Abdul Kadir, stated that only around 20,000 Saudi 
people visited Malaysia per year compared to Malaysians who made up 100,000 to 
200,000 people who came to the Kingdom to perform pilgrimage every year . 
480 Beside 
that, it was also following the tragedy of 11 September, 2001, which indirectly caused 
most of them to spend holidays in Asian countries, including Malaysia. 481 The purpose of 
visits by the Saudi tourists were mostly for holidays (77.5 per cent), business (11.6 per 
cent), and attending conferences (3.3 per cent), and they preferred staying in metropolitan 
cities such as Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Penang and Pahang. 482 Despite the huge increase 
of the arrivals of the Saudi as well as other Middle Eastern counterparts, tourists from 
Singapore, Australia, UK and the US are still among the most consistent visitors to 
479 "Kadir Kempen Tarik Pelancong Saudi", Utusan Malaysia 10 April 2000, 
(http: //uusan com my/utusan/archive asp'yr2000&dt=0410&pub=Utusan Malavsia&sec=l: kono 
mi&l? g=bs 0I. htm). 
"go Malaysians perform pilgrimage in Mecca and Medina could be considered as the main 
attraction for them to come to the Kingdom, and this will be further elaborated in the Chapter VI. 
46' Discussion with Puan Yusnita, an official from the Ministry of Tourism, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 5 may 2003. 
482 Discussion with Puan Yusnita, an official from the Ministry of Tourism, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 5 may 2003. 
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Malaysia from 2001-2002. Singapore tourists are among the highest average arrivals of 
7,249,678 thousand people, followed by UK (250,859 thousand), Australia (208,067 
thousand) and the US (136,874 thousand) 483 
Table 4. Malaysia Tourist Arrivals 
(Major Middle Eastern Countries, No. of People)* 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Saudi 
Arabia 
9,208 9,640 11,267 11,679 10,878 5,498 8,925 11,564 27,808 39,957 45,007 
U. A. E 5,681 5,497 5,859 5,883 5,846 3,205 4,637 2,909 2,391 13,762 14,124 
Kuwait N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 1,095 7,428 10,470 
Oman N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 1,223 7,284 8,432 
Turkey 1,899 2,666 2,333 2,803 3,791 3,834 4,283 2,603 8,705 6,392 5,742 
Syria N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 2,784 18,205 21,109 
Jordan N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 2,888 3,688 3,611 
*Source : Ministry of Tourism, Malaysia, & Malaysia Tourism Promotion Board, Malaysian 
Tourism Statistics Update, December/Fourth Quarter 1993,14. 
N. A.: Not Available 
5.4.4 Foreign Workers 
As is generally known, the Saudi labour market is heavily flooded with foreign workers 
484 or `expatriates'. For instance, in the early 1980s, the Kingdom received about 3 million 
483 Ministry of Tourism, "Tourist Arrivals to Malaysia From Selected Market January-December 
2001-2002", (http"//www. tourism. gov. niy/statistic/tourist arrivals. asp). 
484 The term expatriates is more preferable for the Malaysian workers in Saudi Arabia as most of 
them work in professional jobs like nurses, and others. Discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, 
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foreign workers, and this number is continuously growing, with the total current estimate 
between 7 million to 8 million people from its total population (23 million people) at the 
end of the 1990s. 485 The Indian workers outnumbered other foreign workers with almost 
3 million people, followed by Pakistanis (1 million people), Bangladeshis (1 million 
people), Filipinos (900,000 people), Indonesian (900,000 people), and the rest including 
Egyptians, Syrians, Sudanese, and others. 486 These foreign workers who worked in 
various jobs in Saudi Arabia, as was mentioned by Saudi Labour Minister, Ghazi Al- 
Gosaibi : ".... because our labour market is open even to those who don't have any 
working experience.... if he didn't make it as a barber, he probably could as a 
pharmacist! ", 487 repatriated from US$8 billion in 1980 to US$17.6 billion in 1995.488 
Nonetheless, in the case of Malaysia's foreign workers or expatriates in Saudi 
Arabia, the size is small, which also certainly does not make a big impact upon their 
remittance for the Malaysian economy, compared to other foreign workers in the 
Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00- 
12.00pm, August 30th, 2004, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
ass See Summer Scott Huyette, Political Adaptation in Sa'udi Arabia :A Study of the Council of 
Ministers, (London : Westview Press, 1985), 34, Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia : 
Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Boulder : Westview Press, 1997), 71, Abdul-Aziz Al-Sa'aedi, 
"SR60B, 7M Workers... and Free Training! ", The Saudi Gazette, August 3,2004, M. Ghazanfar 
Ali Khan, "Ease Restrictions on Family Visas, GCC Study Suggests", Arab News August 24, 
2004. 
486 This data is adopted in 2004 through the discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, 
Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00-12.00pm, August 
30 
, 
2004, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In another study (1999), it was indicated that there were about 
1.2 million Indians, 1.2 million Egyptians, 800,000 Pakistanis, 600,000 Filipinos, 130,000 Sri 
Lankans, and 40,000 Americans which made the total number of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia 
to 6 million people. The Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, "Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom for 1999: Saudi Arabia", Center for Studies on New Religions, 
U. S. Department of State, Washington DC, USA, September 9,1999, 
(lit! p: //www. cesnur. or(_,, /testi-/irf/irf saudiara99. html). 
48' Abdul-Aziz Al-Sa'aedi, "SR60B, 7M Workers... and Free Training! ", The Saudi Gazette, 
August 3,2004. 
488 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia : Guarding the Desert Kingdom, 71-72. 
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Kingdom. There are only about 942 Malaysian expatriates in Saudi Arabia, of which 80 
per cent are working as nurses, and the other 20 per cent in a variety of private companies 
like banks, hotels, telecommunications, and petroleum industries. 89 Besides, there are 
about 300 to 500 Malaysian people presently permanently resident in a few cities like 
Mecca, Madinah, Tabuk and Jeddah, without obtaining Saudi citizenship but holding 
Malaysian passports, who came to Saudi Arabia as early as the 1940s and 1960s. 190 The 
small number of Malaysian expatriates in the Kingdom is largely because Malaysia, as 
Saudi Arabia, is not one of the biggest exporters of foreign or migrant workers to other 
countries, instead, it is one of the highest receivers of migrant workers from its 
neighbouring countries in the Southeast Asian region, mainly Indonesia and the 
Philippines. For example, in 1999, the total number of registered migrant workers 
according to the Malaysian government was 715,145 thousand people, of whom 73 per 
cent were Indonesians, 19 per cent Bangladeshis, 3 per cent Filipinos, and the remainder 
from other nations such as India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 491 Yet, this figure is 
probably excludes the actual number of other migrant workers, especially those working 
illegally in Malaysia; it was estimated that there are approximately from 1.5 million to 2 
million both legal and illegal migrant workers. 492 
469 Discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00-12.00pm, August 30th , 
2004, Audrey Edwards & Cecil 
Fung, "Malaysians in Riyadh Safe", The Star Online, November 10,2003, 
(http: //pgoh. free. fi-/ryadh safe. html). 
490 Discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00-12.00pm, August 30th, 2004. 
49' A. Navamukundan, "Labour Migration in Malaysia : Trade Union Views", 116, 
(http: //www. ilo. org/public/en, ) ish/dialoguc/actrav/publ 129/2l . i)d. 492 A. Navamukundan, "Labour Migration in Malaysia : Trade Union Views", 116, Joseph Liow, 
"Desecuritising the `Illegal Indonesian Migrant Worker' : Problem in Malaysia's Relations with 
Indonesia", Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore, September 2002, (http: //www. niLi. edu. sL, 050220. htm). 
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Interestingly, however, although the number of Malaysian expatriates in Saudi 
Arabia is small, the career of nurse had attracted a lot of Malaysian people as well as 
other Asian foreign workers to come to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was stated that 
in 2004 alone, the total number of nurses in the Kingdom was 37,459, but only 32.1 per 
cent of this number were Saudi citizens 493 The shortage of Saudi nurses, particularly 
female nurses, is closely related to the policy of the Saudi government which limits the 
career development of their women. 494 Lately, however, they have realised the 
importance of the health sector in the Kingdom, and also noticed the gradual departure of 
non-Saudi female nurses from Saudi Arabia to other developed countries (for instance, in 
the early 1990s, there were over 48,000 nurses, but in 2004 there were only 37,459 
nurses). This is mainly due to the certain rigid regulations practised, such as they are not 
allowed to go out to the malls, and other shopping complexes except twice weekly, and 
then only if they are accompanied by the Ministry's driver, and they are prohibited to 
drive a car. The nurses have received better offers from other developed countries like the 
US, and UK as well wishing to as to avoid terrorist attacks in the Kingdom . 
495 So the 
Saudi government will have to double its efforts in recruiting more local nurses, 
especially the Saudi girls, by opening up new schools, and colleges, and offering several 
493 Sabria S. Jawhar, "Kingdom Suffers Nurses Shortage", The Saudi Gazette, August 3,2004. 
494 Nevertheless, towards the 1980s, Saudi policy towards their women gradually changed when 
more job opportunities offered to the women, for instance, in 1965, there was no female teacher 
in government schools, but in 1980 there were 11,847 Saudi female teachers working full time. 
Despite this development, the movement of Saudi women is still limited such as no integration of 
both sexes in public, have no authority in making decisions and policies concerning women 
affairs, and others. Louay Bahry, "The New Saudi Woman : Modernizing in an Islamic 
Framework", The Middle East Journal 36 (4) Autumn 1982,503 & 505 (502-515). 
495 Joe Avancena, "Years Before Saudis Fill Vacancies", The Saudi Gazette, August 3,2004. 
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relevant courses in local universities in order to develop nursing careers in Saudi 
Arabia. 496 
For Malaysian nurses, apart from several attractive packages offered by the Saudi 
government like free accommodation, free board, free passage from home to the 
Kingdom, and other benefits, the higher salary is one of the most important factors 
driving them to leave their homes, as they are paid between SR7,000 riyal to SR12,000 
riyal per month (which also approximately between RM7,000 ringgit to RM 12,000 
ringgit). 497 In Malaysia, by contrast, the nurses are only paid around RM700 to RM 1,200 
per month as a starting salary. 498 The willingness of Malaysian nurses to work in Saudi 
Arabia does not mean that Malaysia has enough nurses, instead, the ratio between nurses 
and the Malaysian population is still wide, for example in 2001, one nurse is equivalent 
to serve 970 patients (1 : 970) in public hospitals, while in private hospitals the ratio is 1: 
2,71 9.499 Mr. Anuar Kasman, Malaysia's Counsellor in Riyadh, described the attitude of 
these Malaysian nurses as `selfish', for the Malaysian government still needs their 
496 Sabria S. Jawhar, "Kingdom Suffers Nurses Shortage", The Saudi Gazette, August 3,2004. 
497 Discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00-12.00pm, August 30`s, 2004. 
498 "Malaysia : Nurses Get Pay Rise", Asian Labour News, November 28,2003, 
(http: //wwlv. asianlahour. orQ/archives/0001 34. p p), Embun Majid & Florence Samy, "New Salary 
Scheme Soon for Nurses with Post-Basic Skills", The Star, March 28,2005 
(http: //thestar. com. my/news/story. asp? fi le=/2005/3/28/nation/ 10530433&sec=nation). 
499 But in 2004, according to the Ministry of Health, Malaysia, Datuk Dr. Chua Soi Lek, the ratio 
is one nurse for 630 patients. Ministry of Health, Malaysia, "Table 4.8 : Health Manpower 
Population Ratio by Category of Manpower, Malaysia as on 31.12.2001 ", 
(http: //www. moh. gov. my/indicator`/"202001 /Jadual`%204B. pdf). 
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services to further improve the quality of health institutions for the Malaysian 
population. 500 
5.5 The Influence of the International Economic System 
Scholars of International Relations and International Political Economy, to some extent, 
come to a similar argument that since, at least, the emergence of the modern state in the 
post-Westphalia system in the sixteenth century, there has been international economic 
interaction between sovereign states in conducting their trading and commerce activities. 
Nevertheless, they pose different views on the character of the international economic 
system that influences the relations between states, and how it affects the level of 
development of a state. There are, at least, three main schools that dominate the 
discussion of the character of the international economic system, namely the Liberal, 
Marxist, and Structuralist schools. 501 The Liberal tends to believe that state participation 
in the international economic system, such as free trade, which operates on the basis of 
natural laws, will lead to economic prosperity. 502 Meanwhile, both the Marxist and the 
Structuralist argue that the international economic system, which is largely based on the 
influence of the western-capitalist model, will not bring states, especially Less Developed 
500 Discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10.00-12.00pm, August 30'h, 2004. 
50' There might be another school called the Realist-Mercantilist which is nationalist-oriented, 
emphasizes the importance of wealth in influencing power and the use of economic instruments 
for the pursuit of political goals. See for instance, Nazli Choucri, "International Political 
Economy :A Theoretical Perspective" in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson & Alexander L. 
George (ed. ) Change in the International System (Boulder : Westview Press, 1980), 112-115. 
502 Natural laws defined in a situation where the degree of political interference is virtually non- 
existent in the economic system, and those private enterprises have more the upper hand to decide 
the system, in other words, the liberal prefers to let the market run economic activities naturally. 
See Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations (London : George 
Allen & Unwin, 1985), 1-2 & 170-171, William R. Nester, Japanese Industrial Tar getting : The 
Neo-Mercantilist Path to Economic Superpower (London : Macmillan Academic and Professional 
Ltd., 1991), 13-14. 
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Countries, to development, instead there would be continuous unequal distribution 
between Developed Countries and Less Developed Countries, and the latter will 
incessantly succumb to being dependent upon the former. 503 Although, the Marxist 
emphasizes the exploitative mode of production and class struggle among bourgeoisie 
and proletariat, and the Structuralist on the division structure of international economy 
between the core and periphery zones, these two schools together confront liberal 
arguments, and urge international economy to be re-structured in order to achieve equal 
partnership. 504 
As the main focus of this chapter on Malaysia's economic relations with Saudi 
Arabia, where both countries could be relatively regarded as the peripheral states in the 
international economic system, the discussion of core-periphery, which is extensively 
debated by the School of Structuralist (including Dependencies group), will be treated 
analytically in order to examine how far the question of core-periphery, as part of the 
character of the international economic system, shapes Malaysia's economic relations 
with Saudi Arabia. It is not the central intention of this study, however, to come to the 
conclusion that this is the only feature of the economic relations, rather it is considerably 
among the major characteristics underlying the system of economic interaction between 
both countries, and also parallel to their degree of participation in the international 
economic system, which preferably classifies them as `peripheral states'. 
503 Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 3-4 & 171-173, Nazli 
Choucri, "International Political Economy :A Theoretical Perspective", 112-115, 
5°4 Some researchers consider Structuralist as further extension of the Marxian point of view, or 
called it `Neo-Marxist'. See for instance, Nazli Choucri, "International Political Economy :A 
Theoretical Perspective", 114. 
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There are a few well-known groups of scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre 
Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, John Gatung, Samir Amin, and others, who lengthily discuss 
the question of core-periphery relations, specifically related to complex and stagnated 
development in some parts of the less developed world. Most of these scholars believe 
that the character of relations between developed and less developed countries is mostly 
based on the core and periphery relations, where the former generally acts as the main 
producer of manufactured goods, and gains surplus from the movement of capital goods 
and technological know-how, and the latter acts more as the supplier of a few raw 
materials and the main consumer of the former's products as well as regularly running 
deficits, and getting less profits, especially in trading and commerce activities. 505 
Conceivably, there might be some disparities among these scholars, for instance, between 
Andre Gunder Frank, Barry K. Gills, Samir Amin, and Immanuel Wallerstein, 
particularly on the root and the historical system of capital accumulation in the world 
system involving core-periphery zones, where Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills 
stress that capital accumulation, which establishes linkages between core and periphery 
zones had existed since five thousand years ago, not from the sixteenth century, and the 
system of accumulation (or production) might be, prior to the emergence of the capitalist 
system, in the form of feudal, or others (but remained the same system, `one world 
system'). Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin, on the other hand, focus only from five 
hundred years ago, since the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, and more on the capitalist 
mode of production, but they firmly assert that unequal distribution between core and 
"' Frederic C. Deyo (ed. ) The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca : Cornell 
University Press, 1987), 13, Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization : The 
Management of Contemporary Society (London : Zed Books, 2000), especially p. 12-45, Paul A. 
Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (Middlesex : Penguin Books Ltd., 1973). 
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periphery will unavoidably, and continuously exist in the past, present, and future of the 
world economic system. 506 
The study does not deny the Structuralist point of view that there are some forms 
of unequal distribution for less developed countries' achievement in the international 
economy. Even before the collapse of the former Soviet Union, world economic 
development had divided, at least, into four categories, namely the First World (Mostly 
western developed countries, including Japan), the Second World (Socialist countries), 
Third World (Developing countries like East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries, and 
others), and the Fourth World (The poorest countries in some African continents). After 
the post-Cold War era, however, the term `Second World' seems to have vanished, while 
`Third World' and `Fourth World' appeared infrequently; instead the phrase `less 
developed countries' is more commonly used to refer to those countries which have yet to 
reach fully industrialized countries status, including developing and least developing 
countries. 
Among the economic figures that might show some inequalities of the world 
economic distribution, particularly between developed countries and less developed 
countries for instance, is the different in per capita income of 1949, where high income 
506 Andre Gunder Frank & Barry K. Gills, "The 5,000-Year World System : An Interdisciplinary 
Introduction", Andre Gunder Frank & Barry K. Gills (ed. ) The World System : Five Hundred 
Years or Five Thousand? (London : Routledge, 1996), xx-xxi, 3,39, & 304, Sing C. Chew 
& 
Robert A. Denemark, "On Development and Underdevelopment" in Sing Chew & Robert A. 
Denemark (ed. ), Essays in Honour of Andre Gunder Frank : The Underdevelopment of 
Development (London : Sage Publications, 1996), 11, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the 
World-Economy : The States, the Movements and the Civilizations (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 2-5,15 & 80, Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization, 1-2. 
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countries (developed countries) had $915 million dollars (67 per cent of world income, 
and 18 per cent of world population), while low income countries (less developed 
countries) had only $54 million dollars (15 per cent of world income, and 67 per cent of 
world population). 507 The direction of international trade was also more prosperous 
among developed countries rather than between developed countries and less developed 
countries, for example, export growth rates in 1960 to 1970 within developed countries 
was 2.9 per cent compared to only 1.9 per cent between developed and less developed 
countries. Moreover, the direction of exports in 1970 within developed countries was 
80.2 per cent, whereas between developed and less developed countries it was only 19.8 
per cent. 508 Furthermore, less developed countries experienced huge debts, of which the 
total volume of outstanding debt rose from $22 billion in 1962 to about $60 billion in 
1970,509 and the region that was most badly affected by the debt was Latin America: 
Brazil in 1987 had the total debt of $121 million, followed by Mexico ($105 million), and 
Argentina ($54.5 million). 510 Beside that, the lack of food and starvation, due to 
imbalance between production and consumption (rapidly expanding population) was also 
among the major problems that plagued most of the states in the less developed world, 
specifically the African continents. For instance, the less developed countries' gross 
cereal imports alone rose from 2 million tons between 1949-1951 to 36 million tons in 
1972, and this indirectly strained the balance of payments between the former with the 
507 Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, 267. 
50' Frances Stewart, "The Direction of International Trade : Gains and Losses for the Third 
World" in G. K. Helleiner (ed. ) A World Divided : The Less Developed Countries in the 
International Economy (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1976), 94-95. 
509 Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, 81. 
S10 Ingrid Iversen, "Future Financing for Developing Countries", in Professor Graham Bird (ed. ) 
Third World Debt : The Search for a Solution (Hants, England : Edwar Elgar Publishing Limited, 
1989), 175. 
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developed countries as most of the import of food came from the latter. 511 The 
unfavourable economic situation for most of the less developed countries led them to 
propose a few new arrangements, including the setting up of several meetings between 
developed and less developed countries, and economic groupings such as The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964,512 the quest for the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), 513 Group of 77 (South-South Co- 
operation), 514 Group of 15, sts and others. 
The study believes, however, that it would be unwise to merely argue that those 
inequalities were the result of the structure of the international economic system, which is 
mostly subject to the capitalist mode of production, but other factors including 
governmental policies, domestic political stability, the nature of the economic 
5" It is not only the developed countries that distribute food aid to less developed countries, but 
also international agencies as the former, and the world at large was facing a world food crisis 
due to environmental degradation such as flood and drought. See Joan Edelman Spero, The 
Politics of International Economic Relations, 197-199. 
512 Richard N. Gardner, "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development", 
International Organization 22 (1) Winter 1968,99-114. 
5'3 The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was first initiated by the heads of state of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) who called for new arrangements in the international economic 
system to further accelerate the economic development of Less Developed Countries. See 
Branislav Gosovic & John Gerard Ruggie, "On the Creation of a New International Economic 
Order : Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly", 
International Organization 30 (2) Spring 1976,309-311, Harold K. Jacobson, Dusan Sidjanski, 
Jeffrey Rodamar & Alice Hougassian-Rudovich, "Revolutionaries or Bargainers? : Negotiators 
for a New International Economic Order", World Politics 35 (3) April 1983,335-337, Joan 
Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 392-398. 
514 Group of 77 was considerably attributed to the unity of Less Developed Countries, which was 
launched after the UNCTAD Conference in 1964, and comprised of three main regional groups, 
namely, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Keisuke Iida, "Third World Solidarity : The Group of 
77 in the UN General Assembly", International Organization 42 (2) Spring 1988,376. 
515 Members of Group of 15 are Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Kripa 
Sridharan, "G-15 and South-South Co-operation : Promise and Performance", Third World 
Quarter] 19 (3) 1998,359. 
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environment, and historical background (including the impact of colonization) have to be 
re-considered as all of them interplay in influencing the level of development and world 
economic distribution. As most of the less developed countries experience some losses in 
world economic distribution, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, could provide a good example 
of how these two countries successfully `manipulated' the system of core and periphery 
zones. Both countries, to some extent, have enjoyed being integrated in the world 
economy as well as participate in a few smaller states' organizations like NAM and G- 
77 516 The level of tendency of joining the world economy is obviously shown when only 
on a few occasions these two countries `temporarily' withdrew from the world economy, 
specifically in the oil crisis of 1973 (Saudi Arabia led other Arab-Gulf states to boycott 
exporting oil to industrial countries), 517 and the Asian Crisis of 1997 (Malaysia 
introduced capital control by pegging one US dollar to RM3.80). 
518 
516 The discussion on Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's participation in NAM and G-77 has been 
examined in the Chapter VII. 
51' In 1973, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia led other OPEC members to launch an oil embargo 
upon several developed countries, mainly the US, the Netherlands, Portugal, Japan, Denmark, and 
other developed countries. However, the embargo was finally lifted in March 1974, when a few 
negotiations were held between the two parties on the issue of Israel-Palestine as well as the 
developed countries' offer on military and technological know-how to the Kingdom. See for 
instance, Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, "The Arab Oil Weapon :A Threat to International 
Peace", The American Journal of International Law 68 (3) July 1974,410-439, Ibrahim F. I. 
Shihata, "Destination Embargo of Arab Oil : Its Legality Under International Law", The 
American Journal of International Law 68 (4) October 1974,591-627. 
518 The Asian financial crisis which occurred in mid-1997 disrupted several Asian economic 
miracles including the other four ASEAN tigers namely Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines. Various factors were linked to the crisis, ranging from the weaknesses of financial 
institution of these affected countries, too much reliance on foreign direct investment, the blame 
for the international capital mobility which made these countries susceptible to the crisis, and 
others. For some readings see Michael R. King, "Who Triggered the Asian Financial Crisis? ", 
Review of International Political Economy 8 (3) Autumn 2001,438-466, Prema-Chandra 
Athukorala, "Capital Account Regimes, Crisis, and Adjustment in Malaysia", Asian Development 
Review 18 (1) 2000,17-48, and others. 
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Malaysia, by diversifying its economy from mere agriculture-based to industrial- 
manufacturing sectors, and attracting a lot of foreign direct investments in order to 
provide more capital for its infant industries, has gained some `miraculous achievement' 
by maintaining the growth of GDP from seven to nine per cent, at least, from the mid- 
1980s to the 1990s before tumbling in the Asian crisis of 1997,519 and was nearly 
categorized as one of the new Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in the Asian 
region. 520 Furthermore, through the most celebrated theory of flying geese, 
521 Malaysia 
(periphery) has increased its co-operation with Japan (core) in developing its heavy 
manufacturing and automobile industries. This was a tremendous achievement for 
Malaysia as it successfully produced its first national car called 'Proton Saga' in 1985, 
and was able to export it overseas. 522 However, to some researchers, the level of 
government intervention or the so-called `developmental state' is high, and the 
519 Between 1970-1980, the growth of real GDP per capita was about 5.3 per cent annually. Bruce 
Glassburner, "ASEAN's `Other Four' : Economic Policy and Economic Performance Since 
1970" in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato & Jusuf Wanandi (ed. ) Asian Economic 
Development : Present and Future (Berkeley : Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California, 1985), 163, Paul M. Lubeck, "Malaysian Industrialization, Ethnic Divisions, and the 
NIC Model : The Limits to Replication", in Richard P. Appelbaum & Jeffrey Henderson (ed. ) 
States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim (London : Sage Publications, 1992), 179, Jomo 
K. S. "Malaysia : From Miracle to Debacle", in Jomo K. S. (ed. ) Tigers in Trouble : Financial 
Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia (London : Zed Books Ltd., 1998), 181. 
520 William R. Nester considered Malaysia, alongside with Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines as the Newly Exporting Countries (NECs). See William R. Nester, Japan's Growing 
Power over East Asia and the World Economy : Ends and Means (London : The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1990), xi, Bruce Glassburner, "ASEAN's `Other Four', 183. 
52' Mitchell Bernard & John Ravenhill, "Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese 
Regionalization, Hierarchy and the Industrialization of East Asian", World Politics 47 (2) January 
1995,171-172. 
522 For example, the first total sales in UK alone, Proton set a record for new market entrants in 
the UK by selling 10,000 units of cars. Jomo K. S. "The Proton Saga : Malaysian car, Mitsubishi 
Gain", in Jomo K. S. (ed. ) Japan and Malaysian Development : In the Shadow of the Rising Sun 
(London : Routledge, 1994), 263, Kit G. Machado, "Proton and Malaysia's Motor Vehicle 
Industry : National Industrial Policies and Japanese Regional Production Strategies", Jomo K. S. 
(ed. ) Japan and Malaysian Development " In the Shadow of the Rising Sun (London : Routledge, 
1994), 303. 
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government policy places more emphasis on the Malay (as the majority citizen, more 
than 50 per cent), 523 which might undermine Malaysian full commitment to free trade and 
liberal economic principles, and also too much dependence on foreign direct 
investment, 524 but it has signalled to other less developed countries that a sense of 
development and an impressive economic growth can be achieved by actively 
participating in, not isolating from, the world economic system. 
On the other hand Saudi Arabia, since the discovery of oil in 1930s, the Kingdom 
has indirectly engaged in the world economy. Despite heavy dependence on the west, 
especially the US in order to expand its oil industry, the Kingdom has enjoyed enormous 
surplus from the export of the oil to other countries around the world. However at the 
same time it also faces several economic problems such as being too dependent on oil 
and needing economic diversification, limited growth in agricultural sectors and lack of 
manpower from the Saudi citizens themselves, but to some extent, Saudi Arabia 
is not 
only benefiting itself from the oil exploration, the Kingdom has also begun widening 
its 
role in the world economy by becoming one of the biggest donors in the world, 
contributing 4.2 per cent to 6 per cent of its GNP directly to several less developed 
countries (most of them arc member of G-77) and also to international organizations such 
as OPEC, IMF, and others. 525 This new role might change the status of Saudi Arabia 
from 
the periphery into semi-periphery, particularly in its relations with other less developed 
countries, including Malaysia as it received several financial aids from the Kingdom. 
523 Paul M. Lubeck, "Malaysian Industrialization, Ethnic Divisions, and the NIC Model : The 
Limits to Replication", 179-180. 
524 Jomo K. S. "Malaysia : From Miracle to Debacle", 182-183. 323 The Saudi Development Fund (SDF) "Saudi Aid to the Developing World" 
(http //cc ccýc-uclint'_cixn! rnain 1102: htttt). 
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As both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia gain some benefits from the world economic 
distribution as periphery or semi-periphery status, especially the latter, does the 
integration or participation in international economic system by these two countries also 
enhance their economic bilateral relations? From the 1960s to the 1980s, it could be 
argued that the dynamic participation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the world 
economy might indirectly encourage both countries to interact frequently, as both 
countries mainly depended on the export-import market-orientation of their products, 
which is in line with the free market system as one of the characteristics of the 
international economic system. This can be pointed to by the dramatic increase of 
Malaysia's trade volume with Saudi Arabia, from RN14.25 million ringgit in the 1962 to 
USS24.613 million and USS725.622 million ringgit in the 1970 and 1980.526 Even though 
the character of the trade was less favourable for Malaysia as it ran huge deficits as a 
result of the high import of Saudi oil, it indicated that there were some increases in the 
former's trade with the latter. Furthermore, during the oil crisis of 1973, Malaysia was 
not among the countries that were boycotted by the Kingdom for the access of its crude 
oil. This may due to the nature of the crisis, which aimed to urge the US, especially, to be 
more balanced in its handling of Israel-Palestinian affairs, in which Malaysia had 
indicated its firm support to the question of Palestine. Even after the crisis, Malaysian 
Prime Ministers, the late Tun Razak and Tun Hussein, took such a golden opportunity by 
touring the Kingdom and some Gulf countries to get some financial assistance 
from the 
Kingdom, and at the same time continuously support the policy of the Saudi government 
upon Israel-Palestine affairs, especially during the 1970s. Nonetheless, there 
had yet to be 
any foreign direct investment from Saudi Arabia in Malaysia, and the same goes too for 
526 See Table I in the Chapter V. 
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the Malaysian tourism industry where the Saudi tourists did not have a major impact from 
the late 1960s to 19SOs. 527 
As the years headed towards the 1990s, bilateral economic relations between the 
two countries improved further as the total trade reached RM3,633.56 million at the end 
of the 1990s. Additionally the Kingdom had begun to show some interest in investing in 
Malaysian developmental projects, particularly in the manufacturing sector, and Saudi 
tourists also started to visit Malaysia more frequently. 528 The positive development, 
specifically to trade volume, and investment, could be linked to some factors that lately 
influenced the pattern of `Malaysian economy, including the withdrawal of its privileged 
access to developed countries' markets, called the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), 52' especially to the US, in January 1997.530 In addition with the eruption of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, Malaysia was inevitably forced to seek other market 
opportunities, especially in other less developed countries, which had huge potential 
in 
'27 See sub-topic "From Saudi Aid to Investment Activities", especially pages 167-168, and sub- 
topic "Tourism Sector", pages 172-173. Both are in the Chapter V. s28 For trade, investment, and tourism up to 1990s see pages 153-155 (trade), 165-168 (investment), & 173-175 (tourism) in the Chapter V. s: v The Generalized System Preferences (GSP) is composed of trade preferences granted by the 
developed countries en masse on a nonreciprocal basis i. e. without market access concessions 
in 
return. The GSP was firstly proposed by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) during the Kennedy Round to encourage the participation of 
developing countries in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Caglar Ozden 
& 
Eric Reindhardt, "The Perversity of Preferences : GSP and Developing Trade Policies, 
1976- 
2000", (httP"1. 'rconwý>rldhank. or (ilc '? 1 Rti wLs? 955.1x11). 530 John Wong had mentioned the potential loss of the GSP as the Malaysian economy 
experienced positive growth in the international economy. John Wong, "ASEAN Economies : Continuing Dynamic Growth in the 1990s" in Chris Dixon and David Drakakis-Smith 
(ed. ) 
Economic and Social 
_Development 
in Pacific Asia (London : Routledge, 1993), 119, USIA, "Trade Preferences Programs LJS Programs for Developing Countries and Aid Recipients, 
Economic Prrsprctive, (httlr. /; uýintiýaatr, s; uýcýurnal; /itcsi0ý96/ijcc 3fafl. htm). 
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marketing Malaysian products. '31 This is also similar to the Middle East region, where 
Malaysia had geared up more effort to penetrate a variety of Saudi markets as well as to 
lure more investors from the Kingdom and other Gulf countries such as the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and others. 
It is certainly true, however, that Malaysia's economic relations with Saudi 
Arabia are not so great compared to their economic interaction with developed countries. 
It is not that Malaysia in particular, does not emphasise the significance of its economic 
relations with Saudi Arabia, and not merely because of some stringent policies 
imposed 
by the latter caused the level of interaction to be less favourable to the former, 
but it is 
also mainly due to the level of achievement, the miraculous economic growth and 
massive development that was achieved, resulting with Malaysia's dynamic 
integration 
with the core countries in the world economy. Added to this was the provision of 
developed countries to give `special access', or the Generalized Special 
Preferences 
(GSP) for less developed countries, including Malaysia to penetrate their markets, which 
augmented the level of its participation in the world economy, and which caused 
it 
unconsciously to slightly ignore the efforts to further strengthen economic relations with 
Saudi Arabia, and other less developed countries. Not only that, but owing to the nature 
of economic relations between less developed countries which is more market-driven 
(such as more on the import of Saudi oil), and is not based on technological 
knowledge 
S3' At the end of 1990s, Malaysia inter-trade with less developed countries 
(mainly among the 
South-South Co-operation) was reported about RM90 billion per year. 
"PM : Negara Kecil 
Penting 
- Nilai Dagangan Dua Ilala Dengan Nlereka Meningkat RM90b 
Setahun", Utusan 
Mala Asia, August 24,1999. 
http: //utosan-COm. my'utu<an'arrhi, -e. aspYv=1999Sdt=0R24Spub=titusan 
Nlala "iabsec=Muka 
ladajý; tn<<pg_f]i 0l_. htm). 
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transfer from the core to periphery such as between Malaysia and Japan, Saudi 
Arabia 
and the US, make less developed countries' interrelations less important than with 
developed countries. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The character of Malaysia's economic relations with Saudi Arabia highlights a 
few vital 
patterns in the context of inter-less developed countries interaction, and also within the 
co-religionist point of view. Despite both countries being categorized as peripheral states 
or `Muslim-Islamic states', and the nature of their relations being largely based on their 
socio-economic backgrounds, this presumably argued that their interaction 
in any related 
fields, including economy, might be thriving. However, in terms of economic 
interaction, 
it demonstrates a different picture from those presumptions. This chapter 
has attempted to 
link the unfavourable economic relations, especially for Malaysia, to the three main 
economic determinants; the background economy, the character of economic activities, 
and the influence of the international economic system, which the study believes might 
affect the character of the relations. Through the discussion, the study 
finds that these 
three economic determinants have differently influenced the degree of economic 
interaction between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
For the first, although both countries were carried on an almost similar economic 
background, agricultural based, (with the exception of Saudi income through pilgrimage, 
which will be discussed in the chapter VI), and to some extent, received 
influences from 
western powers, either through colonization or alliance, these `similarities' 
(added with 
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the affiliation of Islam) are not able to bring these two countries to the highest level of 
economic co-operation (except Malaysia's dependence upon Saudi oil which leads to the 
deficit in the former's trade). Conversely, both are bound to fulfil the demand of their 
internal and external needs by supplying their primary products for the international 
market, mainly to developed countries, and at the same time seeking some technological 
exchanges (or technological transfer) from these developed countries for economic 
transformation in order to achieve industrialization status. Besides that, the character of 
the economic activities rather gives a more multifarious explanation for both countries 
interaction. For example, bilateral trade, which in the opinion of the researcher, is seen as 
more favourable to Saudi Arabia because Malaysia is very much in need of the former's 
oil and petroleum products. This has resulted in the continuous deficit to the latter's trade 
volume. Nevertheless, the flow of Saudi financial aid, the late positive investment, and 
the large influx of Saudi tourists (with the exception of Malaysian expatriates which does 
not have a big impact upon the Malaysian economy) to Malaysia has, to some extent, re- 
balanced the deficit, even though the overall volume of these economic interactions is 
still smaller compared to Malaysia's more established relations with other developed and 
developing countries, particularly with the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). 
Furthermore, the influence of the international economic system has also affected 
the degree of economic relations between the two countries. Although inequality exists in 
the international economic system (which in some way leads both countries to join a few 
smaller states' organizations like NAM and G-77), Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, to this 
date, have successfully survived and are able to continuously maintain their economic 
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achievement in the modern world economy. Nevertheless, since both countries, with their 
own primary products, depend more on 'export-import market oriented' to generate more 
capital, particularly from the developed countries, this leads indirectly to their relations 
being secondary to the more developed countries, for these developed countries provide a 
bigger market and huge capital in return to their own national economic revenue. 
Whether their economic relations would be more developed in the future largely depends 
on the pattern of co-operation between these two countries by not merely focusing too 
much on 'market driven', but to give focus more on the research and development, and 
also encourage the exchange of technical expertise in the fields of agriculture, 
manufacturing sectors, and petrochemical industries. 
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CHAPTER VI 
6.0 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 
Religious affiliation is the most vital element in which Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have 
shared commonalities in their bilateral relations. Both countries have been continuously 
interacting in the religious field since as early as the fifteenth century until the present 
day. Despite the existence of some distinct features of Islamic development in Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia such as the historical background of how Islam is developed, 532 the 
culture and the local population, and the level of the implementation of the Islamic 
principles (Shari'ah Laws), 533 these divergences, more or less, will not hinder the 
countries in prolonging their religious co-operation, especially at the international level. 
532 The arrival of Islam in Malaysia may be linked to the earliest role of the Arab and other 
Muslim traders and preachers who came to the Malacca Sultanate to spread Islam both to its 
territories and neighbours; through this traditional linkage, particularly between Malacca and the 
Arabian Peninsula territories, it was continuously expanded until Malaya achieved independence 
in 1957. For further explanation see Chapter Three. Meanwhile for the Islamic historical 
development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it would be largely referred to the politico- 
religious movement initiated by Sheikh Ibn Abdul Wahab, later became known as the Wahabi 
Doctrine, and Mohamed Ibn Saud (the emir of Dir'iyah) in promoting Islamic awakening among 
the Bedouin communities as well as creating the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, at least, three times in 
1747-1818,1824-1891, and 1902-1924 till today. See for instance, Taha Osman El-Farra, "The 
Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State : The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia", Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, (University of Pittsburgh, Greensbury, 
USA, 1973), 86, Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History, 1924- 
1964", Unpublished Ph. D Thesis (University of Utah, USA, 1970), 2-12,13-24 & 25-27, 
Phoenix, "A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement", Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic 
Socie xvii October 1930,401-402. 
533 Malaysia has not implemented the whole principle of Islamic rules, and only emphasized 
limited Shari'ah Laws that generally deal with commercial and personal matters. Muslim 
followers make up about half of the Malaysian population, and the Islamic legal school of 
Malaysia is the Shafi'ite school, whereas Saudi Arabia roughly applies the entire rule of Islamic 
laws, all theSaudi population is Muslim, and the Hanbalite School is the dominant legal school in 
the Kingdom. "Malaysia", CIA World Factbook 
(http: //www. cia. Lyov/cia/publications/factbook/ Jed os/nrv. html), Hong Qu, "Impact of Islamic Laws 
on Malaysia Muslim Women", 
(http: //aolsearch. aol. co. uk/web'? /query=islamic+laws+in+nalaysia&location=wholeweb& firstt=l 
1 &last=20), Rohimi Hj. Shapiee, "Kedudukan Malaysia Sebagai Sebuah Negara Islam dan 
Cabaran Antarabangsa", 4-5 (http: //memherslycos. co. uk/nabirzJsoc 12. htm? ), Farouk A. Sankari, 
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Malaysian and Saudi Arabian governments also realize (as has been discussed in 
the Chapter IV) the importance of the portrayal of religious identity, Islam, in their 
domestic and international policies. Both countries have used `Islam' as useful tool to 
justify their policies as well as reactions towards certain issues to ensure the political 
survival of these two political regimes as argued by James P. Piscatori (especially in his 
observation of Islamic values in Saudi foreign policy) who had put into : "..... it is clear 
that Islam does play a role in Saudi foreign policy, but in the final analysis the overriding 
purpose of that policy is to preserve the Saudi regime and Saudi independence". 
534 Saudi 
Arabia's religious tool can be associated with its global Islamic donations to other 
Muslim counterparts. According to James Piscatori , 
535 Saudi Arabia's `Islamic donation', 
probably began under the period of King Faysal who was at that time facing stiff 
challenge from Gamal Abdel Nasser for Arab-Muslim leadership. With King Faysal's 
slogan, `Pan-Islam', he toured several Muslim countries including Malaysia to support 
Saudi Arabia's vital position within the Muslim world. In order to achieve greater 
support, King Faysal had also poured a lot of financial assistances to the needy or poor 
Muslim countries. Malaysia which was under Tunku Abdul Rahman, who had close 
"Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia", in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (ed. ) Islamic Resurgence in the 
Arab World (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1982), 181, `Saudi Arabia", CIA World Factbook 
(http: //wvw. cia. rod vpuhlications/factbook/L, sa. html), "Saudi Arabia Basic Law of 
Government", (http: //www. midea-, -tinfo. com/doctiments/SaLidi 
Arabia Basic Law. htm), E. J. 
Brill, Dustur :A Survey of the Constitutions of the Arab and Muslim States (Leiden : Tuta 
Subaegide Pallas, 1966), 62-63 & 109-114. 
"" James P. Piscatori, however, indicates the inconsistency of the application of Islamic values in 
Saudi foreign policy. For instance, Islam virtually played no part during `Abd al-'Aziz's reign, 
but became more significant in Faysal's term. However, since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the 
use of Islam in Saudi foreign policy was put into question for the Iranian regime under Khomeini 
had generated Islamic ideology to overthrow the monarch Shah which indirectly threatened the 
political authority of Al-Saud royal family. James P. Piscatori, "Islamic Values and National 
Interest : The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia", in Adeed Dawisha (ed. ), Islam in Foreign Policy 
(London : Cambridge University Press, 1983), 33-45 & 51-52. 
535 James P. Piscatori, "Islamic Values and National Interest", 39-52. 
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personal relation with King Faysal, had taken. the advantage to receive a few financial 
assistances from the Kingdom. 536 The global Islamic donation from Saudi Arabia has 
continued until the present day. 537 For Malaysia, the UMNO political regime has applied 
Islamic elements, including the Islamization programmes under Dr. Mahathir, both at 
domestic and foreign policies in order to maintain the Malay-political centrality vis-ä-vis 
the other Malaysian ethnic communities. 538 In regards to Malaysia's religious relations 
with Saudi Arabia, it could be regarded as part of Malaysia's as well as the Kingdom's 
`religious interests' in gaining Islamic recognition from domestic and international level. 
The Malaysian government, in fact, is very much in need the support from the Kingdom 
for the former seems to tend to interact more with the latter, and not vice versa, in order 
to fulfil its multi-variety of domestic and international necessities. These include the 
performance of pilgrimage activities in the two Holy Cities in Islam, Mecca and Medina, 
sending a number of Malaysian students to learn Islamic Studies in Saudi Arabia as it is 
one of the oldest centres for Islamic learning, particularly in the Arabic language, the 
acquisition of financial assistance to support religious activities and the building of 
religious schools and several mosques. They also include seeking Saudi diplomatic 
recognition for Malaysia as one of the Muslim states, as well as membership of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which is really vital for the needs of Muslim 
communities in Malaysia and for the justification of its Islamic image at the domestic and 
global level. 
536 See sub-topic "Malaysia's Relations with Saudi Arabia Under Tunku Abdul Rahman Era" in 
the Chapter IV. 
53 See sub-topic "5.4.2 : From Saudi Aid to Investment Activities", in the Chapter V. 
"' Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy (New York : Routledge, 1997), 9, sec also 
Chapter IV, especially the sub-topic "The Dr. Mahathir Regime". 
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In religiously interacting with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, however, Malaysia 
will have to face, at least, two contrasting issues which the Malaysian government needs 
to conciliate between them (especially for the beneficial of the Malaysian political regime 
itself); the dominance of the Wahabism and the Al-Saud's religious donations for 
Malaysia. For the Wahabi Doctrine, it has been considered as the main religious ideology 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 539 According to some of the Arab researchers, the 
doctrine had stimulated the Arab awakening (especially the Arabs in the central Arabian 
Peninsula, Najd territories) during the 19th century against foreign influence, for instance 
the Turks, as well as those local Arab rulers associated particularly with the Ottoman 
Empire. 540 It also triggered the Ikhwan541 to rise against some western powers, like 
France and Great Britain, which later perhaps indirectly also aroused several Islamic 
movements in other Muslim territories, including Malaya (later became Malaysia), to 
participate in the calls for early Islamic re-awakening. 542 Besides that, the Wahabi 
Doctrine also created several Islamic legal decisions orfatwa (legal decisions) that for a 
few Muslim countries are not content with, such as rejecting afatwa by most of the Sunni 
scholars that the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h), after he died, can still intercede 
say See note 532 in the Chapter VI. 
540 This argument was mentioned by Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, although there were a few 
researchers such as Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, who considered the Wahhabi movement as part of 
the causes of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. See Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi "Saudi 
Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 11-12, and Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, How the Khilafah was 
Destroyed (London : Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), 5-6. 
"' The Ikhwan was a group that formed by Ibn Saud around 1910 to help the latter raided against 
the opponents of the Wahabi doctrine and the formation of the Saudi state. However, in 1926 and 
onwards, after the capture of Hijaz, the Ikhwan began to show some resistances towards Ibn 
Sa'ud including its protest against his relations with Britain. See Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and 
Revolution in the Middle East, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1988), 67-68. 
542 See Ahmad Abdol Ghafour Attar, Muhamed Ibn Abdel Wahhab, translated by Dr. Rashed Al- 
Barrawi, (Mecca Printing & Information Est., 1979), 85-86, George Rentz, "Wahhabism and 
Saudi Arabia" in Derek Hopwood (ed. ) The Arabian Peninsula : Society and Politics (London 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972), 66. 
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(tawassul) with his God, rebuffing all Ijma' (consensus of the religious scholars) after the 
death of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h), declaring other Muslim 
communities who do not accept the Wahabi Doctrine to be infidel and launching war 
against all innovations (bid'ah) in Islam, being anti-modernization (like the prohibition of 
using telegraph), and others. 543 The strict order of this doctrine in implementing Islamic 
rules may find difficult for the Malaysian government as well as the Malaysian Muslims 
to accept the Wahabism ideology. Nevertheless, the Malaysian government has no 
alternative choice either to formally rebuffing this doctrine or not (although it realizes 
that there are some Islamic groups in Malaysia which probably resemble with the 
Wahabism - this will be discussed later in the following pages of this chapter) for it has 
to safeguard its relations with the Kingdom in order to secure several religious donations 
from Al-Saud regime (the second issue). Those donations are crucial for the Malaysian 
political regime to develop its religious programmes, and simultaneously too to maintain 
the support of the Malaysian Muslim community, especially the Malays. For the Al-Saud 
family, realizing the less welcome of Wahabism ideology among Muslim counterparts, 
including Malaysia, its religious donations could be considered as one of the Kingdom's 
strategies in showing its obligation to work for Islam. 544 
543 Anti-modernization may not pursued by the original teaching of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab. It 
was strongly enunciated by the Ikhwan (Ibn Saud's army, and the fanatic followers of the Wahabi 
Doctrine). See Taha Osman El-Farra, "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal 
Cohesion of an Emerging State", 154, Phoenix, "A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement", 410, 
Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 8, Henry Munson, Jr, Islam 
and Revolution in the Middle East, 67-68. 
544 The use of `religious donations' has been one of AI-Saud's main strategies in displaying its 
work for Islam since the post-King Faysal. There are four kinds of Saudi recipients; a) the formal 
Islamic institutions like OIC, b) the government of an OIC member state, including Malaysia, c) 
the individual association or project in Islamic countries, d) the individual association or projects 
in a non-Islamic country. James P. Piscatori, "Islamic Values and National Interest", 46-48. 
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Based upon this account, this chapter would like to examine these two contrasting 
issues by concentrating on a few questions. The questions are; in what way Malaysia 
could face the possible influence of the Wahabi Doctrine in its long religious relations 
with Saudi Arabia, or in more specific way, to what extent, if any, the Wahabi Doctrine 
could affect the trend of da'wah movements (religious calls) and the practice of religious 
activities in Malaysia, and what are the impacts of the doctrine upon Malaysia's religious 
relations with the Kingdom? Furthermore, more important, since the doctrine is probably 
less welcome in Malaysia due to the different practice of Islamic tradition, in what form 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can use its religious donations to spread the Kingdom's 
influence in Malaysia which at the same time also (or indirectly) assists the Malaysian 
political regime's effort in defending its Islamic political interests vis-ä-vis Islamic 
domestic pressure. 545 In analyzing these particular questions, the study will first define 
the concept of the Wahabi Doctrine and how far it influencing several Islamic 
movements in other Muslim territories, including Malaysia as well as to what extent the 
doctrine might affect Malaysia's religious relations with Saudi Arabia. This will be 
followed with the discussion on how the Saudi donations, as an alternative to Wahabism 
ideology, play some roles in helping Malaysia to develop its religious programme which 
in some ways, will give huge advantage for the consolidation of both political regimes' 
Islamic image at domestic and international level. 
5" See Chapter IV for further discussion on Islamic pressure in Malaysia, especially under the 
sub-topic : "The Significance of Relations for the Malaysian Political Regime". 
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6.1 The Wahabi Doctrine 
The Wahabi Doctrine was commonly associated with the teaching of Sheikh Muhammad 
Ibn Abdel Wahhab, who was born in Uyaynah, Najd, in 1703 and died in Dir'iyyah in 
1792.546 It is called `Wahabi' after the Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab who was considered as 
the initiator of the doctrine. 547 Several terms, however, appeared in an attempt to classify 
the teaching of the Wahabi Doctrine and the identity of its followers within the Muslim 
counterparts, such as Wahabiyyun' (the followers of the Wahabi Doctrine), 
'Wahabiyyah' (the Doctrine itself), `Protestantism' or `Puritanism of the Mohammedans', 
`reformed Muslims', Mohammedan Muslims; the Wahabi followers consider themselves 
as 'al-Muslimun' (which may refer to the early Muslims called 'Salafiyyun) and 'a! - 
Muwahhidun' or `Unitarian' (their emphasis on the absolute oneness of God). 548 
sae Some researchers, however, indicate different dates for the birth and the death of Sheikh Ibn 
Abdel Wahhab, such as Jacques Benoist-Mechin, who mentioned that the Sheikh was born in 
1696 (and died in 1792), while Phoenix states he was born in 1691 and died in 1736, and both 
Mohamed Zayyan and John Obert Voll cited distinctly the period of life of the Sheikh as being in 
the bracket (1703-87) and (1703-1791) respectively. Nevertheless, most of the dates (the birth 
and the death of the Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab) revolve around 1703-1792. See Jacques Benoist- 
Mechin, Arabian Destiny, translated by Denis Weaver (Fair Lawn, New Jersey : Essential Books 
Inc., 1958), 48. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica vol. 12, (Chicago : Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Inc., 1992), 451, George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia", 55 & 57-58, Mohamed Zayyan 
Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 7, Ahmad Abdol Ghafour Attar, Muhamed 
Ibn Abdel Wahhab, 84, John Obert Voll, "Foundations for Renewal and Reform" in John L. 
Esposito (ed. ) The Oxford History of Islam (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999), 517. 
547 The name of the 'Wahabi' might also be related to Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab's descendant, 
from the Tamim tribe called `El-Wahaba'. See John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins 
and Wahabys (London : Henry Colbum and Richard Bentley, 1830), 274-275, John Obert Voll, 
"Foundations for Renewal and Reform", 517. 
548 Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement : Social, Political and 
Religious Conditions During the Three Centuries Preceding-the-Rise of the Saudi State (Reading, 
We : Ithaca Press, in association with the King Abdul Aziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives, 2002), 1, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica vol. 12,451, John Lewis Burckhardt, 
Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 88, Louis Alexandre Olivier de Corancez, The History of 
the Wahabis : From Their Origin until the End of 1809, translated by Eric Tabet, (Reading, UK 
Garnet Publishing Ltd., 1995), xi. 
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It would be a huge task for this chapter to elaborate upon the authentic teaching of 
Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab that had influenced most of the Bedouin Arab community, 
especially in Najd territory, and it later also became the most dominant religious ideology 
in the Arabian Peninsula throughout the 18`h and l9`h centuries. However, among the 
main essence of the teaching of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab (or the Wahabi Doctrine) was 
deliberately a call for the return of all Muslim communities (specifically to the Arab- 
Muslim populations in the Arabian Peninsula) to the original principles of Islam based on 
the Qur'an and Al-Hadith (with the strict interpretation of the Hanbalite School), and a 
repudiation of all innovations contrary to the practices of the Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h) and the early generations of pious Muslims. 
549 
This explanation probably could be linked to the basic principle of Sheikh Ibn 
Abdel Wahhab's call to the Bedouin Arab community, 
550 in Najd in the 18`h century, 
where in his eyes, they were not practicing true Islam sufficiently in their lives, or they 
were ignorant of Islam. 551 Prior to the rising of the Wahabi movement in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and since the central authority of Islam had been transferred from Mecca and 
Medina to Damascus (the Umayyad Period), Baghdad (the Abbasid Period), and Istanbul 
(Ottoman Empire), the religious life of the Arab-Bedouins in Najd, particularly the 
549 This explanation was given by George Rentz, and with some additional statements by John S. 
Habib, however, it generally finds no difference from some discussions by other researchers. See 
for instance, George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia", 54, John S. Habib, Ihn Saud's 
Warriors of Islam " The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 
1910-1930, (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1978), 3, Henry Munson, Jr, Islam and Revolution in the Middle 
East, 66, Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 16, Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Arabian Destiny, 48-49, The New Encyclopaedia 
Britannica vol. 12,451. 
5'0 The Bedouin Arabs here are specifically referred to those living in Najd territory, and the 
nomads, who most of them ignorant of Islam or only practicing traditional and customary beliefs. 
" John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 277. 
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nomads, at that particular time, was in a gloomy situation. It was pictured as full of 
superstitious beliefs such as cults of tree and stone worship, the manifestations of 
innovations (bid'ah) like visiting holy men's tombs, sacrifices to holy men, and others, 
and also the people lived in chaotic condition with little respect towards each other. 552 
Although most of them still believed in God and the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h), they 
neglected ritual traditions, abiding by the laws of Al-Qur'an and Al-Hadith, such as not 
having faith in the day of resurrection after death, not performing prayer, fasting and 
zakat (alms giving), their women not being allowed their legal share of property left by 
deceased relatives, and others. 553 
In fact not merely in Najd, but also during Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab's visit to 
Hijaz, Syria and Iraq, he noticed a lot of deviations and innovations (bid'ah) being 
practiced by the Muslim communities, particularly by those affiliated with the Turks- 
554 sss Sunni Muslims, and the Shi'ah, who have to be `rehabilitated' to the true teaching of 
552 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 16-17, Ahmad Abdol Ghafour Attar, 
Muhamed Ibn Abdel Wahhab, 8-14, George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia", 55, John S. 
Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam, 3. 
 For more explanation see Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement, 
153. 
"' The Turks-Sunni Muslims can be linked to the rulers and the people of the Ottoman Empire 
that dominated most of the Middle Eastern areas including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and others or the 
representative of the Ottoman Empire such as the family of Sheriff from the Hashemite tribe in 
Hejaz, the Mamluk in Egypt, and et cetera. 
... The Shi'ah can be considered as one of the major denominations of Islam, along with the 
Sunni (the majority of the Muslim community), which is closely associated with the strong 
defender of 'Ali's descendants in regaining Muslim leadership. But in this case it refers 
specifically to those Shi'ah living in Al-Hasa, situated on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula, 
and near the ports of the Persian Gulf like Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 'Uqayr and Qatif). Madawi 
Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 34-37, John S. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam, 9. 
For further explanation on Shi'ah see S. Husain M. Jafri, Origins and Early Evelopment of Shi'a 
Islam (London : Longman Group Ltd., 1979), particularly pages 1-2,13-16. 
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the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h). 556 In the case of Turks-Sunni Muslims, Sheikh Ibn 
Abdel Wahhab was less disposed towards the philosophy and the culture of the way they 
carried out their religious duties and ceremonies. For instance, he disapproved of the 
blind acceptance offatwa (legal decisions) by the Jima ' of Ulama for whom the medieval 
systems of Islam had the last word in religious matters, and allowed no independent 
thinking (new Ijtihad) after a fatwa was produced. 557 They rejected the use of Qiyas 
(analogical method of reasoning) by following the stance of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, 
and recognized only two authorities for the sources of Islamic jurisprudence, Al-Qur'an 
and Al-Hadith, along with the precedents of the companions of the Prophet (p. b. u. h), 558 
and considered asking for money in return for religious services, judgement and advice as 
a kind of bribe. 559 They were strongly against the excessive culture of visiting the tombs 
of the Prophet (p. b. u. h) and the families of the Prophet's companions, and even destroyed 
several shrines and tombs, including the monument over the tomb of Zayd ibn Al- 
Khattab (one of the Prophet's companions, and the brother of the second Sunni caliph, 
`Umar Ibn Al-Khattab), and prohibited decorating mosques and others. 560 Sheikh Ibn 
556 Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement, 153. 
557 However, since the Al-Hadith authoritatively collected in the 3'd hijrah/9`h century, followers of 
Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab later modified and accepted the Ijma' of the first three centuries of 
Islam as binding. Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1979), 198. 
... For further details see Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 197-198. 
' Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 57, Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, Najd Before the 
Salafi Reform Movement, 155. 
° Even, the Wahabi scholars ordered the destruction of the domed tombs of the Prophet (p. b. u. h) 
and the caliphs in Medina in order to discourage later visits and veneration by Muslims when 
Sa'ud Ibn Abdel Aziz (1803-1814) managed to establish temporary Sa'udi hegemony over 
Medina in 1804 (also Taif in 1802 and Mecca in 1803). For more information on how the Wahabi 
questioned the practice of the Turks, especially in regard to their manner to the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ), 
after he died, and also to his companions who died in the battlefield reference can be made to the 
work of John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 279-282, and see also 
Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, How the Khilafah was Destroyed, 6-7, Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History 
of Saudi Arabia, 21, The New Encyclopaedia of Britannica, vol. 12,451, Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, 
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Abdel Wahhab and his followers regarded the Shi'ah as a breeding ground for 
innovations (bid äh) in Islam, and also viewed them as 'rafida' (those who reject 
faith). 561 This is due to the Shi'ah's intoxication with the supreme authority of Ali and his 
descendants by claiming their legitimate leadership over the Muslim community, and 
exercising a few religious activities which were not parallel (or had not been done before) 
with the original teaching of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h). These included 
considering Karbala in Iraq as their holy city, the place where the grandson of the Prophet 
(p. b. u. h), Saidina Husayn and his followers were killed by Umayyad forces, and also 
having the annual rites of mourning for Husayn in Karbala as a symbol of remembering 
the struggle (or the suffering) of Ali's descendants in the Muslim world. 562 This is a blend 
of pre-Islamic beliefs, some new practices (bid'ah), and the issues of methodology in the 
Islamic Jurisprudence that Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab attempted to rehabilitate and 
emphasize in his religious call to all Arab-Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula during the 
18`h and 19`h centuries. 563 
Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement, 154, Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam : From 
Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York : I. B. Tauris, 2004), 25 & 66-69. 
56' Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 21,41,64. In another study, it was mentioned 
that although Ibn Abdel Wahhab was adamantly opposed to Shi'ah (Shiism), he specifically 
targeted only one particular extremist sect, called the 'Rafidah', which was argued by Ibn Abdel 
Wahhab, the sect assigned greater authority to their leaders in understanding and interpreting Al- 
Qur'an and Islamic law than the Prophet Muhammad p. b. u. h. See Natana J. Delong-Bas, 
Wahhabi Islam : From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York : I. B. Tauris, 2004), 22 & 
85. 
562 In 1801, the Wahabi followers destroyed the tomb of the Imam Husayn in Karbala. Phoenix, 
"A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement', 403, William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modem 
Middle East, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1994), 34, P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton & Bernard 
Lewis (ed. ) The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 1, (London : Cambridge University Press, 
1970), 70-72, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 10, (Chicago : Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Inc., 1992), 738-739. 
563 Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement, 153-154. 
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The fundamental teachings of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, with the political 
combination of Al-Saud family, had successfully united most of the Arab-Bedouin 
community in Najd to occupy most of the Arabian territories including Hejaz, Hasa, `Asir 
and others, in order to create the first, the second and the third Saudi states from 1747 to 
1818,1824-1891, and 1902 until the present respectively, despite being halted twice by 
the Egyptian governor, Muhammad Ali, under Turkish command, in 1818, and the Al- 
Rashidi family in 1891.5 His doctrine also was arguably claimed to spread out outside 
Najd territory to other Arabian Peninsula areas such as Hejaz, Hassa, `Asir, Tuba, Kura, 
Qatif, and a few other Arab-Muslim territories, including Syria, Iraq, and others. 
565 Not 
only that, the influence of the Wahabi Doctrine was also associated with other Muslim 
movements or certain individual figures beyond the Arabian Peninsula such as Sanusism 
in Libya, 566 Mahdism in Sudan, 567 Sheikh `Uthman Dan Fodio (1754-1817) in northern 
Nigeria, 568 Haji `Umar Tal (1794-1865) in West Africa, 569 Syed Ahmed Al-Bareely in 
India, 570 Haji Shariat Allah in Bengal , 
571 and Haji Miskin in Sumatra, Indonesia572 during 
564 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 23-25, Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi 
Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 2-12,13-24. 
565 Ahmad Abdol Ghafour Attar, Muhamed Ibn Abdel Wahhab, 74. 
566 Sanusism movement was led by Muhamad Ali Al-Sanusi (1787-1859). Youssef M. Choueiri, 
Islamic Fundamentalism (Washington : Pinter, 1997), 10. 
56' Sudanese Mahdism appeared in 1881-1898 and was initiated by Muhamad Ahmad Abdullah 
(1844-1885). Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 10-11. 
56s Youssef M. Chouciri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 8. 
569 Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 9. 
s'o The religious movement of Syed Ahmed Al-Bareely (died in 1831) was commonly regarded as 
the Wahhabite of India. Qeyamuddin Ahmad, The Wahabi Movement in India (Calcutta : Firma 
K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1966), 17-18. Nevertheless, the religious movement by Shah Waliullah of 
Delhi (1703-1762) could be considered as the pioneer of Islamic reformation (claimed being 
influenced by the Wahabi Doctrine) in India. See R. Upadhyay, "Muslim Fundamentalism in 
India : Hostage to Medieval Concepts", South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 351,31 October 
2001 (http: //www.. -, -. iagl,. oi-g/papers4/paper35l. htnil). 
57 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 204. 
s'z Ustaz Mohd. Kamil Hj. Abdul Majid, Tokoh-Tokoh Pemikiran Gerakan Dakwah (Angkatan 
Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM, 1990), 46-47. 
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the 18`h and 19th centuries, and also the Islamic reform movements in the 20th century led 
by Hassan Al-Banna, and Rashid Ridha. 573 
6.2 A Few Arguments on the Wahabi Doctrine 
There are discussions by several scholars on the teaching of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab. It 
is generally believed, however, that there is no single change of element brought by 
Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab into the religion of Islam. He only emphasized the old 
classical teaching of Islam, of which most of the Muslim followers had been ignorant , 
574 
as John Lewis Burckhardt put it: "... Ibn Wahab not purify the existing religion, but they 
made the Arabs strictly observe the positive precepts of one certain religion.... ". 575 Even 
during a discussion held in Cairo, Egypt, in Autumn 1815 under the order of Muhammad 
Ali Pasha, between two religious scholars of Wahabism and the Congress of Ulama, the 
latter found the Wahabis' teachings and their written documents not contradictory to the 
principal teachings of Islam. 576 
573 Youssef M. Choueiri, Qeyamuddin Ahmad, and Fazlur Rahman do not indicate that the above 
movements (except Hassan Al-Banna's teaching argued by Fazlur Rahman) were influenced by 
the Wahabi Doctrine. The researcher only quotes some data on these Islamic movements given by 
these researchers. Among the past studies, however, that link these movements with the Wahabi 
Doctrine were, for instance, George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia", 66, Mohamed 
Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 11, Dr. Sheikh Mohammad lqbal, 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab : The Wonder of Modem Islam, (Srinagar, Kashmir : 
Burzalla Bridge, 1988), 120-123, Ahmad Abdol Ghafour Attar, Muhamed Ibn Abdel Wahhab, 
85-86, Ustaz Mohd. Kamil Hj. Abdul Majid, Tokoh-Tokoh Pemikiran Gerakan Dakwah, 46-47. 
For Fazlur Rahman's presumption on the link between the Ikhwanul Muslimin (Hassan Al- 
Banna's movement) with the Wahabi Doctrine, see Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 200. 
574 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Arabian Destiny, 49, Phoenix, "A Brief Outline of the Wahabi 
Movement", 402, George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia", 56, John Lewis Burckhardt, 
Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 275, Louis Alexandre Olivier de Corancez, The History of 
the Wahabis, 13. 
575 John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 285. 
576 Phoenix, "A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement", 402, John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on 
the Bedouins and Wahabys, 283. 
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Nonetheless, as the Wahabi Doctrine began to be known to other Muslim 
countries, either by direct or indirect contacts or visits or any effects through the 
dissemination of information about the outcome of Arabian Reformation, especially in 
Najd, 577 and also due to the different Islamic legal schools and cultures being practised in 
those Muslim countries, 578 the teaching of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab still created some 
differences among the non-Wahabi Muslim communities, particularly the Sunni- 
Muslims, despite a conference. 579 As has been mentioned before, there are some religious 
issues that lead these two parties, the Wahabi followers and non-Wahabi (Sunni- 
Muslims) to have a few discussions between them. Those issues are, for instance, the 
concept of tawassul (intercede) where most of the Sunni scholars believe that although 
the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h) had died, but he can still intercede with God for his 
people. However this fatwa is refuted by the Wahabi Doctrine, arguing that the Muslims 
would not be allowed to intercede with the Prophet (p. b. u. h) for he died as a mortal as all 
other mortals. 580 Besides that, there are a number of methodological questions raised, 
including the interpretation of some of the Qur'anic verses called `anthropomorphic' 
57 The researcher rephrases the statement written by Dr. Sheikh Mohammad Iqbal in explaining 
how the Wahhabi Doctrine influenced other Islamic movements. Dr, Sheikh Mohammad Iqbal, 
Sheikh Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahab, 120. 
171 It may also, as John Lewis Burckhardt argued, the Wahabi followers do not accustom with the 
Turks-Muslims, and other Arab cultures (like Syria and Egypt) inevitably lead to some quarrels. 
John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 277. 
s'9 It does not mean that the Wahabi followers are not Sunni, this is only to relate them with the 
founder of the doctrine, Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab. Nevertheless, there are some Muslim scholars 
like Sheikh Imam Muhammad Abu Zahrah who questioned whether the Wahabi can be 
considered as Sunni as they are the followers of the thought of Ibn Taimiyyah who was not bound 
to any Islamic theological school. Zamihan Mat Zin Al-Ghani, Salafiah Wahabiah : Suatu 
Penilaian (Selangor, Malaysia : Tera Jaya Enterprise, 1996), 132. 
580 Al-Imam Al-Hafiz Sheikh Al-Islam An-Nawawi, Al-Azkaar, (Beirut, Lubnan : Darul Fikri, 
1403H/1983), 307, Phoenix, "A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement", 410. 
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('Mutasyabihat) where the Wahabists emulate Ibn Taimiyyah's explanation . 
581 They, for 
example, do not interpret (Ta'wit), or arguably attempt to assimilate the word 'Istawa' 
with the nature of God's creatures582 in this Qur'anic verse: "The Most Gracious (Allah) 
rose over (Istawa) the (Mighty) Throne (in a manner that suits His Majesty)", 583 but 
consider it as the (Mighty) Throne that is suitable to God. 584 Sunni scholars, however, are 
not in favour of the Wahabi's approach as this will lead to God's assimilation with His 
creatures. They endeavour to avoid inferring that the nature of God, such as the word 
`Throne', is similar to or allied with any of His creatures. They prefer to apply the word 
`Throne' as `Irtifa' (Arabic word), which means `high' or the indication of God's power 
and His commands to all creatures upon the universe. 585 
S81 Or looks similar to the Ulama Salafi where they do not interpret those Mutasyabihah verses. A 
Discussion, through a letter containing questions and answers, with Ustaz Haji Muchlis 
Sitanggang, Ma'had Tahfiz Al-Qur'an wal-Qiraat, State Mosque of Sabah, Malaysia, February 
26-March 2,2004. 
582 A discussion, through a letter containing questions and answers, with Ustaz A. Aero, a 
religious teacher at SMUI Toh Puan Hajjah Rahmah, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, February 
26-March 2,2004, Dr. Muhammad Ibn Halifah At-Tamimi, Mu'tagid Ahlis Sunnah wal-Jama'ah 
Fi Tauhidil Asma was-Sifat (Medina Al-Munawarah : Hai'ah At-Tadris bil Jami'ah Al-Islamiyah, 
1414H/1994), 87, Sheikh Yusof Ad-Dajwi, Magalat wa Fatawa (Kaherah, Egypt : Majmu'ul 
Buhuthi Al-Islamiyyah, 1401H/1981), 331. 
583 Surah Thaha, verse 5. 
ssa The translation of this Qur'anic verse (from the Arabic language) is adopted from Dr. 
Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali & Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Translation of the Meanings 
of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language (Madinah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia : King Fahd 
Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur'an, 2000), 414. This translation circuitously signifies 
the nature of the authors' interpretation to the Wahabi Doctrine as it printed in the Kingdom. See 
also Al-'Allamah Muhammad Khalil Harras, Sharkh Al-Agidah Al-Wasitiyyah : Shaykh Al 
Islam Ibn Taimiyyah, translated by Abdul Wahhab Awang Kechik, (Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia : Mu'assasah al-Haramayn al-Khayriyyah, 2003), 25-27. 
585 Prof. Dr. H. Mahmud Yunus, Tafsir Qur'an Karim (Changi Road, Singapore : Tawakkal 
Trading, 1973), 448-449 (See the explanation of the verse in the footnote), Zamihan Mat "Lin Al- 
Ghani, Salafiyah Wahabiyah : Suatu Penilaian, 50, and also a discussion with Ustaz Rahim, 
Education Attache of Malaysian Student Department of London, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 
12.30-1.30pm, March 20,2004. 
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Furthermore, the Wahabis also discouraged the Muslims from merely depending 
on the authority of medieval schools, or Ijma' by any Ulama' who had the last word in 
Islamic jurisprudence, 586 in which no independent thinking (Ijtihad) was allowed. Instead 
they encouraged all Muslims to emphasize only the text of the two authoritative sources, 
Al-Qur'an and Al-Hadith, along with the precedents of the Prophet's companions, and 
urged them to exercise independent reasoning (Ijtihad) rather than applying Qiyas 
(analogical method of reasoning) in interpreting the legal sources or making any Islamic 
laws. 587 The Wahabis' strict approach, however, was not shared by Fazlur Rahman 
because by only emphasizing the text of the two divine sources, it will, in some way, lead 
to ultra-conservatism and almost absolute literalism, and the intense use of independent 
reasoning (not covered by any divine text) rather than Qiyas (as it has restrictive 
principles and a code of ethics developed by medieval legists) will generate more liberal 
forces to interpret the divine text further freely. In other words, Fazlur Rahman had said : 
"Although..... the Wahabis were much more fundamentalists and literalists so far as the 
body of the text of the Scripture is concerned, their Ijtihad (independent reasoning), in the 
long run, proved to be much less literalist and restrictive than the Qiyas of the Ulama". 588 
Moreover, most of the Sunni-Muslim scholars are not at ease with the strong 
fatwa of the Wahabis on several new religious practices performed by some Muslims, for 
the Wahabis considered them as innovations (bid'ah). Those new practices include 
building shrines on the tombs of the Prophet (p. b. u. h), and his companions, decorating 
586 However, their opinion of Ijma' was changed later. See note 557 in the Chapter VI. 
587 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 197-198. 
588 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 198-199. 
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mosques, 589 dressing Ka'aba with any kinds of clothes, 590 and smoking tobacco. 591 The 
same goes too for a few customs or ethics such as considering asking for money in return 
for religious services (like judgement or advice) as a kind of bribe, prohibiting the 
marking of Muslim graves with any shrines, 592 and also the attitude towards modem life 
including proclaiming (by some of the Wahabi zealous followers) the use of modern 
technological devices including wireless telegraphy, telephones, television and others as 
innovation (bid'ah). 593 The Wahabis considered the doers of these practices not to be true 
Muslims, and in need of rehabilitation. If they refuse to accept the Wahabi Doctrine, the 
Wahabis will view them as `infidel', and unavoidably war have to be declared against 
these infidel people. 594 Yet, this fatwa was negated by the Sunni-Muslim scholars, as 
they believe that the doers of innovations (bid'ah) cannot be simply considered as infidel 
where a war against them can be justified. This is because those innovations have yet to 
fall within the idolator (mushrik) categories which may not require harsh punishments 
like declaring a war upon the doers or killing them. 
595 
5B9 Louis Alexandre Olivier de Corancez mentioned that no decorations are to be found inside 
their (the Wahabis) mosque. Louis Alexandre Olivier de Corancez, The History of the Wahabis, 
13. 
S90 For example, in 1806 Ibn Sa'ud asked the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrims to stop the tradition of 
the Holy Carpet (Mahmal) in which they annually dressed the Ka'aba with sumptuous gold- 
inscribed velvet hangings in an impressive ceremony. Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi 
Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 14. 
591 Phoenix, "A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement", 410. 
592 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 52 & 57, Louis Alexandre Olivier de 
Corancez, The History of the Wahabis, 14. 
593 George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia", 64. 
594 As-Syeikh Imam Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Tarikh Al-Mazahib Al-Islamiah (Jizah, Egypt 
Darul Fikri Al-'Arabi, 1996), 209, Zamihan Mat Zin Al-Ghani, As-Salafiah Al-Wahabiy a, 133. 
595 A discussion, through a letter contains of questions and answers, with Ustaz A. Aero, a 
religious teacher at SMUI Toh Puan Hajjah Rahmah, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, February 
26-March 2,2004. 
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Besides, those arguments that asserted that the Wahabi Doctrine influenced some 
Islamic movements in other Muslim countries were also questionable. For example, the 
movements of Haji Shari'at Allah in Bengal, and Syed Ahmed Al-Bareely in India were 
arguably not under the influence of the Wahabi Doctrine. When Haji Shari'at Allah 
visited Mecca for pilgrimage in 1782-1802, Hejaz had yet to fall to the hands of Al-Sa'ud 
family (Mecca was only occupied a year later), while when Syed Ahmed Al-Bareely 
stayed in Mecca in 1822 (also for pilgrimage), the Ottoman Empire had already retaken 
Hejaz from the administration of the Al-Sa'ud family. On both occasions, it would be 
difficult for these leaders to receive the teachings of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab easily. 596 
While for other Islamic movements, such as Sanusism, Mahdism, and the Fulani Uthman 
dan Fodio, although they resemble the Wahabis (emphasizing purification of faith and 
Islamic reformation), their method of struggle was a little different since the former (most 
of these movements) attempted to establish theocratic states, whereas the latter had not 
assumed political authority himself (he put more emphasis on religious reformation) but 
chosen to ally with the Al-Sa'ud family. 597 Along with that, several researchers believe 
that the Wahabi movement was mainly confined to peripheral areas (Najd territories, and 
some other parts of the Arabian Peninsula), 598 only regarded as internal reformation 
against superstitious beliefs, 599 to rectify weaknesses (purify the faith) among local 
Muslim society60° or, at least, as Arab-Muslim awakening, or the solidarity ('asahi}yah) 
of the tribes, against the Sherif family in Hejaz and the dominance of the Ottoman 
596 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 203-204 
597 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 210, Qeyamuddin Ahmad, The Wahabi Movement in India, 21-22. 
598 Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, xi. 
599 Dilip Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism (London : Paladin Grafton, 1988), 2. 
600 John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (New York : Syracuse University Press, 1984), 32. 
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Empire, in the pursuit of power in the Arabian Peninsula, 601 which seemed less 
convincingly inspired by Islamic movements in other Muslim territories. 
It is of less doubt that the Wahabi Doctrine invites some debate among 
researchers. However, it is not the focal point of this chapter to further enhance those 
arguments for, as was said earlier, this study will give more attention to the possible 
influence of the Wahabi Doctrine upon religious application in Malaysia based on its 
long religious relations with Saudi Arabia. Yet, it would be appropriate for the study to 
re-emphasize that most of the arguments (or the critiques) on the Wahabi Doctrine were 
closely related to some of the fundamental teachings of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, and 
his rigid order upon the implementation of religious practices, including performing 
communal prayers, paying zakat, and avoiding a luxurious life that might lead to harsh 
punishment for those neglecting to carry out these duties (especially communal prayer 
and zakat), which to some extent also, was found to be avoided or inconvenient for other 
groups of Muslim communities. 602 Making matters worse was the extreme view held by 
some of the Wahabi followers on the prohibition of using modern technology in everyday 
life. In fact, this view was strictly upheld by the fanatical members of the Wahabis called 
the Ikhwan, commonly linked with Ibn Sa'ud's army to occupy some Arabian territories. 
Sometimes without former's command, the latter raided those Arab-Muslim people who 
did not accept the Wahabi Doctrine as they believed that those raids could be considered 
601 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse 
Syracuse University Press, 1995), 16, and see also note 540 in the Chapter VI. 
602 John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 59 & 282, a discussion with 
Ustaz Rahim, Education Attache of Malaysian Student Department of London, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, UK, 12.30-1.30pm, March 20,2004. 
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as `holy war' upon infidels. 603 The zealous attitude of the Ikhwan, and especially their 
raids upon Ibn Sa'ud neighbouring territories like Kuwait, Transjordan and Iraq (which 
also had been under the influence of the British government), forced Ibn Sa'ud to sign an 
agreement with Britain known as the al-Hada Agreement on November 2,1925 to 
determine the eastern and northern boundaries of Saudi Arabia, 604 and eventually also to 
dissolve the group in 1929 to be replaced by the National Guard . 
605 In other words, the 
major opposition of the Wahabi Doctrine was not solely associated with the fundamental 
teaching of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, but also with their extreme political activity and 
the frequent violent militarism pursued by the Ikhwan, which upset other Muslim 
communities. 606 
Despite the existence of some forms of rigidity in Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab's 
religious calls to the Arab-Muslim in the 19`h century, there are several considerations 
that have to be taken into account. For instance, the nature of the Wahabi Doctrine which 
stressed more on the purification of faith may found relevant to the religious situation in 
603 Taha Osman El-Farra, "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of 
an Emerging State", 155-156, see also note 594 in the Chapter VI. 
60' Taha Osman El-Farra, "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of 
an Emerging State", 153. 
605 The main source of the conflict was not only the Ikhwan's desire to spread the Wahabi 
Doctrine to those territories but also the effort of the British government to build the first of a 
series of police ports near the Najdi-Iraqi border. Ibn Saud protested claiming it violated the terms 
of the 1922 'Uqayr Protocols' that had established the border between the Najd and Iraq. In 
addition, the Ikhwan began to criticize Ibn Sa'ud's policies including his diplomatic relations 
with Britain, the Islamic legitimacy of Ibn Sa'ud's personal conduct (his serial marriages with 
daughters of tribal sheikhs and slaves, and having luxurious life), and others. See Henry Munson, 
Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East, 68-69, Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi 
Arabia, 66, Taha Osman El-Farra, "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal 
Cohesion of an Emerging State", 153 & 157. 
606 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 200, Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East, 67, 
discussion with Ustaz Hassan, (a religious officer), Ministry of Islamic Endowments Call & 
Guidance Affairs, 8.00-9.30pm, September 2"d, 2004, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
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Najd in the 18`h - 19`h centuries, where the majority of the Arab-Bedouins were far from 
practicing the true principles of Islam. They become inebriated with the mystic life of 
traditional beliefs, which in some circumstances, led them to greatly admire certain 
objects or individual figures whom they believed had spiritual power and could be asked 
for any help. 607 There were also other factors which influenced the teaching of Sheikh 
Ibn Abdel Wahhab, for instance, since most of the Najdi Ulama prior to the rise of the 
Wahabi movement went to Syria and Egypt to study under the Hanbalite school, which 
was well-known for its firmness in generating a fatwa, 608 until a Hanbali leading centre 
developed in al-Hasa, it too might indirectly form some basis of religious rigidity 
application in Najd. 609 Beside that, the impact of the theological thought of Ibn 
Taimiyyah610 upon the founder of the Wahabi Doctrine, in some ways, played a vital role 
in developing the attitude of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab towards Arab-Muslim 
communities in the Arabian Peninsula. 611 This was compounded by the vague political 
situation, particularly in central Najd, which was based more on tribal confederations and 
607 See notes 551,552 & 553 in the Chapter VI. 
608 This could be linked to Ibn Hanbal's (780-855 A. D), the founder of the Hanbalite School, 
argument with the Khalif Al-Ma'mun (Abbasid Period) about the nature of Al-Qur'an. The 
former believed that Al-Qur'an was God's uncreated word (Qadim), while the latter followed the 
Doctrine of Mu'tazilites, that Al-Qur'an was created. Ibn Hanbal's firm and orthodox belief led to 
his imprisonment. James Hastings (ed. ), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. vii 
(Edinburgh : T. &T. Clark, 1914), 70. 
G09 Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement, 133. 
60 Ibn Taimiyya, or Taqi al-din Abu-l-'Abbas Ahmad b. Abdalhalim, a Muslim theologian of the 
13 - 10 centuries, was familiar with his determined defendant of the old classical Islam. Beside 
that, his birthplace, Harran near Damascus, was regarded as a rigidly puritanical conception of 
religion and the strong representation of the Hanbalite School. Like Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, 
he also declared war against all innovations, and called upon his fellow Muslims to fall back upon 
the old traditional sources. Thus, it was often argued that Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab's teaching 
was merely a re-continuation of Ibn Taimiyya's movement. James Hastings (ed. ), Encyclopaedia 
of Religion and Ethics, 72, Zamihan Mat Zin Al-Ghani, Salafiah Wahabiah, 132, Mohd. Radzi 
Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Perlis, 11. 
611 Zamihan Mat Zin Al-Ghani, Salafiah Wahabiah, 132, Imam Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Tarikh 
Al-Madzahib al-Islami, 208, Uwaidah M. Al-Juhany, Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement, 
157. 
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without formal Ottoman presence, left a vacuum for Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab and the 
Al-Sa'ud family to freely `reform' the society according to his teaching as well as to form 
a kingdom to challenge the authority of the Ottoman Empire. 612 
Along with that, there were other views that might attempt to look at the Wahabi 
Doctrine from other angles or rather in different ways, specifically on a few issues of 
innovations which were largely opposed by Sunni-Muslim scholars. For example 
decorating mosques with luxurious ornaments could be regarded as an encouraging 
guidance for Muslims for not to be wasting their wealth without any restraint. 
613 On one 
hand, the different approach of the Wahabi Doctrine, by emphasizing the Hanbalite 
schoo1614 and the theology of Ibn Taimiyyah, (in fact Ibn Hanbal was one of the disciples 
of Imam Asy-Syafe'i), may be found adaptable to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
615 
612 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 14. 
613 A Discussion, through a letter containing questions and answers, with Ustaz Haji Muchlis 
Sitanggang, Ma'had Tahfiz Al-Qur'an wal-Qiraat, State Mosque of Sabah, Malaysia, February 
26-March 2,2004. 
614 There are some arguments that in practice, Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab turned the exercise of 
ijtihad into an almost literal imitation (taqlid) of the customs of the Prophet (p. b. u. h) and his 
companions as preserved in the scholarly legacy of the first two or three Islamic centuries. 
However, as was mentioned before, the Hanbalite school centre had been established prior to the 
emergence of the Wahabi Doctrine, and even Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab went to Syria to learn 
this school. In other words, it was not unlikely that the legal thought of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab 
had not been influenced by the Hanbalite School. David Waines, An Introduction to Islam 
(Cambridge : University of Cambridge Press, 2003), 208, see also note 610 in the Chapter VI. 
615 In general, not only the Hanbalite School was being practised by Arab-Muslims in Saudi 
Arabia, but also other schools, especially the Hanafite School which still predominates in the 
Hejaz and part of the Eastern Province. Nevertheless, the Hanbalite School forms the basis of 
Shari'ah system in the Kingdom. Farouk A. Sankari, "Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia", in Ali 
E. Hillal Dessouki (ed. ) Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York : Praeger Publishers, 
1982), 181, Ira G. Zepp, Jr. A Muslim Primer : Beginner's Guide to Islam (London : Sheed & 
Ward Ltd., 1992), 150, Helmi Mohd. Foad, "Sano Koutoub : Menimba Ilmu di Tiang-Tiang 
Masjid Al-Haram", Utusan Malaysia, 11 Julai 2003, 
(http: //utusan. com. my/utusan/archive. asp'? y=2003&dt=0711&pub=utusan malavsia&sec=hicara 
%SFagama&pg=ha 03. htm&arc=hive), discussion with Dr. Ahmed Y. Al-Duraiwish, Associate 
Professor/College of Shari'a, Islamic Law Development, Imam Mohammed Bin Saud, Islamic 
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owing to its culture and customs, and on the other hand, it might be a more difficult to 
apply in other Muslim countries, including Malaysia. In other words, the variety of 
religious applications, especially in Islamic jurisprudence is unavoidable due to different 
cultures and customs of Muslim countries, and different Islamic legal schools may have 
their own understanding of what Imam As-Syafe'i had said on Ibn Hanbal : "I do not 
leave behind any one greater as a faqih or more pious and learned than Ahmad Ibn 
Hanbal". 616 However, whatever the arguments on Wahabism, its firm emphasis on the 
absolute oneness of God (Tawhced), the denial of all acts implying polytheism such as 
visiting tombs and venerating saints, and the advocacy of returning to the original 
teachings of Islam as incorporated in the Al-Qur'an, and Hadith (traditions of 
Muhammad p. b. u. h. ), with comdemnation of all innovations or bid'ah, 617 helped the Al 
Sa'ud families to build the Wahabi state, which later became the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 
After the dissolution of the Ikhwan in 1929, however, the Wahabi Doctrine 68 was 
no longer as compelling in the Kingdom as it was before. The Ulama had only played 
University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1.00 - 1.45pm, September 151,2004, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 
with Ustaz Hassan (a religious officer in the Ministry of Islamic Endowments Call & Guidance 
Affairs, Saudi Arabia) as the interpreter of the meeting, and informal discussions with a few 
Saudi Arabian students such as Ayman Al-Nasser, (M. A. Student in Politics, 5 February 2004, 
3.00-4.00pm, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK), and Omar Batarfi (Ph. D. Student in Computer Science, 
2 February 2004,1.00-2.00 pm, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK) who were studying at the University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. 
616 James Hastings (ed. ), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, 70, and a discussion with Ustaz 
Hj. Muchlis Sitanggang, through a letter consisting of questions and answers, Ma'had Tahfiz Al- 
Qur'an wal-Qiraat, State Mosque of Sabah, Malaysia, February 26-March 2,2004. 
617 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol 12, (London : Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1992), 
451, Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia (London : Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 2002), 1975. 
618 This refers more to the period of the emergence of the Ikhwan until its disbanding in 1929, 
where the level of fanaticism was much higher. See John S. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam 
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rather limited role as Madawi Al-Rasheed had stated: "the Mania was confined to giving 
their opinions regarding the matters of Islamic ritual and technological innovations, of 
which the country would have no shortage in the coming years". 619 This limited role, 620 
the subordination of religion to politics, however, was in line with the first alliance 
between Al-Sa'ud as the political Imam, and Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, who was 
responsible for spreading da'wah among the local population, and in contrast with certain 
leaders of the Ikhwan like Al-Duwaysh, Ibn Bijad and Ibn Hithlays, who aspired to 
become the rulers in Najd, Hijaz and Hasa. 621 
6.3 The Influence of the Wahabi Doctrine in Malaysia 
Although there are some arguments on the influence of the Wahabi Doctrine upon a few 
Islamic movements beyond the Arabian Peninsula, 622 Malaysia, as one of the Muslim 
countries, it is also believed, might receive some spill-over effects from the Doctrine. 
Among the Islamic movements that were arguably linked with the spreading of the 
Wahabi Doctrine to the Muslim community in Malaya (later to become Malaysia) was, 
for instance, the Paderi Movement in Minangkabau, Sumatera in the 19`h century. 623 This 
movement was led by three local Hajis, Haji Miskin, Haji Abdul Rahman and Haji 
Muhammad Arif who (especially Haji Miskin), after returning from Mecca in 1802 at 
: The Ikhwan of Naid and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910-1930 (Leiden : 
E. J. Brill, 1978). 
619 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 68. 
620 However, the Kingdom still practises the teaching of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, which was 
based on the Hanbalite School and the theology of Ibn Taimiyyah. 
621 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 68-69. 
622 See pages 206-207 in the Chapter VI. 
623 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kaiian di Negeri Perlis, 13, Abdul 
Rahman Hj. Abdullah, Pemikiran Sejarah dan Gerakan Isiah di Perlis, 3-4, Zakaria @ Mahmod 
Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 460. 
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the time the Wahabi Docrine-Ibn Sa'ud controlled the Hejaz, made several efforts to 
eradicate traditional practices which were heavily influenced by Minangkabau customs 
that were contrary to the true teachings of Islam. 
624 The continuous da'wah of the Paderi 
movement in Sumatra, posed a stiff challenge to the local customs of the Minangkabau 
people, who had to seek help from the Dutch to suppress this movement. Nevertheless, 
realising that the Dutch intended to occupy their territory, they allied themselves with the 
Paderi movement to act against the Dutch in the "Paderi War' (1822-1837). 
625 In spite of 
the defeat at the hands of the Dutch, the Paderi movement remained active under the new 
leaders like Mohd. Abdullah Ahmad (1878-1933), Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah (1879- 
1947), and others. They published a number of religious articles such as al-Bayan, al- 
Basyir, and al-Itqan in order to influence the Muslim community in Minangkabau. 
626 
Furthermore, they came under the tutelage of another local figure,. Sheikh Ahmad 
Khatib bin Abdul Latif (1855-1916), who had close relations with the Paderi movement 
but stayed in Mecca as an Imam in a mosque (Masjidil Haram) and who sent some letters 
to the local people until he had a number of vigorous disciples, who admired his 
messages, including Sheikh Muhammad Jamil Jambek, Haji Ahmad Dahlan, Sheikh 
Tahir Jalaluddin, and Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah. 
627 These disciples were not only 
active in Minangkabau but also outside the territory. Sheikh Abdul Karim Amrullah, 
624 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri Perlis, 12, Nikki 
R. Keddie, Iran and the Muslim World : Resistance and Revolution (London : Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1995), 45-46. 
625 Abdul Rahman Hj. Abdullah, Pemikiran Sejarah dan Gerakan Isiah di Perlis, 2, Anthony Reid, 
"Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia", Journal of Asian Studies 26 (2) 
February 1967,272. 
616 Ustaz Mohd. Kamil Hj. Abdul Majid, Tokoh-Tokoh Pemikiran Gerakan Dakwah (Angkatan 
Belia Islam Malaysia, 1990), 47. 
62' Abdul Rahman Hj. Abdullah, Pemikiran Sejarah dan Gerakan Isiah di Perlis, 3-4. 
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Sheikh Jamil Jambek, and Sheikh Abdullah Ahmad, for example, introduced the 
teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, and Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab to Sumatra, 
while Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin went to the Malay Peninsula to disseminate religious 
reformation, largely influenced by Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, to other Muslim 
communities in this area. 628 It was much argued that through the teaching of Sheikh Tahir 
Jalaluddin, religious reformation629 began to appear in Malaysia. 630 Over the years, the 
reformation movement gradually extended to other Indonesian territories like Java, 
Jakarta, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku. 631 This was followed by the emergence of 
several religious associations like Muhammadiah (1911), Persatuan al-Irsyad (1915), and 
Persatuan Islam or PERSIS (1923) which had close links with the Paderi movement in 
getting rid of all superstitions and innovations within the Muslim community. 
Nonetheless, these movements faced difficulties in propagating their messages due to the 
overwhelming impact of traditional affiliations of Islam among the local Muslim people. 
The establishment of new religious organization known as `Nahdatul Ulama' by K. H. 
Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari in 1926, which claimed to be the 
defender of the traditional practices of Islam, mostly under the guidance of the Shaflite 
School, further restrained the expansion of those reformation movements. 632 However, 
through other Indonesian religious reformers namely A. Hassan Bandung, who resided in 
Singapore, Hj. Abdul Ghani, Fakih Syamsuddin, and others, religious reformation (that 
628 Abdul Rahman Hj. Abdullah, Pemikiran Sejarah dan Gerakan Islah di Perlis, 4. 
629 The term of `religious reformation' here specifically means a movement that claims to uphold 
the old classical Islam (salafi) of the Prophet (p. b. u. h) and his companions. In Malaysia, this 
movement is commonly associated with the phrase `Al-Sunnah' movement. 
630 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 459. 
631 Abdul Rahman Hj. Abdullah, Pemikiran Sejarah dan Gerakan Isiah di Perlis, 4, Ustaz Mohd. 
Kamil Hj. Abdul Majid, Tokoh-Tokoh Pemikiran Gerakan Dakwah, 46. 
632 Abdul Rahman I: Ij. Abdullah, Pcmikiran Sarah dan Gerakan Isiah di Perlis, 5. 
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resembld the Wahabi Doctrine) had continuously influenced a few Malayan religious 
scholars. 633 
Besides that, the influence of Middle East modem reformists, especially those 
from Egypt like Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, also played a 
role in encouraging religious reformation in Malaya. Their teachings, to some extent, had 
influenced a number of Indonesian as well as Malayan scholars to promulgate the 
reformation movement in the Malay Peninsula. They were, for instance, Sheikh Tahir 
Jalaluddin (1869-1957), as mentioned before, who not only received some letters from 
Sheikh Ahmad Khatib bin Abdul Latif of Mecca (1855-1916), but also studied in Mecca 
under him and then continued in Al-Azhar of Egypt, and others like Sheikh al-Hadi, Haji 
Abbas Taha and Dato' Haji Mohammad bin Haji Mohd. Said, who were also indirectly 
exposed to the teachings of these two reformists. 634 They advocated the religious 
movements upheld by Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and Sheikh Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, 
who allegedly claimed to be influenced by Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab. 635 In order to 
633 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 459-460. 
6S4 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 454, Mohd. Radzi Othman, 
Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri Perlis, 28-29. 
635 Basically, it is difficult to ultimately argue that Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, Sheikh Muhammad 
Abduh and Rashid Rida, as among the founders of Modern Muslim reform in the early 20th 
century, were directly influenced, or practised the teaching of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab in their 
religious calls for all Muslims all over the world. Although, there were some arguments to link 
them with the Wahabi Doctrine, as mentioned by Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn 
Abd. Al-Wahab", 454-458, but the study believes that the similarity between these two 
movements (Modem Muslim reformists and the Wahabi Doctrine) is mostly related to their call 
for `Islamic reformations' to improve Muslims' purification of Islam as well as to implement the 
Shari'ah laws in their daily life. The main difference, however, may point to their approach 
towards the aspect of modernity, where the former, especially Sheikh Muhammad Abduh who 
was more positive and liberal with it (for example on the subjects of modem sciences) than the 
latter. See Elie Kedourie, Afghani and `Abduh : An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political 
Activism in Modern Islam (London : Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1997), 12, Yvonne Haddad, 
"Muhammad Abduh : Pioneer of Islamic Reform", in Ali Rahnema (ed. ), Pioneers of Islamic 
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convey their messages to local Muslim community, several religious periodicals were 
published in Malaya, like al-Imam, al-lkhwan, Pengasuh. They also set up a few religious 
schools such as Madrasah al-Igbal in Singapore (1908), Madrasah al-Hadi in Malacca 
(1917) and Madrasah Masyhur in Penang (1919), which generally believed in 
accentuating the element of religious reformation in the curriculum of those schools. 636 
Along with the influences of the Paderi movement and the Middle East modern 
reformists, the dissemination of the Wahabi Doctrine to Malaya was also through the 
direct teachings of a few Saudi scholars who came to some Malayan states, mainly Perlis, 
a state which is located in the northern Malay Peninsula. Zakaria a Mahmod Daud 
argued that those Saudi scholars had already operated in Perlis in the 1920s before the 
birth of local reformation associations in the 1960s. 637 Amongst the scholars were Sheikh 
Hassan and Sheikh Nur al-Surur, locally identified as `Tuan Guru Haji Ismail bin Haji 
Muhammad. 638 The coming of Sheikh Hassan to Perlis was warmly welcomed by the 
people of this state, and he was allowed to form several religious schools as well as to 
deliver his teachings to the local Muslim community. Sheikh Nur Al-Surur, who came 
about thirty years later, was a scholar from the Higher Learning Institution of Dar Al- 
Revival (London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994), 43-46. Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn 
Abd. Al-Wahab", 454-458. 
636 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kalian di Nel; eri Perlis, 28-29, 
Ustaz Mohd. Kamil Hj. Abdul Majid, Tokoh-Tokoh Pemikiran Gerakan Dakwah, 47-48, Abdul 
Rahman Hj. Abdullah, Pemikiran Sejarah dan Gerakan Islah di Perlis, 5-6, Mahayudin Haji 
Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 197. 
637 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 451, Mohd. Radzi Othman, 
Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri Perlis, 102. 
638 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 451-452. 
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Hadith in Medina and taught a few religious courses in Madrasah Al-Falah Mata Air in 
Perlis in the 1950s. 639 
The interactions of the Indonesian influences, modem Muslim reformists, and the 
teaching of the Saudi scholars with a few local religious leaders, as well as the Muslim 
society in Perlis circuitously led to the birth of a new religious practice in this state called 
`Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis'. M0 It is commonly viewed that this practice generally looks 
similar to the doctrine of Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab, from the teaching of Tawheed (such 
as the concept of intercession or Tawassul, God's character or Sifat Tirhan, and others), 
the meaning of Qur'anic anthropomorphic verses, the prohibition or eradication of all 
superstitions (khurafat) and innovations (bid'ah), particularly the elimination of several 
shrines and tombs in Perlis, like the considerably sacred places of Hj. Muhammad Salleh, 
Tok Shaykh Muda, Tok Lebai Salim, Tok Jemih, and others, certain religious practices in 
the prayer, and in managing the affairs of the deaths of close relatives. 641 The only main 
difference between Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis and the Wahabi Doctrine is that the former 
may claim not to strictly associate with any four Islamic legal schools, whereas the latter 
leans is more towards the Hanbalite School. 642 In fact, it has been formally agreed by the 
State Religious Council that the definition of Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah refers to those 
639 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 451-452. 
"The term `Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis' was thoroughly applied by Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud in his 
doctoral studies on the influence of the Wahhabi Doctrine upon Malaysia, specifically Perlis. See 
Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Ajaran 
Ahli Sunnah wal-Jama'ah di Perlis", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti 
Malaya, 1997), and also Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di 
Negeri Perlis, 96-111 (especially for the State of Perlis). 
641 For further explanation see Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 
463-477. 
642 Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 473, Mohd. Radzi Othman, 
Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri Perlis, 7. 
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Muslim people that believe in Qur'an, Al-Hadith, and the Ijma' of the companions of the 
Prophet (p. b. u. h), which clearly indicates (or parallel) in the two divine sources, and also 
recognizes the legitimacy of the four Islamic legal schools without any strict affiliation to 
practice with any of them. 643 
The absorption of religious reformation or `Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis', which 
possibly resembles the Wahabi Doctrine, into the state religious ideology, and was 
strongly appreciated by some groups of the Muslim community in Perlis, was largely due 
to the firm support of the religious officials of the state such as Haji Mat Hakim (former 
Chief Ruler of Religious Council and Malay Customs of Perlis State, or Yang Dipertua 
Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Negeri Perlis), Tan Sri Datuk Syeikh 
Ahmad Muhammad Hashim (former chief minister and one of the Malaysian 
ambassadors in Saudi Arabia), Haji Datuk Wan Ahmad bin Wan Daud (former Acting 
Deputy Chief Judge of Perlis) and Syeikh Abu Bakar al-Asyaari (former Imam of `Alwi 
Mosque in Kangar, Perlis), who in the early stages of their education became exposed to 
religious reformations, mainly from Indonesia and the Middle East, and these four 
individual figures were considered as the founding fathers of this movement. This is 
further strengthened with harmonious relations between these officials and the Royal 
State of Perlis (which was claimed to have Arab descendants), TM5 and also supported by 
643 In fact, there was a debate between Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis and the Shafiite Muslim scholars in 
Perlis about the definition of Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah. However, when the State Religious 
Council proclaimed that all the four Islamic legal schools are legitimate, yet should avoid being 
rigid with any of these schools, the Shafiite Muslim scholars eventually accepted the 
definition. The researcher rephrased Mohd. Radzi Othman's statements. See Mohd. Radzi 
Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri Perlis, 50-51. 
644 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri Perlis, 98-99. 
645 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kaiian di Negeri Perlis, 237. 
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three organizations the Al-Islah Association of Perlis, Jamiyah Pegawai Masjid Negeri 
Perlis (Staff Association of State Mosque of Perlis), and ABIM Perlis (Malaysian Islamic 
Youth Movement of Perlis), which strongly affiliate with religious reformations, and 
impulsively led the teaching of Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis to be officially recognized by the 
state constitution. 646 On top of that, the main religious school in Perlis, Madrasah 
Alwiyah, does not merely emphasize the Shafiite School, but also other legal schools in 
its curricula academic programmes. 647 In contrast with other states in Malaysia, religious 
reformation movements that may look like the Wahabi Doctrine were less prominent. 
This was largely because, unlike Perlis, the religious councils of these states were not 
dominated (or administered) by the followers of those religious reformations, and also 
because of the existence of certain policies of some state governments that did not allow 
this movement to freely spread its teachings. 648 
Despite the appearance of quite a few useful indications to relate some of the 
religious reformations in Malaysia, mainly Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis, with the Wahabi 
movement such as the historical interactions, certain religious beliefs and practices, 
mostly in 'ibadah matters (worship), and also the sense of extreme affiliation with their 
teachings and associations, 649 there are also a few things that might signify these 
movements were not overwhelmingly or rigidly bound to the Wahabi Doctrine. These 
646 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kalian di Negeri Perlis, 50-52 & 97, 
Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 477. 
647 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri Perlis, 243-244. 
648 Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kaiian di Negeri Perlis, 3,145,188, 
200-201 & 206. 
649 Discussion with Ustaz Rahim MSD London, visiting Newcastle on 20 March 2004,12.00- 
I. 00pm. 
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include avoiding strict affiliation with any four Islamic legal schools, 650 denying to be 
labelled as `Wahabi followers', 651 and most of the names of their organizations or 
associations not reflecting or being traditionally associated with the name of Sheikh Ibn 
Abdel Wahhab, such as the Muhammadiah group in Penang, which claimed to address 
itself to the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h), and not to the founder of the Wahabi 
movement in Najd, central Arabian Peninsula. This is different, too, from some religious 
reformations in other states in Malaysia, which mostly used the term `Al-Sunnah' or 
other terms, instead of Wahabi, in their organizations such as Ahlus Sunnah of Perlis, 
Sunnah Movement of Johore, Orang Sunnah of Pahang, Ittiba' al-Sunnah of Negeri 
Sembilan, Islam Jamaah of Selangor. 652 
Nonetheless, the study might be able to correlate the most essential resemblance 
between religious reformations in Malaysia and the Wahabi movement through the 
fundamental nature of their religious messages, which both deeply emphasized the 
realisation of the old classical Islam (salafiyyah) or `al-Sunnah' into their respective 
lives. They urged all fellow Muslims to return to the life of the Prophet (p. b. u. h), and his 
companions. Both movements also endeavoured to eradicate all kinds of superstitions 
(khurafat) and innovations (bid'ah) among their Muslim counterparts, especially in the 
eso See note 642 in the Chapter VI. 
bs' This denial was indicated by the Chief Ruler of Islah Association of Perlis, Ustaz Abd. Razak 
bin Abd. Rahman. Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kalian di Net, eri 
Perlis, 101. 
652 Orang Sunnah of Pahang is not a formal organization, it was given by the people of the state of 
Pahang. Meanwhile, Ittiba' al-Sunnah was a religious school in Negeri Sembilan (one of 
Malaysian states) that emphasized religious reformation teachings. For further informations on all 
these movements, see Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di Negeri 
Perlis, 146-147,182-187 & 200-210, and see also Abd. Rahman Hj. Abdullah, Pemikiran Sojarah 
dan Gerakan Isiah di Perlis, 7. 
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affairs of worship (ibadat). In other words, it is considerably acknowledged that a few 
groups of Islamic movements exist in Malaysia that might receive some influences from 
the Wahabi Doctrine. Yet the number of followers of the religious reformation is less 
significant, approximately a few hundred people, except in Perlis which may claim to 
number its Muslim population in thousands, 653 and their movements were not politically 
supported by the government in comparison with the Wahabi movement, which 
successfully operated under the religious-political alliance with the Al-Sa'ud family until 
the emergence of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd, later renamed as the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in 1932.654 The discouraging development of these movements could be 
associated with some issues that may affect their significance in the trend of religious 
calls in Malaysia. 
Among those issues are, for example, that the, Muslim community in Malaysia 
began, in the 15th century or even earlier, to practice Islam in their daily life, ranging 
from governmental administration (specifically the Malacca Sultanate), to the socio- 
economy and education. 655 Those Islamic teachings brought by Muslim traders and 
653 Such as in Penang (130 followers), Selangor (not more than 50 followers), Johore (120 
followers), and Pahang (250 followers). While in Perlis was roughly estimated about 30 per cent 
of its populations. Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kajian di New 
Perlis, 102-106,110,144-145,187,202 & 207. 
654 See note 532 in the Chapter VI. 
... See Chapter Three, especially under two sub-topics; "Trading Activities in Malacca" and "The 
Spread of Islam in Malacca", and for more elaboration see also Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The 
Malay Sultanate of Malacca (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1992), Armando 
Cotesao (translation), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires : An Account of the East, From the Red 
Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515, vol. II, series II (London : The Hakluyt 
Society, 1944), and Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomas, "The Malay Sultanate of Malacca" in 
Anthony Reid (ed. ), Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era : Trade Power and Belief (Ithaca 
Cornell University Press, 1993). 
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preachers, particularly the ArabsG5G or Muslims of Southern India657, to the Malay 
Peninsula were mostly believed to be under the guidance of the Sunni sect who uphold 
the Shafite School. 658 The Shafiite school has been the major source of reference for any 
matters related to Islamic jurisprudence in Malaysia to the present day. 659 It encourages 
broader and more moderate approaches in dealing with Islamic affairs. It was also found 
to be more suited to the culture and the customs of the Muslim community in 
Malaysia. 660 Other schools of Islamic jurisprudence like Hanafite, Malikite, and 
Hanbalite, however, are not totally ignored, but in certain cases the National Fatwa of 
Malaysia will refer to these schools to solve some issues that they may be more 
appropriate to be deal with. For example, the concept of paying zakat (alms giving) with 
money in Malaysia follows the Hanafite school, and the Malaysian pilgrims will also 
practise some fatwas from the Hanbalite school, like a male Muslim's ablution (wtulhu) 
will not become void when unintentionally touching women while performing Hajj 
656 Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 143-146, Stephen F. Dale, "The Islamic World 
in the Age of European Expansion 1500-1800" in Francis Robinson (ed. ), The Cambridge 
Illustrated History of the Islamic World (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 86, 
Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pem., 87-89. 
657 Cesar Adib Majul mentioned that the Shafiite school of jurisprudence which predominates in 
Malaysia was also found in Southern India. Cesar Adib Majul, "Theories on the Introduction and 
Expansion of Islam in Malaysia", Silliman Journal, 343, Barbara Watson Andaya & Yoneo Ishii, 
"Religious Developments in Southeast Asia, c. 1500-1800", in Nicholas Tarling (ed. ), The 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, 170. 
658 Nevertheless, there were some assertions that the Syi'ah influence had come earlier to Malay 
Archipelago than the Sunni. See Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 165-171. 
659 Dr. Haji Abdullah Ishak, Islam di Nusantara : Khususnya di Tanah Melayu (Al-Rahmaniyah, 
1990), 193, Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan, 241, "Fatwa : Hasil Perbincangan Secara Jemaah", 
Utusan Malaysia, 16 January 2004, 
(http: //utusan. com. niy/utusan/archive. asp? y=2004&dt=0116&pub=Utusan Malaysia&sec=13icara 
Agama&pp, =ba 0I. htm). 
' Discussion, via telephone, with Ustaz Mohd. Arifin Ali, a religious official in the State 
Religious Council of Sabah, Malaysia, 22 February 2005,4.00-4.30am (equivalent to 12.00- 
12.30pm in Malaysia), M. A. Rauf, A Brief History of Islam : With Special Reference to Malaya 
(Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1964), 85. 
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activities. 661 Yet the Shaflite school is still the most dominant Islamic jurisprudence in 
Malaysia. Therefore, based on the established traditional affiliation with the Shafiite 
school, it would be difficult for the Wahabi Doctrine, and several Malaysian religious 
reformations, which do not emphasize the implementation of this school in their religious 
messages, to augment their influence among the Muslim population in Malaysia. 
It is generally realized also that, in Malaysia, the administration of religious 
affairs has been put under the guardianship of the rulers of the various states, while the 
federal territory of Kuala Lumpur and the states of Malacca, Penang, as well as Sabah 
and Sarawak, are under the authority of the Supreme Ruler of Malaysia (Yang Dipertuan 
Agong), 662 and also under the coordination of the Malaysian government through its 
religious agencies, mainly Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM), Institut 
Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM), and the states' religious councils. 663 This tradition, in 
fact, had been implemented during the British government era in Malaya, where after the 
Pangkor Treaty of 1874, it provided for the appointment of a British Resident to the 
"' Discussion, via telephone, with Ustaz Mohd. Arifin Ali, a religious official in the State 
Religious Council of Sabah, Malaysia, 22 February 2005,4.00-4.30am (equivalent to 12.00- 
12.30pm in Malaysia), discussion, via letter of questions and answers, with Ustaz Hj. Muchlis Hj. 
Sitanggang, Ma'ahad Tahfiz Al-Qur'an wal-Qiraat, State Mosque of Sabah, February 26-March 
2,2004. Beside that, Dr. Haji Abdullah Ishak argued that to enable a Muslim person to follow 
other Islamic schools of jurisprudence, he or she would have to get permission from the Malay 
Rulers of Malaysia. See Dr. Haji Abdullah Ishak, Islam di Nusantara, 194. 
662 Federal Constitution, Laws of Malaysia, Article 3, (2) & (3), (Kuala Lumpur : MDC 
Publishers Printers Sdn. Bhd., 1998), 1, Deliar Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimension of 
Islam", in M. B. Hooker (ed. ), Islam in South-East Asia (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1988), 199, Fadzillah 
Mohd. Jamil, "The Reawakening of Islamic Consciousness in Malaysia : 1970-1987", 
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Edinburgh : University of Edinburgh, June 1988), 73, Rohimi I-Ij. 
Shapiee, "Kedudukan Malaysia Sebagai Sebuah Negara Islam dan Cabaran Antarabangsa", 4-5 
(http: //members. lycos. co. uk/nahir7Jsoc 12. htm? ). 
" Deliar Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimension of Islam", 200, Kamarulnizam Abdullah, 
"National Security and Malay Unity : The Issue of Radical Religious Elements in Malaysia", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 21 (2) August 1999,266. 
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Malay state. It was obligatory for the Malay ruler or sultan to ask for the British 
Resident's advice and act upon it in all matters other than those touching Malay religion 
and custom. 664 The provision of power for the rulers as well as for the government 
agencies upon the management of religious affairs has, to some extent, led to the creation 
as in the words of M. Kamal Hassan : "...... of a religio-legal bureaucracy subservient to 
the royal palace and subordinate to the traditional Malay elites (leaders) close to the 
palace". 665 
Since the affairs of religion have been granted to the rulers, and coordinated by 
the government, it provides more opportunities, especially for the governmental religious 
agencies, to run their own Islamic orientations as well as to directly monitor other Islamic 
activities and religious calls that might deviate from the true teaching of Islam or can 
pose some challenges to the government's image as the official guardian of Islam in 
Malaysia. In the case of the Wahabi movement, however, its doctrine is not listed by the 
National Fatwa Council as one of the deviant teachings, unlike a few religious 
movements like Syi'ah, Qadiani, Tariqat Naqsyabandiah Kadinin Yahya which were 
officially declared as deviating from the true teaching of Islam. 666 Even according to 
Mohd. Radzi Othman, most of the Malaysian religious scholars never indicated that the 
M. Kama] Hassan, Towards Actualizing Islamic Ethical and Educational Principles in 
Malaysian Society : Some Critical Observations (Petaling Jaya, Selangor : Muslim Youth 
Movement of Malaysia, 1996), 100. 
66'M. Kamal Hassan, Towards Actualizing Islamic Ethical, 100. 
6' However, the Malaysian government, through Pusat Islam (Islamic Centre), had ever stated its 
firm opposition to the Wahabi Doctrine. Discussion with Ustaz Rahim, MSD London, 20 March, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, National Fatwa Council, "List of Deviant Teaching", 
(http: //w-, vw. islam. , off v. my/ppi/listsesat. html). 
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Wahabi Doctrine is deviant. 667 It is mainly due to the existence of some differences in 
religious beliefs and practices, not fundamental but only in the minor side (Juru'iyyah) of 
Islam, and its rigidity in implementing religious practices that result in the Wahabi 
doctrine not being considered as deviant teaching in Malaysia. 668 The study, however, 
believes that the main reason for the Malaysian government not considering the Wahabi 
Doctrine as deviant but only restraining its movement (except in Perlis), apart from 
acknowledging the differences in certain theological and legal concepts, is to safeguard 
its relations with the Kingdom, which is so vital for the welfare of the Muslim population 
in Malaysia as the former (as stated before) is regarded as the place of performing 
pilgrimage, acquiring Islamic studies, obtaining economic assistance and, to some extent, 
also standing as one of the leading nations in the Muslim world. Along with that, since 
the followers of this faction form only a small group of the Muslim community, and their 
emphasis is more on worship (ibadat), not political, the government has only restricted 
the operation of these religious factions, with the exemption of Perlis where they gained 
support from the royal as well as religious official of the state, in order to avoid any 
disintegration among Muslims in Malaysia. 669 Hence, the controlled approach by the 
government has relatively caused the expansion of the Wahabi Doctrine or any other 
religious reformations to be rather limited. 
66' Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu Kaiian di Negeri Perlis, 246. 
66' Mohd. Radzi Othman, Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam : Satu K Tian di Negeri Perlis, 244, 
Zakaria @ Mahmod Daud, "Muhammad Ibn Abd. Al-Wahab", 481. 
669 Discussion, via telephone, with Ustaz Mohd. Arifin Ali, a religious official in the State 
Religious Council of Sabah, Malaysia, 22 February 2005,4.00-4.30am (equivalent to 12.00- 
12.30pm in Malaysia). 
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Furthermore, the trend of religious calls in Malaysia does not provide 
circumstances which are plainly conducive for the Wahabi Doctrine and other Al-Sunnah 
movements to further enhance their activities, particularly in the 1970s and onwards. 
Even though in the early 20`h century there were some Islamic groups, which arguably 
looked similar to the Wahabi movement, that had successfully influenced a number of 
religious scholars, these were mainly aroused by the ideology of the Middle East modem 
reformists Sheikh Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida, 
670 and 
also to some of the local leaders who acted against British occupation in Malaya such as 
Tok Janggut in Kelantan, Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong in Terengganu, and others, which 
feasibly may be based more on the ideology of nationalism. 
671 Beside that, between the 
1940s and 1950s, the drive for Islamic reformation in Malaya had turned into a domestic 
political struggle when a religious group called `Hizbul Muslimin'672 , an Islamic-leftist 
group associated with anti-UMNO politics, 
673 created an Islamic Party, known as the 
670 For further explanation on how Modem Muslim reformists were claimed to influence a few 
groups of Malay scholars see for instance, M. A. Rauf, Ikhtisar Sejarah Islam dan Hubungannya 
yang Khusus Dengan Semenanjung Malaysia (Petaling Jaya : Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1987), 123, 
Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 197-198, M. A. Rauf, A Brief History of Islam, 
93-94. 
671 Mahayudin Haji Yahya, however, claimed that some of these local leaders applied religious 
calls to act against the British occupation. See Mahayudin Haji Yahyä, Islam di Alam Melayu, 
198, Ahmad Fadhil bin Shaari, "Sejarah dan Masa Depan Perjuangan Politik Islam di Malaysia", 
Kursus Kepimpinan Pelajar YIK Zon 3, Bachok, Kelantan, 24 May 2001,1 
(http: //wivw. geocities. com/afadhlis/artikellO. htni), and for more explanation on the struggle of 
Malay local leaders against British administration in Malaya see Haji Buyong Adil, Perjuangan 
Oran Mg Melayu Menentang Penjajahan Abad 15-19 (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 
1985). 
6'Z This organization was no longer active as most of its leaders were arrested by the British 
administration in Malaya, partly due to their left-wing orientation. Y. Mansoor Marican, "Malay 
Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaysia", Islamic Studies xvi (1) Spring 1977,297. 
6'1 United Malay National Organization (UMNO) is one of the dominant parties in Malaysia. 
Until the present, it has successfully combined with other parties to win an election as well as to 
form a government. 
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Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), to champion Islamic restoration in Malaya. 
674 Then, in 
the 1970s and onwards, most of the religious calls were primarily concentrated among 
specific da'wah movements like Tabligh, 675 Al-Argam, 
676 ABIM, 677 and a few 
governmental religious institutions like PERKIM (Islamic Welfare Association of 
Malaysia), YADIM (Islamic Da'wah Foundation of Malaysia) and IKIM (Institute 
Islamic Understanding of Malaysia). All these movements or institutions have their 678 
own religious agendas that notably differ from the Wahabi Doctrine. 
679 Their vigorous 
activities, except for Al-Arqam which was banned in 1995, by launching several Islamic 
674 Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Islam di Alam Melayu, 198, Louay M. Safi, "Religion and Politics in 
Malaysia", (http: //home. att. net/-Iotiaysafi/articies/2000/religion. htm), Ahmad Fauzi bin Abdul 
Hamid, "Islamic Resurgence in the Periphery :A Study of Political Islam in Contemporary 
Malaysia with Special Reference to the Darul Arqam Movement, 1968-1996", Unpublished Ph. D. 
Thesis (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, March 1998), 193, Y. Mansoor Marican, 
"Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaysia", 291. 
675 Tabligh is an Indian-inspired movement. It was founded in the 1920s, and carried by Indian 
mubalighs (preachers) to the Malay Peninsula in the early 1950s. Judith Nagata, "Religion 
Ideology and Social Change : The Islamic Revival in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs 53 (3) Autumn 
1980,421. 
676 Darul Arqam was established in Kuala Lumpur in 1968 by an Islamic religious teacher, 
Ashaari Muhammad. Ahmad Fauzi bin Abdul Hamid, "Islamic Resurgence in the Periphery", 
146. 
677 ABIM or Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia is an outgrowth of the National Muslim 
Students' Association of the late 1960s. It was founded in 1971, and its membership had reached 
35,000 members in 1979. Judith Nagata, "Religion Ideology and Social Change", 423. 
678 PERKIM, YADIM and IKIM are the governmental religious institutions, and each of these 
institutions plays a different role in promoting Islamic consciousness among the Malaysian 
population. For instance, PERKIM is more towards conversion of a non-Muslim to become a 
Muslim, YADIM is to spread da'wah among Muslim society in Malaysia, and IKIM is an Islamic 
government think-tank. Ahmad Fauzi bin Abdul Hamid, "Islamic Resurgence in the Periphery", 
107-108 & 130. 
679 Ahmad Fauzi bin Abdul Hamid, Fadzillah Mohd. Jamil, and Judith Nagata could be the best 
starting point to know more about the movement of these da'wah associations or institutions in 
Malaysia. Ahmad Fauzi bin Abdul Hamid, "Islamic Resurgence in the Periphery :A Study of 
Political Islam in Contemporary Malaysia with Special Reference to the Darul Arqam Movement, 
1968-1996", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, March 1998), 
Fadzillah Mohd. Jamil, "The Reawakening of Islamic Consciousness in Malaysia : 1970-1987", 
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Edinburgh : University of Edinburgh, June 1988), 127-186, Judith 
Nagata, "Religion Ideology and Social Change : The Islamic Revival in Malaysia", Pacific 
Affairs 53 (3) Autumn 1980,405-439. 
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programmes with different approaches within the Muslim community in Malaysia, have 
further marginalised the Wahabi movement and its co-followers in this country. 
This is in addition to the less rigid practice of the Wahabi Doctrine in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia following the dismantlement of the Ikhwan group in 1929, 
which was well-known for its zealous character towards non-Wahabi Muslim people. It 
does not necessarily mean, however, that the doctrine will no longer have significance to 
the religious ideology of the mostly Muslim population of the Kingdom, but this 
development (post-Ikhwan group) has given more scope for Saudi Arabia to receive some 
elements of modernity which were strongly prohibited before. In other words, the 
situation was much different after the post-Ikhwan because the Al-Saud family has more 
`say' than the Wahabi scholars or the religious influence has been re-subjugated into 
politics as the first alliance between Al-Sa'ud, and Sheikh Ibn Abdel Wahhab. Saudi 
scholars have only played a limited role, which largely aimed to support, or to `adapt', 
the Kingdom's religious policies concerning certain Muslim affairs. 680 At the same time 
also, instead of giving too much attention to this doctrine, more efforts have been directed 
towards developing the socio-economy of Saudi Arabia, particularly after the discovery 
of oil, which is indispensable for the survival of Al-Sa'ud family and to prolong its rule 
as well as to modernize the Kingdom. With the present approach that puts more emphasis 
on the development of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was quite different with the 
680 See Ahmad Abdo] Ghafour Attar, Muhamed Ibn Abdel Wahhab, 72, and Madawi Al-Rasheed, 
A History of Saudi Arabia, 68. 
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first and the second of the Wahabi-States, it probably might also further trim down any 
efforts of spreading the Wahabi Doctrine into other Muslim areas, including Malaysia. 
68' 
Owing to the murky situation of the Wahabi Doctrine, or the Al-Sunnah 
movements that closely resemble it, it is less accepted by the Muslim community in 
Malaysia, partly due to the distinctions in some religious beliefs (Tawheed) and practices, 
not fundamental, but only in minor side or furui'yyah. This, and the government's firm 
approach towards Wahabism from spreading among Malaysian Muslim communities, 
indirectly means that the religious co-operation between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia is 
quite limited, and mostly related to the affairs of pilgrimage, and education. Beside that, 
since Malaysia and the Kingdom have been practicing according to different Islamic legal 
schools, the exchange of fatwas among religious scholars of both countries is mainly in 
the coordination of pilgrimage activities, and not in the other issues in Islamic 
jurisprudence. 682 Nevertheless, various efforts have been made by the leaders of these 
two countries, especially by the Malaysian leaders, to enhance their relations in other 
fields, such as economic, as well as in the Muslim organizations, including the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) where Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are 
vigorously active in promoting Muslim issues at the international level. 
681 Some scholars considered the Wahabi movement as only an internal matter, even Al-Sa'ud 
after conquering most of the Arabian Peninsula territories ordered his army, the Ikhwan, to stop 
raiding his neighbours including Kuwait, Transjordan and Iraq. Yet the Kingdom may cease 
using physical force to spread the doctrine, instead the distribution of written documents to other 
Muslim countries could be considered as a continuous effort to disseminate the doctrine. 
682 However, according to Ustaz Mohd. Arifin Ali, at the moment, Malaysia also refers to other 
three Islamic legal schools; Hanafite, Malikite, and Hanbalite schools, beside the Shafiite school, 
in regards to a few new issues in the Muslim world nowadays. Discussion, via telephone, with 
with Ustaz Mohd. Arifin Ali, a religious official in the State Religious Council of Sabah, 
Malaysia, 22 February 2005,4.00-4.30am (equivalent to 12.00-12.30pm in Malaysia). 
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6.4 Saudi Arabia's Contribution to Religious Development in Malaysia 
Since the Wahabi Doctrine is less welcomed by the Malaysian government as well as by 
most of its Muslim population, it does not particularly mean that the Malaysian political 
regime does not emphasize the importance of its religious interactions with the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. In fact, as has been mentioned before, the Malaysian government has 
made several initiatives to strengthen the relations, especially to gain some capital 
donations from Saudi Arabia to build religious buildings like the mosques, schools, 
da'wah organizations and to send a number of Malaysian students to continue their 
studies in the Kingdom. These religious needs are essential for the Malaysian government 
to be more responsible with for they are closely linked with the political interests of the 
Malaysian political regime, especially UMNO, to ensure the continuity of its dominance 
over others (particularly over Islamic oppositions). For the Saudi government, any 
request by a Muslim country, including Malaysia, for help financing religious 
development plans would be regarded as in line with `Al-Saud family's interest'; to 
further consolidate the Al-Saud's political independence as well as to preserve its image 
at the Muslim world. In the case of the Saudi religious financial assistance to Malaysia, 
most of them were mainly distributed to some specific da'wah organizations and 
educational institutions such as the Islamic Welfare Association of Malaysia (PERKIM), 
the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), Islamic Da'wah Foundation 
(YADIM), and other da'wah organizations and religious schools. In order to analytically 
discuss Saudi's contribution (financial assistance) towards religious development in 
Malaysia, the study will focus on some religious institutions which are believed to have 
closer connections with the Kingdom. 
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6.4.1 Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia (PERKIM) 
The Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia or PERKIM is a non-governmental (or 
voluntary) organization which specifically focuses on spreading Islamic da'wah among 
Muslims as well as non-Muslim communities in Malaysia and other countries. 683 It was 
founded in 1960 in Kuala Lumpur by the former first Prime Minister of Malaysia, YTM 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Hajj, with his close friends, namely Tan Sri SOK 
Ubaidullah, Tan Sri Haji Yusof Ibrahim, Tuan Haji Ibrahim TY Ma, Tan Sri Mubin 
Sheppard, and others. 684 The activities run by PERKIM cover three main areas; welfare, 
missionary and education, including performing religious da'%vah messages, providing 
some religious education particularly to those new Muslim converts, co-operating with 
other religious organizations, and other activities that are closely related to the pursuit of 
Islam. 85 In regards to conversion, former vice-President of PERKIM, Tan Sri Haji 
Yusoff bin Haji Ibrahim, disclosed to Prince Mohamed Al-Feisal Al-Sa'ud of Saudi 
Arabia during his visit to PERKIM, Malaysia, that there were about 30,000 people who 
had been converted to Islam since its inception in 1960 to the 1980s. 686 Then, based on 
the annual report of PERKIM, the average figure of conversion at the end of the 1990s 
and early 2000s is about 1000-1200 people. 687 Most of the converted people are Chinese, 
Indians, Malay aborigines, other local communities, and also those from the Philippines, 
683 PERKIM Leaflet, (Kuala Lumpur : PERKIM, 2003), 1. 
684 PERKIM Leaflet, 1, The Brochure of Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia, PERKIM 
(Kuala Lumpur : Affluent Master Sdn. Bhd., 2003), 3. 
685 PERKIM Leaflet, 1-8, The Brochure of Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia, PERKIM, 3. 
686 Shahrin Shuib, "Perkim's 30,000 Converts", New Straits Times, December 10,1980. 
687 PERKIM, Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PERKIM Kebangsaan Kc-41. (Kuala Lumpur 
PERKIM, 2002), 51. 
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Kemboja and Indonesia. 688 PERKIM also provides care and assistance to Muslim 
refugees from other countries, mainly from Indochina and Bosnia-Herzogovina. 689 It was 
reported that during the Balkan crisis, PERKIM received 119 Bosnian refugees in 1993, 
and it increased to about 138 people in 2000.690 Beside that, -PERKIM also co-operates 
with the United Nations Commission of Human Rights (UNCHR) to give shelter and 
food to those refugees from other parts of the world, irrespective of nationality or 
religion. 691 The cost of managing these refugees, however, is mostly the responsibility of 
the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development of Malaysia. 692 
Owing to the nature of PERKIM, which gives attention to spreading Islamic 
da'wah, it does not possess fixed income, and has to depend on donations from 
government agencies as well as from other corporate and private sectors; it also needs to 
generate more financial assistance from other Muslim countries. 693 Thus, various 
attempts have been made to promote PERKIM among the Muslim counterparts, 
especially to those oil-rich countries from the Middle East. Those efforts eventually 
became fruitful when PERKIM began to receive some donations from the Middle East 
countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. PERKIM started to receive capital 
donations from the Kingdom on May 15,1975 which amounted to $19,751 thousand 
688 PERKIM Leaflet, 5, PERKIM, Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PERKIM Kebangsaan Ke41,68- 
71. 
689 The unit of taking care those Muslim refugees was established in 1975. The Brochure of 
Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia (PERKIM), 7. 
690 Meswarat Agung Tahunan PERKIM Kebangsaan Ke-41,80-82. 
69' The Brochure of Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia (PERKIM), 7. 
692 Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PERKIM Kebangsaan Ke-41,81. 
693 PERKIM Leaflet, 4. 
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dollars. 694 The donations continued in June 2,1975 ($105,000), 695 May 28,1976 
($125,000), 696, March 26,1980 ($500,000), 697 and in December 6,1981 ($1.7 million). 698 
Basically, the range of donations largely relied upon the personal request from Tunku 
Abdul Rahman as the President of PERKIM to Saudi Arabia. Since Tunku had become 
the first Secretary of the OIC, at the suggestion from King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, and 
also had a close relationship with the Saudi ambassador in Malaysia, Tuan Sheikh 
Mohamed Al-Hamad Al-Shubaili, he took the golden opportunity to lure more donations 
from the Kingdom to PERKIM. 699 It is admitted by the officials of PERKIM, however, 
that since Tunku resigned as the President of PERKIM in 1989, donations from Saudi 
Arabia are gradually decreasing. The most recent donation from the Kingdom was about 
RM100,000 ringgit (or equivalent to $38,000) in 2002.700 Besides Saudi Arabia, 
PERKIM also received some donations from other Arab-Muslim countries, mainly Libya, 
Kuwait, and Iraq. For instance, on June 22,1974, Libya donated $16.5 million for the 
building of PERKIM , 
701 and then followed with other donations of $3.8 million in 
1978,702 $4 million in 1979,703 and $12 million in 198 1.704 Meanwhile Kuwait gave away 
694 "Saudi's $19,751 Gift to PERKIM", New Straits Times, May 15,1975. 
695 "PERKIM Terima Sumbangan Saudi $105,000", Utusan Melayu, June 2,1975. 
696 "$125,000 Saudi Donation for PERKIM", New Straits Times, May 28,1976. 
697 New Straits Times, March 26,1980. 
698 "Saudis Donate $1.7m to PERKIM", The Star, December 6,1981. 
699 Discussion with Mr. Ishak Osman, an official of Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia 
(PERKIM), Kuala Lumpur, 11.00-12.00pm, May 5,2003. 
700 According to Mr. Ishak, it was not only due to the resignation of Tunku from PERKIM that led 
to the decline, but also since King Fahd resumed the crown from King Feisal, who died in 1975. 
Interview with Mr. Ishak Osman, an official of Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia 
(PERKIM), Kuala Lumpur, 11.00-12.00pm, May 5,2003, Rekod Pandang, dan Dengar, G. 13750 
(No. Penerimaan : 2001/0043096), National Archive of Malaysia. 
701 "Libya Derma $16.5 juta Untuk Bangunan PERKIM", Utusan Melayu, June 22,1974. 
702 "PERKIM Gets $3.8 million from Libya", Malay Mail, April 26,1978. 
703 "Libya Sampaikan Cek $4 juta Untuk Kompleks PERKIM", Utusan Malaysia, January 31, 
1979. 
7P' "Libya Donates $12m to PERKIM", The Star, December 21,1981. 
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$1 million in 1980,705 and Iraq donated $100,000 in 1977,706 and $34,500 in 1981 to 
PERKIM. 707 
It was noticeable that during the period of the mid-1970s and early 1980s, 
Malaysia received a vast amount of loans and donations from the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. This was primarily because of a series of visits by the second and third Prime 
Ministers of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn, to the Middle East, 
specifically to Saudi Arabia, in order to acquire more funds to develop Malaysia's 
infrastructural programmes. 708 Added to this was the economic situation in the Middle 
East in which most of the oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries 
were undergoing an economic surplus after the global oil crisis of 1973 that led the price 
of oil to increase abruptly. Furthermore, from the mid-1980s and onwards, under the 
leadership of Dr. Mahathir Muhammad, the Malaysian government had given more focus 
to its Islamization programmes to counteract Islamic pressure at the domestic level. At 
this particular moment, Malaysia also needed enormous amounts of capital inflow to 
further expand its development programmes as well as governmental religious 
orientation. Nevertheless, unlike his predecessors, Dr. Mahathir does not merely depend 
on loans or donations from Muslim counterparts, including Saudi Arabia, but also 
encourages more capital inflows from bilateral trade and investment as these two sectors 
are able to produce more funds than loans and donations to Malaysian economic 
development. Meanwhile, for religious programmes, Dr. Mahathir is more in favour of 
705 "Kuwait Sumbang $1 juta Untuk PERKIM", Utusan Malaysia, November 11,1980. 
706 "Iraqi Envoy's $100,000 `Gift' to PERKIM", The Star, December 9,1977. 
707 "Iraq Donates $34,500 to PERKIM", The Star, June 14,1981. 
708 See for instance, sub-topics "Tun Razak's Political-Economic Relations with Saudi Arabia", 
and "Towards Much Improved Bilateral Relations under Tun Hussein Onn" in the Chapter IV. 
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his own Islamization plans such as the establishment of the Islamic Bank, the 
International Islamic University, the Institute of Islamic Understanding of Malaysia, 
Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, and others, which are more conducive to the demands 
of the Muslim community in Malaysia, and this indirectly too makes PERKIM less 
popular than before during the era of Tunku Abdul Rahman. 
6.4.2 The International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) 
The International Islamic University of Malaysia (IUM) was established in 1983 by the 
Malaysian government with support from the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
and a number of individual Muslim countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 709 
Historically, the urge for the establishment of the IUM in Malaysia mainly came from 
the constant pressure from the Islamic demands at the domestic level, which was 
frequently voiced by some well-known academicians, professionals, religious 
organizations as well as from opposition parties. The names of people like the late Dr. 
Ungku Umar, Tan Sri Mohamad Khir Johari, former Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri 
Anwar Ibrahim and others, were synonymous with the founding fathers of the IUM. 710 
Nevertheless, the IIUM only came into reality when Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, who 
became the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, announced the establishment of the 
71 university in 1982.1 
709 Other co-sponsor countries are Maldives, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Libya, and the OIC. 
"Malaysia Education System Higher Education", 
(ht! p: Haolsearch. co. uk/web? query=foreign%, 20in'; 4,20international0iO20islamic`; 4,20university"/20 
otD/o20malavsia&location=wholeweh&isinit=tnie), The International Islamic University of 
Malaysia (UIAM), Postgraduate Prospectus 2002-2003 (Kuala Lumpur : IIUM Press, 2003), 8. 
70 Abu Hassan Adam, "Universiti Islam Antarabangsa", Berita Mingg!, June 20,1982,76-77. 
71 ' Abu Hassan Adam, "Universiti Islam Antarabangsa", 76. 
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It was argued that the concept of learning in the HUM has some similarities with 
certain universities in Saudi Arabia, namely King Saud University, and Mohamed Ibn 
Sa'ud University, both located in Riyadh, where both religious and non-religious 
disciplines like science and technology are taught. The main difference, however, is that 
the IIUM emphasizes the Islamization and the integration of both disciplines (for 
example, an attempt to analyze human sciences' issues or subjects within the Islamic 
perspective). ' 12 Being one of the co-founders of the IIUM, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
to some extent, plays some significant roles in enhancing the development of the 
infrastructure of the university, especially in terms of financial assistance. Even before 
the setting up of the university the Kingdom, through the formal visit by King Feisal to 
Malaysia in 1970, had donated RM258,227 thousand ringgit to officially launch a hall at 
the Islamic College University in June 8,1970, which was later called `Al-Malik Feisal 
Hall'. 713 According to Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub, financial donations from the Kingdom are 
not on an annual basis, but more upon the requests and the needs of the university. The 
latest donation was in 2000, which amounted $2 million, given by Sultan Ibn Abd. Aziz, 
Minister of Defence, during his visit to the HUM. An honorary doctorate in Political 
Science was also conferred on the Prince Sultan. 714 Although the Kingdom does not 
distribute its financial donation to the HUM annually, this university receives about 
"Z Interview with Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director of International Relations and 
Promotion Unit of the HUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9,2003. See also The 
International Islamic University of Malaysia, Undergraduate Prospectus 2001-2002 (Kuala 
Lumpur : IIUM Press, 2002), 8-9 & 64-118, The International Islamic University of Malaysia 
(UTAM), Postgraduate Prospectus 2002-2003,112-200. 
713 Islamic College University was located in Petaling Jaya, Selangor. It was the first location of 
the HUM before being transferred to the new location in Gombak, Selangor. Rekod Pandang dan 
Dengar, G. 9718 (No. Penerimaan : 2001/0038821), National Archive of Malaysia. 
"4 Interview with Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director of International Relations and 
Promotion Unit of the HUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9,2003. 
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$300,000 per year from the Organisation of Islamic Conference through its fund, The 
Islamic Solidarity Fund. 715 The IIUM also obtains some capital donations from the 
Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for developing its infrastructures, 
such as to further improve the building of the Kulliyyah716 of Engineering, Kulliyyah of 
Education and Kulliyyah of Law. 717 As is commonly acknowledged, Saudi Arabia is one 
of the main sponsors of these two financial institutions. 718 
In the administration of the HUM, there was a Saudi citizen, Dr. Abdel Hameed 
Abu Sulaymen, who became the Rector of the university, 719 from 1988 to 1999. Under 
his charge, the total number of HUM students increased from 800 to 13,000. Most of the 
students are from Malaysia, while other foreign students are from neighbouring Southeast 
Asian countries, Bosnia-Hezergovina, Albania, the Maldives, and some from Middle East 
and African countries. 720 The number of Saudi students that continued their studies 
(mostly undergraduate) at the IIUM is as indicated in the Table 1. 
"S Interview with Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director of International Relations and 
Promotion Unit of the HUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9,2003. 
76 Kulliyyah is an Arabic word. It simply means a faculty or a school in a university. 
717 The amount of those donations was not revealed by Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub. Interview with 
Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director of International Relations and Promotion Unit of the 
HUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9,2003. 
7"' According to Mr. Sazali Mustafa, Saudi Arabia alone contributes 22 per cent of the OIC 
finance. Interview with Mr. Sazali Mustafa Kamal, Assistant Secretary, Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), Ministry of Foreign Relations at Wisma Putra, Malaysia, 10.00- 1 1.00am, 
April 8,2003, and see also pages 162-164 for Saudi's contribution to other international financial 
institutions in the Chapter V. 
7111 In the administration of the RUM, Rector was the third highest rank after the Constitutional 
Head which is currently held by HRH Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al-Musta'in Billah (the Ruler of 
Pahang, one of the Malaysian states), and the President of the IIUM, YBhg. Tan Sri Dato' Seri 
Sanusi Junid. The International Islamic University of Malaysia, Undergraduate Prospectus 2001- 
2002,1-2. 
720 Current total number of students studying at the IIUM is about 15,000 students. Admission and 
Records & Records Division, International Islamic University of Malaysia, "Welcome", 
(http: //www. iiu. e(lu. my/alumni/), and interview with Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director 
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Table 1. Statistics of Saudi Arabian Students (1990-2002) 
Year No. Students 
1990 2 
1991 2 
1992 1 
1993 3 
1994 3 
1995 1 
1996 2 
1997 2 
1998 3 
1999 - 
2000 2 
2001 5 
2002 8 
Source : Admissions & Records Division, International Islamic University of Malaysia, 2003. 
Among the programmes or the courses they are enrolling in are Human Sciences721 (4 
students), Law (1 student), Engineering (4 students), Economics (1 student), English 
Language course (2 students), and Islamic Revealed Knowledge 722 (1 student) . 
723 
of International Relations and Promotion Unit of the HUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9, 
2003. 
721 Human Sciences programmes are like Psychology, Sociology, Political Sciences, History and 
Civilization, Communication, and English Literature. The International Islamic University of 
Malaysia, Undergraduate Prospectus 2001-2002,96. 
722 Islamic Revealed Knowledge has three main programmes, Islamic Jurisprudence, Qur'an and 
Sunnah, and Usuluddin (Tawheed) & Comparative Religion. The International Islamic University 
of Malaysia, Undergraduate Prospectus 2001-2002,97. 
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Nonetheless, in terms of academic staff development between the HUM and a some of 
the universities in Saudi Arabia, it is less encouraging as there was only one lecturer from 
the Kingdom that taught in the university, 724 and there has yet to be any formal exchange 
of staff or student between both sides. Most of the visits of academic staff from Saudi 
Arabia to the IIUM are only on an informal basis, for instance within sabbatical leave or 
for doing fieldwork research in Malaysia particularly in the fields of sociology and 
725 Islamic studies. 
To some extent, the IIUM has offered a platform for Malaysia to further 
strengthen its relations with the Kingdom, especially in the field of religious-educational 
interactions. However, until the end of 1990s and onwards, the relations are more on the 
basis of financial assistance from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to improve the 
infrastructure of the university in order to attract more students from other Muslim 
countries. For the Saudi students' admission726 as well as the recruitment of academic 
staff into this university the enrolment is still low. It might be largely because of the 
nature of the IIUM which was only built in 1983, and still requires further refinement of 
the overall structure of its education systems, particularly its religious educational 
723 This data was provided by Zenita Arryani Tiyunin, Assistant Director, Admission & Records 
Division, International Islamic University of Malaysia, May 9,2003. 
724 The lecturer has now left the HUM. Interview with Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director 
of International Relations and Promotion Unit of the HUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9, 
2003. 
725 Interview with Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director of International Relations and 
Promotion Unit of the HUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9,2003. 
726 The overall enrolment of the Saudi students to the universities in Malaysia (including the 
HUM) is only about 50 students. Ahmad Abdul Hamid, "Malaysia-Saudi Setuju Tingkat 
Kerjasama Pendidikan", Utusan Malaysia, September 29,2001 
(http: //utusan. coni. my/utusan/archive. asp'? y=2001 &dt=0929&pub=utusan malaysia&sec=dalam 
negeri&pg=dn 04. htm). 
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programmes, compared to most of the established universities in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 727 Beside that, it is a common tendency for the developing countries, including 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, to send more students to learn technological subjects to the 
universities of developed countries. 728 Nonetheless, as Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub has 
argued, he foresees that INM's relations (as one of the Malaysian government's 
representatives) with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will flourish more in the future, for 
the Saudi ambassador in Malaysia has become a permanent member of the governing 
board of the INM. 729 
6.4.3 The Hajj Fund (Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji) 
The Hajj Fund officially called `The Pilgrimage Management and Saving Corporations', 
is mainly established to manage capital saving and investment as well as to provide Hajj 
services for the Muslim community in Malaysia, particularly for those Muslims who 
would be performing pilgrimage in the holy places of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 730 
727 Most of the universities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were established in the 1950s and 
1960s. For example, King Saud University in 1957 (http: //www. ksu. cdu. sa/ahoutksu/oucn. php), 
King Abdul Aziz University in 1967 (llttp: //www. kaau. edu. sa/facts2000/en/page003. htm), King 
Fahd University in 1963 (http: //www. kfupm. edu. sa/), and others. 
728 For example, according to Grant F. Smith, the Director of the Institute for Research : Middle 
Eastern Policy (IRMEP) in Washington DC, during the 1970s and 1980s (petroleum booms), 
there were about 30,000 Saudi students studying in the United States. However, the current 
estimates of the Saudi students are about 3,500 students. Grant F. Smith, "Getting Back on Track 
: Saudi Study in the United States", Saudi-American Forum, July 16,2003 (http: //w%,. -%v.,;, iudi- 
amei-ican-forum. org/Newsletters/SAE Essay 17. htm). 
729 Interview with Prof. Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Director of International Relations and 
Promotion Unit of the IIUM, Kuala Lumpur, 9.00-10.00am, May 9,2003. 
730 Awang Had Saleh, "Modern Concept of Haj Management : The Experience of Malaysia" in 
Ziauddin Sardar & M. A. Zaki Badawi (ed. ) Haij Studies vol. 1 (London : Croom Helm London 
for the Hajj Research Centre, King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, 1978), 76, Mary Byrne Mc 
Donnell, "Patterns of Muslim Pilgrimage from Malaysia, 1885-1985" in Dale F. Eickelman & 
James Piscatori (ed. ) Muslim Travellers : Pilgrimage, Migration. and the Religious Imagination 
(London : Routledge, 1990), 114, Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Se'arah 
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Before the establishment of the Hajj Fund, the management of pilgrimage was handled by 
the `Sheikh of Hajj' (Sheikh Haji), which was responsible for dealing with any 
pilgrimage affairs. The appointment of a Sheikh of Hajj not only took place in Saudi 
Arabia but also in other Muslim countries, except from 1976 and onwards where the 
Saudi government changed the system by only recognizing those Sheikhs of Hajj that 
were appointed by the Kingdom. 731 
The need for the establishment of the Hajj Fund was proposed by the Royal 
Professor, Ungku Aziz in 1959 who came up with a proposal to improve the way of 
saving among Muslim community in Malaysia, specifically for those Muslims that would 
like to do pilgrimage in the Kingdom. 732 After several meetings between government 
officials, the fund was eventually established in 1963, and approved by the House of 
Parliament in 1969.733 The main essence of the Hajj Fund resources is derived from its 
depositors and increased from the amount of RM46,600 in 1963 to RMIO. 23 billion in 
2003.734 The rapid increase of the capital accumulation in the fund is not merely due to its 
depositors, but it is also further supported by the contributions of the Malaysian 
Perkembangan Tabung Haji Malaysia 30 Tahun (Kuala Lumpur : Utusan Printcorp Sdn. Bhd., 
1993), 113. 
731 Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung Haji Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 40-50. 
732 Awang Had Saleh, "Modem Concept of Haj Management : The Experience of Malaysia", 76. 
73 The approval by the House of Parliament was only to change the old name of the fund called 
`Perbadanan Wang Simpanan Bakal-Bakal Haji' to `The Pilgrimage Management and Saving 
Corporations'. Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung Haji 
Malaysia 30 Tahun, 97-100. 
734 Helmi Mohd. Foad & Azman Che Man, "Kita Cemerlang Dalam Pengurusan Haji', Tam 
Haji, 5 Januari 2003,7. 
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government, 735 some investments736 and a few agricultural projects737 that have been 
undertaken by the fund. 738 
The two previous religious institutions, PERKIM and the HUM, frequently 
receive capital donations from the Kingdom to run their own activities, but the Hajj Fund 
is in different situation. The Fund, in fact, has not formally received any capital donations 
from the Saudi government, 739 except some `gifts' by the Kingdom. For example an 
amount of RM500,000 was donated in 1982 to build a Mosque for Malaysian pilgrims in 
Kelana Jaya, Selangor, and another RM50,000 was received from the Islamic 
Development Bank (1DB) in Jeddah in 1991 for the Fund programmes; it also has the 
opportunity to invest in the IDB in the form of short-term investments. 740 The character 
of the interactions between the Hajj Fund and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, however, is 
more concerned with the management of the Hajj activity itself. Through the setting up of 
75 For example, from 1984 to 1990, the average of the government contribution to the Hajj Fund 
was about RM8,000,000 per year. Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah 
Perkembangan Tabung Haji Malaysia 30 Tahun, 215-216. 
736 The Hajj fund mainly invests in the local investment sectors like Bil Penerimaan Islam, 
pelaburan SWAP and others, and also in a few international banks in the Middle East. Lembaga 
Urusan dan Tabung IIaji (LUTH), Seiarah Perkembangan Tabung Haji Malaysia 30 Tahun, 319- 
322. 
737 Most of the agricultural projects are the plantation of palm oil in a few states in Malaysia 
including Pahang, Johor, Terengganu, Negeri Sembilan and Sabah (total size of the plants are 
about 57,000 acres), and also in some private development projects such as Labuan Water Supply 
Sdn. Bhd., Labuan Beaufort Interconnection Sdn. Bhd., and Teratai KG Sdn. Bhd. Lembaga 
Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Seiarah Perkembangan Tabung Haji Malaysia 30 Tahun, 322 
& 325. 
738 For further elaboration on how the fund derives its capital resources see Lembaga Urusan dan 
Tabung Haji (LUTH), Seiarah Perkembangan Tabung Haii Malaysia 30 Tahun, 213-214. 
'39 Interview with Haji Mohd. Rafidi bin Haji Ibrahim, Corporate Communications Manager, The 
Pilgrimage Management and Saving Corporations, The Hajj Fund Building, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 3.00-4.00pm, April 24,2003. 
740 Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Seiarah Perkembangan Tabung 1laji Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 266 & 270-271, Joni Tamkin B. Borhan, "Tabung Haji As An Islamic Financial 
Institution : An Analysis of Its Contribution in the Economic Development in Malaysia, 1969- 
1990", Islamic Culture Lxxv (4) October 2001,65. 
249 
the fund, the administration of the Hajj is more systematic as the number of Malaysian 
pilgrims is increasing year by year. For instance, prior to the establishment of the fund, 
the average number of Malaysian pilgrims was not more than 20,000 people, 741 but from 
1963 to 1985, it rose dramatically from only 4,886 people to 24,415 people 
respectively. 742 Apart from that, the improvement of pilgrimage transportation from only 
using large ships to aeroplanes had indirectly led to an increase in the number of pilgrims 
to the Kingdom. 743 The Hajj Fund made several agreements with the Saudi airline 
(SAUDIA) to carry the pilgrims to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and usually about 50 
per cent of the airline tender would be given to the Kingdom alone, and the rest to other 
airlines like Malaysia Airline System (MAS), AirAsia, Singapore Airlines and others 
operating in Malaysia. 744 
741 Nevertheless, the usual number of Malaysian pilgrims was only about 5,000 to 6,000 people 
(from 1900s to 1960s), except in a few years like 1911 (11,707 people), 1913 (11,243 people), 
1920 (14,397 people), 1924 (13,024 people) and 1927 (18,407 people). In addition, from 1900 to 
1948, those pilgrims were also from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Sabah, Sarawak, and 
others who used a few ports in Malay Peninsula and Singapore, which was more convenient 
under the British administration, especially compared to the Dutch policies in Indonesia, as the 
point for departure and arrival of pilgrimage. For further elaboration see Dato' Haji Mohd. Saleh 
bin Haji Awang, Haji Di Semenanjung Malaysia, 420-423, and also Chapter Three, page 61. 
742 However, from 1900-1948, the total number of pilgrims from Malaya (Malaysia) also included 
those from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Sabah, Sarawak, and others. Beside that, the total 
number of Malaysian pilgrims to the present is consistently within 23,000 - 25,000 pilgrims 
every year (and sometimes above the quota given by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). Dato' Haji 
Mohd. Saleh bin Haji Awang, Haii Di Semenanjung Malaysia, 422-423, and interview with Haji 
Mohd. Rafidi bin Haji Ibrahim, Corporate Communications Manager, The Pilgrimage 
Management and Saving Corporations, The Hajj Fund Building, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 3.00- 
4.00pm, April 24,2003, 
743 The use of vessels to carry the pilgrims ceased in 1977. Dato' Haji Mohd. Saleh bin Haji 
Awang, Haji Di Semenanjung Malaysia, 423. 
744 Interview with Haji Mohd. Rafidi bin Haji Ibrahim, Corporate Communications Manager, The 
Pilgrimage Management and Saving Corporations, The Hajj Fund Building, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 3.00-4.00pm, April 24,2003, Awang Had Saleh, "Modem Concept of llaj 
Management : The Experience of Malaysia", 79-80. 
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The Hajj Fund also is highly regarded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an 
example of good management in the pilgrimage industry in the Muslim world. The fund 
is regularly visited by the Ministry of Hajj, and other officials of the Kingdom. This 
started from its inception with a visit by Sheikh Hassan Kutbi on the 19`h of February, 
1974, which was warmly welcomed by the late second Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun 
Abdul Razak Hussein, 745 and is continuous until the present time with Sheikh Khaled 
Mohamed Al-Zainal, Saudi Chamber of Commerce who visited the Hajj Fund on June 6, 
2001, followed by Sheikh Mohamad Mahmud, an official Co-ordinator for Pilgrimage in 
Jeddah, on July 11,2002, and others. 746 In 1978, via the Kingdom's radio and television 
station, the Saudi Ministry of Hajj, Sheikh Abdul Wahab Abdul Wasie considered the 
Malaysian Hajj Fund to be one of the good examples that other Muslim countries could 
learn from. 747 Furthermore, the Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage had invited Malaysia to 
become the host of the first seminar outside the Kingdom on the `Preparation of 
Pilgrimage and Guidance', which was jointly organized by the co-operation between the 
Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage and the Malaysian Hajj Fund, in September 2000.748 
The high regard of the Kingdom for the Hajj Fund is probably due to the role of 
the fund which does not merely limit its services to Malaysian pilgrims but also assists 
other Muslim pilgrims, particularly in the Asia Pacific region. The fund has successfully 
"' Rekod Pandang dan Dengar, G. 13382 (No. Penerimaan : 2001/0042721), National Archive of 
Malaysia. 
'46 The Hajj Fund Gallery, The Book of Visitors' Signature, (Kuala Lumpur : The Hajj Fund 
Building, 2003). 
747 Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkemban-gan Tabung Haji Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 263. 
74s Helmi Mohd. Foad, "Tabung Haji : Cemerlang di Arena Antarabangsa", Tabung Haji, January 
5,2003,17. 
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provided more opportunities for other Muslim pilgrims to do pilgrimage in the Kingdom 
by offering its management services, with the permission of the Saudi Embassy in 
Malaysia. For example, in 1969, about 244 Brunei pilgrims and 333 Singaporean 
pilgrims used the Hajj Fund services. 749 Then, in 1982, the fund, with the co-operation 
with the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP), 
visited Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and New Caledonia to offer its services for the 
Muslim communities in these areas to do pilgrimage. As an outcome of the visit, in the 
same year too, these four countries chose the Malaysian Hajj Fund to bring them to the 
holy cities, Mecca and Medina, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As an exemplar, there 
were 34 pilgrims from Australia, followed by Fiji (21 pilgrims), New Zealand (3 
pilgrims), and New Caledonia (3 pilgrims). The rest were Brunei (2 pilgrims), Myanmar 
(1 pilgrim), Philippines (3 pilgrims), Hong Kong (3 pilgrims), India (5 pilgrims), 
Indonesia (13 pilgrims), Pakistan (1 pilgrim), and Singapore (56 pilgrims). 750 
The Saudi pilgrimage officials also find the Hajj Fund a much more convenient 
way of educating the Malaysian pilgrims, which in their eyes are more disciplined and 
organized compared to other Muslim pilgrims. 751 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also 
continually appreciates how the Malaysian government, through the Hajj Fund, reacts 
towards certain crises that happen during the pilgrimage seasons, such as the illegal 
749 Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung Haji Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 263. 
75o Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung llaii Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 263-264. 
75' Interview with Haji Mohd. Rafidi bin Haji Ibrahim, Corporate Communications Manager, The 
Pilgrimage Management and Saving Corporations, The Hajj Fund Building, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 3.00-4.00pm, April 24,2003. 
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incursion of Al-Haram Mosque (Masjidil Haram) in 1979,752 the Iranian demonstration in 
1987 '753 and the tragedy of Muaissim Tunnel 
in 1990.754 The Saudi government feels that 
instead of criticisms that are normally directed toward the Kingdom by other Muslim 
countries, the Malaysian government, through the role of the Hajj Fund, responds more 
positively in handling such crises. The fund co-operated well with the Saudi government 
in facing those crises to safeguard the welfare of the Malaysian pilgrims as well as those 
pilgrims who were using its services. Even to some extent, before a crisis occurred, the 
Saudi government had already informed some of the officials of the Malaysian Hajj 
Fund, such as in the case of the Iranian demonstration where the Kingdom had told them 
the day before the demonstration took place. This was because the Saudi government had 
agreed to allow those Iranian pilgrims to stage a demonstration provided it would be done 
in a peaceful manner, although in the end it turned into violence. 755 To certain extent, this 
study also believes that the mutual relations between the Malaysian Hajj Fund and the 
752 An armed group (about 100-200 people) led by Mohammad bin Abdullah Al-Qahtani al- 
Quraisyi who claimed himself as `Imam Al-Mahdi', invaded the Al-Haram Mosque. However, 
the incursion was overwhelmingly defeated by the army of the Saudi government. Lembaga 
Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung Hail Malaysia 30 Tahun, 240- 
247. 
753 The demonstration was mainly to gain support of other Muslim fellows in the Iranian intention 
to become the leader of the Muslim world since the fall of the Shah Pahlavi regime in 1979. The 
Iran government also urged all Muslim pilgrims to support its policy against US influence over 
the world, especially in its war against Iraq (where the US was in favour to Iraq than Iran). The 
demonstration had resulted in a massive death of the Muslim pilgrims, about 402 people. 
Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung Ilan Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 247-249. 
7" The Muaissim Tunnel was a shortcut to Mina for Turks, Indonesian and Malaysian pilgrims. 
On the early morning of July 2,1990, the tunnel was suddenly packed by the pilgrims, both those 
who had just returned from Mina and those who would be heading towards it. Due to the 
enormous jam-packed crowd, about 1,426 pilgrims died, of whom 153 were Malaysians. 
Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung, Ilaii Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 249. 
755 At the beginning, the Saudi government refused to allow the demonstration, but due to a few 
meetings with the Iranian government, they eventually agreed to allow it in a peaceful manner. 
Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Seiarah Perkembangan Tabung Uaji Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 247-248. 
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Saudi government can be considered in the form of give and take basis. The Malaysian 
government, through the Hajj Fund, must maintain its good relations with the Kingdom 
in whatever circumstances because pilgrimage activity is one of the persistent religious 
demands that will continuously be pursued by the Muslim community in Malaysia. 
756 On 
top of that, by cementing the relations, the number of the Malaysian pilgrims will 
increase in the future, which is more important for the Malaysian government in facing 
religious pressure (pilgrimage demands) at home. 
757 For the Saudis, apart from seeking 
economic gains from the pilgrimage industry (mainly the number of Malaysian pilgrims, 
and airline tenders), its good relations with Malaysia, as well as with the Hajj Fund, will 
further strengthen its position among its Southeast Asian Muslim counterparts. 
6.4.4 Other Saudi Religious Sponsorship Activities 
Other Saudi religious contributions, which have indirectly further enhanced the position 
of the Malaysian political regime at home, are the donation of 100 hundred copies of Al- 
Qur'an, the book of Islamic Pillars, and the Friday speech (Khutbah Juma'at) to the 
756 Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), Sejarah Perkembangan Tabung Haii Malaysia 30 
Tahun, 257. 
757 The discussion on the quota of the Malaysian pilgrims is held regularly between Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia. At the moment, the average quota of Malaysian pilgrims is about 25,000 pilgrims 
per year, and sometimes it more than the proposed quota. Moreover, there are about 200,000 
would-be pilgrims on the waiting list. Discussion with Haji Mohd. Rafidi bin Haji Ibrahim, 
Corporate Communications Manager, The Pilgrimage Management and Saving Corporations, 
The Hajj Fund Building, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 3.00-4.00pm, April 24,2003, "Umrah: Lebih 
400 Umat Islam Tunggu Kelulusan Saudi", Utusan Malaysia, 1/4/2003, 
(1: //utusan. com my/utusan/archive asp? y=2003&dt=0401 &puh=utusan malaysia&scc=muka 
%5Fhadapan&pg mh 08. htm&arc=hive), "Pertemuan Hamid, Dr. Iyad Bincang Kuota 1-iaji 
2005", Utusan Malaysia, 31/l/2004, 
(http: //utusan com mylutusan/archive asp'? y=2004&dt=0131&puh=utusan malaysia&sec=muka 
. 4,5Fhadapan&pz=mh I0. htm&arc=hive), "Asingkan Penguatkuasaan, 
Pendakwaan Jabatan 
Agama", Utusan Malaysia, 13/8/2002, (http: //www. islam. g, ov. niy/btiu/asing. htnil). 
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National Mosque of Malaysia in 1965 via Saudi Ambassador, Sheikh Hussein Al- 
Fattany. 758 On August 17,1976, the Islamic Da'wah Foundation of Malaysia (YADIM) 
received a capital donation amounting to RM232,209.79 from the Kingdom. 59 These 
donations were continued to other religious or public institutions including the Islamic 
College of Klang (RM52,316.89) in 1976,760 the Department of Welfare Society in 
761 Kelantan (RM18,000.00) in 1977, University of Science, Malaysia ($921,719.78) in 
1979,762 National University of Malaysia ($643,000) in 1979,763 the Terengganu Islamic 
Foundation ($660,000) in 1980,764 the State of Kelantan ($5 million) in 1980,765 and also 
to the Supreme Ruler of Malaysia ($30,000) for handicapped societies in Malaysia. 766 As 
has been mentioned before, it was commonly realized that the regular donations of the 
Kingdom to those institutions, especially in the 1970s and 1980s were largely due to the 
formal visits by the two late Prime Ministers of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein and 
Tun Hussein Onn, to the Kingdom. Along with that, the personal influence of the late 
Tunku Abdul Rahman (the first Prime Minister of Malaysia) as the former Secretary of 
75S Rekod Pandang & Dengar, G. 4658 (No. Penerimaan : 2001/0034923), National Archive of 
Malaysia. 
" Rekod Pandang & Dengar, G. 14576 (No. Penerimaan 2001/0043963), National Archive of 
Malaysia. 
760 This donation was to purchase some technical equipments for Arabic language courses offered 
in the college. Rekod Pandang & Dengar, G. 14721 (No. Penerimaan : 2001/0044187), National 
Archive of Malaysia. 
761 The amount of RM18,000 was to organize a workshop for handicapped people in Kelantan. 
Rekod Pandang & Dengar, G. 15090 (No. Penerimaan : 2001/0044504), National Archive of 
Malaysia. 
762 The cheque was given by Mohamed Al-Hamid Al-Shubaili to the Vice Chancellor of the 
University Science of Malaysia to build a mosque. The mosque was named `Masjid Al-Malik 
Khalid', after the Saudi King. New Straits Times, July 20,1979. 
763 The donation was to provide various facilities for the university's mosque in Bangi, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. New Straits Times, October 11,1979. 
764 New Straits Times, March 30,1980. 
765 The $5 million was used to develop the Nilam Puri Higher Islamic Studies Centre in Kelantan. 
Nilam Puri now has been incorporated into the University of Malaya to further enhance Islamic 
Studies in the university. New Straits Times, November 13,1980. 
766 New Straits Times, November 22,1981. 
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the OIC further encouraged the donations. Moreover, the period of the 1970s and 1980s 
was the era when the Malaysian government had just begun to concentrate on expanding 
its basic developmental infrastructure. Hence, any financial loan as well as donations 
from the Kingdom would be regarded as most valuable gifts towards achieving the vision 
of the Malaysian leaders, and the people as a whole. Nevertheless, Malaysia developed 
gradually towards the 1990s, possessing much bigger economic assets, because of the 
foreign direct investments and the successfulness of its industrial-manufacturing sectors, 
which, to some extent, resulted in less reliance upon capital donations from the 
Kingdom. 767 In addition, since Dr. Mahathir Mohamed has led Malaysia, he has launched 
his own Islamization Programmes to counteract Islamic pressure at the domestic level, 
therefore, most of the focus of the government has been towards its religious- 
governmental institutions. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that capital donations from 
the Kingdom are no longer required but only less frequently, and limited to a few 
religious institutions, mainly PERKIM and the IIUM, as in the 1970s and 1980s, where 
Malaysia had not yet achieved the better economic conditions of the 1990s and onwards. 
Besides capital donations, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also signed an agreement 
with the Malaysian government in 1985, to allow its Radio programme called `Nidah Ul- 
Islam' (the Voice of Islam) to be broadcast live in Malaysia. 768 The programme was in 
the Malay language, and was managed by a small Radio and Television Malaysian staff 
from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. It covers various Muslim issues, ranging from politics, socio- 
767 For further elaboration on Malaysian economic development, specifically in its relations to 
Saudi Arabia see Chapter V. 
768 Rekod Pandang & Dengar, G. 19507 (No. Penerimaan : 2001/0049389), National Archive of 
Malaysia. 
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economic matters, to religion and culture. 769 The Saudi government is also playing a part 
in promoting Islamic da'wah in Malaysia through its own institutions as well as a few 
individual figures who received some financial assistance during their studies in the 
Kingdom. Nonetheless, the Kingdom's activity is rather limited, and it is handled by the 
Islamic Counsellor Office, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Malaysia. This Counsellor 
Office sets up a few programmes like Arabic courses, 770 and religious learning classes for 
the Muslim community in Malaysia. 771 Among a few individual figures who are 
promoting religious visits to Malaysia under the Kingdom's funding are Ustaz Abu 
Hurairah, 772 and other figures who taught in religious schools in Malaysia, including 
Ustaz Syafei Hassan Fikri, Ustaz Omar Mirdad, Ustaz Faisal, Ustaz Makki Palembang 
and Ustaz Othman Firfalan. 773 
769 However, this programme was called off in 1990. Anuar Kasman, Brief on Malaysia's 
Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia, (Embassy of Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2004), 25, 
Mokhtar A. Kadir, Keamanan Seiagat : Peranan Malaysia Dalam Politik Antarabangsa (Kuala 
Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1991,98. 
70 The Arabic courses are conducted by several Saudi universities like the University of Medina, 
University of Ummul Qura, and others, and these courses are based upon the invitation of the 
Malaysian Islamic Council. Discussion with Ustaz Zainal Abidin Malim, Islamic Counsellor 
Office, the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2.00-3.00pm, May 29, 
2003. 
"' Discussion with Ustaz Zainal Abidin Malim, Islamic Counsellor Office, the Royal Embassy of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2.00-3.00pm, May 29,2003. 
772 Ustaz Abu Hurairah is currently attached to the United Sabah Islamic Association (USIA), and 
his main task is to preach Islamic da'wah to the Muslim community in the Asian Pacific region, 
Malaysia, Brunei, China, Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong. Discussion with Ustaz Abu 
Hurairah Abd. Rahman, the United Sabah Islamic Association (USIA), Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, 
Malaysia, 2.30-3.30pm, May 23,2003. USIA is an Islamic institution in Sabah (one of the 
Malaysian states in East Malaysia). According to his founder, YBhg. Datuk Haji Ag. Sahari, 
USIA has yet received any financial donation from the Kingdom. Discussion with YBhg. Datuk 
Haji Ag. Sahari Abd. Latif, founder of USIA, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, 4.30-5.30pm, 
May 23,2003. 
"' These individual figures were Malaysian but the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had given them 
Saudi citizenship. Except for Ustaz Abu Hurairah, these individual figures were no longer active 
in Malaysia. Discussion with Ustazah Zubaidah Jammadi, Education Affairs, the Department of 
Islamic Affairs of Sabah, Malaysia (JHEAINS), Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, 9.00-10.00am, 
May 22,2003. (Ustazah Zubaidah Jammadi was also one of the recipients of Saudi financial 
sponsorship during her studies in the Kingdom). 
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Furthermore, the Saudi government provides some funds to qualified Malaysian 
students who would like to continue their studies in the Kingdom. Before entering any 
universities in Saudi Arabia, however, a student must have, at least, Sijil Pelajaran 
Malaysia (Malaysia Learning Certificate), and his or her Arabic proficiency will be tested 
by a qualified teacher. 774 The total number of Malaysian students in Saudi Arabia is only 
about 100 to 300 students compared to the University of Al-Azhar, Egypt, which has 
approximately about 6,000-7,000 students. 775 The current total number of Malaysian 
students in the universities of Saudi Arabia is as indicated in the Table 2. below : 
Table 2. The Number of Malaysian Students Studying in Saudi Arabia (2002-2003) 
University No. Of Students 
Islamic University (Medina) 107 
Umm Al-Qura University (Mecca) 16 
Saud University, Riyadh I 
Al-Imam University, Riyadh 3 
Total 127 Students 
*Source : Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Education of Malaysia, May 9,2003. 
The low number of Malaysian students in Saudi Arabian universities is not because of the 
quota or limited scholarships offered both by Saudi Arabia or Malaysia, but according to 
former Minister of Education of Malaysia, Tan Sri Musa, the Malaysian government 
74 Discussion with Ustaz Zainal Abidin Malim, Islamic Counsellor Office, the Royal Embassy of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2.00-3.00pm, May 29,2003. 
75 A dialogue session between the former Minister of Education of Malaysia, Tan Sri Musa and 
the researcher as well as with a number of Malaysian students at Abraham Moss Centre, 
Manchester, United Kingdom, 9.00-10.00am, September 27,2003. 
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prefers to send its students to Al-Azhar University because it offers a broader education 
compared to Islamic universities in the Kingdom. 776 
Based upon the distribution of the Saudi capital assistance, the allocation of 
Malaysian pilgrims above the quota, and educational co-operation generated by the 
Kingdom for the development of religious programmes in Malaysia, at least, it helps the 
Malaysian political regime to fulifil Malaysian Muslims' necessities as well as to face the 
Islamic challenges, especially from the Islamic party, PAS, which constantly claims as 
the sole protection of Islam in Malaysia. 777 Besides that, by promoting Islam through the 
creation of several religious instituitons, it will further encourage other Muslim countries, 
not only Saudi Arabia, to give financial assistance for Malaysia. 
779 
6.5 Conclusion 
Religious affiliation can be considered as one of the important features that `religiously' 
links Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the international system. Nonetheless, since Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia have experienced different backgrounds on how Islam has historically 
and traditionally developed in their own territories, the exchanges of fatwa and Shari'ah 
rules in particular, between both countries are limited (mostly on pilgrimage affairs). The 
Malaysian government cannot accept the spread of the Kingdom's Wahabism ideology 
among its own Muslim population (although there some Islamic groups that probably 
76 The researcher had the opportunity to ask the former Minister of Education of Malaysia, Tan 
Sri Musa, about the small number of Malaysian students in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, during 
a dialogue session with the Malaysian students at Abraham Moss Centre, Manchester, United 
Kingdom, 9.00-10.00am, September 27,2003. 
7" For the discussion on Islamic challenges in Malaysia, see Chapter IV, especially under the sub- 
topic : "The Significance of Relations for the Malaysian Political Regime". 
171 See sub-topic : "6.4.1: Muslim Welfare Organisation Malaysia (PERKIM)" in the Chapter VI. 
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resemble with the Wahabism) for they have traditionally accustomed to the Shafi'ite 
school (alongside with other factors discussed) which is relatively different, in terms of 
broader conception on Shari'ah laws, from the Hanbalite-Wahabism school. 
However, the different application of the Islamic school does not hinder Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia to interact `religiously' in a few situations (by referring to the 
Kingdom's financial assistance to several religious institutions in Malaysia) which are 
beneficial for the maintenance of both countries' regime political interests. By investing 
vast sums of money in Islamic institutions and individual countries like Malaysia - which 
is parallel with the Al-Saud's contemporary global Islamic agenda - it will further 
consolidate the political position of Al-Saud family both at home and the Muslim global 
scene. While, for the Malaysian government, through the UMNO political regime, it has 
manipulated the `religious generosity' of the Kingdom to improve its religious 
programmes which are fundamental to obtain the support of Malay-Muslim community. 
In other words, it could be said that, Malaysia's religious interaction with Saudi Arabia is 
significant for both countries (particularly for Malaysia), and it also to some extent, 
displays the `practical calculation', specifically through Saudi religious donations, of 
these two countries' political regimes in using Islam for their own political survival. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE PATTERN OF RELATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
MEMBERSHIP IN SMALL STATES' ORGANIZATIONS 
As has been discussed before in Chapter Two, given that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are 
one of the small and developing states, they cannot avoid themselves from being 
influenced by the pressures or challenges of the external environment (the systemic 
factor) which specifically refer to the major pattern or issues of the international political 
system since the post-World War H. These include the superpower rivalries between the 
United States and the former Soviet Union, the North-South debates on economic 
development, the demand for religious solidarity among Muslim countries, and others. In 
facing these pressures and challenges both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have to participate 
or co jointly form several small states' organizations like the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), the Group of 77, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
779 The Group of 15,780 and others '781 with the 
hope that these organizations would safeguard their `interests' as well as making the 
degree of their relations more intimate. 
79 Saudi Arabia was one of the co-founders of OPEC. Malaysia, however, is not a member of 
OPEC. Fadhil J. Al-Chalabi, OPEC and the International Oil Industry (Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 67. 
780 The Group of 15 was a sub-group under the Group of 77. Malaysia proposed the formation of 
this group in 1988. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not the member of the Group of 15. David 
Camroux, "Looking East and Inwards : Internal Factors in Malaysian Foreign Relations During 
the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994", Australia-Asia Paper No. 72 (Griffith University : Faculty of 
Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, October 1994), 
24. 
78' For some lists of international organizations including smaller states', see, for example, Office 
of Personnel Management, the United States, "List of International Organizations", 
(http: //www. opm. gov/employ/internat/LIST. asp). 
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Therefore it is the main task of this chapter to examine to what extent the 
membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the 
Group of 77 (G-77) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) (as their own 
relative choice or autonomy vis-ä-vis the pressures of the systemic factor) could 
safeguard their interests, and how it may affect the degree of both countries' relations in 
the international system. The main reason for choosing NAM, G-77 and OIC is because 
they are the major small states' organizations in the international system, and they are 
largely formed to express their `unhappiness' over the running of the world political and 
socio-economic system. On top of that, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have shown dynamic 
interests in upholding the mission and vision of these organizations. Nevertheless, the 
study assumes that since the nature of NAM, G-77, and OIC are more on a multilateral 
level, not bilateral, and they mostly discuss much bigger issues which are beyond the 
scope of bilateral relations between two countries, the participation of Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia in these three organizations would not further prosper their relations. 
Moreover both countries' affiliation is more towards gaining wider recognition and 
forging closer socio-economic co-operation with other smaller countries. Before 
explaining further, the study would first like to analyze the early emergence of small 
states' organizations, and will continue by elaborating on the affiliation of Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia in those organizations in facing challenges in the international system, as 
well as its impact upon their relations. 
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7.1 The Early Emergence of Small States' Organizations 
After World War II, the states acting in the international system have been increasing, 
largely due to the decolonization process, and the appearance of newly independent 
countries, mainly from the Asian, African, and Latin American regions (however, a few 
states in Latin America had achieved independence earlier). For instance, there were only 
about 52 states (mostly from Europe and Latin America) in the United Nations in 1945, 
but in 1991, the number had increased to 166,782 and increased again to 189 states in 
2000.783 The emergence of these newly independent countries has further coloured the 
pattern of the international system, which is more concentrated by the influence of 
superpowers' rivalries. These newly independent countries, popularly known as `Third 
World' countries, 784 although this term is not shared by some scholars as some of them 
prefer to using other terms including less developed countries (LDCs), emerging states, 
underdeveloped countries, 785 are not only growing in numbers, but are also attempting to 
782 K. J. Holsti, however, mentioned about 163 states in the UN around 1991-1992, K. J. 1-lolsti 
International Politics, 48. 
783 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics : Trend and Transformation 
(Boston : Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), 17. 
7R4 Geographically, the area of the `Third World' includes the Americas south of the US, the 
whole of Africa, Asia apart from the Soviet Union, China and Japan, and the Oceania apart from 
Australia and New Zealand. Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics : An Introduction 
(Wisconsin : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 1. 
785 The term Third World had been quite extensively debated by a number of researchers. Some 
believe that Third World countries is the best term, particularly during the Cold War, to describe 
a group of states which were not members of the western bloc of capitalist (led by the US) or of 
the eastern bloc of Marxist-Leninist states headed by the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the 
First World referred to the US and its western European allies, and the Second World was 
associated with the former Soviet Union and its Eastern Europe counterparts. See for instance, 
Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics, 2-4, Ash Narain Raj, The Third World in the Age of 
Globalisation : Requiem or New Agenda? (New York : Zed Books, 1999), 4-5, Srinivas R. 
Melkote & Allen H. Merriam, "The Third World : Definitions and New Perspective on 
Development", in Alfonso Gonzalez & Jim Norwine (ed. ), The New Third World (Boulder 
Westview Press, 1998), 9. 
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make their presence felt by demanding some drastic changes in the structure of the 
political and socio-economic system of the world. 
As for this study, the researcher will use the term `small states', preferably to 
differentiate from those superpowers, the US and the former Soviet Union, and other 
major regional powers, namely European states like the UK, France, Germany and Italy, 
China, and Japan as well as those `small states' geographically located both in western 
and eastern Europe, with the exemption of the former Federation of Yugoslavia, Cyprus, 
and others which had participated in small states' organizations. Among the main reasons 
for emphasizing the term small states is because there were a few countries which are not 
geographically situated in the Third World areas, for instance the former Federation of 
Yugoslavia, which not only joined but were among the core founders of a smaller states' 
organization such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Also there were several 
countries which were obviously part of the Third World arena or were labelled as Less 
Developed Countries, like Turkey and Pakistan, which could not join (or were not 
allowed to become members) of the organization set up by those particular states due to a 
few policies of these two countries incompatible with the principle of their organizations 
or associations. 786 Nonetheless, due to the complexity of the character of small states' 
organizations, other terms like less developed countries, and Muslim countries (also part 
786 For example, among the provisions of joining the Non-Aligned Movement is that a country has 
no military ties with other countries. Pakistan was member of the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO), and it also had unpleasant relations with India, while Turkey is in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, at the Havana Conference in 1979, Pakistan was 
admitted into NAM. Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization :A Review of 
Developments (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), 63, Srinivas R. Melkote & Allen 11. 
Merriam, "The Third World : Definitions and New Perspective on Development", 11. 
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of smaller states' communities) will be interchangeably applied to suit to the nature of the 
organizations with which Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are affiliated. 
It has commonly been argued that the conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 
was considered the first coalition of the group of small states which attempted to insulate 
themselves from any world superpowers' influence, mainly the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, and also to address several issues and problems that affected their 
security, political and socio-economic affairs in the international system. 787 The 
conference, known as the `Afro-Asian Conference', was only attended by some Asian, 
Middle Eastern, and African countries such as Afghanistan, Burma (now Myanmar), 
Cambodia, China, 788 Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), and others, discussed various 
issues including the issue of US-led military alliances (like ANZUS, the Baghdad Pact, 
and SEATO) against the spread of communism within the members' areas. They also 
sought peace in the conflict of Indochina, and others, 789 and firmly indicated their outlook 
towards the international system as a group of states, based on their core philosophy 
787 Before the Bandung Conference in 1955, there were several efforts taken by Asian, African, 
Latin as well as Middle Eastern leaders to set up an organization to strengthen their unity and to 
manage challenges in the international system including The Congress of Panama (1826), Pan 
African Congress (1919-1945), held outside African continents such as in Paris and London, the 
Islamic Congress in Cairo, Egypt (1926), India's conference named `The Asian Relations 
Conference' (1947), The Arab League (1945), and others. Nevertheless, these gatherings, except 
India's conference, and the Islamic Congress, focused more on their own regional issues 
respectively. See Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and 
International Relations (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986), 3-6,8,12, & 17. 
788 China was invited to attend the Bandung Conference for it (and the communist bloc) seemed 
closer to smaller states compared to the western countries which still controlled a few Afro-Asian 
countries. However, during the Belgrade Conference in 1961, China was not invited, owing to the 
sour relations of Yugoslavia with the Communist bloc. Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political 
Organization, 49-50. 
789 Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 
13-14. 
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called `Panshilah', which upholds mutual respect for each other's territory, non- 
interference in other countries' internal affairs, and belief in the concept of peaceful co- 
existence and non-aggression. Among the main leaders of these groups of states were 
Ahmed Sukarno (Indonesia), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Jawaharlal Nehru (India), and 
Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana). 790 
After the Bandung Conference in 1955, the main leaders of these small states 
continued to establish some platforms in order to affirm their emphasis on the non- 
interference of superpowers' rivalries by forming other organizations including the Afro- 
Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), proposed by Nasser of Egypt, in 1957. 
Through AAPSO, various conferences were organized from 1958 to 1965 to defend the 
welfare of Afro-Asian countries, and also to actively promote anti-colonialism among its 
members. Nonetheless, due to AAPSO's tendency towards the former Soviet Union 
791 
and China, and because most of its representatives were opposition parties, it was less 
popular among the leaders of small states. 
792 Therefore, in further uniting the Afro-Asian 
people with other small states' communities which shared the aims and the principles of 
their struggle to avoid confrontation with any superpowers, the main leaders of the Afro- 
Asian states had allied with Josip Broz Tito, the President of the former Federation of 
Yugoslavia, to form an organization famously known as the `Non-Aligned Movement' 
790 Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 48-49, Robert A. Mortimer, The Third 
World Coalition in International Politics (Boulder : Westview Press, 1984), 7-9 & 13. 
79' This was because of Soviet military aid to Nasser of Egypt, and he also frustrated the 
establishment of the Baghdad Pact, (later called Central Treaty Organisation or CENTO), which 
was comprised of three Middle Eastern countries, namely Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Other members 
include Britain, and Pakistan. Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism" in 
Laurence W. Martin (ed. ), Neutralism and Nonalignment : The New States in World Affairs 
(Westport, Connecticut : Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1962), 101-111. 
792 Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics, 10. 
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(NAM) in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. 793 Since the birth of NAM, small states have 
enthusiastically voiced their principles by promoting the concept of neutrality and non- 
alignment policies towards the superpowers' rivalries, namely the tussle between the 
United States and the former Soviet Union in the international system. 
Furthermore, from the mid-1960s and onwards, the leaders of small states, who 
were inspired by an Argentine economist, Raul Prebisch, 
79a geared more towards the 
issue of socio-economic development. For example, they successfully convinced the 
United Nations to organize the first UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), held in Geneva in 1964. This conference provided more opportunities for 
small states to pursue their demands for the re-structuring of the world economy, which 
in the eyes of their leaders, was dominated by industrial-developed countries, led by the 
United States and its western allies. 795 Through this conference also, the leaders of these 
small states established another organization called the Group of 77 (or South-South Co- 
operation), which would give more focus on the socio-economic development of its 
member countries. 796 The Group of 77 had taken various actions and resolutions to 
vigorously enhance their economic bargaining with the industrial countries by organizing 
a series of economic conferences under the auspices of the United Nations, and also 
79J Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 50-51, Robert A. Mortimer, The Third 
World Coalition in International Politics, 11. 
'9a Ash Narain Raj, The Third World in the Age of Globalisation, 9. 
793 James Lee Ray, Global Politics (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 414. 
'96 Ankie M. M. Hoognelt, The Third World in Global Development (Hampshire : Macmillan 
Education Ltd., 1982), 76, Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 17. 
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strongly demanded a new structure of the world economy or what they called the `New 
7 International Economic Order' (NIEO) in UNCTAD IV, Nairobi in 1976.9 
Besides that the world Muslim countries, (as part of the small states' 
communities), realised the need for an organization through which they can strengthen 
their solidarity and manage several issues and challenges affecting Muslim affairs, 
especially at the international level, where there were some degrees of involvement of 
superpowers, either directly or indirectly, both by the United States, and the former 
Soviet Union, in Muslim issues like the Israel-Palestinian dispute, Iraq-Iran war, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and others. Consequently they were led to 
establish an Islamic organization in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1972, called the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). However most of the issues or conflicts 
emerged after the formation of the OIC. Among the co-founders of this organization were 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, Malaysia, and other Muslim countries. 
798 
Along with the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, AAPSO, NAM, G-77, and the OIC, 
there were other organizations formed by groups of small states such as the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960,799 the League of Arab States in 
797 Ankie M. M. Hoognelt, The Third World in Global Development, 74, Gwyneth Williams, 
Third-World Political Organization, 35, Ash Narain Raj, The Third World in the Age of 
Globalisation, 9. 
798 Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic 
Co-operation Among its Member States (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1987), 71-72, Philippe 
Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 9. 
799 Fadhil J. Al-Chalabi, OPEC and the International Oil Industry (Oxford : Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 67, Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 79-83, Jahangir 
Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth : OPEC's Windfalls and Pitfalls (New York : I. B. Tauris 
Publishers, 2001), 23-47. 
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1945,800 the Group of 15 (G-15) in 1989,801 and a few more specific regional 
organizations like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 802 the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 803 the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), 804 Pan- 
American Meetings. There were also some organizations which cannot be considered 805 
800 The League of Arab States could be classified as a regional organization. However, this 
organization is not bound to a geographical location for its members are the combination of two 
regions, namely the Middle East and African regions. Members of this organization are largely 
connected with the affiliation of Arabism. Its main objective is to encourage unity among all Arab 
countries. Bruce P. Lenman & Katharine Boyd (ed. ), Chambers Dictionary of World History 
(Edinburgh : Larousse plc, 1994), 50. (The definition of Arab is still debatable, see note 113 in 
the Chapter Three). 
801 See note 515 in the Chapter V. 
802 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963 at the African heads of state 
summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its main objectives are the promotion of the unity and 
solidarity of the continent, defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, the 
eradication of `all forms of colonialism from Africa', and to promote international co-operation, 
having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. See Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo & Orobola Fasehum, The OAU After Twenty Years 
(Boulder : Westview Press Inc., 1984), ix & 1-4, Edem Kodjo, "Introduction", in Yassin El- 
Ayouty & I. William Zartman (ed. ), The OAU After Twenty Years (New York : Praeger 
Publishers, 1984), 3-6. 
803 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by five 
founding countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Its main 
purpose is to promote good understanding, good neighbourliness, meaningful co-operation in 
economic, social and cultural fields in the Southeast Asian region, and also sharing common 
concerns for a commitment to anti-communism and anxiety about the long-term prospects for US 
intervention in Indochina, and the regional intentions of China. See Frank Frost, "Introduction : 
ASEAN Since 1967 - Origins, Evolution, and Recent Developments", in Alison Broinowski 
(ed. ), ASEAN into the 1990s (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 3-6, Harold Crouch, 
Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Pasir Panjang, Singapore 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), vii, 1-9 & 90-101. 
804 The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was set up in 1981 in Abu Dhabi by six nations of the 
Arabian Peninsula, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). Its main principle is to emphasise the six members' economic and social 
development, to defend their independence and territorial integrity, and also to safeguard their 
security from any internal or external threat towards any members of the GCC. John A. 
Sandwick, "Introduction", in John A. Sandwick (ed. ), The Gulf Cooperation Council : 
Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World (Colorado : Westview Press, American- 
Arab Affairs Council Washington, D. C., 1987), 1-5, John Christie, "History and Development on 
the Gulf Cooperation Council :A Brief Overview", in John A. Sandwick (ed. ), The Gulf 
Cooperation Council, 7-20. 
Bos The early Pan-American Meetings, in which the US took no part, were the Congress of 
Panama (1826), the Congress of Lima (1847), and the second Congress of Lima (1864). Due to 
US hegemony, most of the Latin American states' organizations, however, were influenced by the 
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as small states' organizations because both smaller states and major influential states 
become members, for example, the International Coffee Organization (ICO), 806 
International Cocoa Organization (ICCO), 807 International Rubber Study Group, 808 and 
others, in which the membership of small states is vital to enhance as well as to safeguard 
their political and socio-economic interests in the international system. 
By looking back to the emergence of these small states' organizations, it is 
undeniable that most of the small states' organizations have different settings and 
agendas that they are going to pursue in the international system. Conceivably, this is 
parallel with the nature of the existence of smaller states which come from different 
backgrounds as had been articulated by Gwyneth Williams that : "..... some are Capitalist, 
some Communist; some agricultural, some mineral producers; some very poor, some not 
so poor; some oil producers, some oil exporters; some least developed, some developing. 
former, for example, the Organisation of American States, which was set up in 1948. Philippe 
Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 17-20. 
806 The producing members of the ICO, excluding Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, are Angola, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Rwanda, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. The importing members are Germany, Italy, Japan, and UK. International Coffee 
Organization, "Producing Member Countries", (http: //www. ico. ors,, /traniesct/icoset. htm), 
International Coffee Organization, "Country Profiles", (http: //www. ico. or ,, /4lib. ser/profile. litm). 
S07 ICCO was founded in 1973. For further information see this website, International Cocoa 
Organization (ICCO), "Facts About the International Cocoa Organization", 
(http: //www. icco. orj,, /facts. btm). 
808 International Rubber Study Group was set up in 1944. It has 17 members; Belgium, Republic 
of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, 
Russia Federation, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. International Rubber Study Group, "About Us", 
(http: //w-%vw. rubberstudy. com/aboutus. aspx). 
270 
The list is endless". 809 Every small state's organizations have different aims. They range 
from the non-alignment of superpower rivalries, the appeal for more economic 
opportunities in the world economic system, the demand for religious solidarity (this 
specifically related to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference which endeavours to 
address the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate and the secular element of the modem 
international system810), and more specific goals, especially in the economic field such as 
managing the price of small states' commodities in the international market, getting 
easier access to developed countries' markets as well as to obtain technological know- 
how from these countries. Besides, most of the issues or conflicts discussed among 
members of small states' organizations are at a multilateral level and not bilateral, which 
to some extent would not give more room for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in particular to 
address their bilateral agenda in these organizations. The issues vary from bilateral 
conflicts between two countries such as the Iran-Iraq war, the Israel-Palestine dispute, to 
a larger scope of discussion including international disarmament, peace and international 
law, the problem of refugees, decolonization, and others. 81 The resolution of these issues 
or conflicts derives participation from all members of the organization irrespective of 
what region or continent they are from. In other words, there seems to be no single 
interest or issue that small states' organizations are going to promote in the international 
political system. Instead, the interests or the issues diverge, and are multilateral 
809 Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organizations, xii. 
810 `Abdullah al Ahsan, OIC : The Organization of the Islamic Conference (Herndon, Va. USA : 
The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988), 11-21. 
8.. See for instance, Odette Jankowitsch, Karl P. Sauvant & Jorg Weber, The Third World 
Without Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, vol. xii, (Dobbs 
Ferry, New York : Oceana Publications, Inc., 1993), 923-949, Philippe Braillard & Muhammad- 
Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations (London : Frances Pinter Publishers 
Ltd., 1984), 109-124, M. S. Rajan, Nonalignment & Nonaligned Movement : Retrospect and 
Prospect (New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD., 1990), 78-86. 
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pertaining to the organization those small states are affiliated with. In addition, although 
the small states' organizations attempt to focus on one shared interest, like the pursuance 
of non-aligned policy in the Cold War or to urge for the price stability of their 
commodities, on some occasions this interest was not collectively upheld or shared. This 
could be linked, for example, to the admission of Cuba into NAM which was not in line 
with the principle of the organization because it had an American naval base at 
Guantanamo, 812 or to the issue of the maintenance of price commodities where, due to 
different merchandise produced by member countries, an integrated effort by all members 
of the Group of 77 could not be taken. It is only members that produce the same 
commodities that are able to make concerted efforts to stabilize the price of their 
commodities. 813 
Furthermore the early establishment of the small states' organizations were 
mainly initiated by a group of certain individual leaders, namely Jawaharlal Nehru of 
India, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia, Nkrumah of Ghana, 
and later joined by Josip Broz Tito of the former Federation of Yugoslavia. The specific 
role of the ruler of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the setting up of the OIC will be 
discussed later. Probably, the significant role of these leaders in promulgating the idea of 
the formation of a small states' institutional coalition is because most of them, with the 
812 Since there were some members of NAM who did not fulfill, at least, the minimum 
requirement to the principles of non-alignment, there was a debate on the rationality of the 
existence of NAM, and the interpretation, either rigid or liberal, of non-alignment principles 
among diverse members. Ashwani Kumar Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in Global Politics : 
The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 in the United Nations General Assembly", 
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Sussex, October 2000,134-135, Peter Willetts, The 
Non-Aligned Movement, 23. 
81' This will be further discussed in the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia under the sub- 
topic of the Group of 77 later in the Chapter VII. 
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exception of Tito and the ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, had experienced the 
process of colonization, especially under the influence of western-European empires. 
Hence, once the leaders of these countries had successfully achieved independence 
through various means, either by military struggle or diplomatic negotiation, they were 
keen to promote, and to share, the sense of freedom among other small countries and at 
the same time also they felt that by strengthening the unity of these countries through the 
setting up of a few organizations, their sovereignty and territorial integrity would be well- 
preserved vis-ä-vis any external or outside influences in the international system. 814 
Nevertheless, although these leaders seemingly had something in common in 
maintaining small states' integrity and their interests at the international level, they had 
some specific goals to be achieved, via those small states' organizations, that were 
closely related to the their image as well as for their own countries' interests. For 
instance, in the case of Gamal Abdel Nasser, his leadership in small states' organizations, 
like NAM, could be regarded as a bridge for him to seek support from other small states, 
particularly the Arab states, in his struggle against Israel, and also to affirm his leadership 
over Arab counterparts. Beside that, his constantly harsh blame on western imperialism, 
for it was against NAM's principles, the emphasis on non-interference and sovereignty 
among members and the world at large, was largely owed to the formation of the 
Baghdad Pact (due to the inclusion of three Middle Eastern countries, Turkey, Iran and 
814 James Lee Ray, Global Politics, 413, Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third 
World and International Relations, xii, Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 
xii-3. 
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Iraq) 
'815 and also as the expression of 
Nasser's dissatisfaction over his loss in the issue of 
the Suez Canal, from which he was ousted by the French-British attack following his 
nationalization of the canal in 1956.816 Meanwhile, Nehru's strong affiliation with the 
struggle of small states in the international system, within the concept of territorial 
integrity and non-interference, could be linked to some of his domestic political 
challenges. Among those challenges were included the demands for the creation of some 
separate entities in India such as Telugu, Malayalam, Marathi, Punjab, and more 
significantly the issue of Kashmir which continuously dragged India in conflict with its 
neighbour, Pakistan. 817 In facing these demands, it was quietly apparent that by 
emphasizing the concept of non-interference and territorial integrity, through the NAM 
organization, at least, Nehru was able to avoid any direct political or military intervention 
from any superpowers in his domestic political issues, 818 and also to further maintain the 
unity of India both at the regional and the international level. Moreover, Nehru's tireless 
involvement in NAM was also related to his quest to develop India economically to be 
stronger than, or equal to its potential regional threats, Pakistan and China. 819 In 
815 Gamal Abdel Nasser argued that any formation of military alliances in the Arab world should 
be formed by Arab countries alone. But in the Baghdad Pact or later CENTO, there were other 
non-Middle Eastern countries, Britain, and Pakistan. Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and 
Nkrumah on Neutralism", 101, see also A. I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World : The Elements of 
Foreign Policy (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1976), 70-74. 
816 Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", 110-111, Jasper Ridley, 
TITO (London : Constable & Company Limited, 1994), 332. 
81' B. N. Pandey, "NEHRU (London : The Macmillan Press, 1976), 341, Judith M. Brown, 
NEHRU, (New York : Longman, 1999), 157. 
818 Nehru, however, failed to obstruct the superpowers, mainly the United States, being involved 
in sub-continent affairs, as the latter began to give military aid to Pakistan in 1954 and onwards 
(India also received the aid). E. I. Brodkin, "United States Aid to India and Pakistan : The 
Attitudes of the Fifties", International Affairs, (4) October 1967,671, (664-677), Robert G. 
Wirsing & James M. Roberty, "The United States and Pakistan", International Affairs,, (4), 
Autumn 1982,589, (588-609). 
819 Among the potential conflicts between India and China, after the latter's invasion of Tibet in 
1950, was the issue of the completion of the Sinkiang-Tibet highway which ran across the Aksai 
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achieving this objective, Nehru disagreed with other main leaders of NAM about creating 
a `third bloc' or `third force' against the East-West influences. Instead, he was in favour 
of a `third area', connoting an area which did not want war but strived for peace and 
believed in co-operation. 820 In contrast particularly with Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia, 
who preferred to create a Conference of the New Emerging Force, 
821 Nehru attempted to 
portray himself as a mediator and was eager to play a more positive role between the east 
and the west rivalries. As a result of this, Nehru managed to gain economic aid, and 
military assistance both sides, the United States and its co-allies as well as the former 
Soviet Union. 822 
This was different, too, from the other two Afro-Asian leaders, Sukarno of 
Indonesia, and Nkrumah of Ghana, who had several political practices which to some 
extent might not be compatible with the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, or 
among other member of small countries, in order to maintain their own political interests. 
Sukarno, who had been involved in fighting against the Dutch occupation in Indonesia as 
early as the 1920s until his premiership in 1945,823 radically opposed any kinds of 
imperialism and urged small states to fight for justice and freedom at the international 
Chin region of Ladekh, which the former claimed as its own territory. B. N. Pandey, NEIHRU, 
369. 
820 B. N. Pandey, NEHRU, 362-363. 
"' During the Belgrade Conference in 1961, Sukarno maintained that there were only two forces 
in the world: the New Emerging Forces which were the forces of freedom and justice, and the Old 
Established Forces, which were the old forces of domination, always threatening the safety of the 
world. B. N. Pandey, South and South-east Asia, 1945 1979: Problem and Policies (London : The 
Macmillan Press, 1980), 156-157, J. D. Legge, Sukarno :A Political Biography (London : Allen 
Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 358. 
822 Judith M. Brown, NEHRU, 158, B. N. Pandey, South and South-east Asia. 1945 1979,360- 
363, Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", 101. 
823 Mochtar Pabotinggi, "Indonesia : Historicizing the New Order's Legitimacy Dilemma", in 
Muthiah Alagappa (ed. ), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia : The Quest for Moral Authority 
(Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1995), 231. 
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level. However, Sukarno's closeness to socialist-communist, 824 especially in 1957 when 
he publicly announced the abandonment of western liberal democracy and substituted it 
with a distinctively `guided-democracy' Indonesian type; also he recruited some 
communist representatives in his government cabinet, indirectly tarnishing his image as 
one of the Non-Aligned leaders, which subsequently also led to his downfall in the 
military coup, in 1965.825 For Nkrumah, his concept of non-alignment, as he defined it,: 
".... nonalignment can be understood only in the context of the present atomic arms race 
and the atmosphere of the Cold War..... It is in no way anti-western; nor it is anti- 
eastern", 826 in some way provided an opportunity for him to lure more financial 
assistance and military aid either from the west or the east. For example, under his 
charge, Ghana received non-military assistance from the US which offered technical 
assistance at a rate of about $US 1 million a year, and between 1958 and 1961 the US also 
helped the country to design as well as giving away SUS 133 million loans to build a large 
hydro-electric dam on the Volta River. At the same time, the Soviet Union, too, designed 
. another hydroelectric dam further upstream on the same river which was 
based on 
Ghana-Soviet's economic-technical co-operation agreements in 1960.827 In order to 
justify his approach, especially in regard to his economic relations with both the west and 
the east Nkrumah's defended by saying : "We make no apology....... for the steps we 
824 Sukarno's closeness to former the Soviet Union was to acquire the latter's arm in his struggle 
to control West Irian, which was helped by the Dutch. See J. D. Legge, Sukarno :A Political 
Biography, 359-360. 
825 Lennox A. Mills, Southeast Asia : Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics (Minneapolis 
: University of Minnesota Press, 1964), 80-84. 
826 Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", 95. 
82' In September 15,1961, Soviet experts drafted plans for a SUS56 million hydroelectric station 
at Buipe on the Black Volta. Thomas A. Howell & Jeffrey P. Rajasooria (ed. ), Ghana & Nkrumah 
(New York : Facts on File, Inc., 1972), 62-63 & 78-79, Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and 
Nkrumah on Neutralism", 115. 
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have taken recently to our trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern 
European countries, and China", and he reminded the US not to be misled by any (recent) 
reports that, as he described, "put the worst possible construction on everything we 
dO. 828 
Furthermore, Tito's growing commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 
which began in 1961 when he offered his capital city, Belgrade, as the host of the first 
NAM Summit, may be associated with his country's political situation. This was 
following of the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (The 
Cominform) in 1948 that led to the economic blockade and the breaking off of all 
agreements on co-operation between Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and socialist- 
Eastern European countries, which represented 50 per cent of Yugoslavia's total trade. 829 
Added to this was the attitude of the Yugoslavia's mentor, the former Soviet Union, 
which was frequently reluctant to defend its territorial-border disputes with some other 
countries, 830 and also the tendency of the US and its western allies to support pro- 
democratic political movements, and not socialist-communist regimes, in those countries 
involved, namely Italy, Greece, and on the Slovene-Austrian borders during the 
828 Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", 115. 
829 Among the main reasons for the expulsion were, for example, the delay of Tito and Dimitrov 
(Bulgarian leader) to implement Stalin's proposal to unite Yugoslavia and Bulgaria into one 
federation. Tito's own initiative to send his troops to Albania to strengthen defence on the 
frontiers with Greece (to help Greek communist rebels) had embarrassed Stalin because he had 
promised Britain that Greece was the latter's sphere of influence, and also Tito's economic 
development plan differed from the leader of communist countries, the former Soviet Union. See 
Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1976), 110- 
111 & 124, Phyllis Auty, Tito :A Biography (Middlesex, England : Penguin Books Ltd., 1970), 
292-293, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton : Princeton 
University Press, 1970), 9-17. 
830 Tito and the leaders of the former Soviet Union were also in a sharp disagreement over the 
handling of Hungarian rebellious leader, Imre Nagy, during the uprising in 1956. See for instance, 
Jasper Ridley, TITO (London : Constable & Company Limited, 1994), 336. 
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discussion at the United Nations. 831 Therefore it seemed that Yugoslavia had no other 
`friends', and was forced to look at those small countries, mostly from the Asian, the 
Middle Eastern, and the African continents, to re-consolidate its position in the 
international system. 832 By regularly travelling to these continents, Tito succeeded in 
signing a few economic agreements, including the Agreement on Preferentials in 1967 
between Yugoslavia, India and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) for a 
lowering of customs duties between these three countries, and they intended to make this 
model the pattern of international trade between other smaller states. 
833 Nonetheless, as 
Yugoslavia's economic links with the European Economic Community (EEC) were 
rapidly improving, Tito's relations with other leaders of NAM and other smaller states' 
organizations were affected. Tito did not even attend the funeral of his old friend, Nasser 
in 1969 because he was acting as host to President Nixon of the US. 834 Frankly speaking, 
the close affiliation of these main leaders to the smaller states' organizations were 
relatively accompanied with a strong sense of nationalism towards anti-colonialism, the 
fulfilment of economic opportunities as well as the attempt to gain leadership, and 
influence over other small states in the international system. 835 Hence, since the interests 
or the goals of the small states' organizations are diverse and, more on a multilateral basis 
(not bilateral), and with the emphasis of certain leaders of these organizations towards the 
fulfilment of their countries' national interests, the membership of smaller countries in 
the organizations, which are bigger and wider than regional organizations, in some cases 
will not enhance the level of the relations of certain countries in the international system, 
"'Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, 169-171. 
832 Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979), 123. 
833 Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, 176-177. 
83a Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, 172. 
835 Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", 116-120. 
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and this point of argument would be further developed within the context of Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia's membership in NAM, G-77, and the OIC. 
7.2 The Affiliation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in Small States' Organizations 
Malaysia, which achieved independence from Great Britain in 1957, only began to co- 
jointly form and participate in several small states' organizations in the early 1960s. Prior 
to this date, Malaysia did not join in any organizations or alliances except its military 
treaty with Britain: the Anglo-Malayan Defence and Mutual Assistance Treaty (AMDA) 
in 1957.836 Although it was surrounded by a few organizations, especially military 
alliances co-sponsored by the US and Great Britain such as the ANZUS Pact (195 1), 837 
and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization or SEATO (1954), 838 Malaysia decided not 
to join these alliances. This, perhaps, was largely due to its pre-independent status, and 
also as commonly argued that, particularly in regards to SEATO which was anti- 
Communist China, Malaysia did not intend to upset the feelings of its Chinese 
community as well as to avoid any war with the mainland of China. 839 Among those 
small states' organizations (narrowed regional organizations) in which Malaysia 
participated after its independence were, for instance, the Association of Southeast Asia 
836 Archana Sharma, British Policy Towards Malaysia, 1957-1967 (London : Sangam Books 
Limited, 1993), 40, Chin Kin Wah, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements : Twenty Years 
After", The Pacific Review 4 (3) 1991,193. 
83' The members of ANZUS were the US, Australia, and the New Zealand. Bruce P. Lenman & 
Katharine Boyd (ed. ), Chambers Dictionary of World History, 47. 
838 Other countries which joined the US in SEATO were Australia, France, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and UK. Bruce P. Lenman & Katharine Boyd (ed. ), 
Chambers Dictionary of World History, 872. 
839 J. M. Gullick mentioned that Malaya's war with China might be inevitable if the British troops 
in Malaya, based on the AMDA treaty, were directed to join SEATO forces against Communist 
China. J. M Gullick, Malaysia (London : Ernest Benn Limited, 1969), 193 & 198, Donald G. 
McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia : The Evolution of a Region (Boulder 
Westview Press, 1986), 250-251. 
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(ASA) established by Malaya (became Malaysia in 1963), the Philippines, and Thailand 
in 1961, and the confederation of ethnic Malay states between Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines, known as `MAPHILINDO', in 1963.840 Nonetheless, owing to the 
confrontation launched by the Philippines and Indonesia over some other parts of 
Malaysian territories, 841 these two organizations were less functional, and were 
eventually replaced by a new organization called the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.842 Through the establishment of ASEAN, Malaysia was able 
to strengthen its regional co-operation with a number of states in the Southeast Asian 
region, and also to further enhance its involvement in other wider small states' 
organizations including NAM, G-77, OIC, and others. 
Saudi Arabia was ahead of Malaysia in terms of founding as well as joining 
several small states' organizations at the international level. This was because the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a modem state in the early 1930s was 
much earlier than Malaysia. Saudi Arabia's affiliation with some attempts to set up and 
participate in various smaller states' organizations, especially to unite all Muslim 
countries, might begin with its role in organizing the Muslim World Conference which 
84° Donald G. McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia, 252-254, J. M Gullick, Malaysia, 
186-192. 
84' Sukarno, the President of Indonesia, was against Tunku Abdul Rahman's Plan (Malayan 
Premier) to incorporate the Malay Peninsula, Sabah, Sarawak, Singapore and Brunei into `the 
Malaysian Federation), while Macapagal, the Philippines' leader, claimed Sabah (North Borneo) 
as part of the Sultanate of Sulu, which was the former empire that governed the Philippines, and 
its other small neighbouring islands. See for instance, K. S. Nathan, "Vision 2020 and Malaysian 
Foreign Policy : Strategic Evolution and the Mahathir Impact", Southeast Asian Affairs 1995 
(Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), 222. 
842 Donald G. McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia, 252-255, J. M Gullick, Malaysi 
192. 
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launched in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 1926.843 This conference, however, which was 
merely to justify Ibn Saud's occupation of Hejaz from the descendant of the Hashemite 
family, was less well attended because most of the Muslim countries, including Malaysia, 
were still under the era of colonization. 844 Furthermore, in order to consolidate its 
position in the Arab world, as well as to act against the formation of the `Hashemite 
states' (the Greater Syria Scheme or the Fertile Crescent Plan), 845 Saudi Arabia had 
joined the Arab League in 1945, and through the league, both the Kingdom and Egypt 
had voiced their protests against the plan. 846 As with Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, also, was 
not inclined to join any military alliances that were co-formed by any foreign powers in 
the Middle East like the Baghdad Pact (1955). Instead Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and 
Syria signed the Mutual Defence Pact after an Arab Summit Conference in 1956.847 
Before the signing of the Defence Pact, the Kingdom had earlier concluded an agreement 
with the US to locate its air force in the Dhahran airfield, Saudi Arabia, in 1950.848 
Throughout the 1960s and 1980s, most of the initiatives taken by Saudi Arabia were to 
emphasize the importance of its security, economic development - particularly oil 
production - and the Kingdom's Islamic image in the Muslim world by co jointly 
forming some organizations, namely the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
'"'Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 40-43. 
844 In the Muslim World conference, Russia was among the non-Muslim countries that attended 
the conference. This might due to Russia's first recognition to the Saudi State in February 1926. 
Hermann Frederick Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy", in L. Carl Brown (ed. ), Diplomacy in 
the Middle East : The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers (London : I. B. 
Tauris Publishers, 2001), 220, Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic 
History", 41-44. 
B45 The Fertile Crescent Plan was proposed by Iraq, particularly by its Prime Minister, Nuri Al- 
Said, who recommended that Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan be united into one state. 
Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 81-82. 
846 T. R. Little, "The Arab League :A Reassessment", The Middle East Journal x, 1956,140-141, 
Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 79-86. 
947 Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 96-97. 
848 Hermann Frederick Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy", 236. 
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(OPEC) in 1960, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1972, the Gulf Co- 
operation Council (GCC) in 1980, and a few other organizations. Nevertheless, as has 
been noted before, not all of these small states' organizations can associate Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia together, and both countries have their own regional organizations, the 
ASEAN and the GCC, which respectively stress regional commitments and challenges. 
Therefore, there are only a few small states' organizations of which Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia are both members, and not based on their specific regional-geographical 
affiliation, that will be analyzed in the following discussion. 
7.3 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
7.3.1 The Birth of NAM 
The birth of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is usually associated with the efforts of 
a few influential leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Josip Broz Tito of the former Yugoslavia. The idea of 
forming NAM (however, in the beginning, they did not mention the exact word `NAM') 
was revealed by these leaders while they were attending the session of the UN General 
Assembly in New York, in September 1960.849 These leaders believed that since most of 
the smaller countries were still in the early years of their independence, some of them had 
yet to achieve self-determination for their own countries, and with the pressure of the 
superpower rivalries in the international system, it was necessary for small countries, 
mainly from Asia, Africa, Latin America and even in Europe, to form a political 
"" Alim-Khan, The Non-Aligned Movement : Achievements Problems, Prospects (Moscow 
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1985), 27. 
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organization to safeguard their interests, and more importantly to attempt to avoid any 
alliance with the two blocs, the US and the former Soviet Union. 850 
Nevertheless, prior to the establishment of NAM, there was a debate on the 
criteria to be used to identify those small countries that would be invited, or could 
participate, in the conference. This was because the concept of the `Afro-Asian region', 
for example, was no longer suitable as other countries like Yugoslavia were not located 
in the region. Besides that, a few countries also had different opinions on the membership 
of NAM, such as India which preferred to open the membership to any country that did 
not belong to any alliance, whereas Cuba and Guinea proposed that criteria more precise 
than just not belonging to an alliance should be adopted . 
851 In resolving this issue, a 
preparatory meeting was held in Cairo, Egypt in June 1961 to discuss the principal 
criteria for NAM membership, 852 and as a result of the meeting, about 25 countries were 
invited to attend the first NAM Conference in Belgrade in September 1961. The 25 
countries that attended the Belgrade Conference were Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, 
Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, 
850 Alim-Khan, The Non-Aligned Movement", 8-11. 
gs' Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 
91. 
8sz NAM had laid down five criteria for the consideration of any countries that would like to join 
the organization. The criteria were; a) The country concerned should have adopted an 
independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems 
and nonalignment, or should be following a trend in favour of such a policy, b) It should be 
consistently supporting the movements for national independence, c) It should not be a member 
of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflict, d) If it has 
bilateral military agreement with a Great Power or is a member of a regional defence pact, the 
agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power 
conflicts, e) If it has conceded military bases to a foreign Power, the concession should not have 
been made in the context Great Power conflicts. See Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza 
Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 91, Alim-Khan, The Non-Aligned 
Movement", 29. 
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Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the United Arab 
Republic, Tunisia, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. 853 During the Belgrade Conference also, 
these countries adopted the basic documents for their political organization which 
primarily focused on the struggle for peace and disarmament, against the division of the 
world into economic and political-military blocs, against any kinds of imperialism, and 
political domination, combined efforts to assist the underdeveloped countries, 
strengthening the role of the United Nations and the promotion of active and peaceful co- 
existence. 854 
Year by year the membership of NAM increased rapidly from only 25 countries 
in 1961 to 54 members at the Third NAM Conference in Lusaka, Zambia in 1974. The 
role of NAM was also getting broader for it started to emphasize the economic 
development of its poor members (coincidently with the launch of the New International 
Economic Order or NTEO in 1973) in the international economic system. 
855 By the 1990s 
(for instance, in 1993), the members of NAM had reached 101 countries. 856 The vast 
membership of NAM had, to some extent, enabled it to promote actively the issues and 
problems of its members in getting the attention of world community leaders. Among the 
efforts included sending written messages to both US President John F. Kennedy, and 
former Soviet Union Premier, Nikita Khrushchev to continuously renew their 
853 Alim-Khan, The Non-Aligned Movement", 29, Tejvir Singh, "Important Dates in the 
Development of the Non-Aligned Movement", in Govind Narain Srivastava (ed. ), Seventh Non- 
Aligned Summit, Commemoration Volume I, (New Delhi : Indian Institute for Non-Aligned 
Studies, 1983), 7-8. 
854 Tejvir Singh, "Important Dates in the Development of the Non-Aligned Movement", 9. 
855 Alim-Khan, The Non-Aligned Movement", 40. 
856 NAM Member List, "Non-Aligned Movement Participants, Observers, and Guests", 
(http: //kis. nagaokaut. ac. ip/niikanii/NAM/member list. htm). 
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negotiations in minimizing the tension of the Cold War in 1961, supporting the desire for 
smaller states' independence (such as Algeria, and some other Asian, and African 
countries), calling for the end of the Apartheid policy in South Africa, and discussing the 
Israel-Palestine issue, promoting economic co-operation among members . 
857 Yet, with 
the passing away of the Cold War, the role of NAM seems less relevant (although it is 
still defended by its members) to address the issues or conflicts that occurred during the 
war. 
858 
7.3.2 Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in NAM 
Malaysia only joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1970, at the Third Summit 
Conference, held in Lusaka, Zambia. 859 The lateness of Malaysia's entry into NAM was 
largely due to the Indonesia's opposition, under its former President Sukarno, who 
strongly launched his confrontation against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia 
in the early 1960s. 860 Added to this was the first Malaysian Premier, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman's preference, which was more on pro-western and anti-communist in his external 
policy at the international level'86' as he said : "... where there has been a conflict 
between two ideologies - Western and Eastern ideologies - then I have made myself 
857 For a comprehensive explanation on the agendas, and the resolution of NAM (The Conference 
Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries), see for example, International Institute 
for Nonaligned Studies, 35 Years of Non-Aligned Movement : Documents 1961-1996 with 
Preambulatory Meetings at Bandung & Brioni, vol. I- II, (New Delhi : International Institute for 
Nonaligned Studies, 1997), particularly pages (vol. I) 14-18,20-36,40-65,92-127,201-270,434- 
536, (vol. II) 681-763,979-1079, Ashwani Kumar Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in Global 
Politics", 131-132,157-158. 
858 Ashwani Kumar Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in Global Politics", 132. 
859 "NAM Member List : Non-Aligned Movement Participants, Observers, and Guest", 
(http: //kis. nagaokaut. ac. ip/mikami/NAM/member list. htm). 
860 Mohd. Yusof bin Ahmad, "Continuity and Change in Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1981-1986", 
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Tufts University, Massachusetts, 1990), 38-41. 
861 K. S. Nathan, "Vision 2020 and Malaysian Foreign Policy", 223. 
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quite clear before that we side with the Western ideology or the Western understanding of 
democracy". 862 Nonetheless, when Sukarno's government collapsed in 1965,863 and Tun 
Abdul Razak, who was in favour of the principle of neutrality and non-alignment, 
864 
succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as the second Malaysian Premier (1970-1976), 
865 
Malaysia eventually participated in the NAM Summit in 1970. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia 
was among the first group of countries that took part both in the Afro-Asian Conference 
in Bandung, Jakarta in 1955,866 and the first NAM Summit Conference in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia in 1961. Between the first NAM Summit in Belgrade in 1961 to the latest 
summit in Putrajaya, Malaysia in 2003, there were only two conferences, namely the 
third NAM Summit in Lusaka, Zambia in 1970, and the sixth NAM Summit in Havana, 
Cuba in 1979, which the Kingdom did not attend. 
867 The absence of Saudi Arabia in 
Lusaka was probably because of the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967,868 and 
also followed some disagreements between the Arab and the African countries in a 
862 R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia (Singapore : Times 
Books International, 1980), 295. 
86s See note 825 in the Chapter VII. 
' K. N. Nadarajah, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen : His Story (Selangor, Malaysia : Pelanduk 
Publications (M) Sdn. Bh. d, 2000), 51 (Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen was the former Foreign 
Minister of Malaysia, 1975-1981 & 1984-1986), see also notes 293 & 294 in Chapter IV. 
'5 Tun Razak began his term in 1970, and died in 1976 at the age of 54. R. S. Milne & Diane K. 
Mauzy, Malaysia : Tradition, Modernity, and Islam (Boulder : Westview Press, Inc., 1986), 156- 
157, see also sub-topic entitled, "Tun Razak's Political-Economic Relations with Saudi Arabia" 
in the Chapter IV. 
866 At the beginning, most of the Arab states including Saudi Arabia were less enthusiastic with 
the Bandung Conference. However, when Pakistan insisted on excluding Israel, and its proposal 
was accepted by India, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia, the Arab countries agreed to participate. 
Georgiana G. Stevens, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung", The Middle East Journal 11 (2) Spring 
1957 (139-152), 146. 
1167 See "NAM Member List : Non-Aligned Movement Participants, Observers, and Guest", 
(http: //kis. nagaokaut. ac. ip/mikami/NAM/member list. htm). 
868 After the war of 1967, the Israeli occupation (or under its control) also covered the Islands of 
Sanafir and Tiran, over which the Saudi government claimed sovereignty. See R. D. McLaurin, 
Don Peretz & Lewis W. Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy : Issues and Processes (New York 
Praeger Publishers, 1982), 208-211. 
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meeting held in Belgrade in 1969, prior to the conference, on the major issues that would 
be highlighted in the conference. 869 The NAM summit in Havana in 1979 was closely 
linked to the Kingdom's protest over the Camp David peace agreement between Egypt 
and the Israeli government. 870 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, along with other NAM members, especially the main 
founders of NAM India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and Ghana, endeavoured to uphold the 
concept of non-alignment in the Cold War era, which was largely dominated by the 
superpowers' rivalries between the United States and the former Soviet Union. A less 
different outlook on non-alignment, especially on the term `peaceful coexistence' was, 
the view of Tun Razak (Malaysia's second Prime Minister), "..... that the policy of 
peaceful coexistence in this region (the Southeast Asia) is in the interests of all concerned 
- big powers as well as small powers - and that 
it is in the interest of the big powers to 
guarantee the integrity, independence and neutrality of the small countries in Southeast 
Asia.... ", 871 or as King Saud (1953-1964) had pronounced: "Our foreign relations are 
conducted on the basis of mutual respect and absolute neutrality, in cooperation with the 
869 The Arab countries emphasised the question of Palestine and Israeli occupation of their lands 
since the 1967 war (where Saudi Arabia was much concerned on the issue of Palestinian people 
since the Kingdom's inception in 1930s), while the African countries concentrated on the affairs 
of southern Africa, and at the same time also, they refused to accept the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) as NAM new member. See Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement, 33- 
36. 
870 During the Summit, the Arab states failed to get support from other NAM members to suspend 
the membership of Egypt. (In the meantime, the Saudi government was dissatisfied with the result 
of the Camp David agreement for the Islands of Sanafir and Tiran, which were under Egyptian 
suzerainty before the war of 1967, and were reverted to the Egyptian government. See R. D. 
McLaurin, Don Peretz & Lewis W. Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy, 211). Another reason for 
Saudi's absence was due to Cuban close relations with the former communist Soviet Union. 
Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 63-65, Philippe Braillard & Mohammad- 
Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 97-98. 
87' Morais, J. Victor (ed. ), Strategy For Action : The Selected Speeches of Tun Haii Abdul Razak 
bin Dato' Hussein Al-Hai, (Kuala Lumpur : Government Press, 1969), 14. 
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Arab Islamic countries and the Afro-Asian bloc, and by stressing the principles of 
Bandung and the United Nations Charter". 872 Both countries played some roles in 
realising the objectives of NAM, specifically in solving or, at least, mediating several 
smaller states' issues and conflicts in the international system. Saudi Arabia, which 
joined NAM earlier than Malaysia, with other Arab states873 had continuously called on 
NAM to emphasize the issue of Palestine, the abolition of old and new colonialism in the 
underdeveloped countries, the problem of unequal development between developed and 
undeveloped countries, the universality of membership in the United Nations, the 
international co-operation and co-ordination in economic, technical, social and cultural 
affairs, and the rejection of the bipolar world. 874 Furthermore Malaysia, which had just 
become a member of NAM in 1970, was appointed as one of the permanent executive 
committee for NAM875 and co jointly with the Arab-Muslim countries promoted the issue 
of Palestine, as well as addressing some of the regional conflicts in the Asian region like 
the Vietnam War, the India-Pakistan tussle, the crisis of the two Koreas, and other issues 
872 Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 201. 
873 Other Arab States including Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, United Arab Republic (Egypt 
and Syria), Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia. Sayed Nofal, "The Role of the Arab World in the Afro- 
Asian Conferences from Bandung to Belgrade", in Fayez A. Sayegh (ed. ), The Dynamics of 
Neutralism in the Arab World :A Symposium (San Fancisco : Chandler Publishing 
Company, 1964) 254. 
874 Sayed Nofal, "The Role of the Arab World in the Afro-Asian Conferences from Bandung to 
Belgrade", 254-257, Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 201- 
202, see also Leo Mates, Nonalignment : Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade : The Institute of 
International Politics and Economics, & New York : Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972), 386-394, 
432-450 & 480-484 (For a few documents of NAM's declaration in its three summits; Belgrade 
in 1961, Cairo in 1964, and Lusaka in 1970), Mohamed El-Hadi Afifi, The Arabs and the United 
Nations (London : Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1964), 28-33 (For several principles of the 
Bandung Conference in 1955). 
875 Other members were Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia, Senegal, Tanzania, 
Zambia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Guyana & Yugoslavia. Peter Willetts, The Non- 
Aligned Movement : The Origins of A Third World Alliance (London : Frances Pinter Ltd., 
1978), 37. 
288 
including Apartheid and the question of the Law of the Sea Conference. 876 Besides that, 
Malaysia also suggested to the NAM members that they should attract those smaller 
states that were still affiliated with any military alliances, such as NATO, SEATO, 
CENTO and the Warsaw Pact, to join NAM and at the same time encouraged both the 
superpowers, the US and the former Soviet Union, to resolve their misunderstandings and 
conflicts in a more peaceful way. 877 At the end of the Cold War, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia 
and other NAM members persistently believe that NAM is still relevant in sustaining and 
safeguarding smaller states' interests in the international system as was articulated by 
King Fahd during the 11th NAM Summit in Cartagena, Colombia in 1995, "....... the end 
of the Cold War, and the emergence of a new international order based on new realities, 
will not diminish the importance of our movement or cancel its principles". 878 Malaysia, 
for the first time in the history of its participation in NAM, had become host for the 13th 
NAM Summit in Putrajaya, Malaysia in 2003 and, together with other members including 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia chaired the Ministerial Meeting of the Committee on Palestine to 
discuss the latest crisis of Israel-Palestine in 2004.879 
Since Malaysia and Saudi Arabia joined NAM, to some extent, how far can their 
membership of the movement safeguard their interests, mainly in facing the superpower 
876 For example, in the Third NAM Summit Lusaka, Zambia (1970), Malaysia proposed the 
Indian Ocean to be free from any nuclear threats. Rozeman Abu Hassan, Tun Abdul Razak Bin 
Dato' Hussein, 74. 
877 Ghazali Shafie, Malaysia : Nilai Politik dan Budaya (Kuala Lumpur : Penerbitan Pustaka 
Antara, 1981), 105-117. 
878 King Fahd's speech was presented by Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Saudi Arabia. "Prince Saud Al-Faisal's speech at Non-Aligned Movement in Cartagena", 
(http: //www. sa ud i embassy. net/ 1995News/Statements/SpeechDetai l. asp? c Index=275 ). 
879 "NAM Urges UN to Send Peacekeeping Force to Palestine", NAM Report, 13 May 2004 
(http: //electronicintifada. net/v2/article2655. shtml). 
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rivalries, and at the same time further strengthen their relations in the international 
system? The study believes that the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in NAM 
is not entirely to safeguard their interests against the rivalry of the two superpowers, 
particularly the US and the western democratic countries, or to consider that they are the 
`enemy' of the NAM members. Both countries, in fact, attempt to seek better relations 
from the two blocs, the US and the former Soviet Union, parallel with the main theme of 
NAM which emphasizes peaceful co-existence with any states of a different social 
system. x"° For instance, Malaysia has developed its commercial relations with the former 
Soviet Union since 1967.3" and through Tun Razak's efforts, also established diplomatic 
relations with another communist country by visiting China in 1970. Meanwhile, Saudi 
Arabia's relations with the former Soviet Union began in the early 1920s, when the 
communist country declared its recognition of the Kingdom in 1926.882 Nonetheless, 
it 
cannot be denied that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are much closer to the US-British 
bloc 
than the former Soviet-socialist states. This is because, apart from British occupation 
in 
Malaysia, and British influence upon the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
both countries also have had established military treaties with the US-British bloc, such 
as the 'Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement' (AMDA) in 1957 which was later replaced 
by a new treaty, called the `Five Power Defence Arrangement' (FPDA) between 
`w Alim-Khan, "I_he Mligned`fovement : Achievemets. Problems Prospects (Moscow 
NO'. osti Press Agency Publishing House, 1985), 5. 
"Russian-Malaysian Trade and Economic Relations", 
(httP /%±W. polprcd, coni en cr. "nealav'. ia htm), "Putin's Trip to Malaysia - 
Special Press 
Summary.. (httl): %, int_o org Region\_l,  hn; ftldddh2(laa-llt, f? ha8Qa2i(xi7cOOOc5592''Openl)ocument). "°' Yet, relations were not strongly developed as the Kingdom's interaction with the 
US. See note 
844 in the Chapter VII. In the case of the 
relations 
between Saudi Arabia and China, it was only 
diplomatically initiated in 1990 (prior to 1990s, it was difficult for China to seek relations with Saudi Arabia). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People's Republic of 
China, 
(htcp: //w ý_"" tmt, rr toy cn'cnL 
_wJh'iý1g=ýýj, 
tsý lh_287ti/cirfault. htm). 
290 
Malaysia, Great Britain, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia in 1971,883 and the U. S. 
Air Force in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, completed in 1946.88; As Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
had experienced the pattern of the US-British influences, which to some extent 
contributed to the preservation of Malaysian and Saudi Arabian security during the world 
wars, to weaken the threat of the communist movement (especially in Malaysia) and to 
provide a network for both countries to be well-integrated within the world economy, 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's participation in NAM is more towards better co-operation 
with the two blocs, especially within the US-British bloc. 
The closeness of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to the US-British bloc in the 
international system, in some ways seemingly signifies that both countries cannot be 
ultimately regarded as non-aligned or neutral, 
885 or would not be accepted as NAM 
03 Rozeman Abu Hassan, Tun Abdul Razak Bin Dato' Hussein, 59-66. 
i8' Now. U. S. airforce in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia has become King Abdul Aziz Air Base (KAAB). 
Peter Willetts, The h'qn_Aligped Movement, 23 & 51, Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi 
Arabia, 326, Global Security. org, "King Abdul Aziz Air Base (KAAB), Dhahran, Saudi Arabia", 
(httn: //ýw. vw ,. lý, halxcuritý". ýýrý! military/täcility/dhahran. htm). g" Even Saudi Arabia which was generally argued as a `traditionally neutral' state, during the 
outbreak of World War I, and World War II, mainly intended to seek protection or to avoid any intervention from any foreign powers, in regards to its arch-rival, the Hashemite descendants. On 
top of that, the Saudi family was also usually in favour of any foreign powers that in the eyes of its ruler can safeguard their interests, and prolong their survival in the Arab world, like in the 
Kingdom's relations both to the Ottoman-British rivalry in the World War I, and the British- 
German clash in World War 11, where it preferred to agree to some proposals made by the British 
government during the two world wars. For example, in the case of the Ottomans, due to their 
support to lbn Rashid family, Ibn Saud's rival in the central Arabian Peninsula, and also Ibn 
Saud's wish for a total defeat for Ottomans in the Arab world, the Saudi government chose to 
accept the British offer (among the offer was to recognize the independence of all Ibn Saud's 
territories including Nejd, Elasa and Qatif) to avoid any co-operation with the Ottoman (despite 
Ibn Saud's early declaration to administer Nejd under the Ottoman empire, and the dispatch of four ulamas by the Ottomans to urge Ihn Saud and Ibn Rashid families became united to act 
against the British). See Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia : The Formative 
Years 1902-1919 (Harvard : Harvard University Press, 1986), 115-117, Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia :A Case Study in Development, 37, Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A 
Diplomatic History", 28-33. Meanwhile the Germans, under Hitler's reign, laid down a better 
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members because of their military tie with the US-British bloc. However, due to 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's refusal to join SEATO, and the Bahgdad Pact respectively, 
and added with some other aspects including the change of Malaysian leadership which 
stressed for non-alignment approach, Saudi Arabia's harmonious relations with Egypt (as 
one of the core founders of NAM), the Kingdom's eagerness to attend the NAM 
conferences (even it also involved in the Bandung Conference prior to the first NAM 
Summit in 1961), $86 as well as its enormous economic resources, the production of oil, 
which enable the Kingdom to contribute financially to a few poor countries of NAM, 
887 
probably had given them an opportunity to become members of NAM. Besides that, both 
countries' membership of NAM could be associated with some domestic political 
necessities. Malaysia, which suffered `the moment of isolation' owing to the Indonesian 
confrontation against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia and its early protest 
(during Sukarno's era) of Malaysia's involvement in NAM, was obliged to send several 
Malaysian officials on a series of tours, especially to the Arab and African continents (as 
the key member of NAM) in order to gain recognition for the Plan. 
888 Saudi Arabia, 
which had to face the threat of the Hashemite descendants whom they overthrew during 
promise to Ibn Saud by offering him the crown of the king of all the Arabs, in order to attack the 
British in World War 11, and there was almost a concession granted to the Germans to extract 
mineral resources on the Red Sea coast, but the Kingdom decided to refuse the Germans' offer 
owing to its long-established relations with the British, specifically during the First World War. 
However, in World War 11, Ibn Saud refused the Allies' (led by the British and the US) attempt to 
use his country as bases for launching any strategic-military purposes. Later, in 1945, Saudi 
Arabia declared war over Axis powers to enable it to join the United Nations. Alexei Vassiliev, 
The IliSLOry of Saudi Arabia, (London : Saqi Books, 2000), 321-323 & 327, Mohamed Zayyan 
Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 198. ""6 Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement, 44. 
"'This will be further discussed in Saudi Arabia's contribution in Group of 77 for this group was 
among the products of NANI (See the sub-topic "The Group of 77" in the Chapter VII). 1" See notes 237 & 238 in the Chapter IV. 
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the Nejd (Ibn Saud's area) and the Hijazi (the Hashemite's influence) war in 1919,889 was 
led to attend as well as to join the movement by acknowledging too that the strong 
influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt in NAM (in which movement there were 
several Arab-Muslim countries) would further reinforce its position in the Arab and 
Muslim World, for Egypt also firmly opposed the Baghdad Pact. 
890 In other words, 
although the participation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in NAM is an attempt to 
safeguard their interests vis-ä-vis superpower rivalries, and to support the organisation's 
principles of non-alignment and neutrality in the international system, in practice they are 
closer to one of the two superpowers' blocs, mainly the US-British bloc (but the two 
countries endeavour too to seek relations with the former Soviet Union's bloc), and more 
significantly, their involvement in NAM could be largely regarded as a kind of public 
relations exercise in order to acquire wider political recognition, broader economic co- 
operation, and to prolong the survival of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's sovereignty in the 
world community at large. 
7.3.3 Malaysia's Relations With Saudi Arabia in NAM 
It is less in doubt that the organization of NAM might influence the degree of Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, it would be inadequate to wholly argue that 
NAM has provided early bases for both countries to interact at the international level. 
This is because most of Malaysia's initial efforts to interact with Saudi Arabia were made 
by its leaders, especially Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Malaysian premier, who first 
""' Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 36. x. 'O Nevertheless, the other reason why Saudi Arabia did not join the Baghdad Pact was because it 
worried the influence of the Hashemite bloc, the Iraqi government, with the British support, in the 
military pact. Mohamed Zayyan Al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia :A Diplomatic History", 89,92-93. 
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visited the Kingdom in 195S after a year of Malaysia's independence. 
891 This formal visit 
was then continued by other Malaysian Premiers such as Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Hussein 
Onn, and Tun Dr. Mahathir `lohamad. 8"2 Moreover, Malaysia's participation in NAM in 
1970 was quite late compared to Saudi Arabia which had joined the movement in 1961. 
Upon Malaysia's late admission into NAM, because of Indonesia's protest in the 
movement for it strongly resisted the Malaysian plan to form the Federation of Malaysia 
in the early 1960s, it could not use NAM directly to get support from other NAM 
members that might not be against its plan. Instead, Malaysia had to unilaterally make 
some efforts to visit several other NAM members (outside the movement), including 
Saudi Arabia, in order to get some recognition for the creation of the Federation of 
Malaysia. "91 In other words, NAM could not be regarded as one of the initial steps that 
might provide some basic foundations to strengthen Malaysia's relations with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Besides, in the beginning years of the creation of NAM, the roles of Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia in the movement were not as important as the main founders of NAM, 
namely Yugoslavia, India, Ghana, and particularly to Egypt, and Indonesia whose roles 
frequently overwhelmed both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in relations to the affairs of the 
Southeast Asian and the Middle East regions respectively within the context of NAM 
itself. "`' With the powerful influences of Sukarno of Indonesia, who was largely 
891 See note 235 in the Chapter IV. 
692 See pages 87-97 in the Chapter IV. 69' See pages 85-86 & 104-105 in the Chapter IV. 694 According to Ashwani Kumar Sharma, the personal attributes and high stature of a few 
influential leaders in NAM, such as Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, Nkrumah of Ghana, Sukarno of Indonesia, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and Boumedienne of 
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responsible for the lateness of Malaysia's membership, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of 
Egypt in the Arab world, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's role in NAM were limited. It was 
only after the downfall of Sukarno that Malaysia was able to attend the NAM Summit in 
Lusaka, Zambia in 1970.895 Nevertheless, at Malaysia's first presence in NAM, Saudi 
Arabia was among the absentees from the conference, which indirectly obstructed both 
countries in discussing some international issues together with other NAM members. 
Meanwhile it could be pointed out that Saudi Arabia's early membership in NAM, along 
with highlighting the issue of Palestine, was more focused on achieving broader 
recognition of the NAM members, especially among Egypt and other Arab counterparts. 
The Saudi government believed that the significance of Egypt in NAM could help the 
Kingdom further to consolidate its position in acting against the Hashemite descendants 
in the Arabian Peninsula as their (both Saudi Arabia and Egypt) role in the Arab League 
which condemned the Hashemites' plan to create `the Greater Syria', and also the 
formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.896 Hitherto, as the years passed, with the changes 
of government in those core founders, primarily India, Egypt and Indonesia, and also the 
suspension of Yugoslavia following the Balkan crisis, Malaysia in particular had began to 
gain some key roles in continuously upholding the vision of NAM in the international 
system including becoming the chairman of NAM in hosting its 13`h Summit in 
Putrajaya, Malaysia in 2003. At this summit the Malaysian government, Saudi Arabia 
and other NAM members prominently called for some contemporary issues including the 
Algeria, is one of the sources of influence in NAM which largely shapes the organization's 
structure and political process, and also to re-orient the organization in response to the changing 
international environment. Ashwani Kumar Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in Global Politics", 
161. 
8' See note 860 in the Chapter VII. 
896 See notes 889 & 890 in the Chapter VII. 
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definition of global terrorism as well as the recent development of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict. 897 
In addition, there were other aspects that illustrate some differences between 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in NAM which may indirectly discourage the consolidation of 
their relations in the movement itself. For instance, the issue of the Camp David 
Agreement, the peace process between Egypt and Israel in 1979 to which the Kingdom 
protested by being absent from the NAM Summit Conference in Havana, Cuba in 
1979.898 On the contrary, the Malaysian government attended the conference and did not 
give any clear signal either to protest or to accept the peace process. However under Tun 
Hussein's premiership (the third Prime Minister of Malaysia), because he believed that 
Egypt's initiative was not deviating from a unified Arab stand, particularly his 
uncompromising attitude on the basic Arab stand on the returning of all occupied Arab 
land since 1967, and the treaty itself only involved a few Arab states: Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan and the Palestinians (along with Israel, and the United States). Besides that, Tun 
Hussein considered it an `internal matter' between the Arabs, and the Malaysian 
government would diplomatically refrain from any involvement in inter-Arab disputes. 
899 
On top of that, there were no other members of NAM, 900 including Malaysia, which 
exclusively agreed on the expulsion of Egypt from NAM as suggested by some Arab 
897 See for instance, XIII Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 24-25 February 2003, "Speech by Prime 
Minister The Honourable Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad at the Opening Session of the XIII 
Summit Meeting of the Non-Alignment at Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lumpur February 24, 
2003", (http: //www. nam. Rov. za/media/030225na. htm). 
B98 The absence of Saudi Arabia from the conference was also due to Cuba's closeness to the 
former Soviet Union. See note 870 in the Chapter VII. 
899 See note 310 in the Chapter IV. 
900 Especially from African countries, most of which opposed any efforts to expel Egypt from 
NAM. Ashwani Kumar Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in Global Politics", 174. 
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countries. For it was beyond the principle of NAM itself, as had been argued by Phillippe 
Braillard and Mohammad-Reza Djalili in regards to the proposal of Egypt's expulsion, 
"..... Although the Camp David policy was formally and severely condemned, the 
conference did not carry out the proposals for expulsion or suspension put forwards by 
some members. In this way the non-aligned movement was seen to remain unwilling to 
accept any idea of the expulsion of a member country". 901 
The other aspects were that the Kingdom has yet to become a host for any NAM 
Summit Conferences, whereas Malaysia had just hosted the summit in 2003. The fact is, 
however, that it took more than 30 years for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to send their 
representatives to attend a NAM conference launched in one of these two countries, and 
no one knows when the Kingdom will become the next host for the NAM Summit. The 
membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC), rather than NAM, played a significant role in attracting the Royal Highness of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Faisal to pay the first formal visit to Malaysia in 1970, 
and simultaneously also offered Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's Prime Minister, as the 
first OIC Secretary. Above all, without ignoring the role of NAM in uniting smaller states 
in one big organization to maintain their interests in the international system mainly to 
face the rivalry of the two superpowers, to ultimately suggest that NAM was 
predominantly leading the relations between the two countries, Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia, closer is quite doubtful. This is because of the focus of NAM, which gives more 
attention to multilateral interactions (not bilateral) between members on some issues or 
90' In the past, only Chile had been excluded in Algiers in 1973 at the instigation of the host 
country. Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International 
Relations, 98. 
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conflicts and added with the character of both countries' initial interactions, which are 
mostly based on the efforts of the country itself (preferably like Malaysia which first 
visited the Kingdom), and also some other obstacles that might limit their role in NAM as 
well as the tendency of both countries which are more active and more concerned with 
their own regional organizations, particularly with their affiliation to several Muslim 
religious institutions. 
7.4 The Group of 77 
7.4.1 The Establishment of the Group of 77 
The establishment of the Group of 77 was commonly associated with the dissatisfaction 
of less developed countries with their economic performances, especially in terms of the 
price of raw materials and agricultural commodities, in the world market system. The 
emergence of the group is generally regarded as a bridge for the commencement of the 
North-South dialogue, between developed and less developed countries, in the 
international political economy. With the pattern of the commodities' price fluctuation, 
the challenges of a few synthetic products from major industrial countries and the 
question of aid (from developed countries), less developed countries urged the United 
Nations and major developed countries to organize a world trade conference in order to 
address their economic problems. The less developed countries wanted to stabilize the 
price of the commodities, to remove all the trade barriers between both sides (less 
developed countries and developed countries), to introduce trade preferences on their 
manufactures and semi-manufactured products, and also to pursue some demands to re- 
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structure the international economic system. 902 The continuous efforts of a few groups of 
less developed countries, mainly from Latin America, Africa and Asia, which repeatedly 
voiced the significance of a world trade conference, for instance at the 16`h session of the 
UN General Assembly in 1961,903 and at the 18th session of the UN General Assembly in 
1963,904 and their organisation of an economic development conference in Cairo in 
1962,905 eventually led to the first launch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, or `UNCTAD I', in Geneva in 1964.906 With the inauguration of 
UNCTAD I also, the Group of 77 was indirectly formed following a number of `Seventy- 
Seven Developing Nations' which participated and recognized UNCTAD I as the most 
important step towards creating a new and better world economic order. 
907 The seventy- 
902 Richard N. Gardner, "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development", 
International Organization 22 (1) Winter 1968,100 (99-130), J. M. Gullick, Malaysia (London : 
Ernest Benn Limited, 1969), 204 (J. M. Gullick specifically mentioned synthetic rubbers, and also 
the United States' surplus stocks of rubber and tin accumulated as strategic reserves at the time of 
the Korean War, which to some extent, influenced the prices of these two commodities at the 
world market in the post-early Korean War), Douglas C. Smyth, "The Global Economy and the 
Third World : Coalition or Cleavage? ", World Politics xxix (4) July 1977,584 (584-609), 
Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 161- 
162, Karl P. Sauvant, "Toward the New International Economic Order", in Karl P. Sauvant & 
Hajo Hasenpflug (ed. ), The New International Economic Order : Confrontation or Cooperation 
Between North and South? (London : Wilton House Publications, 1977), 3-6, Gwyneth Williams, 
Third-World Political Organization, 23-24. 
903 Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 1-2. 
9oa Group of 77, "UNESCO Chapter" (http: //www. unesco. or> g77/). 
905 Among the main core-founders of this conference were Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
India, Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Sudan, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), and 
Yugoslavia. Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International 
Relations, 203. 
906 Richard N. Gardner, "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development", 99-107. 
907 Originally, there were only 75 less developed countries which recognized UNCTAD I, but 
with the support of Japan and New Zealand (both countries however refused to join the Group of 
77), it was then referred to as the Group of 77. The list of less developed countries that 
participated and recognized UNCTAD I were Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, 
Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
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seven less developed countries (excluding Japan and New Zealand) that signed the `Joint 
Declaration of the Developing Countries at UNCTAD Ii908 in 1964 were regarded too as 
the founders the Group of 77.909 The other participants of UNCTAD I included the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, known as 
Group B (developed countries), and the former Soviet Union and its allies, the Eastern 
bloc countries of Europe or Group D. 910 After the inauguration of UNCTAD I, the Group 
of 77, and developed countries (also several socialist countries) embarked on a series of 
UNCTAD conferences, from UNCTAD II to UNCTAD XI, at least every four years, to 
discuss their economic problems and challenges. 911 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of Vietnam, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, and Yugoslavia). See Karl P. Sauvant, The 
Third World Without Superpowers, Second Series: The Collected Documents of the Group of 77, 
volume I (New York : Oceana Publications, Inc., 1981), 19, The Group of 77, "UNESCO 
Chapter", (httL): //www. unesco. org/ý)r770. However, in another book written by the same author, 
Karl P. Sauvant, he included Benin, Lesotho, and Zaire, and also mentioned one Congo only, but 
omitted Ghana and Dahomey. Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77 : Evolution, Structure, 
Organization (New York : Oceana Publications, Inc., 1981), 103. 
908 There were, at least, ten major points of the Joint Declarations of Developing Nations in 
UNCTAD I. For further details see for instance Karl P. Sauvant, The Third World Without 
Superpowers, Second Series: The Collected Documents of the Group of 77 volume I, 19-20. 
909 Nevertheless, members of the Group of 77 had increased from 77 in 1964 to 132 countries 
(Yugoslavia was suspended after the Balkan crisis). Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation : 
The Group of 77 in UNCTAD (New York : St. Martins Press, 1991), 78, Group of Seventy-Seven 
at the United Nations, "Member States of the Group of 77", 
(http: //ww-%v. g77. org/main/main. htm). 
910 Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 20-21. 
91 The other UNCTAD conferences are UNCTAD II (New Delhi, 1968), UNCTAD III (Santiago, 
1972), UNCTAD IV (Nairobi, 1976), UNCTAD V (Manila, 1976), UNCTAD VI (Belgrade, 
1983), UNCTAD VII (Geneva, 1987), UNCTAD VIII (Cartagena, 1992), UNCTAD IX 
(Midrand, South Africa, 1996), UNCTAD X (Bangkok, 2000), and UNCTAD XI (Sao Paolo, 
2004). Marc Williams, International Economic Organisations and the Third World (New York : 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 185, UNCTAD, "UNCTAD IX in Midrand, South Africa", 
(htip: //www. unctad. orgfI'emplates/Calendar. asp? frmCategory=0&frmKeyword=&1rmMonth=5& 
frmYear=1996&frmNoOfMonth=l&Action=Do+search&intltem1D=2068&Iaii =I&vear=1996 
&month=6&day=1), UNCTAD, "UNCTAD X in Bangkok, Thailand", (http: //ww"w. unctad- 
10. orriwelcome. htm), UNCTAD, "UNCTAD XI in Sao Paulo, Brazil", 
(http: //www. unctad. org/Templates/StartI'at c. asp'? intlteinlD=2068). 
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The frequent dialogues between less developed countries and developed countries 
in a series of UNCTAD conferences to some extent enabled the Group of 77 to stress 
their demands, which were mostly directed to developed countries, to further improve 
their economic performances in the international economic system. The crucial demands 
of the Group of 77 revolved around the issue of the setting up of an international trade 
organisation where, in the eyes of less developed countries, membership was more 
universal than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in 1948,912 
with the stabilization of the commodity market, the introduction of preferences on 
manufactured and semi-manufactured products, and the increase of the now of financial 
resources to less developed countries. 913 The Group of 77 was still not entirely displeased 
with the response of developed countries over their demands in the UNCTAD 
conferences, but at least they had achieved some agreements with the latter, within the 
UNCTAD framework, mostly in regards to the structure of UNCTAD itself, international 
trade and financial assistance. For example, the acceptance of UNCTAD as a permanent 
member organ of the United Nations in UNCTAD I, through which it simultaneously 
provided regular opportunities for less developed countries and developed countries to 
directly negotiate, especially on trade regulations, 914 facilitated the introduction of the 
Generalised System of Preferences in 1970, which helped less developed countries to 
912 For early establishment of GATT see for instance, United Nations, General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade : Protocols and Declaration (Lake Success, New York, 1948), 1-33, and see 
also on the Declaration note after page 33 in this book. 
913 The Group of 77 at the UNCTAD I adopted a target of aid to less developed countries of I per 
cent of the combined national incomes of the developed countries. For further details on demands 
of the Group of 77 see Karl P. Sauvant, The Third World Without Superpowers, Second Series: 
The Collected Documents of the Group of 77, volume I, 24-37, Gwyneth Williams, Third-World 
Political Organization, 22-24, Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International 
Politics, 16. 
914 Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 23. 
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easily promote their commodities and products in developed countries' markets; 915 the 
establishment of the Integrated Programme Commodities (IPC), which allowed for 18 
specified commodities of less developed countries to be negotiated by means of 
producer-consumer 'agreements that set floor916 and ceiling price917 in order to stabilize 
the commodities' price; 918 the setting up of the Common Fund for less developed 
countries' commodities in 1980; 919 the distribution of debt relief amounting GB6.5 billion 
91s At UNCTAD II, the conference unanimously adopted a resolution on preferential or free entry 
of exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures of developing countries to developed 
countries. Among the developed countries taking part in implementing the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) were Austria, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The degree of 
implementation of GSP, however, varied from one country to another and from one product to 
another. For instance, most of the developed countries introduced it in 1971, except Australia 
which a bit earlier in 1966, UK in 1972, and the US in 1976. Beside that, the GSP would be 
applied in certain exceptions based upon individual developed countries' preferences, in which 
some products would be excluded from the GSP such as textiles, petroleum and petroleum 
products, leather and leather goods. See UNCTAD, Proceedings of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session, Vol. II, Merchandise Trade (New York : 
1973), 105-107, UNCTAD, Seminar Program, UNCTAD North-South Symposium, May 1979, 
Report Series No. 5, Thomas R. Graham, "The U. S. Generalized System of Preferences for 
Developing Countries : International Innovation and the Art of the Possible", The American 
Journal of International Law 72 (3) July 1978,513 (513-541), Christopher P. Brown, The 
Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980), 
48. 
916 Floor price is the lowest price that a commodity stabilization scheme is intended to allow. John 
Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1997), 182. 
917 Ceiling price is the highest permitted price of a good or service set by a government or a 
regulatory body. John Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 56. 
91s Those 18 commodities were cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, hard fibres, jute, rubber, tea, tin, 
sugar, bananas, bauxite, iron ore, manganese, meat, phosphates, tropical timber, and vegetable 
oils (olive oil and oil seeds). Marc Williams, International Economic Organisations and the Third 
World, 201, Christopher P. Brown, The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control, 
166 & 202, Michael W. Doyle, "Stalemate in the North-South Debate : Strategies and the New 
International Economic Order", World Politics 35(3) April 1983,431 (426-464), Walden Bello, 
"The Future of Global Economic Governance", (http: //www. unu. edu/millennium/I)Cllo. pdt). 
919 The Common Fund which was proposed by the Group of 77 in UNCTAD IV, Nairobi in 1976, 
was to further support the price commodities (under Integrated Programme Commodities) of less 
developed countries. The fund would stabilize, by buying and selling the buffer stock (a stock of 
a commodity held for the purpose of stabilizing its price), the specified price commodities when 
they either fell below or climbed too far above the negotiated price targets. Marc Williams, 
International Economic Organisations and the Third World, 196, Christopher P. Brown, The 
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(UK) to less developed countries and also the conversion of some debts to grants in 
UNCTAD V in 1979; 920 and a few other agreements including the Set of Multilaterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Business Practices (1980), the 
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships (1986), the Global System of Trade 
Preferences (1988), 921 et cetera. 922 Heading towards the 1990s, the Group of 77 
expanded its economic dialogue with developed countries as well as among themselves, 
putting more emphasis on the issue of economic globalization, financial crisis, the 
concept of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other related agendas. 923 
7.4.2 Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the Group of 77 
In regards to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's affiliation in the Group of 77, it is encouraging 
to note that both countries are quite active in participating at meetings or seminars of the 
Group of 77, especially in the preparatory meeting prior to an UNCTAD conference. 924 
Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control, 100-138, John Black, Oxford Dictionary of 
Economics, 42, Walden Bello, "The Future of Global Economic Governance", 6. 
920 The financial assistance and the conversion of debt into grants had been agreed since 
UNCTAD IV, V, and re-emphasised in UNCTAD VI. See for instance Gwyneth Williams, Third- 
World Political Organization, 41, Karl P. Sauvant & Joachim W. Muller, The Third World 
Without Superpowers Second Series: The Collected Documents of the Group of 77, volume vii, 
(New York : Oceana Publications, 1989), 517. 
921 Global System on Trade Preferences was a contractual commitment of less developed 
countries (about 48 less developed countries of the Group of 77 signed the agreement in 1988, 
and came into force in 1989) to promote their economic co-operation in the key area of trade 
exchanges. Karl P. Sauvant & Joachim W. Muller, The Third World Without Superpowers, 
Second Series: The Collected Documents of the Group of 77, volume xv (New York : Oceana 
Publications, 1991), 189-191. 
922 Marc Williams, International Economic Organisations and the Third World, 196. 
923 The Non-Aligned Movement Under the Chairship of South Africa, "Report of the Outgoing 
Chair on the Activities of the Non-Aligned Movement During Its Full Term as Chair, September 
1998-February 2003", (httn: /Iwww. suedafrika. ore/sae/download/nam. pdI). 
924 For a few indications of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's participation in the Group of 77 
meetings, and UNCTAD conferences see for instance Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77,30,112- 
113, Karl P. Sauvant, The Third World Without Superpowers, Second Series: The Collected 
Documents of the Group of 77 (New York : Oceana Publications Inc., 1981), 19 & 368-369 (vol. 
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Malaysia and Saudi Arabia could even be considered as the core founders of the Group of 
77 as they were among a group of less developed countries attending the first UNCTAD 
conference which subsequently led to the establishment of the Group of 77.925 Besides 
that, both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia also carried out some vital functions in the Group 
of 77: the former was a member (as one of G-77's representatives) of the UNCTAD 
Trade and Development Board, especially in 1968 and 1973,926 acted as one of the 
preparatory committees for the 1979 Fourth Ministerial Meeting, 927 was involved in the 
Working Group of 33 G-77 members on the Integrated Programme for Commodities and 
the Common Fund in 1980,928 and was appointed as the presiding country of the Group 
of 77 in New York in 1989.929 It also chaired a few seminars of the Group of 77 including 
the Second South-South Dialogue in Kuala Lumpur in 1985 (this dialogue paved the way 
for the creation of the South-South Commission at the Non-Aligned Movement in 
1986), 930 the Seventh Meeting of the Intergovernmental Follow-up and Coordination 
I), 306 (vol. II), 125-126 (vol. III), 233 (vol. IV), Karl P. Sauvant & Joachim W. Muller, The 
Third World Without Superpowers, Second Series: The Collected Documents of the Group of 77 
(New York : Oceana Publications Inc., 1989), 503-504 (vol. VII), 358-361 (vol. XVIII, 1993), 
and other G-77 meetings such as Meeting of the Global System on Trade Preferences (GSTP), the 
Intergovernmental Follow-up and Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation among 
Developing Countries, Meeting of the Heads of National Focal Points for Economic and 
Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDCITCDC), Meeting of Representatives 
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Developing Countries, and et cetera. Karl P. Sauvant 
& Joachim W. Muller, The Third World Without Superpowers. Second Series: The Collected 
Documents of the Group of 77 (New York : Oceana Publications Inc., 1991), 55 (vol. XV), 365 
(vol. XVII), 241 & 246 (vol. XIV), and 433 (vol. XIX, 1993). 
925 See note 907 in the Chapter VII. 
926 J. Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence, 78 & 108, Karl P. Sauvant, The Third 
World Without Superpowers, Second Series: The Collected Documents of the Group of 77 vol. 1, 
369. 
927 Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77,113. 
928 Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77,117. 
929 Group of Seventy-Seven at the United Nations, "Presiding Countries of the Group of 77 in 
New York", (littp: //www. e 
930 Johan Saravanamuttu, "Malaysia's Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Period, 1981-1995 : An 
Iconoclast Come to Rule", Asian Journal of Political Science 4 (1) June 1996,6 (1-16). 
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Committee on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (IFCC-VII) in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia in 1989,931 and others. Saudi Arabia also became a member of several 
committees of the Group of 77, for example as one of the co-ordinator countries of the 
932 Group of 77 in Geneva in 1968, was involved in the preparatory committees for the 
1979 Fourth Ministerial Meeting, 933 and during the early post-energy crisis of 1973 the 
Kingdom, with other 18 less developed countries (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia), represented the Group of 77 to negotiate with developed 
countries in the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CLEC), called `the 
north-south dialogue', between 1975-1977. From this dialogue, Saudi Arabia was 
appointed, alongside with Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Venezuela, 
and Zaire (and also a few developed countries led by the United States), as one of the 
Energy Committees of the four commissions (Energy, Raw Materials, Development, and 
Finance) of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC). 934 
Furthermore, post-1973 and onwards, the Kingdom had contributed financial aid to 70 
less developed countries, mostly to the members of the Group of 77, which 
approximately amounted to $80 billion dollars, and it was endeavouring to continue 
granting aid to these poor countries in the years to come. 935 
93 Karl P. Sauvant & Joachim W. Muller, The Third World Without Superpowers. Second Series: 
The Collected Documents of the Group of 77 vol. xv, (New York : Oceana Publications Inc., 
1991), 174. 
932 Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77,122. 
933 Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77,114. 
93" Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organization, 93-98, Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 
77,127-128. 
935 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington D. C., "Kingdom's Address to Group-77 South 
Summit, Havana, delivered by H. E. Dr. Nizar bin Obain Madani, Assistant to the Foreign 
Minister", 14`h of April, 2000, 
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7.4.3 Malaysia's Relations with Saudi Arabia in the Group of 77 
As the affiliation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 
which in some ways could not provide an early basis of the interaction between these two 
countries, the Group of 77 also is not an organization where Malaysia can further 
improve its relations with Saudi Arabia, especially in economic relations. Although 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia had joined the Group of 77 in 1964, the trade relations 
between these two countries were not progressively growing. 
936 As was discussed in 
Chapter V, most of the pattern of the trade relations had been in deficit from the former 
than the latter, and it was only in the late 1990s where the trade indicated some positive 
improvements (but was still in deficit after about 30 years of both countries' participation 
in the Group of 77), also the main trading partners of both countries were developed 
countries. 937 Beside that, Malaysia started receiving Saudi aid only in 1975, not through 
the Group of 77 but more on a bilateral effort basis (mostly from Malaysia's efforts), 
following the official visits by the Malaysian Premiers, the late Tunku Abdul Rahman 
and Tun Abdul Razak, to the Kingdom. 
938 The less encouraging situation for the Group 
(http"//www saudiembassy net/2000News/Statements/SpeechDetail. asp'? clndex=260), "Saudi 
Delegate Says Kingdom will Continue Aiding Developing Countries", Saudi Information Source, 
June 30,2004, (http: //www. s4Lidinf. com/main/y7297. litii ). 
936 Even trade relations among less developed countries (south-south trade) were not so 
encouraging. For instance, in 1970, less developed countries traded just under 20 per cent of their 
merchandise with each other ($11.2 billion out of total merchandise trade of $55.9 billion), and 
by 1990, they were trading 25.2 per cent of their goods with each other ($186.7 billion out of 
$740 billion). For further detail see John Madeley, Trade and the Poor : The Impact of 
International Trade on Developing Countries (London : Intermediate Technology Publications 
Ltd., 1992), 159. 
937 See for instance, pages 134-135 & 145-146 in the Chapter V. 
938 Although, since the post-energy crisis of 1973, Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members had 
begun to distribute some financial aid to less developed countries, in the case of Malaysia it had 
been developed earlier based on personal relations between the late Tunku Abdul Rahman and 
King Feisal, especially when the former was offered to become the first Secretary of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference during the latter's visit to Malaysia in 1970. For further 
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of 77 in fostering closer Malaysian relations with Saudi Arabia in the economic fields 
could be largely attributed to the different economic orientation of these two countries in 
the group itself. 
As has been noticed, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia produce different set of 
commodities for export, for example the Malaysia's products are mostly associated with 
non-oil commodities, rubber, and tin (also palm oil, timber, iron, and others), 
939 while the 
Saudi Arabia's is more on the extraction of oil. 
940 The different sets of commodities 
produced by Malaysia and Saudi Arabia indirectly led them to take different approaches, 
despite being members of the Group of 77, specifically in order to stabilize their price 
commodities in the international trade system, and it is quite apparent that Malaysia 
seemingly needs the Group of 77 more than the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in facing the 
world market's fluctuation. This can be linked to the reaction of Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia in the Group of 77 where Malaysia was more dependent upon the group than the 
Kingdom in stabilizing its commodities in the international market. For instance, for the 
price stabilization of rubber and tin, 941 Malaysia firmly supported the Group of 77's effort 
explanation on King Feisal's visit to Malaysia see pages 86-87 & 103-104 in the chapter IV, and 
Saudi aid see pages 159-161 in the Chapter V. 
939 Before Malaysia emphasised the manufacturing sector as a way towards the industrialization 
process, the export of rubber and tin alone accounted for 85 per cent of all Malaysia's exports, 
especially during the period of the 1950s to early 1970s. But at the end of the 1970s, the sector of 
agricultural-raw material commodities began to decline from 30.8 per cent in 1970 to 20.4 per 
cent in 1989 as manufacturing sector started to grow from 13.4 per cent (1970) to 25.1 per cent 
(1989) respectively. J. Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence, 30, Chong Kwong Yuan, 
"Trade and External Relations", in E. K. Fisk & H. Osman-Rani (ed. ), The Political Economy of 
Malaysia (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1982), 184, Mohamed Ariff, The Malaysian 
Economy : Pacific Connections (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1991), 7. 
940 See the sub-topic : "The Background of the Saudi Arabian Economy" in the Chapter V. 
941 Malaysia also took some unilateral actions in stabilizing the price of rubber, or formed a few 
associations with other producing countries (not Saudi Arabia) such as the Association of Natural 
Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC), and the International Tin Council. 
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to set up the scheme of the Integrated Programme Commodities (IPC), and the Common 
Fund in facing price uncertainties in the international trade system, 942 and rubber was the 
first commodity to reach the stage of negotiations within this scheme at the end of 
1978.943 Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, along with other major oil producing 
countries, was much more reliant on their own organization, the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in 1960, to strongly influence the price 
of oil in the world market. 944 Malaysia's support for the Integrated Programme 
Commodities (IPC), and the Common Fund was mainly due to the continuous weakening 
price of its commodities, rubber and tin, compared to the price of oil which had been 
improving, although inconsistently, since the post-energy crisis of 1973. For instance, the 
price of rubber fell from RM300 cents per kilo in 1960 to a low of under RM 100 cents 
per kilo in 1972 '945 and persistently 
below RM300 cents per kilo heading towards the 
1980s-1990s. 946 The price of tin dropped abruptly from US$29 per kilo before the 
collapse of the International Tin Agreement (ITA) in 1985 to only US$13-US$14 per kilo 
in the 1990s, 947 (See also Table 1 for the prices of rubber and tin, which were 
942 For further elaboration on the Integrated Programme Commodities (IPC), and the Common 
Fund, see notes 918 & 919 in the Chapter VII. 
gas Richard Stubbs, "Malaysia's Rubber Smallholding Industry : Crisis and the Search for 
Stability", Pacific Affairs 56 (1) Spring 1983,95 (84-105). 
944 However, there were some arguments that OPEC was not responsible for setting oil prices, but 
with certain of its members, especially the largest oil producers. Paul Hallwood & Stuart W. 
Sinclair, Oil, Debt and Development : OPEC in the Third World (London : George Allen & 
Unwin, 1981), 45. 
v4s Richard Stubbs, "Malaysia's Rubber Smallholding Industry, 86-87. 
946 "Rubber Price, A New Hope From Tire Industry", April 3,2001 
(http: //www. ai, troin(ionegia. com/news/enm/200 l /apr/03-04-0 l. htm). 
94' After the collapse of the International Tin Agreement (ITA) in 1985, the price of tin crashed by 
50 per cent. Trade Economic Database (TED) Projects, "TED Case Studies : Tin Mining in 
Malaysia, Present and Future", (http: //www. american. edufrED/tin. htm). See also Eric J. 
McFadden on the collapse of the International Tin Agreement (ITA) in 1985, Eric J. McFadden, 
"The Collapse of Tin : Restructuring a Failed Commodity Agreement", The American Journal of 
International Law 80 (4) October 1986,811-815 (811-830). 
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continuously unstable from 1970 to the early 1980s) which directly turned the Malaysian 
government to giving more focus on heavy industries in the early 1980s. 948 In contrast the 
price of oil rapidly increased from only US$5.12 per barrel before 1974 to US$11.65 per 
barrel in 1974 and onwards till the highest peak from 1980 to 1982 at US$35-US$32 per 
barrel949 (See Table 2 for the price of oil from 1973 to 1990). It did not simply show, 
however, that Saudi Arabia had ignored the Integrated Programme Commodities (IPC), 
and the Common Fund proposed by the Group of 77 in UNCTAD IV in 1976 '950 
but the 
establishment of these two schemes was mainly directed to the sustenance of the price of 
non-oil commodities which noticeably had less bargaining power than oil as the main 
world source of energy. For commodities like rubber and tin, Malaysia does not only face 
frequent price fluctuations in the world market but also has to deal with the challenge of 
synthetic rubber, 951 and the use of other materials like plastic and aluminum in the 
packaging industry as an alternative to tin. 952 
948 Jomo K. S., "Introduction", in Jomo K. S. (ed. ), Industrialising Malaysia : Policy, Performance, 
Prospects (London : Routledge, 1993), 2. 
949 Towards 1990s, the price of oil continuously fluctuates around US$22-US$28 per barrel. 
James L. Williams, "Oil Price History and Analysis", Energy Economics Newsletter, 1996-2003, 
1& 3-5, (http: //www. wtrg. com/prices. htm). Energy Information Administration (EIA), "World 
Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies . 1970-2003", March 2004,7-11, 
(http: //www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/chron. html). 
950 Even Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait announced some cash contributions to the fund (Besides, the 
Kingdom, and other OPEC members indicated their willingness to loan the Common Fund). See 
Gwyneth Williams, Third-World Political Organizations, 36-37, Christopher P. Brown, The 
Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980), 
108, and 311. 
951 The percentage use of synthetic rubber at the end of 1990s (or early 200-2001) was 52 per 
cent, and 48 per cent for natural rubber. A. F. S. Budiman, "Recent Development in Natural 
Rubber Prices", Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Corporate Document Repository, 
(http: //www. fao. or;., /documents/show cdr. asp'? url file=/DOCRF, P/006/Y4344E/y, 4344eOd htm). 
952 Chong Kwong Yuan, "Trade and External Relations", 193. 
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Table 1. The Price of Rubber & Tin* 
Commodity 
Price, cent 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
($)/kg 
Rubber 126 155 119 97 123 111 92 81 
Tin 984 1,570 1,337 1,247 1,291 1,254 1,192 518 
*Kedar N. Kohli & Ifzal Ali, "Falling Commodity Prices : Implications for Asian and Pacific 
Developing Countries", Asian Development Review 5 (1) 1987,49 (44-60). 
Table 2. The Price of Oil* 
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*Energy Information Administration, "World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies : 1970- 
2003", (httg: //www. eia. doc. gov/erneu/cabs/chron. html). 9s' 
... Referring to the Table 2, although there are some declining moments for the price of oil, 
especially from 1986-1988, but it does not return to the price of the early 1970s. For the 
chronology of the oil price from 1973-1990 as the following; 1973 (US$5.18 per barrel), 1974 
(US$11.65 per barrel), 1975 (US$14.81 per barrel), 1976 (US$13.71 per barrel), 1977 (US$14.76 
per barrel), 1978 (US$14.94 per barrel), 1979 (US$28.91 per barrel), 1980 (US$35.63 per barrel), 
1981 (US$35.95 per barrel), 1982 (US$32.85 per barrel), 1983 (US$29.2 per barrel), 1984 
(US$28.02 per barrel), 1985 (US$26.21 per barrel), 1986 (US$14.17 per barrel), 1987 (US$17.2 
per barrel), 1988 (US$14.11 per barrel), 1989 (US$20.05 per barrel), 1990 (US$25.53 per barrel). 
Energy Information Administration, "World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies : 1970- 
2003", (hLtp_-_L, 'AwwL.. eia-. doe. gov/eiiieu/cabs. /`chron. html). 
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Besides that, at UNCTAD II in 1970, the Group of 77 had reached an agreement 
with developed countries to grant a preferential access, or so-called `Generalised System 
of Preferences' (GSP), to enable the Group's raw materials and manufacturing products 
to easily penetrate the latter's markets. The granting of GSPs, however, were bound to 
certain exceptions based upon individual developed countries' preferences, in which 
some products would be excluded from the GSP such as textiles, petroleum and 
petroleum products, leather and leather goods. 954 In regards to the commodities produced 
by Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, both countries would certainly experience different 
treatment under the GSP. For example, it could generally be said that Malaysia's 
products, which were mostly non-oil commodities, had enjoyed some advantages of the 
GSP by less complicatedly accessing several developed countries markets, including the 
United States, 955 (nevertheless, not all Malaysia's commodities were granted GSP 
scheme956), but the movement of the Saudi Arabia's oil commodities in a few developed 
countries (with the exception of the EEC countries)957 were not put under the GSP, 
954 See note 915 in the Chapter VII. 
955 For example, Malaysia's exports to developed countries, through GSP, were over RM2 billion 
a year during the 1980-1985, and Malaysia was placed among the top fifteen beneficiaries of the 
GSP scheme. Nevertheless Malaysia had graduated from the U. S. GSP from 1 January 1997, and 
beginning from January 1998 Malaysia also graduated from the EU GSP. Mohamed Ariff, The 
Malaysian Economy, 97, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), "The Generalised 
System of Preferences", (littp: //www. miti. , oý, v. m 
/ttrd-support. html), Malaysia External Trade 
Development Corporation (MATRADE), "Assisting Malaysian Exporters", 
(htip: //www. matrade. gov. my/exporter/'how-to/expot-ter-howl 7. htm). 
956 For example, the US GSP, excludes palm oil but provides duty-free preferential treatment to 
palm-kernel oil. Malaysia's manufactured exports vary from one developed country to another, 
such as sawn timber faces 5 per cent GSP tariff rate in Japan, while plywood exports were applied 
9 per cent in the US, and most of Malaysia's electronic components, however, enjoy duty-free 
treatment in the US (since these products are the exports of its own multinationals). The other 
Malaysian commodities that are given GSP access include rubber products, cocoa products, 
textiles, and garments. See Mohamed Ariff, The Malaysian Economy, 97. 
957 In 1984, however, the EEC had to impose a 13.5 per cent common customs tariff on Saudi 
methanol entering Europe because the Saudi government had exceeded their duty-free allowance 
under the EEC's Generalised System of Preferences. Nowadays, Saudi and other members of the 
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especially in the United States' market. 958 This is largely because most of the developed 
countries, like the United States and Japan, excluded petroleum and petroleum products 
from the GSP, 959 and also the United States in particular, considered that petroleum and 
petroleum products were already highly competitive in the international market compared 
with other, non-oil, commodities of less developed countries. 
960 Therefore, the 
implementation of the GSP had not provided similar, or only limited, access of several 
commodities of less developed countries, including the products of Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia, which prompted both countries to seek other alternatives, beyond the scope of the 
Group of 77 activities, such as forming bilateral agreements with other countries or 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) have been negotiating with European Union on establishing a 
Free Trade Agreement for both sides. "EEC-Arab Talks to Focus on Petrochemicals Exports", 
December 14,1984 (http"//www sun sonline. org/tradc/areas/industry/12140084. htm), Europa, 
"Bilateral Trade Relations, Saudi Arabia (Gulf Co-operation Council)", May 2002, 
(htip: //europa. eii. int/comni/trade/bilateral/gcc/saa. htm), and for the list of developing countries 
including Saudi Arabia and Territories (but still subjected to changes of economic development 
of these countries and territories) enjoying Generalised Tariff Preferences see UK Trade and 
Investment, "European Community Rules of Origin", 
(http: //www. invest. uktradeinvest gov uk/Uploads/Ini-oSheets/European°o20Rules. pd1), Marianne 
Kurzweil, Oliver von Ledebur & Petra Salamon, "EU-Trade Agreements - What Are They 
Dealing With? ", Policy Brief No. 3, See Annex on Preferential Trade Agreements of the 
European Union, European Network of Agricultural and Rural Policy Research Institutes 
(ENARPRI), November 2003, (http /I ww. enarpri. org/Publications/PBNo3. pol). 
958 Peter J. Ginman & Tracy Murray, "The Generalized System of Preferences :A Review and 
Appraisal", in Karl P. Sauvant & Hajo Hasenpflug (ed. ), The New International Economic Order 
" Confrontation or Cooperation Between North and South?, (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 
Inc., 1977), 193-194, UNCTAD, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Third Session, Vol. lI Merchandise Trade, 107. 
959 It is to be admitted, however, that although some of the petroleum and petroleum products are 
exempted from the GSP, but it does not necessarily mean that it is difficult for the Saudi 
government to export its oil to US market because even without the GSP scheme, based on both 
countries established mutual'co-operation since the discovery of the oil in the Arabian Peninsula, 
the US remains Saudi Aramco's largest customer in the oil market system. U. S-Saudi Arabian 
Business Council, "Welcoming Remarks by John Lichtblau, Chairman of the Petroleum Industry 
Research Foundation Inc., at the Meeting of US-Saudi Energy and Economic Relations in Global 
Perspective, Washington D. C., April 22,2002, (http: //www. us-sau(ii- 
business or *Speeches/Litchblau%20speech. htm), UNCTAD, Proceedings of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session, Vol. II Merchandise Trade, 107. 
96° Thomas R. Graham, "The U. S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries", 
72. 
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putting more stress on their own regional economic spheres, in order to enlarge their 
market coverage. On top of that, the application of GSP in most of the trade relations 
between developed countries and less developed countries had, to some extent, led the 
relations of the latter (specifically for the commodities of less developed countries that 
were given the GSP access) closer to the former than among the less developed countries 
themselves. Even so, most of the less developed countries would pay less attention to any 
members of the Group of 77 that provide strict rules and regulations in trading with them, 
as the Malaysian government found it difficult to venture some business activities in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia due to its stringent trading regulations. 
961 In other words, the 
efforts of the Group of 77 to implement GSP in the international trade system had given 
different experiences for its members (which in some ways could not contribute to 
fostering the relations of the Group of 77), and at the same time also, GSP had opened 
more `doors' between developed countries and less developed countries to frequently 
interact in economic issues than among the less developed countries, especially in 
economic relations between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (although, the study cannot deny 
that other trade relations between less developed countries were improving, especially 
between the South and the Southeast Asian regions which, for example, accounted for 
more than 50 per cent, excluding fuels trade, of the total South-South export in the period 
1955-1989962). 
96' See pages 158-159 in the Chapter V. 
962 Steen Folke, Niels Fold & Thyge Enevoldsen, South-South Trade and Development 
Manufacturers in the New International Division of Labour (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1993) see Table 2.3 in page 13 of this book. 
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Furthermore, an effort by a few members of the Group of 77 to further strengthen 
economic co-operation among less developed countries by establishing the Global 
System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) in 1988, which came into force in 1989, and which 
attempted to offer preferential tariff treatment for participating countries, 963 was only 
participated in by Malaysia, and not the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The non-membership 
of the Kingdom in GSTP might be linked to the nature of this preferential agreement 
which gave more emphasis to the agricultural and industrial commodities that were 
considered as eligible products under GSTP coverage. 964 In addition to this, since most of 
the less developed countries have normally imposed a high tariff among themselves, for 
instance the Kingdom alone taxed Malaysian goods entering its market at 12 per cent, 965 
and the simple average tariff in less developed countries is 17.9 per cent compared with 
5.2 per cent in developed countries, 966 (which indirectly discourages the growth of trade 
between less developed countries), thus any reduction of their tariff levels, as proposed in 
"3 There are 45 members of less developed countries participate in the Global System of Trade 
Preferences; a) African region : Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guyana, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Qatar, Sudan, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, 
Zaire, and Zimbabwe), b) Europe : Romania and Yugoslavia, c) Asia : Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, d) Latin America : Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Karl P. Sauvant & Joachim W. Muller, 
The Third World Without Superpowers, Second Series: The Collected Documents of the Group 
of 77, volume xv, (New York : Oceana Publications Inc., 1991), 189-191, Department of Foreign 
Trade, Trade Preferences, Thailand, "The Global System of Trade Preferences", 
(http: //www. dit. mot. (-, o. th/cng/Trade/GSTPI. html), Department of Foreign Trade, Trade 
Preferences, Thailand, "The Global System of Trade Preferences", 
(http: //ww'v. df't. moc. go. thlent/Trade/GSTP2. html). 
' Among the major eligible products under the GSTP are cereals, lac, gum, meat, fish, 
preparation of vegetables, fruits, nuts, tobacco, electrical machinery, and et cetera. 
Department of Foreign Trade, Trade Preferences, Thailand, "The Global System of Trade 
Preferences", (http: //www. dft. moc. go. th/engrFrade/GSI'Pl. htmi). 
See page 158 in the Chapter V. 
9" "Exploring Potential of South-South Agreements Including Global System of Trade 
Preferences (GSTP), June 4,2004", ESCWA Report to the Forum on, "Multilateral ism and 
Regionalism : The New Interface", a Pre-Event of the Eleventh Session of the UNCTAD XI, June 
8,2004, Sao Paolo, Brazil, (ham: /hiww. escwa. org. lb/divisions/ead/reports/south-sotith, p(it). 
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GSTP, was incompatible with their trade and economic procedures. 967 Along with that, 
although in the late 1980s and onwards, especially during Dr. Mahathir's era (the fourth 
Malaysian Premier), Malaysia had become more active in promoting economic co- 
operation among members of the Group of 77, for example chairing the steering 
committee of the Second South-South Dialogue in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1985, and 
being the motivating force of the creation of the Group of 15 in 1988,968 nonetheless, 
most of the efforts did not directly involve Malaysia with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
For the Kingdom was not part of the Group of 15, and instead Malaysia worked closely 
with other members of the group like Egypt, India, Senegal, and Venezuela, Algeria, 
Argentina, Indonesia, Jamaica, Nigeria, Peru, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. 969 Besides, Dr. 
Mahathir's economic policy was much directed towards the concept of the `Look East 
Policy' which endeavoured to emulate the successfulness of two Asian giants, namely 
Japan and South Korea, in the international economic system, and had further kept 
Malaysia interacting less economically with the Kingdom. 
In some ways, however, it cannot be denied that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
played some vital roles in the Group of 77 by distributing its financial aid, mostly through 
the Saudi Development Fund (SDF), to several less developed countries and especially 
among the poorest countries, in order to develop their economic infrastructures, and 
96' Beside that, this also might be referred to a general view of some of these countries that trade 
with poor neighbours as second best to that with developed countries. "Poor Nations Launch 
Talks to Lower Trade Barriers", June 18,2004, 
(httQ//www. f foost. org/news/modules. php? op=modload&name=News&t ile=articles&s... ). 
9s David Camroux, "Looking East and Inwards : Internal Factors in Malaysian Foreign Relations 
During the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994", Australia-Asia Paper No. 72, (Griffith University : Faculty 
of Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, October 
1994), 24 (1-62). 
969 Kripa Sridharan, "G-15 and South-South Cooperation", 359. 
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Malaysia was one of the recipients of the Kingdom's fund. By giving away some 
financial aid, it would be a bridge for Saudi Arabia to further strengthen its economic 
relations with these less developed countries. Ye, the distribution of the funds could also 
be considered as the Kingdom's, and also for other OPEC members, form of 
compensation for high oil prices from which they had gained huge surpluses benefitting 
from the booming oil price since the oil crisis of 1973. This was because the Saudi 
government, and other OPEC members, had only started giving away financial aid to 
some poor members of the Group of 77 after the post-oil crisis in 1973. Aware of the 
danger of high oil prices without adequate compensation in the form of aid would 
stimulate less developed countries to join developed countries in open demand for the 
reduction of oil which the OPEC members were themselves reluctant to do. 
970 The 
demand by less developed countries for oil price reduction could be referred to some 
dissent by several members of the Group of 77 from OPEC, such as before the end of 
1973 at an extraordinary meeting of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) where a 
few statesmen from Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya appealed to OPEC to reduce the price 
of oil but their request was turned down. Instead Arab OPEC members offered US$200 
million aid to Africa. Also prior to UNCTAD V, Costa Rica was active in assembling a 
new group called `Organisation of Oil Importing Countries' (OPIC) to specifically urge 
Venezuela to sell oil at a reasonable price to its neighbouring Latin Americans. 971 Along 
with that, between 1970 and 1979, the price that less developed countries paid for oil 
increased hugely from USS1.80 per barrel to US$18 per barrel (an increase of 1,000 per 
9'o Paul Hallwood & Stuart W. Sinclair, Oil, Debt and Development, 107. 
971 Paul Hallwood & Stuart W. Sinclair, Oil, Debt and Development, 2-3. 
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cent), 972 and their outstanding debts were also accelerating greatly from US$91 billion in 
1974 to US$165 billion in 1977,973 which further called for Saudi Arabia and other OPEC 
members to reduce the price of oil. Therefore, those financial aids given to less developed 
countries were significant for the Saudi government as well as the other OPEC members 
in order to maintain their relations with other members of the Group of 77. 
In the context of Malaysia, it was admitted that the distribution of the Kingdom's 
fund which began in 1975 could be considered as one of the initial steps that could bring 
these two countries closer in the economic field. Nevertheless, as was mentioned before, 
the financial aid that given by the Kingdom was not largely due to the membership of 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the Group of 77, but had been developed earlier since King 
Feisal's offer to Tunku Abdul Rahman to become the first Secretary of the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1970. Without denying the role of Saudi Arabia's 
financial aid, at least in providing some opportunities for Malaysia to undertake some 
economic activities in the Kingdom, the aid itself did not contribute much, especially 
during the 1970s and the 1980s, to further accelerate the economic relations between the 
two countries. This probably could be linked to the manner of the Kingdom's fund itself 
which was only granted to Malaysia for a limited period of time starting from 1975 and 
ending in 1983 (in fact, Malaysia only received three times, namely in 1975,1979 and 
972 Paul Hallwood & Stuart W. Sinclair, Oil, Debt and Development, 56. 
973 Nevertheless, Paul Hallwood & Stuart W. Sinclair argued that there was a difficulty in relating 
the impact of the OPEC price rises to less developed countries' debts which mainly affected 
several countries such as Mexico, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Argentina, Chile, and others. See 
Paul Hallwood & Stuart W. Sinclair, Oil, Debt and Development, 84. 
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1983974), and from the 1990s, and onwards, Malaysia no longer received aid because the 
Kingdom considered Malaysia to be one of the developing nations in the world. 975 
Moreover, although the amount of the aid was quite huge, approximately SR312.30 
million, it only could be spent on a few projects in the Third Malaysian Development 
Plan, particularly during the period of the late Tun Hussein Orin, the third Malaysian 
Premier. After the era of Tun Hussein, owing to Dr. Mahathir's industrialization 
aspirations in the early 1980s (Dr. Mahathir succeeded Tun Hussein in 1981), the 
Malaysian government, by not merely depending on Saudi aid (the last Saudi aid was in 
1983 amounting to US$1.3 million to build four district hospitals), had to borrow more 
capital, mostly from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and also from 
syndicated loans976 obtained in international markets in order to finance its development 
projects and industrial ventures. 977 Besides that, achieving Dr. Mahathir's aim to turn 
Malaysia into one of the leading industrial countries in the Asian region had also 
indirectly not made Saudi Arabia one of Malaysia's main destinations. Instead some 
newly industrializing Asian countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well 
as the more established Japan, had become the best models to be followed by the 
Malaysian government in achieving industrial status. 
9'4 Anuar Kasman, "Brief on Malaysia's Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia", (Embassy of 
Malaysia in Riyadh, 2004), 17. 
975 Anuar Kasman, "Brief on Malaysia's Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia", 18. 
976 Syndicated loan is a loan provided by a syndicate of banks or other lending institutions. It is 
normally arranged by one of a small group of leading banks negotiating the terms, and persuading 
a large number of other lenders to take up small parts of the loan. Syndicated loan is usually 
offered to less developed countries. John Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 455. 
977 Mohamed Ariff, The Malaysian Economy, 39. 
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Apart from different economic orientations for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, the 
limited application of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) upon commodities of 
less developed countries, some efforts by Malaysia and other less developed countries 
within the Group of 77, especially to set up Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP), 
and the Group of 15, and the Saudi aid (which some extend had provided basic 
interaction for both countries in economic fields), some features of the Group of 77 are 
also not an encouraging circumstance for both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to forge closer 
relations in the international economic system. Those features include the large 
membership of the Group of 77 where the total of its members rapidly increased from 77 
countries in 1964 to 132 countries at the end of the 1990s. 978 Since these countries 
originate from different continents, the Group of 77 is not a homogenous organization, 
and certainly the immediate interests and specific negotiating priorities among its 
members, (without exception to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia), are different from each 
other. 979 With the vast number of members also, the group does not have a strong 
unifying institutional administration (mostly of an ad hoc nature) particularly in terms of 
leadership and its administrative staff, which rotates on an annual basis among the three 
regional groups, Latin America, Africa and Asia. 980 This leadership rotation might be 
more problematic for the Asian region than Latin America and Africa since most of its 
98 Ashwani Kumar Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in Global Politics : The Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Group of 77 in the United Nations General Assembly", Unpublished Ph. D. 
Thesis (Sussex : University of Sussex, October 2000), 93-95. 
979 Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77,9. 
980 It could be said that the Group of 77 has informal coordinating groups at all headquarters of 
the various United Nations specialized agencies such as at UNCTAD, UN Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Monetary Fund/World Bank, the United 
Nations in New York, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and others. Ashwani Kumar 
Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in Global Politics", 96 & 106, Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 
77,9&27. 
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members are diverse, from oil rich countries, newly industrializing nations, to the small 
islands (Fiji, Samoa and Maldives); also it has no history of big regional cooperation like 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or the Latin American Free Trade Area 
(LAFTA), which could encourage them to regularly interact in a bigger Asian group. 
981 
Instead, Asian countries tend to be more communicative in rather small-separated 
regional groups, like Malaysia in the ASEAN and Saudi Arabia in the GCC, and this 
situation does not offer much help for Malaysia and the Kingdom to interact more 
intimately in the Group of 77, whose scope and purposes are much wider and bigger than 
their own geographically limited regional organizations. Moreover, in order to 
accommodate both the complexity of the members' needs and to tackle a range of issues 
of international economic development, the Group of 77 has a variety of sub-groups 
including the Group of 19, the Group of 24, the Group of 15 and others, which have their 
own specifications and functions, as well as different members that are selected within 
the group itself. 982 In most situations, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia were usually not both 
working in the same sub-group: Malaysia was not a member of the Group of 19,983 while 
Saudi Arabia was not in the Group of 15.984 Furthermore, not much different to the Non- 
Aligned Movement (NAM), the roles of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the Group of 77, 
particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, was overshadowed by the most influential 
countries in the group like Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
"'Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation, 93-94. 
982 For further elaboration on the structure and the organization of the Group of 77 see Karl P. 
Sauvant, The Group of 77,27-86. 
983 See note 934 in the Chapter VII. 
984 See note 969 in the Chapter VII. 
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Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 985 
These countries, particularly Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia, had been actively 
promoting the interests of smaller states vis-ä-vis the power rivalries of superpowers as 
well as the stiff competition posed by major industrial countries in the world economy. 986 
Meanwhile, the Latin American countries are indeed the architects of the creation of the 
Group of 77 where, through the inspiration of their renowned Argentinean economist, Dr. 
Raul Prebisch, they led the merger of Latin American and Afro-Asian countries to form 
the Group of 77 in 1964.987 Besides that, since the meeting of the Group of 77 is only at 
ministerial level and does not involve a summit of its members, frequent meeting of both 
Malaysia's and Saudi Arabia's leaders in the group is difficult to achieve, and it only 
occurred in 2000 when for the first time the summit meeting of the Group of 77 was held 
in Havana, Cuba. 988 Nevertheless, Malaysia was headed by its premier, Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamed, 989 but the Kingdom was only represented by H. E. Dr. Nizar bin Obani 
Madani, who acted as the Head of the Saudi Arabian Delegation to the summit. 990 
985 Karl P. Sauvant, The Group of 77,9, Ashwani Kumar Sharma, "Third World Solidarity in 
Global Politics", 184. 
986 The Philippines, however, only joined NAM in 1993, after the end of the Cold War. See 
"NAM Member List : Non-Aligned Movement Participants, Observers, and Guest", 7. 
987 Richard N. Gardner, "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development", 105-107. 
988 Martin Khor, "First Ever G-77 Summit Gets Under Way", Third World Network, 
(http: /hvw\v. twnside. orý-,,. sg/title/under. htm), "First Ever South Summit of G-77, Havana, Cuba, 
10-14 April 2000", Third World Network, (http: //www. twnside. org. si; /title/havana. htm). 
989 "China, Malaysia Agree on Stronger Ties", People's Daily, April 14,2000, 
(http: //ent; Iish_people. com. cn/english/200004/14/eng200004I4 38939. html), "South Summit 
Concludes in Havana", People's Daily, April 15,2000, 
(http: //enL,, Iish. people. com. cn/english/200004/15/eng2OoOO4l5 38993. html). 
99° Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington D. C., "Kingdom's Address to Group-77 South 
Summit, Havana, " 14`h of April, 2000 
(http: //www. saudicmbassv. net/2000News/Statements/Sp echDelail. asp? cln(ex=- 0). 
321 
On the question as to whether the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in 
the Group of 77 can safeguard their economic interests in the international economic 
system, which is largely influenced by major developed countries, both countries 
actually, as was explained in the Chapter V (see pages 158-172), are mutually and 
continuously interacting with developed countries. Although, on some occasions, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia especially led other OPEC members in 1973 to launch an oil 
embargo upon several developed countries, mainly the United States, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Denmark, Japan, and other developed countries99' (not the United Kingdom, 992 
France and Spain which were labelled as `friendly countries 993), owing to hard pressure 
(and some negotiating on the issue of Israel-Palestine, military, and technological 
agreements 994) from developed countries, especially the US, and France (France had 
proposed the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, 1975-1977) and also 
the appeal of less developed countries, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other Arab oil 
countries (except Libya), finally ended the embargo upon the US on March 18,1974.995 
Following the oil crisis, even though the price of oil inevitably rose, the relations between 
the Kingdom and the US, and also with other major developed countries improved. 
Malaysia too is closer to the developed countries as traditionally it had developed 
"' Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, "The Arab Oil Weapon :A Threat to International 
Peace", The American Journal of International Law 68 (3) July 1974,410-412 (410-439), Robert 
A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics, 47, Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), "World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies : 1970-2003", March 2004, 
7-11, (http: //ww,. v. eia. doe. ¬, ov/emeu/cabs/chron. htm)), 7. 
992 "Saudi-British Business and Political Relations", a Public Lecture given by HRH Prince Turki 
Al-Faisal, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the UK & Ireland, Curtis Auditorium, 
Herschel Building, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, May 11,2004. 
993 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, "Destination Embargo of Arab Oil : Its Legality Under International 
Law", The American Journal of International Law 68 (4) October 1974,597 (591-627). 
994 Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, "The Arab Oil Weapon", 412. 
"S Energy Information Administration (EIA), "World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies : 
1970-2003", March 2004,7-11, (http: //www eia doe. gov/eineulc ibs/chron. htni1), 7. 
322 
bilateral economic agreements with them since the end of the 1950s and onwards, like the 
UK (in the most part of Malaya's economic activities), West Germany, Japan, the US, 
and even with the former Soviet Union. 996 It was only when the Malaysian government 
realized the price of its main agricultural commodities, such as rubber and tin in 
particular, had miserably weakened after greatly benefitting from booming prices during 
the Korean War, that it initiated some demands, including joining the Group of 77, to re- 
stabilize the price of those commodities in the international trade system. 
While acknowledging that the members of the Group of 77 have been helpful in 
forming, at least, the economic solidarity of less developed countries in one big 
organization, in the case of Malaysia's economic development, there were not so many 
achievements that Malaysia could gain by becoming a member of the group. Apart from 
the application of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the introduction of the 
Integrated Programme Commodities (IPC) where only the price of its rubber and not tin, 
was being set, the setting up of the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) to 
enhance trade relations between less developed countries, and Malaysia in some parts, 
has registered positive trade volume with these countries by acquiring about RM90 
billion per year. 997 However the key economic development of Malaysia is mainly based 
on its dynamic integration with developed countries by practising an open economy to 
attract foreign direct investment, establish potential bilateral economic agreement with 
them including exploring some ventures in new project developments, and at the same 
996 J. Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence, 30-32. 
9" "PM : Negara Kecil Penting - Nilai Dagangan Dua Hala Dengan Mcreka Meningkat RM90b 
Setahun", Utusan Malaysia, 24 August 1999, 
(http: //utusan. com. my/utusan/archive. aspily=1999&(It=0824&nub=[. Jtusan Malavsiaý'l"_src=tituka 
1 ladapan&pg=fp 01. htm). 
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time a rapidly developing its industrialization plan to achieve the vision of Malaysia to 
become one of the industrial nations in 2020. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as has been 
stressed before, has an image in the Group of 77 as more the provider of financial aid for 
those among the poorest of less developed countries. The aid itself is so significant for 
the Kingdom because it would maintain the relations between the Kingdom, and the large 
number of members of the Group of 77. It could be indicated that the Kingdom, in fact, 
has less need for the Group of 77 (except for its oil markets) and conversely the group 
requires the Kingdom and other OPEC members more, specifically (along with the aid) in 
strongly pursuing the Group of 77's proposal for the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) towards developed countries in the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations 
General assembly in 1974 corresponding to the early post-oil crisis in 1973.8 Most of 
the members of the Group of 77 considered the event of the oil embargo led by the 
Kingdom had paved the way for them to negotiate the price of their non-oil commodities 
and other issues related to trade relations with developed countries. 999 
The Group of 77, in principle, has unlocked the door for Malaysia, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (and in some situations, the Kingdom and other OPEC members became 
the leader of other less developed countries) and other less developed countries to have 
an open dialogue with developed countries concerning the international trade system and 
other issues of economic development. In regards to the membership of Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia in the Group of 77, rather than being considered `unfriendliness' over the 
99" Karl P. Sauvant, "Toward the New International Economic Order", in Karl P. Sauvant & I-lajo 
Hasenpflug (ed. ), The New International Economic Order, 3-4. 
999 Philippe Braillard & Mohammad-Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations, 
165-166. 
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developed countries in the international economic system, both countries are very much 
in need of the latter's capital (especially Malaysia), investment opportunities and their 
technological know-how in order to rapidly develop these two countries in the future. 
Somehow, due to the different economic orientation of both countries, along with some 
other aspects including a few features of the Group of 77 that may not strongly motivate 
the level of interaction, the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the Group of 77 
could not further improve Malaysia's economic relations with the Kingdom, especially in 
the 1970s, and 1980s. It could even be said that the Group of 77 does not provide much 
opportunity for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in particular to enhance their economic 
bilateral relations, for both countries take different approaches to maintaining the price of 
their commodities in the international market. While at the end of the 1990s the relations 
were positively growing, this was much because of the efforts of Malaysia, after 
experiencing financial crisis in 1997, in attempting to find more economic markets and 
investment prospects in new countries as well as those countries that it did not have 
dynamic economic relations before, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in order to 
speed up the process of its economic recovery after the crisis. 1000 
7.5 The Organisation of The Islamic Conference (OIC) 
7.5.1 The Emergence of the OIC 
The emergence of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in the early 1970s 
has been generally connected with the continuous response among Muslim countries or 
10°° Khadijah Md. Khalid discussed about Malaysia's efforts in the 1990s in forming new partners 
for its business community, particularly with the members of the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC). See Khadijah Md. Khalid, "Malaysia's Growing Economic Relations with the 
Muslim World", Kyoto Review, issue no. 5, March 2004, (http: //k otoreview. cseas_k yoto- 
u. ac jp/issue/issue=d/article 362. doc). 
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several individual Muslim scholars, through the Pan-Islam movement, 1001 to the dominant 
feature of secularism in the international system which had superseded the Islamic 
Caliphate system roughly about 400 years ago1002 (post-War World II, the international 
secular system was largely dominated by two superpower rivalries between the US- 
democratic bloc, and the former Soviet-socialist bloc 1003) and as a result of the abolition 
of the Caliphate in 19231004 by Mustafa Kemal Atartuk (1881-1938) who wholly adopted 
secularism in his administration. 1005 Added to this was the tendency of the Muslim 
countries which, due to the overwhelming feature of secularism in the international 
1001 Pan-Islamism was initially linked to the effort of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) to 
consider `Sultan' as the legitimate Caliph among Muslim communities. However, the individual 
Muslim scholar responsile to the birth of Pan-Islam was Jamaluddin Afghani (1838-1897). The 
general character of Pan-Islamism was the realization of the Islamic ideal, the unity of the world 
in Islam, and the central direction under a leader (Imam) of the world community. Pan-Islamism 
was also as regarded a common action against the non-Islamic world or as the impact of the 
occident. Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism", The Journal of Modem history 41 
(1) March 1969,18 & 20 (17-28), Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism", The American 
Historical Review 47 (2) January 1942,279-280 & 286 (278-287). 
1002 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu argued that the secularization of international political system began 
with the emergence of the European state system resulted from the Peace of Westphalia Treaty in 
1648. See Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "Islam and Its Implications For the International System", in 
Metin Heper & Raphael Israeli (ed. ), Islam and Politics in the Modem Middle East (Sydney : 
Croom Helm Australia Pty Ltd., 1984), 105, David George, "Pax Islamica : An Alternative New 
World Order? ", 77. 
1003 Dr. `AbdulHamid `A. AbuSulayman addressed the rivalry of two superpowers that dominated 
the feature of international system. See Dr. `AbdulHamid `A. AbuSulayman, The Islamic Theory 
of International Relations : New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought (Herndon Va., 
USA : International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987), xix-xxi. 
1004 Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference : 1960-1992, 
The Nature of Deviation From the Kemalist Heritage (New York : Vantage Press, Inc., 1994), xi, 
Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC)", 17, `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference : An Introduction to 
An Islamic Political Institution, (Herndon, Va. USA : The International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 1988), 11, G. W. Choudhury, Islam and The Modern Muslim World (London : Scorpion 
Publishing Ltd., 1993), 182-183. 
1005 Samuel P. Huntington mentioned that the effort of Mustafa Kemal Atartuk or `Kemalism' in 
secularizing the Ottoman Turkey was to achieve modernization (by embracing westernization) 
through the abandonment of the indigenous culture (Islamic culture). Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London : Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 
1996), 73-74, see also Dr. `AbdulHamid `A. AbuSulayman, The Islamic Theory of International 
Relations, 134. 
326 
system, were no longer implementing Islamic principles but practising elements of 
secularism in their external relations, especially with other Muslim counterparts including 
those aligned with neutral states. They implemented non-interference in their internal 
matters, pursued secular national interests over religious principles like the joining of 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan in CENTO or the Baghdad Pact in 19551006 (which 
caused division to Arab-Muslim unity, especially between Egypt, and these four 
countries), Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Yemeni Civil War (for instance, between 
1956 and 1958) for the sake of the Kingdom's border with Yemen, 1007 the Malaysia- 
Indonesian confrontation (1963-1965), the Iran-Iraq War territorial dispute (1980-1988), 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (although these two cases occurred after the 
formation of the OIC but it showed that Muslim countries still concentrated more on their 
secular national interests rather than on religious demands), and others. ' 008 In order to 
address these issues, and more importantly to fill the gap created by the elimination of 
Islamic Caliphate which was so integral to the Muslim community, 1009 various meetings 
and conferences were held from the 1920s to the early 1960s by some Muslim countries, 
notably Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Malaya (later the Federation of 
Malaysia), Tunisia, Morocco, the Dutch East Indies (or Indonesia) and others, to discuss 
the possibility of uniting all Muslim communities under one single leadership)°'° 
1006 See notes 791 & 815 in the Chapter VII. 
100' Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (New York : Longman Group Limited, 1991), 
377. 
1008 The early abandonment of the Shari'a and the practice of secular international law in the 
Muslim world could be referred to the Ottoman's peace treaty with the Hapsburg Empire, and the 
Venetian Republic at the Congress of Carlowitz in 1699. David George, "Pax Islamica : An 
Alternative New World Order? ", 75 & 89 (see note 20), see also Peter Calvocoressi, World 
Politics Since 1945,361-370 (for Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). 
1009 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 11. 
1010 Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 11-12. 
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Among those conferences or initiatives taken were, for example, the first Islamic 
Congress in Cairo in May 1926, followed by King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud's Conference in 
Mecca in June 1926, the Jerusalem Conference in December 1931, the International 
Islamic Economic Conferences in Pakistan and Iran in 1949 and 1950 respectively, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman's call for a Commonwealth of all Muslim countries in 1961, King 
Feisal's tours to several Islamic countries to promote his Pan-Islamism in the early 1960s, 
the setting up of the Muslim World League (Rabitah al-'Alain al-Islami) in 1962, and 
others. )°11 Nonetheless, owing largely to ideological political differences, specifically 
between Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, 1012 and because 
most of the Muslim countries had yet to achieve independence, all these initiatives were 
futile in driving all Muslim countries to revive the Caliphate or, at least, to form an 
International Islamic Organization. It was only after the defeat of the Arabs, led by 
Egyptian Premier Jamal Abdel Nasser, in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, where the 
attitude of Arab Muslim countries in particular began to change, and simultaneously 
following the fire damage to al-Aqsa Mosque on 21 August 1969, that King Hassan 11 of 
Morocco, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim counterparts were prompted to 
unite against the burning of al-Aqsa Mosque as well as inaugurating the first Islamic 
Summit in Rabat, Morocco on 22-25 September 1969,1013 which also eventually cleared 
101. For further elaboration on several initiatives taken by Muslim countries to unite all Muslim 
communities see Gomathi AT Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC)", 2-13, `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, 11-17, G. W. Choudhury, Islam and The Modern Muslim World, 183-186, Noor 
Ahmad Baba, Organisation of Islamic Conference : Theory and Practice of Pan-Islamic 
Cooperation (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1994), 24-51. 
1012 Noor Ahmad Baba, Organisation of Islamic Conference : Theory and Practice of Pan-Islamic 
Cooperation (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers Pvt., Ltd., 1994), 39-40. 
1013 Shahid Husain, "Fostering Cooperation Among Muslim Countries : OIC's Response and 
Responsibilities", Pakistan Horizon 51 (2) 1998,18 (15-22), G. W. Choudhury, Islam and The 
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the way for the formation of an International Islamic Organization called the 
`Organisation of the Islamic Conference' (OIC) in 1972.1014 
The first Islamic Summit in Rabat, Morocco in 1969, which was attended by 24 
Muslim countries1015 (including Malaysia and Saudi Arabia), and the PLO as an observer, 
indirectly provided a platform for participating Muslim countries to organize frequently, 
and more systematically, a series of Islamic conferences between them, such as to hold an 
Islamic Summit every three years, and an Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers once a 
year. 1016 Besides that, the Muslim member countries had formulated the Charter of OIC 
in 1972 which specifically focused on the issue of the Palestinian people as well as the 
calls for the promotion of Islamic solidarity (in political, and socio-religious-economic 
fields) among Muslim countries, the respect for sovereignty, and self-determination, the 
upholding of international peace, the elimination of racial segregation and colonialism, 
and the prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity, national unity or 
Modem Muslim World, 186-187, Mohamad Abu Bakar, "Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy", in 
Mohammed Azhari Karim, Llewellyn D. Howell & Grace Okuda (ed. ), Malaysian Foreign Policy 
: Issues and Perspectives (Kuala Lumpur : Institut Tadbiran Awam Negara, Malaysia, 1990), 83, 
`Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 17-18, Noor Ahmad Baba, 
Organisation of Islamic Conference, 53-55. 
1014 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 19. 
1015 In other reports there were 25 Muslim countries which attended the conference including the 
Muslim Community of India. Others were Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Popular Republic of Southern Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab 
Republic (Egypt & Syria), and the Yemen Arab Republic. See Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference, "First Islamic Summit Conference", (http: //www. oic- 
oci. ore/english/fm/AII%2ODownload/Frm. 0l. htm), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 
"Organisation of the Islamic Conference", April 1981, page 1, British Public Record Office, UK 
(FO 973/360). 
1016 Organisation of the Islamic Conference, "First Islamic Summit Conference", 
oci. org/english/fi-n/A]1%20Dowiiload/Frm. 01. htm), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 
"Organisation of the Islamic Conference", April 1981, page 3, British Public Record Office, UK 
(FO 973/145). 
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political independence of any member state. 1017 The membership of the OIC has also 
grown from 24 countries in 1969 to 57 member countries in the late 1990s. The rapid 
increase in OIC membership is contributed to by the admission of a few Muslim newly 
independent states like Albania, which joined the OIC in 1992, Azerbaijan in 1992, 
Kazakhstan in 1995, Tajikistan in 1992, Turkmenistan in 1992, and Uzbekistan in 
1996.1018 As the major representative of all Muslim countries, the OIC has persistently 
attempted to pursue and promote the well-being of Muslim member countries, as well as 
all the Muslim communities as a whole, in facing the problems and challenges 
(especially for the issue of the Palestinian people) in the international political system. 
Ideally, it cannot be denied that the OIC is different from the character of NAM 
and the Group of 77 as these two organizations were established in direct response to the 
major changes of the feature of the international system after the end of the World War 
II. NAM is more towards the non-alignment of small states upon the rivalries of the two 
superpowers, and the Group of 77 is to sustain the economic of smaller states vis-a-vis 
developed countries. The nature of the OIC, as has been the endeavour of its members, is 
to trace back to the era of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and the 
Caliphate of Al-Rasyidin, where the main characteristic of the Muslim community or 
Ummah of that era was subjected to the Al-Qur'an and Al-Sunnah. In other words, the 
101 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 23-24, Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, "OIC in Brief", 1-2, (http: //ww-, v. oic-oci. org/enrlish/main/oic in brief. htm), 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, "Organisation of the Islamic Conference", April 
1984, page 1, British Public Record Office, UK (FO 973/360). 
l01ß The latest country joined OIC was the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire in 2001. See Organization of 
the Islamic Conference, "Member States", 1-3, (http: //www. oic-oci. org/en glig sh/niain/member- 
States. htm , `Abdullah al 
Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 45 (al Ahsan only 
mentioned the increase of OIC membership from 24 to 46 members between 1969 and 1986). 
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OIC has tried to exhibit itself as the manifestation of Ummah in the modem international 
system after the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate. Nevertheless, since the modern 
international system, to some extent, has been fundamentally circumscribed by the 
principle of secularism (particularly in the concept of nation-state, and state sovereignty), 
as was argued by David George, where all religious elements were eliminated, 
1019 the 
OIC's Ummatic conception is difficult to apply in the modern international system. This 
inevitably could be related to the vast difference in the Caliphate's and the OIC's 
approaches to the notion of sovereignty. The former was certainly considered by Ummah 
as the supreme political authority to implement the teachings of Islam, however, in the 
OIC, Muslim countries do not `exclusively' submit their state sovereignty, even as 
indicated by `Abdullah al Ahsan; member states are, in fact, stronger authorities than the 
OIC itself. '° ° On top of that, since the birth of the OIC has appeared in the modern 
international system, where the Islamic Caliphate no longer exists, OIC members have to 
acknowledge the dominant pattern of secularism and state sovereignty in the international 
system, and it simultaneously indicates that `Muslim countries' relations' was probably 
one of the sub-systems that formed the big umbrella of the modem international system. 
7.5.2 The Role of the OIC in Safeguarding Muslim Countries 
As NAM and the Group of 77 have responded actively to deal with the major changes of 
the pattern of the international system, how is the OIC, as the key agent of Muslim 
countries, to react in safeguarding the interests of its members and especially in regards 
to the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the organization, to face the 
101 David George, "Pax Islamica : An Alternative New World Order'? ", 72-73. 
1020 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 48. 
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challenges of the modem international system? As was previously mentioned, although 
the OIC theoretically attempted to portray itself as an organization that upholds Islamic 
teachings, in practical terms it is faced with the complex sovereignty of its members 
which are composed of various forms of government ranging from traditional monarchy 
to democratic, military, and autocratic regimes. This is the most noticeable obstacle for 
the OIC where it cannot surpass the sovereignty of its members, and heavily depends on 
them to implement its decisions. Moreover, unlike the Islamic Caliphate which had 
supreme authority to implement Shari'a (divine law), for instance Saidina Abu Bakr (the 
first Caliph) was able to implement the Shari'a by fighting against some tribes of Arabia 
who refused to pay zakah1021 after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon 
him), the OIC cannot implement Shari'a among its members (or even the larger Muslim 
community) because their membership in the organization is based upon voluntary 
submission. The OIC does not possess political authority as the Caliphate did. It mainly 
relies upon mutual consultation among its members which in some situations makes it 
difficult to achieve consensus in the organization. 1022 Therefore, it seems that the OIC has 
no obvious role in safeguarding the interests of its member countries as it does not have 
the capacity to overrule their sovereignty, and it is up to its members to maintain the 
sense of Islamic solidarity in the OIC. 1°23 Instead, the role of the OIC is more 
concentrated on giving critical responses to some of the Islamic issues (this is parallel 
with its inception to react to the burning of al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969), like the Palestinian 
1021 Zakah is the third pillar of Islam. It is the obligatory of sharing of wealth with the poor and the 
community at an annual rate, of appropriated wealth above a certain minimum. `Abdullah al 
Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 48 (see note 2 in this book). 
'022 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 48. 
1023 For further discussion see `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
48-51. 
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people, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq-Kuwait, and also to 
act as a mediator between two conflicting Muslim countries. 1024 
Nevertheless, in some situations, the role of the OIC which is more to solve, or at 
least endeavour to mediate in various Islamic issues and conflicts, does not provide an 
encouraging platform for members to integrate more closely among themselves, 
particularly if those issues contrast with, or would threaten, member. countries' national 
interests. It is only when some particular issues emerge (which are different from the 
issues that they disagreed upon) which have greater impact upon their own national 
interests that they will subsequently be induced to give support, or at least `reserve their 
stance' (by not indicating against an OIC decision) towards any OIC resolutions. This 
may be associated with the behaviour of Turkey's membership in the OIC, especially on 
the Israel-Palestine issue, where at the beginning of the Islamic Summit in Rabat in 1969, 
it opposed any condemnation of Israel or any attempt by OIC members to consider the 
Zionist movement as a racial, aggressive, and expansionist faction. 1025 Yet, after the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Turkey's stance on Israel gradually changed and it began to 
support the OIC's condemnation of Zionism as a form of racism and racial 
discrimination, and would not allow the US to use their military facilities to ship aid to 
Israel, while at the same time permitting the former Soviet Union to use its airspace to 
1021 Thus, OIC is normally considered as a political forum for Muslim countries to primarily 
concerned with consolidating cooperation among its members on various Arab-Muslim issues, 
including the Palestinian issue. Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, ix. 
lots Mohammad El Sayed Selim (ed. ), Abdel Monem Al-Mashet, Mounir Badawi Al-Sayed & Ola 
A. Abou Zeid, The Organization the Islamic Conference in A Changing World (Giza, Egypt : 
Center for Political Research & Studies, Faculty of Economics & Political Science, Cairo 
University, 1994), 66. 
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give military aid to Egypt and Syria. 1026 The change of Turkey's approach towards the 
Israel-Palestine issue was, for the most part, linked with its efforts to raise support from 
other Muslim countries in the case of Turkish minority in Cyprus, because it seemed that 
Turkey had lost hope in its Western allies as the US imposed an arms embargo upon it in 
February 1975 due to its military operation in Cyprus in July 1974. Thus, by continuously 
promoting the Palestinian issue among Muslim counterparts, eventually Turkey received 
OIC members' support in passing a resolution on the equality of rights of the two Cyprus 
communities; the Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots in the Seventh Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul, Turkey in May 1976.1027 
This is also similar to the Arab Muslim countries' early position on Turkish 
Cypriots in Cyprus where they did not vote Turkey's claim that it was granted, based on 
the Zurich-London Agreements of 1959-1960, to act as a guarantor of peace in Cyprus in 
December 1965 for UN Resolution 2077. Among the main reasons the Arab countries did 
not take Turkey's side was because Turkey, as discussed above, did not support the Arab 
stance on the Palestine issue and the tendency of the Arab countries, including the 
Palestinian people, to compare the respective positions of Jews in Palestine and Turkish 
Cypriots in Cyprus, where the Jewish community later formed a state in Palestine, and 
1026 Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 67-69 & 74- 
76. 
1027 However, Turkey still did not break off its diplomatic relations with Israel, despite supporting 
the Palestinian people. Its attitude towards the OIC, and the issues of Muslim countries is, in fact, 
as argued by Mahmut B. Aykan, as `balancing' between the Muslim world and the rest, 
depending largely on Turkey's affiliation with European communities, and as one of the NATO 
allies. See Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 75- 
79 & 100. 
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left the Palestinian people without a state. 1028 Along with that, the Arab countries were 
overwhelmed by the influential Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt who was concerned with 
the sensitivity of Cyprus as one of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Supporting Turkey would jeopardize the integrity of Cyprus. 1029 This Arab position on 
Turkey was unchanged until the formation of the OIC. However when Turkey, after the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1973, started to change its approach towards Palestine and became 
more active in the OIC, for example contributing to the budget of the organization, 
sending its Foreign Minister for the first time to the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers in Jeddah in 1975 and offering Istanbul as a host for the following Foreign 
Minister's conference in 1976, the Arab countries sided with Turkey to uphold the equal 
rights of the two main communities in Cyprus. 1030 
Furthermore, in solving Muslim issues or conflicts, the OIC was also bound to 
some limitations which indirectly might hinder its efforts to further safeguard the affairs 
of other Muslim countries, such as the maintenance of its mutual relations with other 
international organizations, mainly the Non-Aligned Movement that need to be respected, 
the character of the divisions between OIC members (especially between Arab Muslim 
countries) and also the concept of bilateralism between its members and non-OIC 
members (both Muslim, and non-Muslim countries).. This could be observed in OIC's 
interference in Islamic cases like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, 
Muslim minorities including the issue of the Kashmiri people between India and 
Pakistan, and others. In the case of the former Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan 
1028 Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 59. 
'029 Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 59. 
1010 Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 77. 
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(which was largely due to the concept of bilateralism among pro-Arab countries to the 
former Soviet Union), the resolution of the OIC to expel the Marxist regime in Kabul was 
not unanimous as a few pro-Soviet Arab countries such as Syria, and even the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) opposed the resolution, arguing that the Afghani 
government was still led by Afghan nationals. 
103 1 Then, the failure of the OIC to mediate, 
let alone solve, the conflicts between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988), was owing to the 
propensity of several OIC members which seemed to side with one or other of the 
conflicting parties. For instance, in the Iran-Iraq War, there were a few OlC members 
(specifically Saudi Arabia which was concerned with the Iranian revolution) who 
favoured Iraq over Iran, and to make matters worse for Iran, the OIC held the Twelfth 
Foreign Ministers Conference in Baghdad in June 1981 (while the war was still 
extremely tense), without paying attention to the protest of Iran which proposed that the 
OIC members should organize the conference in a neutral place. The OIC's rejection of 
Iran's protest was generally believed to be because of the Khomeini government's 
boycott of the Third Summit Conference in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in January 1981. At the 
end of the conference, the OIC had endorsed Iraqi's government's statement which was 
geared up for peaceful negotiation,, but at the same time Iraq accused Iran of being less 
than serious in resolving the conflict. The OIC's inclination to Iraq had disrupted its 
image as the mediator of Muslim countries' conflicts. 
1032 In another point of argument, 
the study believes that the tendency of the OIC members of seemingly giving more 
103 `Abdullah al Ahsan, "Organization of Islamic Conference : An United Nations of Muslim 
Countries", Conference on Globalism and the Muslim Ummah, 16-17 October 1993, International 
Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), & Yayasan Ummi, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia, 5, 
see also Mohammad El Sayed Selim (ed. ), Abdel Monem Al-Mashet, Mounir Badawi Al-Sayed 
& Ola A. Abou Zeid, The Organization the Islamic Conference in A Changing World, 78-82. 
1032 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 78-81, `Abdullah al Ahsan, 
"Organization of Islamic Conference", 5-6. 
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support to Iraq, and less to Iran, was owing to the vast influence of Sunni-Muslim 
countries in the organization compared to Shi'ah which was only practised by a small 
group of Muslim countries, with the exception of Iran, Bahrain, and Iraq. 1033 
Meanwhile, for the issue of Muslim minorities, the OIC faces intricacy with the 
concept of bilateralism, and its institutional relations with other smaller states' 
organizations, primarily the Non-Aligned Movement. This can be referred to the issue of 
Kashmir which involves the tussle between Pakistan and India. As is well-known, India 
and Pakistan have been rivals since early post-World War II. Their conflicts are rooted in 
geographical boundaries, the threat of nuclear war, and the issue of Kashmir. Principally, 
in solving the issue of Kashmir the OIC is trapped between considering Pakistan as one 
of its members and at the same time respecting the sovereignty of the Indian government, 
as well as maintaining its mutual relations with the Non-Aligned Movement, of which 
India is one of most influential countries. This is because any OIC decisions which are 
biased towards Pakistan would jeopardise the members' bilateral relations with India. 1034 
Therefore, in mediating the issue of Kashmir, the OIC initiated two actions. Firstly, it 
condemned the violation of human rights under the U. N Charter and expressed its 
willingness to have a dialogue between Pakistan and India to solve the issue of Kashmir. 
Secondly, in respecting the sovereignty of India, the OIC is only supporting the right of 
1033 Shi'ite-Muslim followers can be found in Iran (89%), Bahrain (70%), Iraq (60%), Kuwait 
(30%), Pakistan (20%), Afghanistan (19%), Libya (3%), and others. CIA-The World Factbook, 
"Guide To Country Profiles", 
(http"//www cia ov/cia/publications. factbook/docs/profileQuide. htnil), ReligionFacts. com, 
"Islam by Country", (http"//www religionfacts com/islani/places/countries. htin). 
1034 Recently, India in a letter dated 151 November, 1994, circulated to all OIC members in New 
York made it clear that supporting the Pakistan resolution on Kashmir would undermine the 
principle of bilateralism and would only encourage terrorism in the state. Darshan Singh, "India 
and the OIC", India Quarterly L (4), 1994,26. 
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self-determination to the people of Kashmir, but with no reference given, or linked, to the 
sovereignty of the Indian government. This is unlike the case of Mindanao for which the 
OIC claimed self-autonomy under the sovereignty of the government of Philippines. 1035 
Needless to say, the OIC is in favour of mediating the issue of Kashmir within a peaceful 
international framework, and emphasizes providing humanitarian assistance to the 
Kashmiri people. 1036 Nonetheless, the `lenient' approach of the OIC towards the issue of 
Kashmir dissatisfied Muslim communities and in the opinion of `Abdullah al Ahsan, 
compared to the credibility of the UN which had successfully resolved some Muslim 
conflicts (like the Iran-Iraq War, and others), the OIC never seriously questioned the 
affairs of Muslim minorities in Kashmir or in other Muslim minority areas, except for 
giving too much emphasis to Muslims in Mindanao, the Philippines. 1037 In spite of the 
setbacks and limitations of the OIC, the varied Islamic background specifically between 
Sunni-Shi'ite which to some extent portrays the lack of Pan-Islam unity (for example, 
refer to the Iran-Iraq War), and the different form of governments among its members, 
the organization, however, will be always become the main channel for all Muslim 
communities to analyze Islamic issues and conflicts as well as to take any necessary 
action in order to improve the standard of their life in the international system. 
7.5.3 Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the OIC 
On the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the OIC, both countries have played 
significant roles in promoting and supporting the vision of the organization among their 
1035 Mohammad El Sayed Selim (ed. ), Abdel Monem Al-Mashet, Mounir Badawi Al-Sayed & Ola 
A. Abou Zeid, The Organization the Islamic Conference in A Changing World, 76. 
1036 Mohammad El Sayed Selim (ed. ), Abdel Monem Al-Mashet, Mounir Badawi Al-Sayed & Ola 
A. Abou Zeid, The Organization the Islamic Conference in A Changing World, 78. 
1037 `Abdullah al Ahsan, "Organization of Islamic Conference", 5-7. 
338 
Muslim counterparts and the world at large. Yet, whether Malaysia's and Saudi Arabia's 
participation in the OIC can safeguard their interests as `Muslim countries' in the modem 
international system, is a complex question to be answered for the OIC itself, as 
discussed before, faces some limitations, specifically in the question of its members' 
sovereignty and their own national interests, which quite often contrast with the 
principles of the OIC, and also it lacks Pan-Islam unity (for instance, the division 
between Sunni-Shiite, and some problems accepting Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia, mainly 
among Muslim communities in the non-Arab Muslim world including Malaysia 1038). 
What is more obvious, however, even though the initial establishment of the OIC 
emphasizes the concept of Ummah (which is different to the notion of nation-state and 
state sovereignty), is that its members are composed of a number of states (irrespective of 
what kind of governments they are) or `Muslim countries', have communally (although 
not all members) been absorbed into one of the basic features of the modem international 
system, namely the `state system'. As Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are among the states 
(that could be classified as moderate Muslim countries) in the modem international 
system, they have in fact already been safeguarded by jointly integrating with other 
states, especially with those influential states which they believe might provide the basic 
needs (for instance, in security affairs, Malaysia signed a military agreement with Britain 
through the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), 1039 while the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia had close military operations with the US, especially in Dhahran, Saudi 
Arabia1040) in the system that they have lived in even before the formation of the OIC. 1041 
1038 For further elaboration on Wahhabism, see Chapter VI. 
'039 See note 883 in the Chapter VII. 
10'0 See note 884 in the Chapter VII. 
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By becoming members of the OIC, rather than to preserve both countries' 
interests in the modem international system, they are rather consolidating their image in 
the Muslim world where, through the intimate co-operation with other Muslim countries 
within the OIC and constantly supporting several Muslim issues, the survival of Malaysia 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be prolonged into the future. Besides that, 
equipped with better economic conditions compared to other Muslim countries like 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Mali and other Muslim countries which can be 
categorized as `least developed', 1042 Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia are instead, playing the 
role as the members that are prominently `looking after' the organization by financially 
adhering to contributing annually to the OIC budget. 
1043 Moreover, more importantly, the 
membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the OIC, can be closely linked to the 
Islamic challenges that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are facing, both at the domestic level 
and the regional level, especially for the Kingdom which is not only concerned with the 
Hashemite descendants at home, but also among its Arab neighbours including the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and Morocco as well as with other Arab countries like 
1041 As had been argued by Hasan Moinuddin, the acceptance of international law by Islamic state 
(or Muslim countries) depends wholly and solely upon them. See Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter 
of The Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic Co-operation Among Its Member 
States (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1987), 54. 
iO42 Malaysia is classified as `middle-income country', while Saudi Arabia as 'oil-rich producing 
country'. See Kabir Hassan, "Regional Economic Blocs Among OIC Countries and the Prospect 
of Islamic Common Market", The Middle East Business and Economic Review 15 (1) July 2003, 
60 (52-87). 
1043 According to Mr. Sazali Mustafa Kama], Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are the most consistent 
members in contributing some financial assistance to the OIC. Both countries contribute 
approximately 30 per cent of the OIC's total budget, with 8 per cent from Malaysia, and 22 per 
cent from Saudi Arabia. Interview with Mr. Sazali Mustafa Kamal, Assistant Secretary, 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 10.00-11.00am, Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
Wisma Putra, Putrajaya, Malaysia, April 8,2003. See also 'Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization 
of the Islamic Conference, 20. 
340 
Iran, Egypt, and Libya which are also vying for the Islamic leadership. 1044 For the 
Malaysian government (led by UMNO, as one of political parties of Barisan Nasional or 
`National Coalition' that formed the government), its affiliation with the OIC could be 
more relevant to cope with local Islamic challenges which undoubtedly come from its 
traditional long-time rival, the Islamic Party or Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), and the 
growing Islamic resurgence propagated by a few Islamic Dakwah groups in Malaysia 
since the 1970s. 1045 
7.5.4 Malaysia's Relations with Saudi Arabia in the OIC 
It is undeniable that the affiliation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the OIC since the 
early 1970s has opened up more opportunities for both countries to interact beyond the 
issues of pilgrimage and education which commonly illustrated relations between these 
two countries during the 1950s and 1960s. '°46 Malaysia's preliminary interaction with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the OIC possibly began with the appointment of Tunku 
Abdul Rahman (the first former Malaysian Prime Minister) as the first General Secretary 
of the OIC and who received strong support from King Feisal of Saudi Arabia in the 
period of his visit to Malaysia in 1970. In the same years that he was appointed as the 
OIC Secretary Tunku relinquished his post as the Malaysian Premier, and the Malaysian 
government, especially under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, took advantage of the 
1044 Saudi-Hashemite rivalry can be seen back into the history of the establishment of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the contest of Islamic leadership between Saudi Arabia, and other 
influential Arab-Muslim states like Egypt (particularly during the era of Jamal Abdel Nasser), 
Iran (Khomeini's revolution), and others. 
'045 For the challenge of Islamic Party, and Islamic Dakwah Groups to the Malaysian government 
see notes 288,297 & 319 in the Chapter IV (Islamic Party), and see pages 232-234 in the Chapter 
VI (Islamic Dakwah Group). 
'046 Discussion on Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, and 1960s, see pages 83- 
86 in the Chapter IV. 
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personal relations formed between Tunku Abdul Rahman, and King Feisal, by starting to 
gain financial aid from the Kingdom to fund several developmental projects in 
Malaysia. 1047 Under the reign of the late Tun Hussein and Dr. Mahathir (but only in the 
early 1980s), the Malaysian government continued to receive more financial aid from 
Saudi Arabia. 1048 Even though it could be said that the flow of Saudi aid to Malaysia was 
the outcome of the formal visits by the Malaysian leaders, in some ways the affiliation of 
both countries, as they were among the co-founders, in the OIC had paved the way for 
Malaysia to receive the Saudi aid in developing its economic infrastructure. 1049 
Besides that, through the OIC, Malaysia also received some financial assistance 
from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) to finance economic programs as well as to 
build some academic institutions. The establishment of the IDB, which is the major 
affiliated financial organ of the OIC, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1975 was initially 
proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman to King Feisal to help in uniting the economies of the 
OIC members. 1050 Both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia were among the first contributors of 
IDB accounts. Malaysia's contribution to the IDB was roughly around US$40 million (or 
1047 See pages 87-89 in the Chapter IV. 
1048 See pages 91-96 in the Chapter IV. 
1049 According to Anuar Kasman, Malaysia was among the first Muslim country to receive project 
financing from the Saudi Fund for Development (SDF). Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy 
Mission, "Brief Statement", Embassy of Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1996,4. 
1050 At the beginning of the establishment of the 1DB, most of the Arab countries were less 
supportive of Tunku's idea. However, when Tunku toured a number of Arab countries in 1974, 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Libya, most of them believed 
that the IDB could help Muslim countries to gain more capital for their economic development. 
Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC)", 102-103, "Islamic Bank : Tunku Off to Brief Arabs", Malay Mail, March 6,1974. For 
further details on 1DB see for instance, S. A. Meenai, The Islamic Development Bank :A Case 
Study of Islamic Co-operation", (New York : Kegan Paul International, 1989), 1-22, 'Abdullah al 
Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 37-38. 
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RM120 million), 1051 whereas the Kingdom is among the biggest contributors to the bank, 
approximately representing 25.5 per cent or US$536,4440,000 million of the total IDB 
accounts. 1052 Amid good and steady relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as one 
of the largest contributors to the IDB, and the significant role played by Tunku in 
bringing about the idea of the bank, Malaysia received a lot of financial assistance from 
the bank. 1053 The first financial assistance amounted to RM50 million dollars (in loan) 
given by the IDB to Malaysia was in 1977 for Permodalan Nasional Bhd. (a financial 
institution in Malaysia), and this was followed by Pahang Cement Company which 
received RM17 million ringgit (in equity terms) in 1978.1054 Between 1984-1985, the 
IDB distributed its financial assistance (two equities, and eight loans) to 10 Malaysian 
projects. These included the Palpa dan Paper Factory (US$130.2 million), Cold Rolling 
Factory (US$88.1 million), Mini Hydroelectric Area I (US$11 million), Electricity for 
urban people (US$23.5 million), the construction of Lumut Port (US$63.4 million), the 
highway of Seremban-Air Hitam Fasa 11, III dan IV (US$92.7 million), the building of 
eight religious schools (US$5 million), the Islamic Academy, University of Malaya 
"" Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)", 107. 
.... In another study, Saudi's contribution to the IDB is about 27.33 per cent (the largest donor), 
followed by Libya (10.96 per cent), and Iran (9.59 per cent). See Simon Henderson, 
"Institutionalized Islam : Saudi Arabia's Islamic Policies and the Threat They Pose", Senate 
Judiciary Committee United States Senate, September 10,2003, 
(http: //kvl senate ov/leis center/subdocs/091903 henderson. pdt), see also note 451 in the 
Chapter V. 
1053 Yet, it did not necessarily mean that Malaysia was the only Muslim country receiving the 
financial assistance as Cameroon, and Jordan were among the first beneficiaries of the IDB's 
financial assistance. Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC)", 104. 
"" Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)", 108. 
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(US$10.4 million), Islamic Complex (US$3.2 million), and Petrajaya Art Centre (US$1 
million). 1055 
Heading towards the 1990s, however, after Malaysia experienced rapid economic 
growth, it no longer qualified to receive 100 per cent financial assistance from the IDB, 
instead the bank would only distribute about 30 per cent for financial loans, and 70 per 
cent for the purchase of equipment (in instalment scheme1056) in any project 
developments in Malaysia. 1057 Despite this, at the end of the 1990s, Malaysia was able to 
get financial assistance amounting to RM1,198,056.10 million from the IDB to build the 
International Islamic University, 1058 and US$20.16 million for the construction of the 
University of Malaysia Sabah (UMS). 1059 Frankly to say, the total amount of IDB 
financial assistance from 1977 up to the end of the 1990s to Malaysia was approximately 
about US$512 million dollars. 1060 The tendency of Malaysia to gain financial assistance 
from the 11313 is probably due to the preconditions of the bank which does not charge any 
interest for the loan given and the borrowers (the OIC members) are only pay one per 
loss Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)", 109-110. 
lose The form of instalment scheme is similar to leasing but involved the immediate transfer of 
ownership of assets to the borrower. Economic Planning Unit, "Chapter 22 : Development 
Through International Cooperation", Rancangan Malaysia Kelapan. 2001-2005, 
(http: //www. epti. ipm. my/new%/20folder/RM8/c22 cont. pdt), 598. 
1057 Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)", 112-113. 
loss Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Mission, "Brief Statement", Embassy of Malaysia in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1996,23. 
lose Khadijah Md. Khalid, "Malaysia's Growing Economic Relations with the Muslim World", 5, 
"1DB Hopes for Faster OIC Revamp", Utusan Malaysia, October 30,2004, 
(http: //utusan com my/utusan/archive asp'w=2004&dt=1030&pub=uttisan express&sec=fi"ont`: ö5 
Fpage&pg fp 05. htni&arc=hive). 
1060 Khadijah Md. Khalid, "Malaysia's Growing Economic Relations with the Muslim World", 5. 
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cent for the service fee. ' 061 Yet the overall picture of the TDB's financial assistance to 
Malaysian economic development is still smaller in comparison to the contributions from 
other major financial institutions like Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
the World Bank, UN Organizations, or to several developed countries such as the US and 
Europe. This could be referred to, for example 1987, where Japan (through the ODA) 
alone contributed about 30 per cent (RM230.8 million) of Malaysia's total sources of 
foreign equity in approved projects, followed by Singapore (18.1 per cent), Taiwan (15.8 
per cent), the US (8.2 per cent), while others (including the IDB's contribution106) was 
only about 9.1 per cent or RM68.3 per cent. 1063 Moreover, from 1996-2000, for 
Malaysia's technical assistance, the IDB had only contributed USS0.20 million (and then 
only in 1999), whereas Japan, as the largest donor, gave away on average from US$55 
million (1996) to US$60 million (2000), followed by other developed countries and a 
number of international financial agencies. 1064 The limited financial contribution of the 
1DB in Malaysia's economy may be associated with its resources which are not quite 
large enough (that was about RM5,971 million in 1980s, 1065 and it rises to nearly US$7 
billion towards the end of the 1990s1066) to finance all the projects that were undertaken 
by members of the OIC, including Malaysia. Nevertheless, the poorest members which 
1061 "Islamic Bank : Tunku Off to Brief Arabs", Malay Mail, March 6,1974. 
1062 In 1986 and 1987, the 1DB had given US$15 million, and US$40 million to Malaysia 
respectively, but since most of the fund was used to purchase imported materials for 
developmental projects, the government could only spend about US$3.135 million (1986), and 
US$8.487 million (1987) on the projects that had been approved by both sides. Gomathi A/P 
Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)", 110. 
1063 Mohamed An ff, The Malaysian Economy, 112, see Table 4.6, and also for further elaboration 
see Table 4.7, and Table 4.8 (pages 112-113) in this book. 
1064 For further details see Economic Planning Unit, "Chapter 22 : Development Through 
International Cooperation", Table 22.1 in page 592. 
'065 Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)", 107. 
1066 Islamic Development bank, "IDB Annual Budget", 2004 
(http: //www. isdb. or. R/'29annLialreport/ChapterO, -o2O7. pdf). 
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are identified as `least developed' receive more emphasis. Added to this are the other 
financial commitments of Arab oil producing countries as the main IDB donors, 
especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in several international financial institutions like 
the OPEC Fund, the International Monetary Fund, the International Fund for Agriculture, 
the African Development Fund, and others. 1067 
Even though, Malaysia's affiliation in the OIC has, to some extent, brought it 
closer to Saudi Arabia, mostly in the form of receiving financial aid from the Kingdom, 
in terms of economic relations, as discussed in Chapter V, Malaysia in particular is less 
encouraging (except at the end of the 1990s), and it has to face some stringent policies of 
the Saudi government which indirectly lead to the former having some difficulties in 
penetrating the latter's markets. 1068 In fact, it is not only the economic relations between 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia that are discouraging, but the overall economic co-operation 
among all OIC members is also not growing rapidly. The OIC has been active in 
promoting the strengthening of the level of the economic co-operation among its 
members since the Second Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore, Pakistan in February 
1067 See note 451 in the Chapter V. 
1068 The researcher, while visiting the Embassy of Malaysia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2004, had 
asked questions of Mr. Anuar Kasman regarding a few of Saudi Arabia's stringent policies which 
caused difficulties for Malaysian goods to enter the Kingdom's markets. According to Mr. Anuar, 
while he admitted the tough regulations imposed by the Kingdom, however, it was the main 
responsibility for the Malaysian companies to convince the Saudi government of the quality of 
their products, and he said again that Malaysia's economic officials must visit regularly, and 
explain to the Kingdom how Malaysia assessed the quality of its products before marketing them 
overseas. Discussion with Mr. Anuar Kasman, Counsellor, Deputy Mission in the Embassy of 
Malaysia, Riyadh, August 28,2004,3.30-4.30pm, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. For a few Saudi's 
stringent policies, see pages 158-159 in the Chapter V. 
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1974.1069 Various efforts were also taken to integrate the economic solidarity of the OIC, 
such as formulating a `General Agreement for Economic, Technical and Commercial 
Cooperation' in 1975, preparing for a `Plan of Action for Economic Cooperation Among 
Islamic Countries', in 1981, the discussion on `Industrial and Technical Cooperation 
Among Islamic Countries' in 1982, the current proposal of the Islamic Common Market 
(which was previously proposed by Bangladesh in 1981), and others. 
1070 However from 
the early 1990s and onwards, as an example, the economic cooperation between members 
remained low (perhaps with the exception of Iraq which was undergoing international 
economic sanctions) compared with their trading activities with non-OIC members, 
especially developed countries (See Table 3 and Table 4 for further explanation). Among 
the major reasons behind this is their high dependency on a single commodity (like oil 
petroleum for the most of Arab oil producing countries) to exchange for manufacturing 
merchandise which is normally produced by industrially-developed countries, 
1071 too 
much emphasis given to their own regional economic groupings like the Gulf Co- 
operation Council (GCC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Council of Arab 
Economic Unity (CAEU), the ASEAN, and others, 1072 and also due to the lack of 
political will of the OIC members in responding to some economic issues or proposals to 
1069 OIC, Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries 
(SESRTCIC), "Official Action for Expanded Economic Cooperation : 1969-1983", Journal of 
Economic Cooperation Among Islamic Countries 2 (18), January 1984,10-21. 
1010 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 83-102. 
10'1 `Abdullah at Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 92, Kabir Hassan, 
"Regional Economic Blocs Among OIC Countries and the Prospect of Islamic Common Market", 
64. 
1012 Kabir Hassan, "Regional Economic Blocs Among OIC Countries and the Prospect of Islamic 
Common Market" 54-57. 
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develop their own economic co-operation. 1073 Besides that, the less encouraging 
economic relations among OIC members indirectly indicate the non-international co- 
operation of Muslim countries in the international economic system, and at the same time 
also shows that in the secular system, Muslim countries are paying less attention to 
assisting their Muslim counterparts, in the scope of trade relations, as urged by the 
Islamic principles; instead they are putting much emphasis on the modernization and 
industrialization which mostly possessed by non-Muslim countries (developed countries). 
Table 3. International Trade Among OIC and non-OIC Countries, 1992-1996 
(Selected Countries)* 
OIC Exports From Islamic Countries USSMillion 
Members To Is lamic Countries To Non-Islamic Countri es 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Algeria 329 288 248 641 916 10,808 9,810 8,343 10,190 11,982 
Bahrain 347 411 543 522 621 6,987 8,430 9,390 11,691 13,608 
Egypt 568 758 624 608 809 2,482 4,368 2,851 2,833 4,430 
Indonesia 2,216 2,547 1,809 2,698 2,895 31,761 34,296 36,405 41,306 45,164 
Iran 1,619 2,162 1,159 1,193 1,332 18,249 15,858 15,439 18,008 20,530 
Iraq 396 403 379 411 13 213 68 3 13 2 
Jordan 602 526 585 756 615 391 472 560 718 886 
Kuwait 352 595 842 1,049 942 4,133 8,386 8,587 10,307 9,904 
Libya 791 409 711 933 1,131 9,143 7,131 7,079 7,532 8,902 
Malaysia 2,352 2,713 3,457 4,281 4,543 38,357 44,415 55,291 69,441 73,703 
Pakistan 1,397 1,234 1,126 1,481 1,532 5,872 5,467 6,206 6,510 7,767 
S. Arabia 6,686 6,755 6,442 7,145 7,947 43,601 35,603 36,142 44,321 49,353 
Turkey 2,656 2,965 2,968 2,855 3,673 11,950 12,384 15,187 18,441 17,723 
UAE 3,426 3,240 3,460 3,544 3,729 18,939 18,006 18,271 20,925 24,375 
*Source : Kabir Hassan, "Regional Economic Blocs Among OIC Countries and the Prospects ot 
Islamic Common Market", The Middle East Business and Economic Review 15 (1) July 2003, 
68-69. 
107 The lack of political will among the OIC members could be related, for example, with the 
attempt of the organization to hold a meeting on the `Food Problem in Islamic Countries and 
Proposals for Future Action' parallel with the OIC Resolution in 1978. Unfortunately, because of 
the lack of responses, the meeting on the matter was delayed several times, and even the place of 
meeting changed from Egypt to Mali. `Abdullah al Ahsan, "Organization of Islamic Conference", 
9-10. 
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Table 4. International Trade Among OIC and non-OIC Countries, 1992-1996 
(Selected Countries)* 
OIC Imports To Islamic Countries USSMillion 
Members From Islamic Countries From Non-Islami c Countries 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Algeria 458 565 915 780 705 8,190 8,196 8,655 9,346 7,810 
Bahrain 1,954 1,675 1,749 1,957 2,110 2,580 2,580 2,439 2,123 2,341 
Egypt 609 884 660 1,256 1,302 7,684 13,658 8,933 10,483 18,211 
Indonesia 1,867 1,685 1,530 2,001 2,937 25,416 26,648 28,857 38,235 40,008 
Iran 2,406 2,153 2,114 2,287 2,196 20,700 14,497 9,471 9,843 11,588 
Iraq 315 329 343 422 133 288 204 155 194 94 
Jordan 893 920 985 1,150 844 2,364 2,621 2,423 2,540 3,197 
Kuwait 301 760 1,249 306 267 6,981 6,152 5,477 6,799 7,411 
Libya 890 818 689 839 881 4,275 4,556 3,464 4,011 4,256 
Malaysia 1,108 1,299 1,592 1,944 1,312 38,819 44,317 57,963 75,718 76,485 
Pakistan 2,099 2,430 2,741 3,531 3,793 7,276 7,062 6,143 7,929 8,357 
S. Arabia 2,521 2,826 2,536 2,936 3,283 30,752 25,376 20,808 24,513 33,146 
Turkey 3,333 2,697 3,428 4,324 4,805 21,047 26,658 19,850 31,442 36,791 
UAE 2,045 2,484 2,607 3,262 3,777 15,369 17,036 18,417 23,945 25,311 
*Source : Kabir Hassan, "Regional Economic Blocs Among OIC Countries and the Prospects of 
Islamic Common Market", The Middle East Business and Economic Review 15 (1) July 2003, 
66-67. 
In political affairs Malaysia, along with Saudi Arabia, is among the forerunners of 
the OIC members to promote Muslim issues like the Palestinian people, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, Muslim minorities, the Gulf War, and others. 
Also both countries are regular attendants of the OIC conferences to discuss several 
issues related with other Muslim countries. 1074 In dealing with various Muslim issues and 
conflicts, however, Malaysia is seen as a bit more `careful' in responding to some 
particular issues that have overlapping impact over other OIC members, especially 
1074 For the attendance of the OIC members, particularly Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, in the 
Islamic Summit Conferences see for instance, OIC, "First Islamic Summit Conference, Rabat, 
September 1969", (http: //www. oic-oci. or(-Y/english/fm/All%2ODownload/frm. Ol. hlm), OIC, "2"d 
Islamic Summit, Lahore, Pakistan, February 1974", (http: //www. oic-oci. ori! VcnR]ish/is/2/2n(I-is- 
sum. htm), OIC, "Third Islamic Summit Conference, Mecca, Saudi Arabia, January 1981", 
(http: //www. oic oci. or-, /), OIC, "The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, Morocco, 
January 1984", (http: //www. oic-oci. org/english/is/d/4th-is-sum. htm), OlC, "The Fifth Islamic 
Summit Conference, Kuwait, January 1987", (ht! p: //www. oie-oci. oriz/ i- ish/is/i/äth-is- 
sum. htm), OIC, "The Sixth Islamic Summit Conference, Dakar, Senegal, December 1991", 
(http: /Iwww. oic-oci. ori/engl i sh/is/6/6th-is-sum. htm). 
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among inter-Arab or Arab-Iranian rivalries. Probably, in the issue of Palestine, Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia, have a common stance by jointly promoting the welfare of the 
Palestinian people at the international level. Malaysia, for instance, constantly promotes 
the statehood of the Palestinian people, annually celebrates the `Palestine Solidarity Day' 
for every 21st of August (the day after the burning of al-Aqsa mosque), established a PLO 
office in Kuala Lumpur in 1974, proposed (by Tunku Abdul Rahman) to the OIC to send 
a team to Jerusalem to examine al-Aqsa Mosque in 1973 (but this was turned down by 
the Israeli government), 1075 and in 1989 Malaysia upgraded the PLO status in Malaysia to 
the embassy level. 1076 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia not only gives moral support to 
Palestine but also frequently distributes financial aid to the Palestinian people through Al- 
Quds Fund, to which the Kingdom donated, between 1978-1985, about SR37,000,000 
. 
1077 The deep interest of Saudi Arabia in the affairs of Palestine might be vital as early as 
during the establishment of the Kingdom, in order to revive its image after overthrowing 
the Hashemite family. 1078 In some ways, it also could be considered that the issue of 
Palestine had made the relations between these two countries closer in the OIC itself. 
This was also different from the issue of the Muslim minorities, specifically the Muslim 
1075 OIC, "Brief on the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers", Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 12- 
15 July, 1975, the Embassy of Malaysia, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (IS/CM/34[ 1)), 4& 16. 
1076 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 207. 
1077 OIC, "Explanatory Note on the Palestinian Issue and Arab Israeli Conflict", The 181" Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers, 13-16 March, 1989, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (ICFM/18- 
89? PIL/D. 2). 
1078 In a telegram (Decypher, Sir R. Bullard, Jeddah, 24th March, 1937) from Ibn Saud to the 
British government, prior to the Balfour Declaration, the King emphasised how important the 
issue of Palestine was for his government when he had said : "As a Moslem and an Arab his 
sympathies naturally lay with the Arabs of Palestine. He had suppressed these feelings hitherto 
out of friendship for His Majesty's Government and he could always suppress his feelings in the 
interests of policy. But His Majesty's Government must remember that he stood alone, and that 
he had to think of his position in a world where many of his co-religionists would not even admit 
that he was a Moslem". "Palestine Royal Commission, Proposals of the King of Saudi Arabia", 
British Public Record Office, UK (CO 733/347/1). 
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communities in Mindanao, southern Philippines, where Malaysia in the capacity of its 
status as one of the ASEAN members, and the Committee of Four, comprised of Saudi 
Arabia, Libya, Senegal, and Somalia, had frequently negotiated (mostly based on the 
Tripoli Agreement in 19761079) for a settlement between the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) and the Philippine government. This eventually came into reality under 
President Fidel V. Ramos's reign, with the help of Indonesia as the mediator, when both 
parties agreed to sign the ceasefire agreement in Jakarta in 1996. The agreement also 
showed the election of Nur Misuari (the Chairman of the MNLF) as the governor of the 
four province autonomous region of Muslims in Mindanao, Philippines. ' 080 
Besides that, in the case of Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan, Malaysia supported 
the struggle of the Mujahideen Afghanistan, although prior to the actual invasion by the 
Russian troops in December 1979, it practised a non-interference policy towards the 
conflict. 1081 Malaysia's approach towards the Mujahideen was similar to the PLO, as the 
former was also allowed to establish its office in Kuala Lumpur and, in 1985, the Afghan 
Refugees Humanitarian Aid Fund was set up to provide non-military assistance to the 
Mujahideen. Moreover, following the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union in 1989, 
Malaysia continued its recognition of the Mujahideen guerrillas as the interim 
1079 The Tripoli Agreement was signed by the representative of the Philippine government, the 
Chairman of the MNLF, the Libyan Foreign Minister, and the OIC Secretary-General. The 
agreement provided for the autonomy of Muslims in the Southern Philippines. Ralph H. Salmi, 
Cesar Adib Majul & George K. Tanham, Islam and Conflict Resolution : Theories and Practices 
(Lanham, Maryland : University Press of America, Inc., 1998), 161-162. 
loco K. N. Nadarajah, Tengku Ahmad Ritahuddeen : His Story (Selangor, Malaysia : Pelanduk 
Publications Sdn. Bhd., 2000), 69-71 (Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen is a former Foreign Minister 
of Malaysia). 
1081 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 208. 
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government-in-exile of Afghanistan, 1082 and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia too acted in 
the same way as Malaysia did by giving its undivided support to the interim government 
of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. 1083 The recognition from both Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia towards the Mujahideen of Afghanistan could be linked to Malaysia's anti- 
communist policy towards the former Soviet Union since the era of its independence 
(without denying, too, cooling off the local religious pressure) while the Kingdom, as 
commonly known, had been involved in Afghanistan since the 1980s, firmly supporting 
anti-Soviet forces, namely the Mujahideen guerrillas, against the Soviet invasion. 1084 Yet, 
the support of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to the Mujahideen Afghanistan could be 
described as `individual recognition' from both countries and not an extension of the 
OIC's declaration. For in general, the OIC supported neither the Kabul regime nor the 
Mujahideens. The OIC did not support the former as it was an illegal government directly 
supported by the former Soviet Union, while the latter could not be considered as the 
representative of the Afghan people. The OIC's indecisiveness towards the Afghanistan 
issue was largely owing to the closeness of a few members of the organization with the 
former Communist power. 1085 
In some cases, where there were seemingly apparent differences among the OIC 
members, mainly between Arab countries, or Arab-Iranian disagreements, Malaysia 
usually opted to be neutral (or as was mentioned before, it tried to be more `careful' in 
dealing with the issues or conflicts). This can be seen, for instance, in the event of the 
1082 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 208-209. 
1083 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 209. 
l084 Simon Henderson, "Institutionalized Islam : Saudi Arabia's Islamic Policies and the Threat 
They Pose", 6. 
1085 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 64-65. 
352 
Iran-Iraq War where there was a tendency for a few members of the OIC like Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt which noticeably sided with Iraq, while others 
including Syria, and Libya were in favour of Iran; 1086 Malaysia, on the other hand, 
attempted to portray its neutrality towards the war, 1087 and at the same time the Malaysian 
government along with other OIC members, such as Bangladesh, Guinea, Pakistan, PLO, 
Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkey which were appointed as the Islamic Peace Committee 
(IPC), initiated some efforts to find a solution for the two warring countries. However, 
because both Iran and Iraq were less co-operative in supporting the OIC's proposal, and 
added with Iran's high suspicions of the members of the organization, which it believed 
were more pro-Iraqi government, the efforts of Malaysia and other IPC committees were 
not fruitful in bringing the war to the end. 1088 Instead, it was the initiative of the United 
Nations that was capable of ending the war and led both Iran and Iraq to the negotiating 
table. 1089 Despite Malaysia's neutrality to the Iran-Iraq War which, to some extent, was 
different to the position of the Saudi government as the relations between the Kingdom 
and Iran had already soured since the Khomeini revolution in 1979,1090 Malaysia's stance 
on the war did not affect its mutual relations with Saudi Arabia. This is largely because 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia still share the same approach towards Iran's revolutionary 
lost Itamar Rabinovich, "The Impact on the Arab World", in Efraim Karsh (ed. ), The Iran-Iraq 
War : Impact and Implications (Hampshire : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989), 102-105. 
1087 Malaysia's neutrality was agreed by Dr. Mahmud Taghni Bahnki, Iran's representative, 
during his visit to Malaysia in 1981. Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)", 80, and see also Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian 
Foreign Policy, 93. 
1088 K. N. Nadarajah, Tengku Ahmad Ritahuddeen, 54. 
1089 `Abdullah al Ahsan, "Organization of Islamic Conference", 7. 
1090 The relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, however, started to improve since the election 
of a more pragmatic President of Iran, Ali Mohammed Khatami on August 3,1997. Anthony II. 
Cordesman, "Saudi Arabia and Iran", Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, 
Washington D. C., (http: //www. csis. org/burke/saudi2Ifsaudi iran. pdf). 
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government, where both countries believed, particularly for Malaysia, that the impact of 
the Iranian revolution could generate instability in their local Islamic movements. 1091 
Furthermore, Malaysia also had a different attitude towards the Egypt-Israel peace 
deal at Camp David in 1978.1092 At the onset, the Malaysian government considered 
Egypt's action did not deviate from unified Arab stand on the Palestinian struggle, 
particularly on the returning of all occupied Arab land taken since 1967, including Baitul 
Muqaddis, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and the recognition of 
the rights of the Palestinian people. Malaysia too chose to be impartial on the Arab- 
Muslims' protests (including Saudi Arabia) against Egypt's peace treaty, for it 
endeavoured to refrain itself from any involvement in inter-Arab disputes. 1093 Yet, during 
the 10th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Maghribi in 1982, Malaysia altered 
its position on Egypt's peace treaty with Israel by supporting the OIC Foreign Ministers' 
proposal to suspend the membership of Egypt from the organization. The suspension of 
Egypt from the OIC was because of the view that its action had violated the 
organization's charter which calls for the co-ordination of efforts for the safeguard of the 
Holy Places and supporting the Palestinian people, and also Egypt's conclusion of a 
`separate' peace treaty with Israel that did not give any substantial concessions to the 
Palestinians. '094 For Malaysia, its support of the OIC resolution was, as was indicated by 
1091 In dealing with the Iran-Iraq War, Malaysia, in fact, got frustrated with Iran's continued 
depiction of the war as Jihad (holy war). Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 93. 
1092 G. W. Choudhury, Islam and the Modem Muslim World (London : Scorpion Publishing Ltd., 
1993), 111. 
1093 Anidah Robani, "The Attitude and Role of the Malaysian Government Towards the Palestine 
Issue", 113. 
1094 Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic 
Co-operation Among Its Member States (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1987), 101-102. 
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Malaysia's former Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, for the sake of OIC 
solidarity as well as Arab unity. 1095 From another angle, however, Malaysia was in an 
uncertain position because it was faced with two contrasting circumstances, namely 
facing the protests of the Arab-Muslim countries towards Egypt's peace treaty and, at the 
same time, avoiding interfering Egypt's internal matters. Therefore, in this situation, 
Malaysia had to take a more balanced option, for both sides are significant for the 
development of Malaysia's survival in the international system. For example, Malaysia 
still highly acknowledged Egypt's neutral stance during Indonesia's confrontation against 
the formation of the Federation of Malaysia (although Sukarno of Indonesia was one of 
Jamal Abdel Nasser's close friends), 1096 while other Arab-Muslim countries, mainly 
Saudi Arabia, were not only supporting Malaysia during the confrontation, but were also 
regarded as one of the material sources for the continuation of Malaysia's economic 
developments. 1097 Nevertheless, the re-admission of Egypt into the OIC in 1986, which 
was strongly supported by Malaysia at least, had calmed down the situation, and 
simultaneously its relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Arab-Muslim 
countries continued to be maintained. 1098 
1095 Gomathi A/P Vanathan, "Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)", 23-24. 
1096 Shariff Ahmad (Dato'), Menjunjung Kasih (Kuala Lumpur : Berita Publishing Sdn. Bhd., 
1983), 133. 
1097 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 96. 
1098 Shanti Nair argued that Malaysia's support for the re-admission of Egypt into the OIC was 
partly due to the importance of the moderate members (like Egypt) in the organization, but the 
study believed that Malaysia could be uneasy with the suspension of Egypt from the OIC as it 
was suggested by Syria, one of the Arab countries that did not support Malaysia during the 
confrontation. Interview with Tan Sri Wan Mokhtar, the ambassador of Malaysia in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, 10.00-10.30am, September 1,2004, See also Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian 
Foreign Policy, 93. 
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Malaysia's carefulness in dealing with issues or conflicts where the degree of the 
rivalries between Arab-Muslim countries or Arab-Iranian disputes are extremely tense, 
and which subsequently may disrupt the Islamic solidarity in the OIC, does not 
necessarily mean that Malaysia will be always on the `observing sides' without giving 
any response or critiques, or constantly in the side of the Arab moderate countries, 
particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Instead, in the early operational era of the 
OIC, Tunku Abdul Rahman, as the first secretary, had described some members of the 
OIC as egotistical and indifferent and, referring to the attitude of Afghanistan and Egypt 
in particular, Tunku had said : "..... they are not all serious....... They do not take the 
business of Muslim unity seriously..... They just join because they happen to be 
Muslims". 1099 Moreover, under Dr. Mahathir administration, he had frequently expressed 
its harsh criticism towards the behaviour of some of the OIC members, especially to the 
`habitually'(or traditionally) conflicting parties, that may have led the OIC to be an 
ineffective organization in implementing its decisions, and even Dr. Mahathir had always 
labelled the OIC as a mere "extension of the Arab League". 100 Nevertheless, the 
critiques given by Malaysia did not keep it apart from the members of the OIC, including 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in persistently pursuing Muslim issues in the international 
system. 
7.6 Conclusion 
It could be generally said that the main aspiration of the establishment of small states' 
organizations in the international system is to safeguard the interests of the members of 
10'9 `Abdullah al Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 20. 
100 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian ForeigLi Policy, 94. 
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the organization as well as to express their unhappiness over the running of the world 
political and economic system. Although organizations like NAM, G-77, OPEC, G-15, 
and the OIC are different in terms of the main goal to be achieved, for instance NAM is 
to deal with the superpower rivalries, G-77 towards the North-South economic 
negotiation, and the OIC is to tackle the secular feature of the international system as well 
as the abolition of the Caliphate, they could be considered as the major stage for smaller 
countries to reflect to the challenges of the modem international system. Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia, on some occasions, were among the front runners of smaller countries that 
frequently voiced issues or problems related to the interests of small states' organizations. 
Nevertheless, since Malaysia and Saudi Arabia had been in historical and mutual 
interaction with the major players of the international system, especially the US, United 
Kingdom and their allies, both countries' participation in small states' organizations 
could be largely attributed to the need of gaining wider recognition and forging closer 
economic cooperation with other smaller countries. This is vital because of the challenges 
that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia were facing during their early appearance in the 
international system. For example, the former not merely had to confront Indonesia's 
protest at the formation of the Federation of Malaysia but also had to deal with local 
Islamic pressure, while the latter had been in long dispute with the Hashemite's 
descendants as well as persistently competing with other Arab-Muslim countries for 
leadership in the Islamic world. 
Furthermore, concerned with the membership of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the 
major small states organizations, with the exception of the Organisation of Islamic 
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Conference (OIC), like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Group of 77 (G-77), 
it does not provide the basic orientation for both countries to further strengthen their 
relations. This is because the main concentration of these organizations is more on 
multilateral issues or conflicts rather than in a bilateral context. Most of the issues or 
conflicts discussed among members, for instance in NAM, are beyond the framework of 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. It is only, perhaps, with the exception of certain 
issues or conflicts like the Palestinian people, the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and other Islamic issues that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have to address as 
members of the OIC, and also to face the Islamic pressure at home which indirectly 
brought Malaysia closer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Besides that, the concept of 
non-alignment in NAM is also found less relevant to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia for both 
countries were closer in practical terms, especially in the military-security field, to the 
US-British bloc. Moreover, unlike in the OIC, the membership of Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia in NAM is overshadowed by other very influential countries, mainly Indonesia, 
Egypt, India and the former Yugoslavia, the core founders of NAM. In the Group of 77, 
due to the different economic background (Malaysia's commodities were largely non-oil, 
while Saudi Arabia's, mostly oil), the affiliation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the G- 
77 also contributed less towards economic cooperation, for both countries took diverse 
efforts to stabilize their commodities in the international markets. Even within the G-77 
itself various sub-groups formed to tackle particular issues or economic programmes that 
were based on the commodities that the members of the organization produced. This 
situation, in some ways further discourages t economic solidarity among smaller states in 
the international economic system. In contrast with the OIC, although the foci of Islamic 
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issues are also multilateral and broad, the interaction of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the 
organization is mostly influenced by personal relations, particularly between Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, and King Feisal, who was responsible for the appointment of the former 
as the first Secretary of the OIC during the latter's visit to Malaysia in 1970. As the 
Secretary of the OIC, Tunku had worked closely with King Feisal to address several 
Muslim issues, and at the same time also, the Malaysian government took the advantage 
over the close personal relations to acquire financial assistance from the Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
8.0 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Summary of the Research Procedure 
The study attempts to examine the character of a bilateral relationship between two small 
states that are situated in different regions but have some shared interests and 
commonalities as well as both facing challenges from the external environment or 
systemic pressures in the international system. In analyzing this issue, however, the 
researcher cannot afford to rely upon one single factor over others, for all factors 
(domestic and international or systemic factors) are inter-related. A researcher is neither 
able to explain the foreign policy nor the behaviour of a small state towards other states' 
policies nor any events by merely concentrating, for instance, on idiosyneracies or 
systemic factors. He or she needs to make the analysis by looking into both factors (and 
other domestic factors) in order to get a better understanding of a small state's foreign 
policy or its behaviour in the international political system. 
The existing conceptual frameworks, particularly the three major theoretical 
perspectives of International relations: neo-realist, liberal and structuralism, and the 
Foreign Policy Analysis (with the exception of Comparative Foreign Policy - but it 
largely depends on empirical U. N votes and does not contribute to the theoretical 
insights) are not adequate to explain the behaviour of small states due to their 
overemphasis on one factor over others (see Chapter II). A number of previous studies on 
small states' relations or foreign policies, may to some extent, give a few guidelines in 
identifying the key determining factors by investigating several relevant factors including 
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idiosyncracies, political and economic variables, and systemic factors such as the 
influence of regional (middle state) or hegemonic powers in the international political 
system. Nevertheless, most of these studies give emphasis on one factor over others (with 
a few exceptions- see Chapter II). Hence, for the analysis of the thesis's case study, 
`Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia', the researcher has applied a multi-level 
approach with the incorporation of empirical contextuality (particularly developed by 
Gerd Nonneman). 
Upon the employment of this multi-level approach, the study manages to identify, 
at least four key determining factors that influence the character of Malaysia's relations 
with Saudi Arabia in the international political system. Apart from the discussion on the 
historical or ancient interactions between the two countries which has successfully 
provided some basic foundations for the relations to be developed further (see Chapter 
III), the study, however, has found that the four key determining factors; the nature of 
state and regime interest, economic determinants, religious affiliation, and the 
membership in small states' organizations, do not uniformly indicate that the character of 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia is intimate. Instead, the relations are variable 
according to the four determining factors discussed. For further elaboration on the 
influence of the four key determining factors upon Malaysia's relations with Saudi 
Arabia, the study will highlight the findings of this thesis as indicated below : 
8.1.1 The Nature of State and Regime Interest 
In Chapter IV, the nature of the state is defined as the character of the state itself, and the 
regime interests will be referred to some particular interests that the prevailing system of 
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a government (the regime of a state) is pursuing in order to preserve its political 
continuity both at domestic and international levels, especially in augmenting its relations 
with other states. The role of the nature of state and regime interest is largely based on the 
leadership period of both countries, and in examining it within the context of Malaysia's 
relations with Saudi Arabia, the study has found that more efforts in strengthening the 
relations between the two countries come from the Malaysian government than from the 
Kingdom. This is illustrated by the initiatives of the Malaysian leaders, the late Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Hussein Orin, and Dr. Mahathir who had visited 
Saudi Arabia, specifically to seek financial assistance from the Kingdom. This contrasts 
with the Kingdom's rulers: only King Feisal paid a visit to Malaysia, in 1970. The 
frequent visits of Malaysian leaders to Saudi Arabia indirectly show that the Malaysian 
government needs more help from the Kingdom, especially in the field of financial aid to 
develop its economy, or in fulfilling the Islamic appeal of the Malaysian Muslim 
community in performing religious activities like the pursuing of religious education and 
pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, and not vice-versa. 
Besides that, for the significance of the relations particularly for the Malaysian 
political regime, the Malaysian leaders' efforts to enhance relations with Saudi Arabia, 
the most influential Muslim state in the Islamic world, could be considered as an 
opportunity for them to gain political support among the Muslim community at a 
domestic level as well as to achieve an Islamic reputation in the Muslim world at large. 
For the Saudi government, however, due to the lack of visits by its rulers to Malaysia, 
apart from King Feisal's visit to promote Pan-Islamism prior to the establishment of the 
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OIC, it is difficult for this study to enhance the significance of the relations for the 
Kingdom, except as is discussed in Chapter VI where through its global Islamic capital, it 
can further consolidate its position as the leading Islamic nation both at home and 
international level. 
8.1.2 Economic Determinants 
The second key determining factor, namely the economic determinants, shows that 
although both countries may be categorized as peripheral states or `Muslim states', this 
does not lead them to develop their economic relations more prosperously in the 
international economic system. In some situations Malaysia, in particular, has found 
some difficulties in penetrating Saudi markets owing to its stringent policies on some 
Malaysian products. By concentrating on the three main economic aspects: the 
background economy, the character of economic activities, and the influence of the 
international economic system, the study has found several economic tendencies and 
obstacles that have differently influenced the degree of Malaysia's economic interaction 
with Saudi Arabia. 
In the first aspect, it portrays the historical tendency of both Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia to safeguard their economic relations, or dependency, with their `parent' countries 
whose contributions in providing and developing a basic economic foundation in these 
two countries cannot be denied. Besides that, the demand for achieving industrialization 
status (both countries were agriculturally oriented at the beginning of their economic 
development) has led both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to interact more closely with 
developed countries than to augment their economic relations. For the second aspect, it 
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primarily indicates Malaysia's high dependency upon Saudi oil which has resulted in the 
continuous deficit to its trade volume with the latter. In addition, some of the Kingdom's 
stringent policies upon Malaysia's products, such as medical goods and palm oil, have 
made it more difficult for the Malaysian government to reduce the deficit. Yet, with the 
flow of Saudi financial aid, the late positive investment, and the large influx of Saudi 
tourists at the end of the 1990s to Malaysia has (with the exception of Malaysian 
expatriates, who do not have a large impact upon the Malaysian economy) to some extent 
re-balanced the deficit albeit not totally. The last aspect exhibits the encouraging 
affiliation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, especially with developed countries, in the 
international economic system where both countries, due to their own economic 
capabilities, such as the oil industry for Saudi Arabia and the manufacturing sector as 
well as an open economy to attract foreign investors to Malaysia, helped them to achieve 
some economic growth and, possibly, indirectly pay less attention to the efforts to 
strengthen their economic interactions. 
8.1.3 Religious Affiliation 
Religious affiliation can be considered one of the most important determining factors 
influencing Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia. Since Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
interacted religiously even prior to their emergence as a modern countries, especially 
through commercial activities during the Malacca Sultanate (as discussed in Chapter III), 
both countries realize the significance of the incorporation of religious elements in the 
systems of government in order to preserve and to prolong their political regime survival. 
Nevertheless, in its rather one-sided interaction with Saudi Arabia, Malaysia has to face 
two contrasting issues which the Malaysian political regime needs to conciliate between 
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them. The issues are the Wahhabism ideology, and the Saudi capital donation to 
Malaysia. For the first issue, the Malaysian government acknowledges the strict teaching 
of Wahhabism on the practice of Islam which indirectly leads to its reduced welcome 
among the Malaysian Muslim community in Malaysia. However, in order to safeguard its 
relations with the Kingdom, the Malaysian government has used the wise approach by 
not declaring the Wahhabism ideology as one of the deviant teachings that is spread in 
Malaysia. This wise approach used by Malaysia has enabled it to receive Saudi capital 
donations to be distributed in some of the religious institutions and a few Islamic 
programmes in Malaysia which are vital to contain the Islamic pressures at home. 
Meanwhile, for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its contribution to Malaysia can be 
regarded as part of its global Islamic donation in order to further strengthens its 
reputations as a leading Islamic country. In other words, it could be said that Malaysia's 
religious interaction with Saudi Arabia is significant for both countries (particularly for 
Malaysia) and it also to some extent, displays the `practical calculation', specifically 
through Saudi religious' donations, of these two countries' political regimes in using 
Islam for their own political survival. 
8.1.4 Membership in Smaller States' Organizations vis-h-vis Systemic Pressures 
Since Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are small states where the character of their interactions 
is vulnerable to external pressure, this has brought them to join small states' 
organizations. The relative autonomy that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have in facing 
external challenges for some of the organizations in which they are participating have 
`counter-systemic' reactions like NAM versus bipolar, G-77 - North-South debates, OIC 
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as the reaction towards the secular aspects of the international political system. Thus they 
hope that these organizations will safeguard their interests in the international system. 
With their participation in these small states' organizations, it would be assumed too that 
Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia would be further enhanced by jointly acting with 
other small states to pursue their demands in the international system. In analyzing this 
point of view, the researcher has studied three major small states organizations, namely 
NAM, Group of 77 and OIC. The results vary according to the nature and the necessities 
of the organizations. 
In NAM, the participation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia is not really to safeguard 
their interests against the superpower rivalries for both countries are closer, especially in 
the political and military fields, to the US-British bloc. Their participation could be 
generally considered as a public relations exercise in order to gain broader and wider 
diplomatic recognition from other members of NAM. Furthermore, NAM could not 
provide early basic relations for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as the former only joined 
NAM in 1970,9 years after the establishment of NAM in 1961, while the latter became a 
member in 1961. Prior to Malaysia's membership of NAM, its early relations with the 
Kingdom were mostly instituted by the Malaysian leaders themselves. Meanwhile, the 
role played by Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in NAM was limited and mainly overwhelmed 
by a few influential leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia, Garnal 
Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia. Moreover, since NAM gives 
more focus to multilateral issues, rather than bilateral, among the various members of the 
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organization, this does not offer much scope for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to discuss 
their own bilateral affairs at the international level. 
Although Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are among the core-members of the Group 
of 77, as both participated in the first UNCTAD in 1964 which later led to the formation 
of G-77, their membership does not encourage the level of both countries' economic 
relations. Most of the funds given by the Saudi government were primarily initiated by 
the Malaysian leaders who frequently paid formal visits to the Kingdom, and were not 
due to the affiliation in G-77. The discouraging situation for G-77 in fostering Malaysia's 
closer economic relations with Saudi Arabia is principally related to the different 
economic orientation of both countries in the group. The different economic orientation 
could be largely because of the different commodities produced by Malaysia (mostly 
non-oil) and Saudi Arabia (highly dependent on oil) which drive both countries to take 
diverse approaches, together with other members of G-77 that have similar commodities, 
in order to stabilize the price of their commodities in the international market. Apart from 
this, Malaysia needs the Group of 77 more than Saudi Arabia, which gives much 
attention to OPEC. The Kingdom prefers to act as the capital provider for the poorest 
members of the Group of 77, and on some occasions the Kingdom's and other OPEC 
funds to several members could be regarded as compensation for the high price of oil, to 
maintain the price of its commodities as well as to pursue some economic demands. As a 
consequence the Malaysian government is led to interact more regularly with other 
smaller states that face the same problems and challenges in the international economic 
system. Besides that, on the issue of whether the participation of Malaysia and Saudi 
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Arabia in the Group of 77 could safeguard their interests or not vis-ä-vis the North-South 
context, what is more obvious is that both countries' membership in the Group of 77 
could be considered as a bridge for them (especially Malaysia) to acquire more capital 
from developed countries and to transfer technological expertise in order to continuously 
build their economic development in the future. 
Furthermore, regarding Malaysia and Saudi Arabia's affiliation in the OIC, it is 
quite noticeable that the organization has laid down some basic foundations for Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia to further strengthen their relations at the international level. This could 
be linked to the strong support of King Feisal to the appointment of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, as the first OIC Secretary during the 
King's visit to Malaysia in 1970. Through the support of King Feisal, the relationship 
between Tunku's government and the King's Kingdom had become closer, and indirectly 
resulted in gaining some advantages for Malaysia, for it began to receive some funds 
from the Saudi government to finance its development projects as well as to support 
religious activities in Malaysia. However, owing to the political rivalries between some 
Arab countries or Iranian-Arab disputes (Sunni-Shi'a division) in the OIC, Malaysia had 
to take more `careful' approaches in dealing with some Islamic issues that were 
influenced by these traditional rivalries in order to maintain its relations with the 
members of the OIC, and particularly with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On whether the 
affiliation of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the OIC could uphold their interests in the 
secular international system, the study has found that the OIC is unable to safeguard 
members' interests, including those of both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, particularly in 
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implementing the Shari'a in the secular international system. The failure of the OIC in 
safeguarding members' interests could be attributed to factors which include the secular 
pattern of the international system where all religious elements are eliminated, the 
formation of the OIC which is different to the system of the Islamic Caliphate where the 
former does not have the political authority that the latter had, the tendency of Muslim 
countries to practise the secular elements in their external relations towards other Muslim 
countries and, prior to the formation of the OIC, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia had already 
been safeguarded by jointly integrating with some influential countries which they 
believed were able to provide their basic needs. Therefore, specifically for Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia, their membership in the OIC is more towards the consolidation of both 
countries' Islamic image which is so significant in gaining political and diplomatic 
appreciation both at domestic (Muslim communities) and international level (Muslim 
counterparts). 
In sum up, although both Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have shared similarities as 
small states' entities in the international political system, those similarities do not 
uniformly bring their relations to be more intimate. Instead, the character of their 
relations has been largely influenced by the four key determining factors discussed 
above. 
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